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Abstract 
This thesis examines whether members of the public wish to place greater weight 
on a unit of health gain for end of life patients (i.e. patients with short life 
expectancy) than on that for other types of patients. The research question was 
motivated by a policy introduced in 2009 by the National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence (NICE). The policy indicates that under certain circumstances, life-
extending end of life treatments may be recommended for use in the National 
Health Service even if they would not normally be considered a cost-effective use of 
health care resources. NICE’s policy was justified in part by claims that it reflected 
the preferences of society, but little evidence was available to support the premise 
that society favours such an ‘end of life premium’. This thesis helps to fill the gap in 
the evidence. 
Four empirical studies were undertaken, each using hypothetical choice exercises to 
elicit the stated preferences of the UK general public regarding the value of health 
gains for end of life patients (total n=6,441). A variety of preference elicitation 
techniques, modes of administration and analytical approaches were used. Results 
varied across studies, but overall the evidence is not consistent with an end of life 
premium. Whereas NICE’s end of life policy applies to life-extending treatments, 
there is some evidence that quality of life improvements are more highly valued 
than life extensions for end of life patients. The results of all four studies suggest 
that where a preference for prioritising the treatment of end of life patients does 
exist, this preference may be driven by concerns about how long the patients have 
known about their prognosis rather than how long they have left to live per se. End 
of life-related preferences also appear to be sensitive to framing effects and study 
design choices. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Aims and scope of the research in this thesis 
The primary aim of this thesis is to answer the following research question: 
Do members of the public wish to place greater weight on a unit of 
health gain for end of life patients (i.e. patients with short life 
expectancy) than on that for other types of patients? 
This research question was motivated by a policy introduced in 2009 by the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), an agency that provides 
guidance and advice on the use of health technologies in the National Health 
Service (NHS) in England. The policy effectively gives higher priority to life-
extending end of life treatments than to other types of treatments. This thesis 
seeks to examine the extent to which such a policy is consistent with the 
preferences of the general public. Throughout the thesis, the NICE end of life policy 
is used as the framework for the design of the research. However, the issues 
explored have relevance in all jurisdictions seeking to understand the extent of 
public support for giving priority to patients with short life expectancy. 
Further aims are: 
 to understand what factors motivate any observed preference for placing 
greater weight on a unit of health gain for end of life patients than on that 
for other types of patients; 
 to examine whether the focus on life extensions and absence of quality of 
life improvements in NICE’s end of life policy is consistent with public 
preferences; 
 to assess whether people’s stated preferences regarding the value of 
health gains for end of life patients depend on the ways in which the 
preference elicitation tasks are designed, framed and presented;  
 to contribute to the literature on public preferences regarding the 
prioritisation of health care. 
The scope of the thesis is to present a series of empirical investigations of people’s 
stated preferences regarding the value of health gains for end of life patients. It is 
acknowledged that there are a number of other potential health care priority-
setting criteria and issues that are worthy of investigation. This thesis focuses on 
just one of these issues, deemed to be topical and highly relevant to current health 
care policy, though many of the methods and analyses could be applied to the 
examination of other candidate topics. The scope is also limited to the preferences 
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of the general public. The preferences of other stakeholder groups, such as patients 
and policy makers, are not considered.  
While the thesis reviews and discusses relevant research undertaken in other 
countries, all primary empirical research undertaken focuses on the general public 
in the UK.1 This reflects the focus on NICE (an agency that operates in England) 
and the fact that the author resides, works and studies in England.  
The weighting of health gains for end of life patients is considered within the 
framework of cost-effectiveness analysis, a form of economic evaluation that 
underpins NICE’s methods for the assessment and appraisal of health technologies. 
The remainder of this chapter sets the context for the research in the thesis, 
providing background information about cost-effectiveness, efficiency and equity 
objectives of health care, stated preference research, UK policy developments, and 
the calls for empirical evidence that this thesis has sought to respond to. Brief 
explanations of the basic concepts used regularly in the thesis are provided in 
Appendix 1. 
1.2 Cost-effectiveness analysis 
No health system can afford all health care for everyone, since the resources used 
to provide health care are scarce. Decisions therefore need to be made about how 
to allocate health care resources and how to set priorities. Economic evaluation – 
defined by Drummond et al. (2005, p.9) as “the comparative analysis of alternative 
courses of action in terms of both their costs and consequences” – can be used to 
guide these decisions. It helps answer the question of whether a particular health 
technology, intervention or programme is worth investing in, relative to other 
things that could be done with the same resources. The four main techniques of 
economic evaluation are cost-minimisation analysis, cost-benefit analysis, cost-
effectiveness analysis and cost-utility analysis. Cost-minimisation analysis identifies 
the least costly option for achieving a fixed outcome. Since it is seldom the case in 
practice that competing alternatives generate identical outcomes (Brazier et al., 
2017), cost-minimisation analysis is rarely used and is not considered further in this 
thesis. 
                                           
1 NICE was initially set up as an England and Wales Special Health Authority, but the way it has been 
established in legislation means that its guidance is officially England only. However, the Institute has 
agreements to provide certain services to Northern Ireland, Scotland and (in particular) Wales, and the 
devolved administrations are often involved and consulted with in the development of NICE guidance. In 
Wales, there exists a memorandum of understanding which formally sets out the circumstances in which 
NICE and the All Wales Medicines Strategy Group collaborate in order to provide guidance about 
treatments funded by NHS Wales (All Wales Medicines Strategy Group, 2016). Hence, this thesis refers 
at different points to England, England and Wales, and the UK, as appropriate. 
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Cost-benefit analysis values both the costs and the consequences of the 
intervention under evaluation in monetary terms. It is widely used in many 
settings, particularly in the evaluation of transport and environmental programmes 
(Sugden and Williams, 1979; Mallard and Glaister, 2008; Nas, 2016), and can be 
described as the broadest form of economic evaluation (Drummond et al., 2005). 
But cost-benefit analysis is restricted to including only those consequences that can 
be expressed in terms of money. Well-functioning markets enable goods and 
services to be valued in monetary terms, reflecting consumers’ observed willingness 
to pay and suppliers’ willingness to accept payment for those goods and services. 
Such ‘revealed preferences’ are often unavailable in the health setting due to 
various market failures and other distinctive features, such as information 
asymmetries and heavily subsidised prices for health care at the point of use. In 
the absence of readily available information about revealed preferences, ‘stated 
preferences’ can be sought via contingent valuation (Donaldson et al., 2006), 
whereby individuals are asked how much they would be willing to pay for an 
intervention. However, this too poses challenges as people may not be used to 
paying directly for health care (in publicly financed systems, for example, the costs 
of health care are not borne by the beneficiaries but are distributed across the 
system) or for some of the intangible benefits generated by health care.  
For these reasons, cost-effectiveness analysis – which measures consequences in 
terms of a single natural unit, such as the number of episode-free days – is more 
commonly used to evaluate health care than cost-benefit analysis. This type of 
analysis is suitable when comparing interventions that affect a single shared 
outcome (Weinstein and Stason, 1977). A special type of cost-effectiveness 
analysis – sometimes referred to as cost-utility analysis (Drummond et al., 2005) 
uses the quality-adjusted life year (QALY) as that single outcome.2 The QALY is a 
generic measure of health that combines quality of life and length of life in a single 
index (Weinstein et al., 2009). QALYs are calculated by multiplying the number of 
life years by a numeric quality of life weight. One QALY is equivalent to one year of 
life in full quality of life (often referred to as full health). Quality of life is measured 
on a scale that is anchored at one (representing full health) and zero (representing 
dead). A quality of life weight of less than one implies that the individual in 
question is not in full health, and a weight below zero implies that the individual is 
in a state of health considered to be worse than dead. Preference elicitation 
techniques to obtain quality of life weights for defined health states include time 
trade-off and standard gamble (Green et al., 2000). Underpinning the QALY model 
                                           
2 In this thesis, the term cost-effectiveness analysis is used in favour of cost-utility analysis, in line with 
much of the literature (Brazier et al., 2017).  
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is an assumption that the quality of life weight (or value) for a given health state is 
independent of the duration of that state and when that state occurs (Brazier et al., 
2017).   
The use of the QALY is contentious (Nord et al., 2009, Neumann, 2011), but its 
broad and generic nature allows it to act as a ‘common currency’ for assessing 
health effects both within and across disease areas. It is therefore widely used by 
agencies undertaking health economic evaluations – for example, in England (NICE, 
2013a), Netherlands (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2015) and Australia (Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Advisory Committee, 2016). The results of a cost-effectiveness analysis 
can be expressed in terms of the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of the 
intervention under evaluation – that is, the incremental cost per QALY gained by 
investing in the intervention relative to an appropriate comparator. The ICER of 
that intervention can then be compared to the ICERs of other interventions, or to 
some threshold value that reflects either displaced activities (that is, the 
opportunity cost of investing in the intervention) or societal willingness-to-pay for 
an additional QALY (Towse et al., 2002).  
1.3 Health-maximisation 
Maximising principles, whereby resources are allocated so as to bring about the 
best possible consequences, are central to traditional economic analysis. It is widely 
assumed by health economists that the principal objective of health care is to 
maximise population health, subject to relevant budget constraints (i.e. what health 
care resources are available) (Culyer, 1997a; Dolan et al., 2005). Health-
maximisation is an attractive objective for those who are concerned about 
allocating resources efficiently, rather than with regard to equity or social justice 
(Drummond, 1989). The health-maximisation objective implies a kind of egalitarian 
approach whereby equal social value is attached to each unit of health gain, 
regardless of to whom it accrues or the context in which it is enjoyed. This is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘a QALY is a QALY is a QALY’ principle (Tsuchiya, 
2012).  
While clearly linked to the ethical theory of utilitarianism, health-maximisation 
differs from classical utilitarianism in that the former involves maximising health 
and the latter involves maximising utility (Culyer, 1989). It is grounded in extra-
welfarism – that is, a rejection of the welfarist view that social welfare is simply the 
sum of individual welfare (utility) of members of the community (Sen, 1979; 
Culyer, 1989).  
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Setting priorities using the health-maximisation framework can involve ranking 
activities such that those “that generate more gains to health for every £ of 
resources take priority over those that generate less; thus the general standard of 
health in the community would be correspondingly higher” (Williams, 1985, p.326). 
Gafni and Birch (1993) describe a ‘league table’ approach in which activities are 
ranked in order of their ICERs, and adopting sequentially until the budget is 
exhausted. However, since this approach involves infeasible informational 
requirements, in practice other methods are used to define the threshold for 
determining which activities should and should not be funded. For example, the 
threshold may be based on an estimate of the opportunity costs of displacing 
existing activities at the margin in order to fund a new, cost-increasing activity. In 
that case, the health-maximisation objective dictates that, assuming a fixed 
budget, the new activity should be funded only if its ICER is lower than that of the 
activity that would need to be displaced. 
Regardless of how the threshold is defined, an outcome of the health-maximisation 
approach is that when faced with a choice between two equally costly options, the 
one that is expected to generate greater health gains is the one that will be 
prioritised, irrespective of any other factors.   
1.4 Alternative objectives of health care 
While health-maximisation – an example of an efficiency objective – is an important 
goal in many health care systems, it is unlikely to be the sole goal of either 
decision-makers or society more generally. Many health policy initiatives in the UK, 
for example, have been shown not to have been driven by the pursuit of health 
gains (Shah et al., 2012). It may be legitimate to compromise health-maximisation 
in order to pursue alternative objectives that allow for equity and other 
considerations, such as ‘improving the health of the poorest fastest’ (Department of 
Health, 2003; Department of Health, 2010a).  
Cookson and Dolan (2000) identify maximising principles (maximising aggregate 
health or aggregate utility) as one of three different classes of principles of justice 
in health care rationing decisions; the others being egalitarian principles and need 
principles. The former involves allocating resources so as to reduce inequalities in 
health. Examples include the ‘fair innings’ argument for equalising lifetime health 
(Williams, 1997) and a related argument for equalising people’s opportunities for 
achieving lifetime health (Le Grand, 1991). Need principles involve allocating 
resources in proportion to the degree of need, which can be defined in terms of ill 
health (immediate ill health, lifetime ill health or threat to life) or in terms of 
capacity to benefit from treatment. It has also been argued that the primary 
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objective of the health care system should be to protect the life and health of all 
individuals, and to give all individuals an equal chance of having their own health 
needs met (Harris, 1997). This argument has been criticised by health economists 
for failing to acknowledge the limited availability of resources and for failing to 
distinguish ‘needs’ from ‘mere wants’ (Culyer, 1997b). 
Cookson and Dolan (2000) also note that it is possible to combine principles, either 
by weighting them together or by specifying that a secondary principle is “to come 
into operation only when the primary principle does not yield a definite answer” 
(p.327). People may, for example, advocate health-maximisation up to a certain 
threshold beyond which other principles are considered relevant (Ubel et al., 2000). 
Egalitarian objectives are typically pursued in combination with other objectives, as 
blind pursuit of equality is likely to have unreasonable implications for resource 
allocation.3 
Based on egalitarian and/or need principles, society may place more importance on 
a unit of health for some people than on that for other people. If members of 
society hold preferences as citizens rather than as consumers, motivated by what is 
beneficial for society, then such preferences can be used to form the basis of policy 
(Nussbaum, 1999; Dolan et al., 2003; Tsuchiya, 2012).  
1.5 Weighting health gains to account for equity 
considerations 
It has been suggested that the best way to combine efficiency and equity concerns 
is to use societal preferences to construct equity weights to be attached to QALYs 
(Williams, 1997). Resource allocation decisions could then be based on the 
incremental cost-per-equity-adjusted-QALY gained of competing technologies, with 
the overall objective of maximising equity-weighted QALYs (Culyer, 1989). Nord 
(1999), for example, has proposed a system of weighting which involves applying a 
transformation function in order to give greater weight to gains and losses for those 
who are more severely ill in terms of quality of life.  
However, Wailoo et al. (2009) suggest that even if legitimate, valid and reliable 
weights become available, incorporating these weights into cost-effectiveness 
analysis remains challenging. A supposedly straightforward approach to 
incorporating equity weights involves multiplying the number of incremental QALYs 
generated by a given technology by the relevant equity weight, and comparing the 
                                           
3 For example, imagine a situation is which half of the population is healthy and the other half is 
unhealthy. It seems difficult to justify an egalitarian-driven policy that corrects for this inequality by 
making both groups unhealthy (albeit equally so). 
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resulting cost-per-equity-adjusted-QALY to the standard threshold. A 
mathematically equivalent approach is to use the equity weight to adjust the 
threshold. Assuming the equity weight is greater than one, this effectively 
downgrades the QALYs generated by the activity displaced at the margin. As Wailoo 
et al. point out, this means that the QALY gains for patients affected by the 
displaced activity are being adjusted not according to their own characteristics, but 
according to the characteristics of a different patient group. But the patients who 
bear the opportunity costs may themselves have characteristics that warrant 
special weighting of their health gains – indeed, it cannot safely be assumed that 
they do not share the same characteristics as the patients who are deemed to be 
eligible for equity weighting. Leigh and Granby (2016) suggest that equity weights 
cannot rationally be attached to a technology under evaluation unless it is possible 
to identify and apply the correct weight to the bearers of the opportunity costs of 
funding that technology. 
A further complication is that, given that many different (and often non-mutually 
exclusive) equity-related attributes exist, multiple weights would likely apply to the 
health gains of any given patient group, and these weights may vary over time and 
act in different directions (Tsuchiya, 2012). A methodologically acceptable 
functional form for applying multiple weights would need to be identified. The use 
of weights may also make the resource allocation process more opaque than is 
desirable. Wailoo et al. (2009) warn that while equity weights can facilitate the 
reallocation of health care resources, they do not increase the total amount of 
available resources. Equity weighting is therefore an example of a zero sum game: 
any increases in resources for some patient groups due to unequal weights must be 
balanced by reductions in resources for other patient groups.  
Given the complexity of the various judgements involved, health care decision-
makers often prefer to make recommendations on a case-by-case basis4 via a 
deliberative process (Culyer, 2009) rather than to rely on an algorithmic weighting 
scheme. Most jurisdictions that use cost-effectiveness information to guide priority-
setting decisions tend to consider equity implicitly, rather than defining a set of 
explicit weights (Skedgel, 2013). There is increasing interest in understanding how 
to structure the decision-making process for complex reimbursement decisions 
involving trade-offs between multiple criteria. A growing number of health care 
decision-making agencies – including the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in 
Health Care (IQWiG) in Germany and the Regione Lombardia in Italy – are 
exploring the application of structured decision-making processes such as multi-
                                           
4 At the technology level, rather than at the individual patient level 
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criteria decision analysis (Radaelli et al., 2014; Thokala et al., 2016; Devlin and 
Garau, 2017). 
1.6 Role of public preferences 
Assuming it is deemed appropriate to apply equity weights to health gains, and 
irrespective of the precise way in which the weighting system operates, the 
direction and magnitude of the weights are matters of value judgement (Brazier et 
al., 2017). A pertinent question to ask is whose values should be used.  
Since the eventual goal of economic evaluation is to guide policies about resource 
allocation that fulfil the interests of society as a whole (rather than to make 
decisions at the individual patient level), it seems appropriate that any social value 
judgements being fed into the process should be informed by the preferences of a 
representative sample of society – i.e. members of the general public (Shah, 2009). 
The importance of public participation in health care decision-making has been 
emphasised by the government in the UK (Department of Health, 1997), where 
members of the general public are both potential users and (as taxpayers) the 
ultimate funders of the country’s NHS. Towse (1999) has argued that a compelling 
reason for public participation in UK health care priority-setting decisions is that 
since the NHS is a monopoly public service, most people cannot switch to a 
competing service and so rely on surveys to voice their preferences. The general 
public may also be expected to be more detached and less biased than other 
candidate judges (such as clinicians, current patients and unelected health care 
managers) of the relative value of health gains across different patient groups 
(Dolan et al., 2003). Empirical studies of public preferences can provide meaningful 
information as long as the methods used are scientifically defensible (Ryan et al., 
2001). Richardson and McKie (2005) have argued that such research should form 
part of an ‘empirical ethics’ approach to allocating health care resources. 
For these reasons, most empirical studies examining the relative value of a QALY 
have involved surveys using general public samples (Brazier et al., 2017). A review 
of public involvement in health care published in 1999 reported that the methods 
used to understand public views about priority-setting were at that time dominated 
by opinion polls, satisfaction surveys and citizens’ juries (Kneeshaw, 1997). 
However, economists have argued that in order for public involvement to be useful, 
the methods used should involve opportunity costs (the notion that providing more 
of one good means providing less of something else), give an indication of the 
strength of preference, and involve trade-offs that reflect the kinds of choices that 
actually have to be made by health care decision-makers (Shackley and Ryan, 
1995; Towse, 1999). More recently, public preferences have increasingly been 
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elicited using ‘choice-based methods’, which are based on the premise that the 
value of something can be demonstrated by how much people are willing to 
sacrifice in order to obtain it. For example, the willingness-to-pay method involves 
the sacrifice of money, and the person trade-off method involves the sacrifice of 
benefit to another group. For a review of techniques used to elicit public 
preferences, see Ryan et al. (2001). 
It should be noted that not all preferences held by the public are suitable for 
forming the basis of policy decisions (Tsuchiya, 2012). For example, the public may 
express a preference for prioritising or restricting health care resources in ways that 
are legally prohibited or politically unappealing. Nevertheless, public preference 
studies are useful in that they can help inform decision-makers about the values 
and priorities of the populations whom they serve. 
1.7 Evidence on potential priority-setting criteria 
There are a number of published reviews of the empirical evidence on public 
priority-setting preferences and on the relative social value of a QALY (Schwappach, 
2002; Dolan et al., 2005; Whitty et al., 2014; Gu et al., 2015). Researchers have 
categorised the various factors contributing to the social value of a QALY in 
different ways. Broadly speaking, these factors may relate to characteristics of 
patients (such as age and socioeconomic status), characteristics of the health effect 
(such as the size and direction of the effect), or the way in which the QALYs are 
distributed (Schwappach, 2002). Other, less frequently studied factors relate to the 
characteristics of the technology itself – for example, whether it represents a 
breakthrough innovation that has the potential to promote scientific progress or 
whether it generates wider societal benefits beyond direct health effects (Linley and 
Hughes, 2013). 
One factor that has been the focus of much debate in the literature is whether 
greater weight should be placed on QALYs for those who are severely ill. Severity 
has been the specific focus of a separate review, and is discussed in detail in 1.7.1. 
Another factor for which there is a relatively rich body of empirical evidence is 
patient age. The majority of studies indicate that people place greater weight on a 
unit of health gain for younger individuals than on that for older individuals (Dolan 
et al., 2005; Gu et al., 2015). However, in some cases preferences regarding age 
have been found to display a non-linear pattern, with gains for working age 
individuals valued more than equivalent gains for younger individuals (Whitty et al., 
2014; Gu et al., 2015). Gu et al. (2015) also warn that preferences for age may be 
confounded by preferences for a person’s capacity to benefit from treatment (in 
that a younger person has greater to capacity to achieve sizeable life extensions 
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than does an older person) and that some studies fail to control for this 
confounding effect. Further, there are some studies that have not supported age as 
an important factor relative to other potential prioritisation criteria (Whitty et al., 
2014).  
The evidence base for other factors is less developed, but overall there appears to 
be a tendency to prefer giving higher priority to: those who are not considered to 
be responsible for their illness compared to those who are; those with lower 
socioeconomic status compare to those with higher socioeconomic status; and 
preventive (health loss-avoiding) interventions over curative (health-improving) 
treatments.  
1.7.1 Severity of illness 
This sub-section focuses on severity of illness as a priority-setting or QALY 
weighting criterion. Severity is particularly relevant to this thesis due to its clear 
overlap with end of life – indeed, the latter may be interpreted as a subset of the 
former. 
A concern for the worst off in society is a common feature of several different 
principles of justice (Rawls, 1972; Daniels, 1985; Brock, 2001), including both 
egalitarian and need principles. While the definition of need in terms of capacity to 
benefit may lead to the objective of QALY-maximisation, other definitions of need – 
based on immediate ill health, lifetime ill health, or threat to life – lead to a 
competing objective of placing special weight on the QALYs accruing to those who 
are severely ill (described by Nord (2005) as the ‘severity approach’). This is also 
consistent with a basic principle governing the actions of clinicians, who generally 
seek to prioritise according to the perceived degree of suffering (Cubborn, 1991).  
Severity can be defined in different ways. A person can be described as severely ill 
if their expected number of lifetime QALYs represents a major shortfall (in either 
absolute or proportional terms) from a ‘normal’ QALY expectancy (Williams, 1997; 
Towse and Barnsley, 2013). Alternatively, a person can be described as severely ill 
if their current level of health is poor. The severity approach suggests that the 
value of a health gain would depend on the patient’s level of (lifetime or current) 
health prior to benefiting from that gain.  
A review of the empirical evidence on severity-related preferences published in 
2009 suggests that people are, on the whole, willing to sacrifice aggregate health in 
order to give priority to the severely ill (Shah, 2009) – 17 of the 19 studies 
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reviewed reported results broadly consistent with the severity approach.5 Similar 
findings have been reported in more recent reviews (Nord and Johansen, 2014; 
Whitty et al., 2014; Gu et al., 2015). The majority of studies reviewed by Shah 
(2009) focused on severity as measured by a patient’s current quality of life in 
absence of treatment, with several using adapted versions of a simple mobility 
scale used by Nord (1993). Few studies defined severity in terms of length of life or 
proximity to death. In some cases, life expectancy was controlled for by asking 
respondents to assume that it did not differ across patients. In other cases, it was 
less clear how life expectancy (and duration more generally) was to be considered.  
The importance of severity is already well established in a number of jurisdictions 
(Shah, 2009). Since the 1980s, the Norwegian National Health Service has 
recognised that severity should be considered alongside the effectiveness of 
treatment when prioritising between patients (Norwegian Commission for 
Prioritising in Healthcare, 1987). A recent Norwegian government commission on 
priority-setting recommended that for group-level decisions, severity should be 
measured in terms of the absolute loss of QALYs as a result of not making available 
the treatment under assessment (Ottersen et al., 2016). This recommendation has 
just been approved and endorsed by the Norwegian government (Norwegian 
Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2017). In Australia, the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Advisory Committee (2016) applies a so-called ‘rule of rescue’ whereby 
special consideration may be given to a treatment for a condition that meets the 
four factors concurrently, one of which being that the condition is severe.6 In the 
Netherlands, an equity principle called ‘proportional shortfall’ – a measure of 
severity based on the proportion of lifetime health lost due to illness – has been 
proposed (Stolk et al., 2004). According to van de Wetering et al. (2013), there has 
been support for incorporating information about proportional shortfall into Dutch 
technology assessments. However, its influence in decision-making has been 
limited by a lack of consensus on how best to operationalise a QALY weighting 
system based on proportional shortfall and on whether such a system would be 
aligned with societal preferences (van Exel, J., 2017, personal communication, 16 
February). In Sweden, the Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency assesses 
technologies in relation to a threshold that reflects individuals’ maximum 
                                           
5 Shah (2009) defined the severity approach as follows: “when conducting CUA [cost-utility analysis] in 
order to make allocation decisions, the health gains accruing to individuals in poorer health without 
treatment should be valued more highly than those accruing to individuals in better health without 
treatment, with health defined in terms of quality of life, length of life, or both” (p.79).  
6 Note that the Australian operationalisation of the rule of rescue does not focus on the rescue of 
identifiable individuals from imminent death, and is therefore substantially different from the original 
rule of rescue discussed in the literature (Cookson et al., 2008). McKie and Richardson (2003) argue that 
it is the emphasis on identifiable individuals that distinguishes the rule of rescue from a more general 
concern for the worst off underpinning the severity approach.  
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willingness-to-pay for a QALY. The threshold is adjusted for need, which is related 
directly to disease severity (defined as the expected loss of QALYs for untreated 
patients, though a strict formula for determining the degree of severity is not 
applied) (Persson, 2012). 
1.8 UK policy context 
1.8.1 NICE and its social value judgements 
NICE provides national guidance and advice on the use of health technologies in the 
NHS in England (and in certain cases in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales). It 
was set up in 1999 as a special health authority (that is, an arm's length body of 
the Department of Health), primarily to ensure that everyone living in England and 
Wales had equal access to health care from the NHS. Since April 2013 it has been 
established as a non-departmental public body. It is accountable to, but 
operationally independent of, the UK government.  
NICE’s activities include a technology appraisal programme (which includes, inter 
alia, the assessment and appraisal of branded medicines), an interventional 
procedures programme, a highly specialised technologies programme, a medical 
technologies evaluation programme (covering devices and diagnostics) and the 
development of clinical guidelines (Cowles et al., 2017). NICE also produces public 
health and social care guidelines. 
NICE’s technology appraisals are guided by clinical and cost-effectiveness analyses, 
usually using the QALY to measure health outcomes (and with the EQ-5D specified 
as the preferred measure of the quality of life component) (NICE, 2013a). The 
general requirement is that in order to be recommended for routine use in the NHS, 
the technology under appraisal should have an ICER at or below a threshold range 
of £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY gained. The likelihood of a given technology being 
rejected on grounds of cost-ineffectiveness increases as its ICER increases. A 
technology with an ICER below £20,000 per QALY gained is likely to be 
recommended, while the acceptability of a technology with an ICER of between 
£20,000 and £30,000 per QALY gained is more likely to depend on other factors, 
such as the innovative nature of the technology and aspects that relate to non-
health objectives of the NHS. An increasingly strong case with regard to these 
factors would need to be made in order to recommend the use of a technology with 
an ICER above £30,000 per QALY gained (NICE, 2013a).  
Current guidelines used by NICE define a ‘reference case’ position. This position 
corresponds to the aforementioned ‘a QALY is a QALY is a QALY’ principle: “In the 
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reference case, an additional QALY should receive the same weight regardless of 
any other characteristics of the people receiving the health benefit” (NICE, 2013a, 
paragraph 5.4.1). In the first edition of its technology appraisal methods guide, 
NICE explained that this position “reflects the absence of consensus regarding 
whether these or other characteristics of individuals should result in differential 
weights being attached to QALYs gained” (NICE, 2003, paragraph 5.9.7.2). 
However, NICE’s technology appraisal committees (independent advisory 
committees responsible for formulating guidance) are given discretion to consider 
alternative equity positions and are expected to make social value judgements. 
These are concerned with what is appropriate and acceptable for society in 
delivering health care across the NHS. The appraisal committees occasionally 
depart from ‘a QALY is a QALY is a QALY’ principle in order to incorporate values 
reflected in legislation, in the deliberations of NICE’s Citizens’ Council (see below), 
and in feedback from stakeholders such as patient representatives and health care 
professionals (Chalkidou, 2012).  
NICE is unusual amongst similar organisations elsewhere in the world in that it 
systematically publishes details of the evidence and reasoning underpinning its 
decisions, including references to social value judgements (Shah et al., 2013a). 
However, while its principles related to cost-effectiveness are relatively explicit 
(NICE, 2013a), those covering equity concerns have generally been less specific. 
NICE’s approach to social values is not driven by a single philosophical perspective 
but is pluralistic in that it draws on several traditions (Shah et al., 2013a).  
NICE and its advisory committee are well placed to make scientific value 
judgements but have no special legitimacy to impose social value judgements on 
the NHS. The Institute’s position is that “advice from NICE to the NHS should 
embody values that are generally held by the population that the NHS serves” 
(Rawlins and Culyer, 2004, p.226). For this reason – and in line with the NHS’s 
increasing emphasis on the need for public involvement in health care decision-
making (Department of Health, 1997) – NICE formed a Citizens’ Council in 2002. 
The Council is a panel of 30 members of the public that is intended to broadly 
reflect the demographic characteristics of the general population (NICE, 2017a). It 
normally meets once a year to discuss and provide NICE with a public perspective 
on matters of ethics and equity that have arisen during guidance development 
activities. Topics discussed by the Council include the definition of clinical need 
(NICE, 2002a), the legitimacy of adopting a ‘rule of rescue’ criterion (NICE, 2006), 
the use of severity as a priority-setting criterion (NICE, 2008a) and the appropriate 
reasons for deviating from the usual threshold range (NICE, 2008b). The Council's 
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recommendations – which are reached following a structured deliberative process 
(Culyer and Lomas, 2006) – are incorporated into a general guidance document 
called Social value judgements: Principles for the development of NICE guidance 
(NICE, 2008c) and, where appropriate, into the technology appraisal methods 
guide.  
Accordingly, NICE’s appraisal committees have occasionally applied social value 
judgements and ‘special weighting’ in order to recommend treatments with ICERs 
exceeding the range normally considered acceptable (Rawlins et al., 2010; Shah et 
al., 2013a). For example, in the appraisal of riluzole for motor neurone disease, the 
committee considered the ‘severity and relatively short lifespan’ of affected 
patients, and recommended the use of the technology despite the fact that the 
ICER estimates ranged between £34,000 and £43,500 per QALY gained (NICE, 
2001). Similarly, life-extending trastuzumab combination therapy was 
recommended for use in the treatment of advanced breast cancer even though the 
manufacturer provided an ICER estimate of £37,500 per QALY gained. The decision 
was due in part to the committee’s observation that “improvements in survival of 
this magnitude due to therapeutic intervention have rarely been recorded in women 
with metastatic breast cancer” (NICE, 2002b, paragraph 4.3.3). According to 
Rawlins et al. (2010), NICE’s appraisal committees have also sought to take into 
account whether the treatments under appraisal target children and/or 
disadvantaged populations. However, until 2009 there were no official 
circumstances in which appraisal committees were asked to depart systematically 
from the reference case position. 
1.8.2 NICE’s guidance on appraising life-extending end of life 
treatments 
In 2008, several high-profile rejections of new treatments for renal cancer on cost-
effectiveness grounds resulted in criticism from the media, patients and 
pharmaceutical companies (Wagstaff, 2008; Walker et al., 2008), and in calls for a 
more generous coverage policy for cancer treatments. Some patients sought to 
supplement their free NHS care by paying for these treatments out-of-pocket, but 
the government ruled that such ‘top-ups’ were not permitted (Timmins et al., 
2016). Under mounting pressures, the Department of Health announced a four-
month review to examine “if, when and in what circumstances patients should be 
able to purchase additional drugs that are not funded by the NHS” (Richards, 2008, 
p.2). The review recommended that, inter alia, NICE should demonstrate greater 
flexibility and assess “what measures could be taken to make available drugs used 
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near the end of life that do not meet the cost-effectiveness criteria applied to all 
drugs” (p.4). 
The government accepted the recommendations and called on NICE to review its 
methods for appraising end of life treatments (Chalkidou, 2012). NICE began a 
public consultation on proposed supplementary advice for its appraisal committees. 
It was originally proposed that appraisal committees should consider recommending 
the use of medicines with an ICER exceeding the range normally considered 
acceptable if all of the following criteria were met (NICE, 2009a): 
 The medicine is indicated for the treatment of patients with a diagnosis of a 
terminal illness and who are not, on average, expected to live for more 
than 24 months. 
 There is sufficient evidence to indicate that the medicine offers a 
substantial extension to life, compared to current NHS treatment. 
 The medicine is indicated, in its licence, for a patient population normally 
not exceeding 7,000 new patients per annum. 
Some aspects of the supplementary advice were revised following the consultation 
exercise (NICE, 2009b). Notably, the ‘substantial extension to life’ criterion was 
replaced by a more specific threshold of a three-month extension, and the 7,000 
patient threshold was replaced by a less specific ‘small patient populations’ 
criterion. Further, an earlier proposal – that in order for a treatment to be eligible 
for special consideration there should be a lack of alternative treatments with 
comparable benefits available in the NHS – was dropped (Chalkidou, 2012). The 
revised criteria (NICE, 2009c) are reproduced below; if met, the appraisal 
committees were asked to consider the impact of giving greater weight to the 
health gains achieved in the later stages of disease: 
 The treatment is indicated for patients with a short life expectancy, 
normally less than 24 months. 
 There is sufficient evidence to indicate that the treatment offers an 
extension to life, normally of at least an additional three months, compared 
to current treatment. 
 The treatment is licensed, or otherwise indicated, for small patient 
populations. 
The advice stated that the appraisal committees should be satisfied by the 
robustness of the estimates and assumptions used in the economic modelling and 
that all calculations should consider the cumulative population for each licensed 
indication. It also asked the committees to consider: 
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 The impact of giving greater weight to QALYs achieved in the later stages of 
terminal diseases, using the assumption that the extended survival period is 
experienced at the full quality of life anticipated for a healthy individual of 
the same age, and; 
 The magnitude of the additional weight that would need to be assigned to 
the QALY benefits in this patient group for the cost-effectiveness of the 
technology to fall within the current threshold range.  
No reason was specified for why it should be assumed that the life extension would 
be experienced at full quality of life. The consultation response document (NICE, 
2009b) referred to a number of arguments made in favour of placing greater weight 
on life extensions for end of life patients. These included: the argument that such a 
policy was consistent with societal values; the aspiration for access to end of life 
drugs to be ‘in step with’ the levels observed in other high-income countries; the 
importance of supporting the development of innovative treatments; and the 
concern that the standard QALY model fails to adequately capture important 
benefits for end of life patients. The latter argument is discussed in detail elsewhere 
(Garau et al., 2011; Round, 2012; Devlin and Lorgelly, 2017). The supplementary 
end of life policy represented the first systematic departure from the ‘a QALY is a 
QALY is a QALY’ reference case position underpinning NICE’s technology appraisals. 
It has been referred to in the literature as an ‘end of life premium’ (Cookson, 2013; 
Linley and Hughes, 2013; McCabe et al., 2016a). 
Of the first 23 technologies that were considered in light of the supplementary 
advice, 13 were considered to have met all of the criteria. Of those 13, eight were 
ultimately recommended for use in the NHS (Trowman et al., 2011). More recent 
analysis by Barham (2016) suggests that the effective threshold applied to end of 
life treatments between 2009 and 2015 was around £49,000 per QALY gained. 
Other sources refer to an unofficial threshold of £50,000 per QALY gained for end of 
life treatments (NICE, 2013b; Boysen, 2014; Stewart et al., 2014; Parliamentary 
Office of Science and Technology, 2015). 
1.8.3 Selected criticisms of NICE’s end of life policy 
While NICE’s end of life policy has resulted in increased access to end of life 
treatments for patients, if the NHS budget is fixed then the funds for these 
treatments must be found by disinvesting from other activities. Collins and Latimer 
(2013) have shown, under the assumption that society places no more weight on a 
unit of health gain for end of life patients than on that for other types of patients, 
that the application of NICE’s policy “is likely to have resulted in substantial QALY 
losses and budgetary pressures to the NHS and population in England and Wales, 
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as cost effective interventions are displaced in favour of less cost effective 
interventions” (p.2).7 However, the authors acknowledge that if society does in fact 
place greater weight on health gains at the end of life, then the overall QALY loss 
may be acceptable to the extent that it represents societal preferences. 
In a paper addressing the normative issues raised by NICE’s policy, Cookson (2013) 
considers whether 11 potentially relevant ethical arguments can be used to provide 
support for an end of life premium. Seven of the arguments8 are rejected on the 
basis that they are not relevant in the context of a national agency making 
recommendations about the public funding of health technologies based on the 
systematic assessment of value for money. The other four arguments9 are rejected 
on the basis that “applying them systematically would yield something quite 
different from the NICE end-of-life premium” (p.1145). These include the argument 
that health care resources should be allocated in relation to severity – Cookson 
points out that proximity to death is an excessively narrow way to define severity, 
and contrasts the binary nature of NICE’s end of life cut-offs to the continuous 
nature of typical definitions of severity. 
Paulden et al. (2014) similarly highlight the arbitrary nature of the cut-offs in the 
criteria – for example, a treatment for patients with just under two years of life 
expectancy in good quality of life would meet the end of life criteria whereas a 
treatment for patients with just over two years of expectancy in poor quality of life 
would not. The authors point out the inconsistency of quality of life improvements 
being central in NICE’s assessments of the cost-effectiveness of health 
technologies, yet irrelevant to its end of life criteria.  
Raftery (2009) has warned that making an exception to the usual rules in order to 
recommend the use of life-extending end of life treatments limits the universality of 
the cost-per-QALY approach and sets a precedent that could lead to special 
pleading by other groups. 
1.8.4 Recent policy developments 
This sub-section provides details of policy developments in England that followed 
the introduction of NICE’s end of life guidance in 2009, including the planned value-
based pricing and value-based assessment schemes and the introduction of a ring-
                                           
7 Specifically, Collins and Latimer (2013) estimate a net annual loss of between 5,933 and 15,098 QALYs 
depending on which value of the standard cost-effectiveness threshold is assumed. 
8 Rule of rescue; fair chances; ex post willingness-to-pay; caring externality; financial protection; 
symbolic value; diminishing marginal value of future life years. Cookson acknowledges that some of 
these arguments may be relevant considerations in other decision-making contexts, such as how 
politicians or health care professionals should respond to exceptional, emergency situations. 
9 Concentration of benefit; dread; time to set your affairs in order; severity of illness. 
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fenced ‘Cancer Drugs Fund’ (CDF). Although these policies are not the focus of this 
thesis, they are relevant because they represent further departures from the ‘a 
QALY is a QALY is a QALY’ position, and (could have) had implications for the 
appraisal of and access to end of life treatments. 
In 2010, the Department of Health published a consultation document on a 
proposed scheme for the value-based pricing of branded medicines. One of the 
stated objectives of the scheme was to “include a wide assessment, alongside 
clinical effectiveness, of the range of factors through which medicines deliver 
benefits for patients and society” (Department of Health, 2010b, paragraph 3.3). 
This indicated that the ‘value’ of a medicine is derived not only from the health 
gains from treatment, but also from other factors that may be of benefit to society. 
Under the new system, it was proposed that in addition to the basic threshold 
reflecting benefits displaced in order to fund new medicines, there would also be 
higher thresholds for medicines for diseases associated with high levels of ‘burden 
of illness’: “the more the medicine is focused on diseases with unmet need or which 
are particularly severe, the higher the threshold” (paragraph 4.10). The 
consultation document did not state how severity and unmet need were to be 
defined. Higher thresholds were also proposed for medicines that demonstrated 
“greater therapeutic innovation and improvements compared with other products” 
and/or “wider societal benefits” (paragraph 4.10).  
A Health Select Committee report into NICE, published in 2013, criticised the delays 
in developing and implementing the value-based pricing scheme (Health 
Committee, 2013). In response, the Department of Health asked NICE to take into 
account additional terms of reference for the ‘value based assessment of health 
technologies’ (NICE, 2013b). This requested that NICE’s methods should, inter alia, 
“include a simple system of weighting for burden of illness that appropriately 
reflects the differential value for the most serious conditions” (p.15). It was 
suggested that burden of illness could be estimated “using a simple percentage 
weighting that is proportionate to the QALY loss suffered by patients with the 
condition” (p.15). Accordingly, NICE developed a set of proposals to incorporate 
these new terms of reference into its appraisal methods. These included the 
proposal that burden of illness would be assessed by calculating patients’ absolute 
and proportional QALY shortfall from normal healthy life expectancy,10 and that this 
                                           
10 Absolute and proportional QALY shortfall can be described as two possible operationalisations of 
severity of illness (see 1.7.1). According to Towse and Barnsley (2013), absolute shortfall is given by 
subtracting current health prospects (with condition) from total potential health from today (without 
condition); and proportional shortfall is given by dividing absolute shortfall by total potential health from 
today (without condition). These can be contrasted to the fair innings approach, which considers one’s 
QALY shortfall from birth rather than from today. The levels of absolute and proportional QALY shortfall 
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– in combination with other modifiers – would form the basis for QALY weights. It 
was also proposed that the end of life criteria would be ‘subsumed’ within burden of 
illness.    
The proposals were outlined in a consultation paper, responses to which were 
received from patient groups, clinicians, academics, the pharmaceutical industry 
and other interested groups. No consensus emerged, with respondents particularly 
split in their views about how burden of illness and other criteria should be 
measured and valued. As a result, NICE recommended to its Board that no changes 
to the technology appraisal methodology be made in the short term (NICE, 2014a). 
This meant that the supplementary end of life policy was retained. 
The CDF was introduced in 2010, with the aim of improving access to cancer 
medicines that were not routinely available in the NHS. It made available cancer 
drugs that had been rejected by NICE on cost-effectiveness grounds, had not yet 
been appraised by NICE, or were being used outside of their marketing 
authorisations. The CDF was intended only as a temporary arrangement prior to the 
renegotiation of the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme and the introduction 
of the aforementioned value-based pricing scheme (Dixon et al., 2016). 
According to impact assessment of the CDF proposal, the purpose of the fund was 
to “enable cancer treatments to be funded by the NHS where society values their 
benefits more than the benefits that could be provided by spending the funding on 
other treatments, elsewhere in the NHS” (Department of Health, 2010c, p.1). If 
society indeed places special value on the health gains achieved by cancer patients, 
then “cancer treatments which provide less health benefits than the alternative use 
of funds might still be socially more valuable than the alternatives” (p.12). The 
extent to which this is the case has been examined elsewhere (Linley and Hughes, 
2013; Culyer, 2017; Shah, 2017).  
The CDF has been criticised by health economists, who have argued that it 
undermines the function of NICE, reduces incentives for pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to lower prices, and arbitrarily singles out cancer for special 
consideration for emotive reasons (Maynard and Bloor, 2011; Appleby, 2014; 
Buxton et al., 2014; Claxton, 2015). More generally, it has been argued that the 
opportunity cost of prioritising cancer drugs tends to fall on lower profile areas of 
health care (Adams, 2011) such as mental health and palliative care (Barrett et al., 
2006).  
                                           
increase for life-limiting illnesses, particularly when patients are expected to fall short of a ‘normal’ life 
expectancy. 
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A reconfiguration of the CDF was announced in 2016. Under the new system, all 
new cancer drugs (as well as those already funded via the CDF) are to be referred 
to NICE’s technology appraisal process. For drugs that display plausible potential 
for satisfying the criteria for routine use (with or without the application of the end 
of life criteria), a conditional recommendation can be made. In such cases, the 
drugs would be funded via a new CDF for an agreed period whilst further clinical 
and cost-effectiveness evidence was collected, with the view to recommending the 
drugs for routine use subject to the approval of the new evidence (Dixon et al., 
2016). Recent analysis suggests that the vast majority of the product-indication 
pairs that were included in the original CDF would not have met NICE’s criteria for 
defining a life-extending end of life treatment, and most are unlikely to be funded 
by the revised CDF (Britton, 2016). While the revised CDF addresses some of the 
problems associated with its predecessor, the notion of a dedicated fund and 
special access mechanism for cancer drugs remains controversial (McCabe et al., 
2016b). 
Linked to the new CDF, the NICE end of life criteria were revised in July 2016 as an 
addendum to the Institute’s technology appraisal methods and processes guides 
(NICE, 2016). The small patient population criterion has been dropped altogether. 
The current guidance is shown in Box 1 [formatting in original].  
At the time of writing, the revised CDF is in place, while NICE is continuing to 
investigate the possibility of incorporating a system of burden of illness weighting 
into its methodology (Boysen, 2014). The author’s understanding is that the end of 
life policy is outside the remit of these investigations.  
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Source: NICE (2016)  
6.2.10  In the case of a ‘life-extending treatment at the end of life’, the Appraisal  
 Committee will satisfy itself that all of the following criteria have been   
 met: 
 the treatment is indicated for patients with a short life expectancy, 
normally less than 24 months and 
 there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the treatment has the 
prospect of offering an extension to life, normally of a mean value of 
at least an additional 3 months, compared with current NHS 
treatment. 
  and 
 the technology is licensed or otherwise indicated, for small patient 
populations normally not exceeding a cumulative total of 7000 for all 
licensed indications in England. 
  In addition, the Appraisal Committees will need to be satisfied that: 
 the estimates of the extension to life are sufficiently robust and can be 
shown or reasonably inferred from either progression-free survival or 
overall survival (taking account of trials in which crossover has 
occurred and been accounted for in the effectiveness review) and 
 the assumptions used in the reference case economic modelling are 
plausible, objective and robust. 
6.2.11  When the conditions described in section 6.2.10 are met, the Appraisal  
 Committee will consider: 
 the impact of giving greater weight to QALYs achieved in the later 
stages of terminal diseases, using the assumption that the extended 
survival period is experienced at the full quality of life anticipated for a 
healthy individual of the same age and 
 the magnitude of the additional weight that would need to be assigned 
to the QALY benefits in this patient group for the cost effectiveness of 
the technology to fall within the normal range of maximum acceptable 
ICERs, with a maximum weight of 1.7. 
Box 1. NICE’s supplementary advice for the appraisal of life-extending end of life treatments 
(latest version) 
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1.9 Calls for empirical evidence of societal preferences 
regarding end of life treatments 
It has been claimed that NICE’s end of life policy reflects a recognition that society 
places special value on treatments that extend the life of patients with terminal 
illness, as long as the life extension is of a reasonable quality (Rawlins et al., 
2010). However, the consultation on NICE’s end of life policy revealed concerns 
that there is little evidence to support the premise that society is prepared to fund 
life-extending end of life treatments that would not meet the cost-effectiveness 
criteria used for other treatments (NICE, 2009b). The Citizens’ Council had 
expressed an overall preference for taking disease severity into account (NICE, 
2008a) and for relaxing the cost-effectiveness threshold under certain 
circumstances (including for life-saving interventions) (NICE, 2008b). However, the 
Council had not been asked for its views on the specific criteria underpinning the 
supplementary policy. Further, a general limitation of the Council is that as a panel 
of just 30 people, it could only offer limited insight into the views of wider society.  
As a result, a number of calls for research on society’s preferences were made. A 
review undertaken by the Department of Health (2010c) to assess the potential 
impact of the CDF noted the need for robust evidence to support the weighting of 
health gains accruing to patients who are severely ill or at the end of life. NICE 
itself acknowledged the need for further testing of the assumptions behind the end 
of life policy (Longson and Littlejohns, 2009). In an unpublished review of the 
empirical ethics literature, Green (2011) noted that the evidence on end of life-
related preferences was limited and called for further exploration of the issues. 
More recently, two former chairs of the Scottish Medicines Consortium claimed 
(referring to the premia for end of life treatments implied by NICE’s end of life 
policy, the CDF, and Scotland’s New Medicine Fund) that there “has been tacit 
acceptance that the changes made match the views of UK society, yet there has 
been no exploration of whether that is, in fact, the case” (Webb and Paterson, 
2016, p.2).   
1.10 Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into six chapters. 
Chapter 2 reviews the published literature that is relevant to the overall research 
question underpinning the thesis. It identifies the extent to which public 
preferences on this topic have been studied and reported in peer-reviewed journals. 
It also reports the methods used to elicit preferences and the findings of the 
existing studies. The search for literature was first carried out in 2014, and 
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repeated in 2016 in order to update the review. The timing of the review was such 
that it includes articles based on the studies reported in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Chapter 3 describes the first of four empirical studies undertaken – an exploratory 
study conducted in early 2011 using a convenience sample of 21 members of staff 
and students at the University of Sheffield. It develops and pilots an approach to 
examining end of life-related preferences using a choice exercise administered in 
face-to-face interviews.  
Chapter 4 describes the second of the four empirical studies – a study conducted in 
mid-2011 using a sample of 50 members of the public. This study uses a similar 
approach to that used in the previous study, though the survey design was refined 
in accordance with the earlier findings. Five hypotheses relating to the value of life-
extending end of life treatments are tested. 
Chapter 5 describes the third of the four empirical studies – a web-based discrete 
choice experiment (DCE) conducted in 2012. The study uses a sample of 3,969 
members of the public, broadly representative of the general population in terms of 
age, gender and social grade. The study design presents respondents with choices 
representing trade-offs between achieving larger QALY gains and prioritising the 
treatment of patients with shorter life expectancy. The extent to which the cut-offs 
implied by the NICE end of life criteria are consistent with public preferences is 
analysed and discussed in this chapter.  
Chapter 6 describes the fourth and final empirical study – a web-based study 
conducted in 2016 using a sample of 2,401 members of the public, representative 
of the general population in terms of age, gender and social grade. As well as 
seeking to address the overall research question underpinning the thesis, this study 
also seeks to examine the extent to which people’s stated preferences regarding 
end of life treatments are sensitive to a number of framing effects and study design 
choices. Nine hypotheses are tested, all of which arose from trends, ambiguities 
and gaps in the existing evidence, as identified in the previous chapters. 
Chapter 7 concludes by drawing together and discussing the findings of the overall 
thesis. It summarises the main contributions and limitations of the research, and 
identifies some policy implications of the findings and recommendations for further 
research.
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2 DO MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC WISH TO PLACE 
GREATER WEIGHT ON A UNIT OF HEALTH GAIN FOR 
END OF LIFE PATIENTS THAN ON THAT FOR OTHER 
TYPES OF PATIENTS? A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE11 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to review the published social sciences literature that is 
relevant to the following research question: do members of the public wish to place 
greater weight on a unit of health gain for end of life patients than on that for other 
types of patients? Policies reflecting such preferences can be described as an ‘end 
of life premium’ (see 1.8.2). The need for an up-to-date review is clear – most 
existing reviews of the empirical ethics literature did not include end of life as an 
attribute of interest, and two that did are limited in that they are unpublished, did 
not use systematic methods, and are relatively old (Green, 2011; Keetharuth et al., 
2011). 
The review reported in this chapter seeks to identify the extent to which public 
preferences on this topic have been studied in the peer-reviewed literature. It also 
seeks to provide an in-depth account of the methods used to elicit preferences and 
the findings of the studies, with the intention of informing policy decisions and 
future research, including research for this thesis. The decision to focus on the 
social sciences literature was made based on an informal scoping exercise involving 
preliminary searches of PubMed Central. These searches indicated that the 
biomedical literature contained a very large number of articles that would be 
identified using search terms such as end of life but would not be informative to the 
research question.   
The review focuses on studies concerned with the prioritisation of treatment based 
on patients’ life expectancy (or proximity to death), thus distinguishing it from 
previous reviews of severity of illness more generally (Shah, 2009; Nord and 
Johansen, 2014), which typically have examined studies describing severity in 
terms of quality of life.   
The review has also applied a creative approach to searching the literature for 
articles that are relevant to a particular health policy issue. 
                                           
11 Selected findings from this chapter have been published as: Shah, K.K., 2016. Does society place 
special value on end of life treatments? In: Round, J., ed. Care at the end of life: an economic 
perspective. Cham: Springer. 
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2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 SSCI search 
The primary source of data for the review was an electronic search of the Social 
Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) within the Web of Science Core Collection, first 
carried out in May 2014. The search was repeated in May 2016 in order to update 
the review. No time or language limits were imposed, though the database only 
covers articles published since 1956.  
An iterative approach was used to identify search terms. The following sub-section 
therefore includes selected intermediate results, as necessary to explain the 
methods. 
2.2.1.1 Search terms 
Two types of search were considered: title term and topic term. The former 
searches only for terms in the titles of articles. The latter searches for terms in the 
titles and abstracts of articles, as well as in the keywords that have been assigned 
to the articles by the authors and Web of Science. The search was based on topic 
terms for two reasons. The first is that some authors use titles that do not reflect 
the content of their articles. The second is that some authors may have examined 
preferences regarding end of life treatments as one of several elements in their 
study, in which case a term such as end of life would be likely to appear in the 
abstract but unlikely to appear in the title. A full text search was not used due to an 
expectation that this would reduce the specificity of the search to an unacceptable 
degree.  
Search terms were developed using an iterative process. The initial search terms 
were end of life and preferences.12 In order to improve the sensitivity of the search, 
two terms related to end of life – severity and terminal – were added. In a review 
of severity as a priority-setting criterion (Shah, 2009), some of the studies 
identified measured severity in terms of life expectancy. In its supplementary 
guidance on the appraisal of life-extending end of life treatments, NICE (2009c) 
refers to the benefits of such treatments being achieved “in the later stages of 
terminal disease” (paragraph 2.2.1).  
A form of ‘word frequency analysis’ (Glanville et al., 2006) was then used to 
identify further search terms, in order to improve the specificity (and therefore the 
efficiency) of the search. Three articles were designated as ‘key papers’ (Abel 
                                           
12 Note that Web of Science automatically helps to find plurals and variant spellings, so it makes no 
difference whether the search term is, say, preference or preferences. 
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Olsen, 2013; Linley and Hughes, 2013; Shah et al., 2014) and their abstracts were 
examined. These were the only three fully-published articles that explicitly 
investigated public preferences regarding end of life treatments, as defined by the 
NICE guidance (and therefore of direct relevance to the policy issue that motivated 
this programme of research), that were known to the author at the time of 
developing the search strategy. Some discussion/working papers that addressed 
the topic were also known to the author, but these articles were not used for the 
purpose of identifying search terms because they had not yet been published in 
peer-reviewed journals and their abstracts were therefore subject to change. 
All of the unique words that appeared in at least two of the three key paper 
abstracts were identified, and those considered to be potentially relevant to the 
research question (see 2.3.1 for more details) were selected. The impact of adding 
these terms to the search was tested by examining whether their inclusion 
substantially reduced the number of records identified whilst increasing the 
specificity of the search. This was judged informally by assessing the number of 
‘probably relevant’ records within the most recent 20 records. As a result of this 
process, the terms health and respondents (or its synonyms: subjects, participants, 
sample) were added. The term life expectancy was also added as a further 
alternative to end of life. The informal assessment process revealed that at least 
some of the 56 additional records identified by adding life expectancy to the search 
strategy were potentially relevant, thus justifying the inclusion of the term. 
Adding combinations of the terms patient, treatment, evidence, public and 
population (as well as related terms such as popular) further reduced the number 
of records identified. However, it was noted that some potentially relevant records 
were missed as a result of adding these terms. The terms were therefore not 
included in the search strategy.   
Box 2 shows the final strategy (note that TS refers to topic search). The results of 
preliminary searches are presented in Appendix 2. 
Box 2. Final search strategy 
 
The chosen strategy required that the term preferences was included as a topic 
term. It did not include alternatives to preferences, hence it cannot be claimed that 
a fully exhaustive search has been conducted. Such terms were identified by 
27 
 
examining the titles of empirical studies included in a similar review (Shah, 2009): 
attitudes (as in Oddsson, 2003), choices (e.g. as in Ubel et al., 1996), utilities (e.g. 
as in Ubel et al., 1996) and values (e.g. as in Dolan and Green, 1998). Including 
these four terms as alternatives to preferences increased the number of results 
substantially (nearly five-fold). However, an informal assessment of the titles of (a 
randomly selected sample of) 50 of the additional records identified by adding these 
terms did not detect any that were considered relevant to the research question. 
2.2.2 Selection of studies for inclusion 
To be included, articles had to meet all of the following hierarchical criteria: 
1. Publication: Article must be published in English in a peer-reviewed 
journal. 
2. Empirical data: Article must review, present or analyse empirical data. 
3. Priority-setting context: Article must relate to a health care priority-
setting or resource allocation context. Articles reporting preferences from an 
individual or ‘own health’ perspective (rather than a social decision-maker 
perspective) can be included as long as they clearly seek to inform health 
care priority-setting policies. 
4. Stated preference data: Article must report preferences that were elicited 
in a hypothetical, stated context using a choice-based approach involving 
trade-offs. 
5. End of life: Article must inform the topic of placing greater weight on a unit 
of health gain for end of life patients (i.e. patients with short life expectancy) 
than on that for other types of patients.  
6. Original research: Article must present original research and must not be 
solely a review of the literature. 
Criterion 3 was applied to ensure that the review focused on studies that can inform 
the kinds of priority-setting policy issues faced by NICE and other similar agencies. 
The exclusion of articles reporting preferences only from an individual or ‘own 
health’ perspective was considered, as the legitimacy of using such studies to 
inform decisions about how to allocate shared resources has been questioned 
(Brouwer and Koopmanschap, 2000). However, it was deemed appropriate not to 
apply this exclusion rule on the basis that the own health perspective studies may 
provide information that is relevant to the research question.  
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Titles and abstracts were screened for eligibility against criteria 1 to 4, sequentially. 
The full texts of potentially eligible articles were then screened against criteria 1 to 
6, sequentially. Full texts were also screened in cases where it was not clear from 
the title and abstract which of the criteria had and had not been met.  
Whitty et al. (2014) and Gu et al. (2015) both note that there is currently no single 
standardised method for assessing the quality of stated preference studies covering 
the full range of preference elicitation techniques (though best practice guidelines 
do exist for specific methods – e.g. Bridges et al., 2011). Hence, a formal 
assessment of study quality was not undertaken. 
2.2.3 Identification of additional material 
Additional material was identified by following up the reference lists of the articles 
whose full texts were screened. The same criteria were applied to determine 
whether or not to include these newly identified articles. 
2.2.4 Data extraction 
Data were extracted for each included study and compiled in an Excel database. 
Table 2-1 shows the fields used to categorise and describe the studies. Following 
Whitty et al. (2014), it was deemed inappropriate to synthesise the preference data 
due to the variation in methods and contexts between studies, so a largely 
descriptive reporting approach was used. 
The ‘other factors examined’ field covers attributes that varied across the tasks, 
options or choices in a given study, in addition to the attribute(s) of direct 
relevance to end of life. Information on attributes that were mentioned but held 
fixed in all tasks, or on factors that were addressed in the study but not in the tasks 
relevant to end of life, was not extracted systematically. 
The last two fields, which concern age- and time-related preferences, were included 
as these are potential drivers of decisions to prioritise the treatment of end of life 
patients. When asked whether to give life-extending treatment to patients with 
shorter life expectancy or to patients with longer life expectancy, there may be 
reasons for favouring the former other than a preference for treating end of life 
patients per se. First, if all of the potential recipients are the same age today, then 
in absence of treatment the patients with shorter life expectancy will be younger 
when they die than the patients with longer life expectancy will be when they die. 
Hence, a preference for treating patients with shorter life expectancy may be driven 
by a preference for treating the young. Second, the benefit from treating the 
patients with longer life expectancy would not take place until further into the 
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future. Hence, a preference for treating patients with shorter life expectancy may 
be driven by respondents’ social time preference, which is often assumed to be 
positive. It is therefore informative to examine whether studies attempted to 
control for or to analyse the impact of age- and time-related preferences. 
Table 2-1. Data extraction fields and descriptions 
Field Options (where applicable) a 
Author(s)  
Year of publication  
Year of study conduct  
Country or countries of origin of data  
Sample size  
Type of sample Public, other [describe] 
Sample recruitment process  
Criteria for excluding respondents and/or observations 
reported? 
Yes [describe], no 
Mode of administration  Internet survey, computer-assisted personal 
interview, non-computer-assisted personal 
interview, focus group b, self-completion 
paper survey c, multiple modes [describe] 
Summary of primary study objective(s) e.g. ‘To test for support for end of life 
prioritisation’ 
Was end of life (or a related term) mentioned explicitly 
in the study objectives? 
Yes, no 
Pilot reported? Yes, no 
Preference elicitation technique Discrete choice experiment, other choice 
exercise, budget allocation, willingness-to-
pay, ranking exercise, person trade-off, Q 
methodology, other 
Perspective Social decision-maker, own health, both 
End of life definition  
Life expectancy without treatment attribute levels  
Life expectancy gain from treatment attribute levels  
Was disease labelled or named? Yes [describe], no 
Did the study examine whether quality of life-
improving or life-extending treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
Yes, no / unclear 
What were respondents choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
e.g. ‘Which of two patients to treat’ 
Was it possible to express indifference? Yes, no, not reported 
Were visual aids used? Yes, no  
Strength of preference examined at the individual 
respondent level?  
Yes [describe], no / not reported 
Number of tasks completed by each respondent  
Time taken to complete survey reported? Yes [describe], no 
Summary of finding: end of life vs. non-end of life Evidence consistent with an end of life 
premium, evidence not consistent with an 
end of life premium, mixed or inconclusive 
evidence 
Summary of finding: quality of life improvement vs. 
life extension 
Quality of life improvement preferred, life 
extension preferred, not examined / 
reported 
Other results of potential interest  
Other factors examined  
Impact of background characteristics reported? d Yes [describe], no 
Were qualitative data or explanatory factors sought? Yes [describe], no 
Was any reference made to age-related preferences? e Yes [describe], no 
Was any reference made to time-related preferences? f Yes [describe], no 
30 
 
a Options with no observations are not indicated – for example, there is no telephone interviews option 
within the mode of administration field since no studies reported using that mode  
b Defined as a group discussion guided by a moderator (or moderators) with individual completion of 
questionnaires (there were no observations of group discussions with group completion of 
questionnaires) 
c Includes postal surveys and self-completion surveys administered within a group setting (but with no 
group discussion)  
d For example, the authors may have reported that some respondent subgroups (e.g. females) were 
more likely than others to express support for an end of life premium 
e For example, the authors may have reported evidence of support for an end of life premium for 
younger but not older patients 
f For example, the authors may have attempted to control for the fact that health gains experienced now 
are valued more highly by individuals with a positive rate of time preference than health gains 
experienced later 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Searching for search terms 
Table 2-2 lists the unique terms appearing in the abstracts of the three key papers, 
alongside a count of how many times each term appeared in the relevant abstract. 
Numbers written as digits (e.g. ‘10’) have been excluded from the list. 
Table 2-2. Terms appearing in the abstracts of the three key papers 
Abel Olsen (2013) Linley and Hughes (2013) Shah et al. (2014) 
Term Count Term Count Term Count 
and 7 the 13 to 13 
treatment 5 for 9 the 10 
lifetime 4 and 7 of 8 
a 3 to 5 be 6 
age 3 criteria 4 that 6 
in 3 health 4 for 5 
remaining 3 of 4 in 5 
that 3 societal 4 there 4 
the 3 by 3 a 3 
their 3 preferences 3 public 3 
to 3 allocation 2 respondents 3 
years 3 are 2 support 3 
an 2 benefits 2 treatments 3 
argument 2 cdf 2 and 2 
expectancy 2 diseases 2 are 2 
for 2 in 2 but 2 
gain 2 medicines 2 choose 2 
health 2 national 2 end-of-life 2 
life 2 nice 2 evidence 2 
of 2 nor 2 expressed 2 
patients 2 not 2 giving 2 
prognosis 2 or 2 health 2 
support 2 prioritisation 2 if 2 
without 2 proposed 2 is 2 
analytical 1 resource 2 life 2 
article 1 respondents 2 life-extending 2 
as 1 system 2 may 2 
asked 1 under 2 nice 2 
be 1 vbp 2 not 2 
characteristics 1 a 1 patients 2 
choices 1 accepting 1 policy 2 
depends 1 actual 1 preference 2 
did 1 address 1 priority 2 
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Abel Olsen (2013) Linley and Hughes (2013) Shah et al. (2014) 
Term Count Term Count Term Count 
differed 1 adults 1 such 2 
differences 1 allocate 1 them 2 
disease 1 as 1 they 2 
end-of-life 1 asking 1 this 2 
entitled 1 assumed 1 treat 2 
evidence 1 basis 1 we 2 
fair 1 between 1 were 2 
framework 1 but 1 which 2 
from 1 cancer 1 would 2 
how 1 children 1 preferences 2 
hypothetical 1 choice-based 1 consensus 1 
illustrate 1 clinical 1 account 1 
implying 1 conducted 1 advice 1 
increase 1 consequences 1 age 1 
increasing 1 cost-effectiveness 1 answered 1 
incremental 1 decisions 1 appraisal 1 
incurable 1 determined 1 appraising 1 
inequalities 1 did 1 appropriate 1 
innings' 1 different 1 as 1 
into 1 disadvantaged 1 asking 1 
is 1 disease 1 assuming 1 
little 1 drugs 1 between 1 
loss 1 economic 1 both 1 
make 1 effect 1 cannot 1 
makes 1 empirical 1 certain 1 
matter 1 end-of-life 1 clinical 1 
month 1 england 1 committees 1 
months 1 evidence 1 concerns 1 
norwegian 1 excellence 1 conclude 1 
not 1 experiment 1 considered 1 
old 1 explore 1 consultation 1 
on 1 fixed 1 control 1 
our 1 fund 1 cost-effective 1 
pairwise 1 funding 1 criteria 1 
past 1 funds 1 current 1 
patient 1 future 1 described 1 
patients' 1 have 1 designed 1 
population 1 higher 1 england 1 
preferences 1 inappropriate 1 enough 1 
preferential 1 including 1 even 1 
presents 1 incremental 1 examines 1 
prioritize 1 innovative 1 excellence 1 
reduced 1 institute 1 expectancy 1 
reveal 1 introduced 1 extension 1 
sample 1 introduction 1 face-to-face 1 
short 1 is 1 few 1 
should 1 lacking 1 fifty 1 
social 1 lead 1 find 1 
splits 1 may 1 funds 1 
strong 1 needs 1 general 1 
such 1 new 1 has 1 
terms 1 nine 1 higher 1 
there 1 offered 1 however 1 
this 1 on 1 hypothetical 1 
total 1 other 1 improvement 1 
untreated 1 others 1 indicated 1 
value 1 over 1 indifference 1 
was 1 patient 1 institute 1 
who 1 perceived 1 insufficient 1 
with 1 policies 1 interviewed 1 
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Abel Olsen (2013) Linley and Hughes (2013) Shah et al. (2014) 
Term Count Term Count Term Count 
year 1 population 1 interviews 1 
  populations 1 into 1 
  potential 1 issued 1 
  premium 1 it 1 
  pricing 1 its 1 
  provided 1 july 1 
  rare 1 little 1 
  ratios 1 members 1 
  recent 1 met 1 
  reflect 1 minority 1 
  reflecting 1 national 1 
  rewarding 1 nice’s 1 
  robust 1 nontrivial 1 
  service 1 normally 1 
  severe 1 note 1 
  significant 1 observed 1 
  some 1 one 1 
  special 1 opposite 1 
  specific 1 or 1 
  specified 1 other 1 
  status 1 over 1 
  substantial 1 patient 1 
  support 1 prefer 1 
  supported 1 quality-of-life 1 
  surveys 1 questions 1 
  these 1 recommend 1 
  they 1 remaining 1 
  this 1 results 1 
  those 1 revealed 1 
  treatments 1 scenarios 1 
  types 1 scientific 1 
  uk 1 service 1 
  unmet 1 set 1 
  used 1 shorter 1 
  value-based 1 single 1 
  values 1 six 1 
  via 1 so 1 
  we 1 some 1 
  web-based 1 study 1 
  were 1 substantial 1 
  wider 1 suggest 1 
  with 1 supplementary 1 
  
  
taken 1 
  
  
than 1 
  
  
time-related 1 
  
  
treatment 1 
  
  
two 1 
  
  
types 1 
  
  
unwillingness 1 
  
  
use 1 
  
  
various 1 
  
  
very 1 
  
  
was 1 
  
  
ways 1 
  
  
when 1 
  
  
whether 1 
  
  
whilst 1 
  
  
with 1 
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Table 2-3 shows the terms that appeared in at least two of the three key paper 
abstracts. Many of the commonly appearing words – such as articles (e.g. the), 
prepositions (e.g. of) and pronouns (e.g. this) – are of limited use in terms of 
informing literature search strategies. The asterisked words were deemed to be 
potentially relevant to the research question and the impact of adding these to the 
search was tested (see 2.2.1.1).  
Table 2-3. Terms appearing in at least two of the three key paper abstracts 
Term Number of key paper abstracts this term appears in 
with 3 
to 3 
this 3 
the 3 
support 3 
preferences* 3 
patient* 3 
of 3 
not 3 
is 3 
in 3 
health* 3 
for 3 
evidence* 3 
end-of-life* 3 
as 3 
and 3 
a 3 
were 2 
we 2 
was 2 
types 2 
treatments* 2 
treatment* 2 
they 2 
there 2 
that 2 
such 2 
substantial 2 
some 2 
service 2 
respondents* 2 
remaining 2 
population* 2 
patients* 2 
over 2 
other 2 
or 2 
on 2 
nice 2 
national 2 
may 2 
little 2 
life 2 
into 2 
institute 2 
incremental 2 
hypothetical 2 
higher 2 
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Term Number of key paper abstracts this term appears in 
funds 2 
expectancy* 2 
excellence 2 
england 2 
disease 2 
did 2 
criteria 2 
clinical 2 
but 2 
between 2 
be 2 
asking 2 
are 2 
* Terms that were deemed by the author to be potentially relevant to the research question 
2.3.2 Literature search output 
The final (May 2016) SSCI search yielded 768 unique results (Figure 2-1). By 
comparison, the May 2014 search yielded 598 unique results. Following the review 
of titles and abstracts (in which inclusion criteria 1 to 4 were applied sequentially), 
701 of these were excluded, mostly for failing to meet criterion 3. Commonly 
excluded articles at this stage included: studies about advance directives (living 
wills); studies of people’s preferences for their own death and/or palliative care; 
studies focusing on the individual-level, bedside decision-making context; and 
health state valuation studies. Both of the articles excluded for failing to meet 
criterion 1 were published in German. 
Following a review of the full texts of the remaining 67 records (in which inclusion 
criteria 1 to 6 were applied sequentially), a further 55 were excluded. Commonly 
excluded articles at this stage reported public preferences regarding the 
prioritisation of health care resources based on severity (amongst other criteria) 
but did not define severity in terms of life expectancy, or did not report the results 
in such a way that preferences regarding life expectancy could be inferred. 
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Figure 2-1. Flow chart of search results 
 
The reference lists of the articles whose full texts were reviewed identified a further 
eight articles that were relevant to the research question but had not been picked 
up by the SSCI search. For example, two of these articles did not include the term 
health in their titles, abstracts or keywords. The additional articles met all six of the 
criteria for inclusion. The initial review had included four articles that were known to 
the author and were considered relevant to the research question, but had been 
published after the SSCI search was conducted. These four articles were all 
identified in the updated search. 
In cases where an article described a large study comprising multiple sub-studies 
with distinct methods and/or samples (e.g. Baker et al., 2010a), only the data for 
the sub-studies that were relevant to the research question were extracted. 
2.3.3 Description of included studies 
The included articles (Table 2-4) were published between 2000 and 2015, with the 
majority conducted and published after NICE issued its supplementary advice on 
end of life in January 2009. Ten of the studies (50%) used a solely UK-based 
sample, with the other studies originating elsewhere in Europe and in Australia, 
Canada, Japan, South Korea and the United States. Two studies included multi-
country samples (Pennington et al., 2015; Shiroiwa et al., 2010). The distribution 
of key variables across the 20 articles is shown in  
Table 2-5. Full details are available in Appendix 3.
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Table 2-4. Summary of included studies (n=20) 
Record Authors (date) Country Sample size 
(type) 
Method a Mode of administration Summary of primary study objective(s) 
1 Abel Olsen (2013) NOR 503 (public) Choice Internet survey To test for support for end of life prioritisation and the fair 
innings approach 
2 Baker et al. 
(2010a) 
UK 587 (public) DCE Computer-assisted 
personal interview 
To test for support for multiple prioritisation criteria 
3 Dolan and 
Cookson (2000) 
UK 60 (public) Choice Focus groups 
(individual responses) 
Qualitative examination of support for multiple prioritisation 
criteria 
4 Dolan and Shaw 
(2004) 
UK 23 (public) Choice Focus group (individual 
responses) 
To test for support for multiple prioritisation criteria 
5 Dolan and 
Tsuchiya (2005) 
UK 100 (public) Choice; 
ranking  
Individual self-
completion survey 
(completed in group 
setting) 
To compare support for prioritisation according to age vs. 
prioritisation according to severity/life expectancy 
6 Lim et al. (2012) ROK 800 (public) DCE Internet survey To test for support for multiple prioritisation criteria 
7 Linley and Hughes 
(2013) 
UK 4,118 (public) Budget 
allocation 
Internet survey To test for support for multiple prioritisation criteria  
8 McHugh et al. 
(2015) 
UK 61 (‘data-rich’ 
individuals) b 
Q method Non-computer assisted 
personal interview 
Qualitative examination of societal perspectives in relation to 
end of life prioritisation 
9 Pennington et al. 
(2015) 
Multiple 17,657 (public) WTP Internet survey To compare WTP for different types of QALY gain 
10 Pinto-Prades et al. 
(2014) 
SPA 813 (public) WTP; PTO Computer-assisted 
personal interview 
To test for support for end of life prioritisation and to compare 
support for life extensions vs. quality of life improvements 
11 Richardson et al. 
(2012) 
AUS 544 (public) Other Multiple modes: 
Internet survey and 
self-completion survey 
(postal) 
To test a technique for measuring support for health-
maximisation and health sharing 
12 Rowen et al. 
(2016a) 
UK 3,669 (public) DCE Internet survey To test for support for multiple prioritisation criteria 
13 Rowen et al. 
(2016b) 
UK 371 (public) Choice Multiple modes: 
Internet survey and 
To test for framing and mode of administration effects in the 
elicitation of preferences regarding burden of illness 
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Record Authors (date) Country Sample size 
(type) 
Method a Mode of administration Summary of primary study objective(s) 
non-computer assisted 
personal interview 
14 Shah et al. (2014) UK 50 (public) Choice Non-computer assisted 
personal interview 
To test for support for end of life prioritisation 
15 Shah et al. 
(2015a) 
UK 3,969 (public) DCE Internet survey To test for support for end of life prioritisation 
16 Shiroiwa et al. 
(2010) 
Multiple 5,620 (public) WTP Internet survey To obtain the monetary value of a QALY (in six countries) 
17 Shiroiwa et al. 
(2013) 
JPN 2,283 (public) WTP Internet survey To obtain the monetary value of a QALY 
18 Skedgel et al. 
(2015) 
CAN 595 (public); 61 
(decision-
makers) 
DCE Internet survey To test for support for multiple prioritisation criteria 
19 Stahl et al. (2008) USA 623 (public) Choice Internet survey To test for support for multiple prioritisation criteria 
20 Stolk et al. (2005) NLD 65 (students, 
researchers, 
health policy 
makers) 
Choice Non-computer assisted 
personal interview 
To test for support for multiple approaches to priority-setting 
a Choice = choice exercise that did not include design or analysis methods associated with the DCE technique; DCE = discrete choice experiment; PTO = person trade-off; WTP = 
willingness-to-pay 
b Made up of 59 data-rich individuals with different types of experiences or expertise in end of life in a professional and/or personal capacity (e.g. researchers, pharmaceutical 
industry employees, patient group representatives, religious group representatives, clinicians, people with experience of terminal illness in family members), plus two ‘meta-
respondents’ representing the views of 250 general public respondents. 
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Table 2-5. Distribution of key variables (n=20) 
Variable Frequency % 
Year of study publication 
- Prior to 2009 
- 2009 onwards 
 
5 
15 
 
25% 
75% 
Year of study conduct a 
- Prior to 2009 
- 2009 onwards 
 
7 
13 
 
35% 
65% 
Sample size 
- 1-99 
- 100-999 
- 1,000+ 
 
5 
9 
6 
 
25% 
45% 
30% 
Perspective 
- Own health  
- Social decision-maker  
- Both 
 
2 
16 
2 
 
10% 
80% 
10% 
Method / preference elicitation technique 
- Discrete choice experiment 
- Other choice exercise 
- Budget allocation 
- Q methodology 
- Willingness-to-pay 
- Person trade-off and willingness-to-pay b 
- Ranking exercise and other choice exercise c 
- Other 
 
5 
7 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
 
25% 
35% 
5% 
5% 
15% 
5% 
5% 
5% 
Mode of administration 
- Internet survey 
- Computer-assisted personal interview 
- Non-computer-assisted personal interview 
- Focus group 
- Self-completion paper survey (completed in group setting) 
- Multiple modes d  
 
10 
2 
3 
2 
1 
2 
 
50% 
10% 
15% 
10% 
5% 
10% 
Disease labelled? 
- No 
- Yes – choice between several named diseases 
- Yes – choice between treatments for a single named disease 
 
16 
1 
3 
 
80% 
5% 
15% 
Shortest life expectancy presented 
- 0mths (i.e. imminent death) 
- 0mths < LE ≤3mths 
- 3mths < LE ≤ 12mths 
- 12mths < LE  
- No length specified 
 
4 
6 
6 
3 
1 
 
20% 
30% 
30% 
15% 
5% 
Possible to express indifference? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Not reported / unclear 
 
10 
9 
1 
 
50% 
45% 
5% 
Visual aids used? 
- Yes e 
- No  
 
10 
10 
 
50% 
50% 
Strength of preference examined at the individual respondent level? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Not reported / unclear 
 
9 
10 
1 
 
45% 
50% 
5% 
Qualitative data or explanations for choices sought? 
- Yes 
- No / not reported 
 
8 
12 
 
40% 
60% 
Impact of background characteristics  
- At least one characteristic found to be associated with preferences 
- No characteristics found to be associated with preferences 
- Not reported 
 
5 
6 
9 
 
25% 
30% 
45% 
Any reference to age-related preferences? 
- Yes 
- No 
 
12 
8 
 
60% 
40% 
Any reference to time-related preferences? 
- Yes – an attempt was made to control for or analyse time-related 
preferences 
- Yes – time-related preferences were mentioned but not controlled for 
- No 
 
3 
3 
14 
 
15% 
15% 
70% 
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Variable Frequency % 
Overall finding: end of life vs. non-end of life 
- Consistent with an end of life premium 
- Not consistent with an end of life premium 
- Mixed or inconclusive evidence 
 
7 
9 
4 
 
35% 
45% 
20% 
Overall finding: quality of life-improving vs. life-extending end of life 
treatments 
- Quality of life improvement preferred 
- Life extension preferred 
- Mixed or inconclusive evidence 
- Not examined / reported 
 
2 
1 
1 
16 
 
10% 
5% 
5% 
80% 
a Not always reported – in some cases this was inferred based on the year of study publication; in other 
cases clarification was sought by means of personal communication with authors 
b Separate methods – all respondents completed tasks using both methods 
c Hybrid method – all respondents were asked first to choose which of six patient groups to treat, and 
then to rank the six patient groups in order of preference 
d Internet survey and self-completion paper survey; internet survey and non-computer-assisted personal 
interview 
e One study is counted as a study that used visual aids on the basis that visual aids were used in the 
majority of study arms (and for the majority of respondents) 
2.3.4 Methods used to elicit preferences 
Thirteen of the 20 studies (65%) elicited preferences using some form of choice 
exercise whereby respondents were presented with multiple hypothetical patients 
(or patient groups) and were asked which they thought should be treated. In most 
cases the tasks involved pairwise choices, though Dolan and Shaw (2004) and 
Dolan and Tsuchiya (2005) both asked respondents to choose between six 
alternatives. Five of the choice exercise studies explicitly applied the DCE method 
as defined by Carson and Louviere (2011) – that is, an approach in which choices 
are made between discrete alternatives where at least one attribute is 
systematically varied in such a way that information related to preference 
parameters of an indirect utility function can be inferred. 
A related approach, budget allocation, allows respondents to indicate the strength 
of their preference by specifying how funding should distributed among the 
candidate beneficiaries. The results of this method can be simplified by reporting, 
for example, whether respondents gave the majority of the budget to one group or 
another, or opted for an equal allocation between the groups. Indeed, the sole 
budget allocation study (Linley and Hughes, 2013) reported their results in this 
way. Respondents had 11 different distributions of funding to choose from but the 
authors collapsed the results into three categories (as above), making them 
comparable with studies which used pairwise choice tasks with an indifference 
option (e.g. Shah et al., 2014).    
Most of the studies used methods that are well-established in the field of health 
care preference elicitation (Ryan et al., 2001). A more novel approach, which 
combined elements of the budget allocation and choice exercise techniques, was 
used in one study (Richardson et al., 2012). Respondents were asked to allocate a 
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set budget to one of the four patients (all of whom were the same age and faced 
immediate death without treatment), which would have the effect of extending 
their lives by 12, 8, 6 or 4 years, respectively. After allocating the first budget, they 
were then given a second budget (of the same size and with the same life-
extending effects) to allocate in addition to the first. The procedure was repeated 
30 times. Respondents’ allocations gave an indication of whether they sought to 
maximise the number of years gained or to sacrifice overall gains by giving priority 
to the patient with the shortest life expectancy. 
Another less established approach (in the field of health economics, at least) – Q 
methodology (Watts and Stenner, 2012) – was used in one study (McHugh et al., 
2015). Q methodology combines qualitative and quantitative methods to study 
people’s subjective opinions, values and beliefs (Baker et al., 2006). Respondents 
were presented with 49 statements describing views relating to the provision of end 
of life treatments. Following a structured process, they were asked to sort and 
position the statements on a response grid depending on whether they agreed with, 
disagreed with or were neutral towards them. They were then asked to articulate 
their views and to comment on statements that had been placed in the extremes of 
the grid. The researchers used factor analysis to identify underlying patterns in the 
resulting ‘Q sorts’. 
Four studies employed the willingness-to-pay method (Shiroiwa et al., 2010; 
Shiroiwa et al., 2013; Pinto-Prades et al., 2014; Pennington et al., 2015), in which 
respondents were asked whether and how much they would be willing to pay, from 
their own pocket, for a given improvement in health or life extension – or in the 
case of Pinto-Prades et al. (2014), for a specified chance of improvement. 
Respondents were generally expected to take an ‘own health’ perspective (i.e. to 
imagine that they were the beneficiaries of the treatment on offer) when 
completing the willingness-to-pay tasks. The other studies employed a ‘social 
decision-maker’ perspective whereby respondents were expected to make choices 
that they considered most appropriate and acceptable for society rather than those 
guided purely by self-interest. One study employed both an own health perspective, 
in willingness-to-pay tasks, and a social decision-maker perspective, in person 
trade-off tasks (Pinto-Prades et al., 2014). Another study examined respondents’ 
willingness-to-pay for life extensions not only for themselves but also for a family 
member (via an out-of-pocket payment) and for an unidentified member of society 
(via a tax increase) (Shiroiwa et al., 2010). 
One study compared two operationalisations of the social decision-maker 
perspective, asking half of the respondents to adopt the role of a decision-maker 
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and assigning the other half to a ‘veil of ignorance’ condition (Dolan and Cookson, 
2000). In the Q methodology study, the vast majority of statements presented 
were framed in a manner consistent with a social decision-maker perspective, 
though a few referred to the respondent’s own health or situation – for example, “I 
wouldn’t want my life to be extending just for the sake of it – just keeping 
breathing is not life” (McHugh et al., 2015).  
Thirteen studies (65%) used modes of administration that required respondents to 
complete the tasks without an interviewer or moderator present to provide 
guidance. With one exception (Baker et al., 2010a), the DCE studies were all 
administered via internet surveys, most likely due to the ease of obtaining large 
samples with this mode. There has been a shift towards computer-based survey 
administration over time – the review included only two studies published since 
2005 which did not use either an internet survey or computer-assisted personal 
interview approach. 
Visual aids were used by 10 studies (50%), including all of the DCE studies. The 
same number of studies permitted respondents to express indifference between or 
assign equal value to the alternatives presented. Eleven studies (55%) reported 
that their design had been informed by piloting. 
In each study, with the exception of the Q methodology study, the size of the 
health gain was controlled for either in the design (e.g. by presenting equal-sized 
gains for all candidate recipients) or in the analysis. 
2.3.5 Samples 
Most of the studies used general public samples, though the extent to which the 
samples were representative of the relevant populations was mixed. McHugh et al. 
(2015) used a purposive sample comprising data-rich individuals (that is, 
individuals expected to have ‘rich, strong and different views’ on the topic) with 
different types of experiences or expertise in end of life in a professional or 
personal capacity. Skedgel et al. (2015) surveyed a small number of decision-
makers (n=61; out of a total sample of 656 respondents) with the aim of 
contrasting their responses with those of the general public. Stolk et al. (2005) 
used a convenience sample consisting of students, researchers and health policy 
makers – all of whom had some level of expertise in the topic of health care 
priority-setting.  
The samples ranged from 23 individuals recruited from a single small city (Dolan 
and Shaw, 2004) to 17,657 individuals recruited from nine different countries 
(Pennington et al., 2015). The six largest-sample studies (n≥1,000) were all 
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administered over the internet and recruited respondents from panels managed by 
market research agencies. 
2.3.6 End of life definitions 
Eight articles (40%) explicitly mentioned end of life, or some synonym for end of 
life, in the stated study objectives. Of the remaining studies, some included end of 
life amongst several prioritisation criteria examined (e.g. Linley and Hughes, 2013), 
whilst others sought to answer an altogether different research question but 
happened to provide evidence relevant to end of life-related preferences indirectly 
(e.g. Richardson et al., 2012). In the latter cases, preferences regarding end of life 
were inferred by extracting the results that could be used to draw conclusions 
about the values of a given gain for patients with different life expectancies 
(occasionally making calculations beyond those presented in the journal articles as 
necessary). End of life was most commonly presented in terms of patients’ ‘life 
expectancy’ or ‘remaining life years’ if they did not receive the treatment, health 
care or transplant on offer. Other terms used included ‘future years’, ‘urgency’, 
‘fatal disease’ and ‘imminent death’.  
A wide range of levels for the ‘life expectancy without treatment’ attribute (where 
applicable) was used. Some studies, none of which explicitly set out to examine 
preferences related to end of life, asked respondents to consider scenarios where 
patients would die immediately in absence of treatment, which meant in effect that 
their life expectancy without treatment was zero. In two studies (Stolk et al., 2005; 
Baker et al., 2010a), information on the patients’ life expectancy was not presented 
directly but could be calculated using the attributes that were included. 
All but three of the studies presented at least one alternative in which the patient or 
patient group would live for less than two years without treatment, which would 
make them potentially eligible for special consideration under NICE’s criteria (NICE, 
2009c). The first exception is Dolan and Cookson (2000), whose only question 
relevant to this review involved choosing between two patient groups who would 
live for 10 or 30 years without treatment (they included other questions in which 
the life expectancies were shorter but did not differ between the patient groups, 
hence no end of life versus non-end of life comparison could be made). The second 
exception is Rowen et al. (2016b), whose only question relevant to this review 
involved choosing between two patient groups who would live for five or 10 years 
without treatment. The third exception is McHugh et al. (2015), whose method did 
not involve choices between patients with specified life expectancies, and whose 
statements did not mention specific life expectancy values. 
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2.3.7 Comparators and other attributes examined 
In the majority of studies, the key comparison – at least for the purposes of this 
review – was between an alternative describing a short, fixed amount of remaining 
life without treatment and one or more alternatives describing longer, fixed 
amounts of remaining life without treatment. Three studies, all of which applied the 
willingness-to-pay method, used different types of comparators (Shiroiwa et al., 
2013; Pinto-Prades et al., 2014; Pennington et al., 2015). These studies all 
included scenarios involving temporary quality of life losses, and sought 
respondents’ willingness-to-pay to avoid those losses. One of the three studies also 
included a scenario involving a life extension at the end of the respondent’s own 
stated life expectancy, and another involving spending time in a coma (Pennington 
et al., 2015).  
While several studies included attributes relating to quality of life gains, only three 
explicitly tested and reported whether respondents preferred quality of life 
improvements or life extensions for end of life patients (Pinto-Prades et al., 2014; 
Shah et al., 2014; Shah et al., 2015a). Other studies collected the data required to 
make such comparisons possible but did not focus on quality of life in the published 
articles. 
Nine studies (45%) purposely included information about age, thereby providing 
evidence on interactions between respondents’ preferences regarding age and 
regarding end of life. One study (5%) attempted to control for time-related 
preferences by including questions designed to identify whether any observed 
preference for treating patients with shorter life expectancy is driven by a 
preference for the benefits of treatment to occur sooner rather than later (Shah et 
al., 2014).  
2.3.8 Findings of the studies 
2.3.8.1 Evidence consistent with an end of life premium 
Seven studies (35%) report evidence of support for placing greater weight on a unit 
of health gain for patients with relatively short life expectancy than on that for 
other types of patients. Their findings are summarised briefly below (presented in 
chronological order). 
Stahl et al. (2008) report that respondents preferred treating the patient who was 
closer to death until the difference in life expectancy was less than 1.1 months 
(beyond which they showed no preference for the patient with shorter life 
expectancy). They also report that when one patient was set to gain a shorter life 
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extension than another, the former needed to have a shorter life expectancy 
without treatment in order to be given priority overall (up to a threshold). 
Shiroiwa et al. (2010) report that in all six countries examined, higher willingness-
to-pay values were observed in scenarios where respondents had zero years of life 
expectancy than in scenarios where they had five years of life expectancy.  
Lim et al. (2012) report that higher priorities were given to patients with less 
remaining life, noting that that respondents overall were willing to give up a 0.39 
QALY gain in order to treat the patient whose life expectancy without treatment was 
one level (usually five years) lower. 
Pinto-Prades et al. (2014) report that six- or 18-month life extensions for end of life 
patients were valued more highly than temporary quality of life improvements for 
non-end of life patients that were equivalent in terms of the number of QALYs 
gained. They note that this result was observed in both the willingness-to-pay and 
the person trade-off surveys, though the patterns of responses differed across the 
two methods. 
Rowen et al. (2016a) report results that showed support for an end of life premium 
across different regression models, with evidence of a preference for treating 
patients with shorter life expectancy without treatment. However, the responses to 
their follow-up (attitudinal, non-choice-based) questions appear to contradict this 
finding. 
Shah et al. (2014) report that the majority of respondents chose to give a six-
month life extension to the patient with one year left to live without treatment 
rather than to the patient with 10 years left to live without treatment. However, 
they also noted that a non-trivial minority of respondents expressed the opposite 
preference.  
Pennington et al. (2015) report that the mean and median willingness-to-pay 
values for one QALY worth of life extension achieved in the scenario of ‘imminent, 
premature death from a life threatening disease’ were considerably larger than 
those for an equal-sized gain achieved at the end of respondents’ self-predicted life 
expectancy. 
2.3.8.2 Evidence not consistent with an end of life premium 
Nine studies (45%) report evidence that people do not wish to place greater weight 
on a unit of health gain for patients with relatively short life expectancy than on 
that for other types of patients.  
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Dolan and Shaw (2004) report that the majority of respondents chose to give 
priority to the patient with the longest life expectancy without a kidney transplant 
and who stood to gain the most from receiving the transplant. When it was later 
revealed that the end of life patient was the oldest of the six candidate recipients, 
none of the respondents chose to give the transplant to that patient. 
Dolan and Tsuchiya (2005) report that respondents priority ranked end of life 
patients lower than corresponding non-end of life patients for all levels of age and 
past health. They also note that the coefficient for future years (life expectancy 
without treatment) as a main effects variable was not statistically significant. 
Stolk et al. (2005) report priority rankings (based on respondents’ choices in paired 
comparison tasks) of 10 conditions that correlated poorly and non-significantly with 
the theoretical ranking implied by a ‘priority to shorter life expectancy’ approach. 
Other theoretical rankings (severity, fair innings, proportional shortfall) were all 
significantly correlated with the observed ranking. Respondents were less 
concerned about life-threatening conditions for the elderly than prospective health 
theories that ignore the past (i.e. age) would have predicted. 
Abel Olsen (2013) reports evidence of strong support for the fair innings argument, 
noting that respondents’ choices were not affected by differences in patients’ 
remaining lifetime without treatment. 
Linley and Hughes (2013) report that, when faced with a choice between treating 
one patient group with a life expectancy of 18 months and another patient group 
with a life expectancy of 60 months, about two-thirds of respondents opted not to 
allocate more resources to the end of life group. The most popular choice was to 
allocate an equal amount of funding to both groups. 
Shiroiwa et al. (2013) report that the proportions of respondents willing to pay an 
initial bid value for gains worth 0.2 or 0.4 QALYs were consistently lower in end of 
life scenarios than in non-end of life scenarios. Further, the average willingness-to-
pay per QALY values observed in the end of life scenarios were generally lower than 
in the non-end of life scenarios. 
Shah et al. (2015a) report a statistically significantly negative coefficient for the life 
expectancy without treatment variable, but noted that it was very small in 
magnitude compared to the health gain coefficients and had very little impact on 
the choices made by respondents. An end of life dummy variable defined purely in 
terms of life expectancy without treatment was found to have a small and non-
significant coefficient. 
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Skedgel et al. (2015) report evidence of statistically significant and negative 
(positive) welfare effects associated with prioritising patients with the shortest 
(longest) level of initial life expectancy. 
Rowen et al. (2016b) report an approximately equal split between choosing to treat 
a patient group with a life expectancy of five years and choosing to treat another 
patient group with a life expectancy of 10 years. Tests of association conducted by 
the authors indicate that this result did not depend on the mode of administration, 
wording of the question, or use of visual aids.   
2.3.8.3 Studies reporting mixed or inconclusive evidence 
Four studies (20%) reported evidence that cannot easily be interpreted as being 
clearly consistent or inconsistent with an end of life premium. This was either 
because of heterogeneous preferences or because the observed results were not 
sufficiently robust. 
Dolan and Cookson (2000) report that when asked to choose between giving a 10-
year life extension to one patient group with 10 years of life expectancy without 
treatment and another with 30 years of life expectancy, 2% of respondents chose 
the latter; 50% chose the former; and 48% gave the same priority to both groups. 
Baker et al. (2010a) assessed preferences for different scenarios relative to a 
reference scenario of treating 40 year old patients expected to die at 60 years with 
a 0.7 quality of life loss without treatment. They report that in scenarios which were 
purely life-saving (i.e. involving immediate death without treatment), a preference 
was observed for treating patients aged 10 years relative to the reference scenario 
(controlling for the size of QALY gain). For other ages (1, 40 or 70 years), the 
reference scenario was preferred to the life-saving treatments. Similarly, life-saving 
treatments for 10 year old patients were preferred to treatments (offering the same 
QALY gains) for 10 year old patients who would not die immediately if left 
untreated, whilst the opposite was observed for patients of other ages. 
Richardson et al. (2012) report that the majority of respondents did not behave in a 
QALY-maximising manner, with 69% allocating one of their first four budgets to the 
patient who stood to gain least (a four-year life extension) rather than giving that 
budget to the patient who stood to gain most (12-year life extension). The authors 
note that the average respondent allocated resources in such a way that 62.6% of 
possible gains in life years were achieved, with 37.4% of gains sacrificed to achieve 
sharing. In their regression models, life expectancy is a dominating variable – 
across all choices, the greater a given patient’s life expectancy, the smaller the 
probability of that patient receiving resources (i.e. further life extensions).  
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McHugh et al. (2015) identified three ‘factors’ (shared perspectives) in their 
analysis. The first factor describes the view that society’s interests are best served 
by seeking to maximise population health, and that “terminal illness should not be 
treated as a special case” (p.9). The second factor emphasises patient choice and 
the right to life-extending treatment for patients who want it, though this right may 
apply to non-end of life as well as end of life conditions. The third factor permits 
cases where special value is placed on extending the life of end of life patients, but 
this value is not unconditional and must be weighed up against opportunity costs. 
The findings demonstrate the ‘plurality of views’ within society and the authors 
highlight the problems associated with determining policy based on simple majority 
votes. 
Table 2-6 compares the distribution of selected variables of interest among studies 
that report evidence consistent with an end of life premium with those among 
studies that do not. 
Table 2-6. Distribution of selected variables, by overall study finding 
Variable Evidence consistent with an 
end of life premium 
Evidence not consistent with 
an end of life premium 
Country 
- UK 
- Europe (non-UK) 
- Rest of the world a 
 
2 
2 
3 
 
5 
2 
2 
Method b 
- DCE 
- Other choice exercise 
- Willingness-to-pay 
- Other 
 
2 
2 
3 
1 
 
2 
4 
1 
2 
Mode of administration c 
- Internet survey 
- Other 
 
5 
2 
 
6 
4 
Possible to express 
indifference? 
- Yes 
- No or not reported 
 
 
5 
2 
 
 
3 
6 
Visual aids used? d 
- Yes 
- No or not reported 
 
5 
2 
 
3 
7 
a Includes a multi-country study conducted in Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, UK and USA. 
Counted as a ‘Rest of the world’ study because the UK sample comprised less than 20% of the total 
sample.  
b Study combining person trade-off and willingness-to-pay methods counted as two studies since 
separate results are reported for both. Study combining ranking exercise and other choice exercise 
counted as one study since this is considered to be a single hybrid method. 
c Study combining internet survey and non-computer-assisted personal interview modes of 
administration counted as two studies since separate results are reported for both. 
d Study combining visual aid and no visual aid arms counted as two studies since separate results are 
reported for both.      
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2.3.8.4 Other findings of relevance 
Most of the studies did not examine or report explicitly whether quality of life 
improvements or life extensions for end of life patients were preferred, though in 
some cases it would have been possible to examine this given the nature of the 
data collected. Two studies reported that respondents favoured quality of life 
improvements (Pinto-Prades et al., 2014; Shah et al., 2014); and one study 
reported that respondents favoured life extensions (Shah et al., 2015a) – 
controlling for the size of health gain in all cases. 
The majority of studies included patient age in the study design. In some cases age 
was one of several prioritisation criteria being examined; in other cases, the 
researchers were seeking to examine whether respondents’ end of life-related 
preferences were influenced by the ages of the patients. The findings of two studies 
suggest that respondents become less concerned about the number of remaining 
life years when the patients in question are relatively old (Dolan and Shaw, 2004; 
Stahl et al., 2008). One study did not find that concern about age is a motivating 
factor for giving priority to the treatment of end of life patients (Shah et al., 2014), 
though the range of ages presented was narrow (nine years). Several studies 
reported evidence that respondents gave priority to younger patients, often without 
making an explicit link between age-related preferences and end of life-related 
preferences (Dolan and Cookson, 2000; Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2005; Stolk et al., 
2005; Baker et al., 2010a; Abel Olsen, 2013; Skedgel et al. 2015). 
Time-related preferences were mentioned in only a few of the studies. One study 
reported evidence that patients who have only just learned their prognosis are 
given priority over those who have known about their prognosis for some time, 
controlling for life expectancy (Shah et al., 2014).13 Another study interpreted 
differences between willingness-to-pay values in end of life and non-end of life 
scenarios in terms of time preference, and used the data to estimate discount rates 
(Shiroiwa et al., 2010). Three studies acknowledged that their findings may have 
been influenced by respondents’ time preference or that applying a positive 
discount rate in the analysis would have led to slightly (albeit not qualitatively) 
different results (Richardson et al., 2012; Pennington et al., 2015; Shah et al., 
2015a).  
Two studies reported evidence that older respondents were more likely than 
average to make choices based on patients’ life expectancy without treatment 
(Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2005; Stahl et al., 2008). One of the willingness-to-pay 
                                           
13 Similar analyses were also conducted by Shah et al. (2015b) but were not reported in the journal 
article and were therefore not included in the review. Full details are available in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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studies reported that older age was associated with lower valuation for life 
extensions in the own terminal illness scenario (Pennington et al., 2015). Other 
background characteristics found to be associated with respondents’ priority-setting 
preferences were: education (Dolan and Tsuchiya (2005) and Shiroiwa et al. (2010) 
found that respondents with higher levels of education were more likely to place 
greater value on end of life treatments); employment status (Dolan and Tsuchiya 
(2005) found that respondents in employment were less likely to prioritise the 
treatment of end of life patients); health status (Pennington et al. (2015) found 
that respondents in better health gave higher valuations for life extensions at their 
own end of life); health history of family members (Stahl et al. (2008) found that 
respondents with transplant recipients in their family tended to prioritise 
transplants for patients with poor quality of life over those for patients with short 
life expectancy unless remaining life was extremely short, i.e. less than one 
month); and household income (Shiroiwa et al. (2010) found that respondents with 
higher household income levels gave higher willingness-to-pay values for life 
extensions at the end of life). However, the majority of studies either did not 
observe any associations between background characteristics and preferences or 
did not report any such analysis. McHugh et al. (2015) found that none of the 
academic researchers in their sample helped to define the shared account most 
closely related to support for an end of life premium, though the authors warn 
against making generalisations based on qualitative samples. 
2.4 Discussion 
Twenty empirical studies that inform the research question of whether members of 
the public wish to place greater weight on a unit of health gain for end of life 
patients than on that for other types of patients were identified and reviewed. The 
number of studies addressing this topic has been growing – several were initiated 
following (and refer explicitly to) the issuing of NICE’s supplementary advice on end 
of life treatments in January 2009. Many of the studies originated in the UK, which 
is unsurprising given the policy interest in NICE (an agency which make 
recommendations on the use of health technologies in England) and the country’s 
tradition of contributing to the literature on empirical ethics in health (Green, 
2011). Most of the studies reviewed used a preference elicitation technique that can 
be described as a ‘choice exercise’, with an increasing number specifically applying 
the DCE method. This reflects the growing popularity of the method in applied 
health economics research (Ryan et al., 2008; de Bekker-Grob et al., 2012; Clark 
et al., 2014), particularly in the field of health care priority-setting (Whitty et al., 
2014). DCEs are considered to enjoy a strong theoretical basis (Lancsar and 
50 
 
Donaldson, 2005) and there is evidence that the method is feasible, flexible and 
capable of presenting choices that are relevant to respondents (Louviere et al., 
2000; Ryan and Gerard, 2003).  
The primary finding of the review is that the existing evidence is mixed, with seven 
studies that report evidence consistent with a premium for end of life treatments 
and nine studies that do not. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no comparable 
up-to-date reviews are available. Two unpublished reviews of social value 
judgements in health care priority-setting, including those related to end of life, 
have been undertaken. One did not identify any relevant studies (Green, 2011); the 
other described the evidence base as ‘not strong’ (Keetharuth et al., 2011). In 
comparison to those reviews, this review was more successful in identifying 
relevant studies, in part because many of those studies have been undertaken and 
published in the last few years. Further, more specific and comprehensive 
approaches to searching for articles and extracting the relevant data were used in 
this review.  
Reviews of severity-related preferences more generally have been able to reach 
more decisive conclusions – Shah (2009) and Nord and Johansen (2014) both 
report an overall preference for giving higher priority to those who are severely ill – 
but as mentioned above the studies reviewed typically focused on severity in terms 
of quality of life, not length of life. Comparing the findings of the reviews of severity 
with those of the present review suggests that people are more likely to be 
concerned about treating patients with poor quality of life than with treating 
patients with short life expectancy. However, this supposition is not supported by 
individual studies that examined both simultaneously – Stahl et al. (2008), Shah et 
al. (2015a) and Rowen et al. (2016a) all report stronger support for giving priority 
to treating patients with relatively short life expectancy than to treating those with 
relatively poor quality of life, controlling for the size of health gain.  
Whether quality of life improvements or life extensions were preferred for end of 
life patients was also examined. Although several studies collected data on both 
types of health gain, only three reported their results so as to make this 
comparison possible.14 Again, the evidence is mixed, with two studies reporting 
evidence of an overall preference for quality of life improvement over life extension, 
and one study reporting the opposite. It is noteworthy that the current NICE policy 
involves giving greater weight to life-extending but not to quality of life-improving 
                                           
14 It should be noted that the primary focus of this review was whether gains for end of life patients are 
given more weight than gains for non-end of life patients, hence studies that focused only on end of life 
without a non-end of life comparator were excluded based on inclusion criterion 5 (see 2.2.2). Some of 
the excluded studies may have contained relevant information about whether quality of life 
improvements or life extensions are preferred in an end of life context.  
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treatments for those at the end of life. There is little evidence to suggest that such 
a policy is consistent with public preferences. 
The overall findings of studies were summarised by assigning each to one of three 
categories: (1) consistent with an end of life premium; (2) not consistent with an 
end of life premium; and (3) mixed or inconclusive evidence. In absence of a clear 
definition of what counted as ‘support’, this exercise involved a degree of subjective 
judgement. It is rarely the case in stated preference studies that a unanimous 
preference is observed. There is usually a split in opinion, and a judgement then 
needs to be made about whether the minority view is held by a sufficiently large 
number of respondents (or held sufficiently strongly) so as to conclude that the 
evidence is inconclusive overall. As far as possible, the study authors’ own 
conclusions were used as a guide. This was not always possible, since some studies 
did not set out to examine end of life-related preferences directly and further 
subjective interpretation of the reported results was required. In cases where there 
was uncertainty about the conclusions of a given study, the corresponding author 
was contacted to check that they agreed with the proposed summary and 
categorisation of their findings.  
The heterogeneity of preferences held by the general population is highlighted by 
McHugh et al. (2015), who identified three distinct shared perspectives in their 
data. If most or all of their respondents had expressed agreement with statements 
indicating clear support for prioritising treatments for end of life patients, the 
authors’ methods of analysis would have allowed a shared viewpoint consistent with 
an end of life premium to have emerged (McHugh, N., 2016, personal 
communication, 26 September). However, the data indicate that the views held by 
respondents were in fact more varied and nuanced than that. Other studies 
similarly identified multiple subgroups within their samples whose response 
patterns imply very different views about the value of end of life treatments (e.g. 
Pinto-Prades et al., 2014; Shah et al., 2015a). Given these findings, it is perhaps 
not surprising that this review has been unable to establish whether or not the 
overall evidence available in the literature is consistent with an end of life premium. 
Majoritarian decision rules are common in politics and policy making, with most 
elections and referendums in modern western democracies being decided by 
majority rule. However, such approaches are criticised for failing to achieve 
outcomes that represent the views of all sections of society in a representative 
manner (Mill, 1861). A hypothetical example of a study that would be problematic 
to categorise based on majority rule is one in which a slight (but statistically 
significant) majority of respondents express weak support for an end of life 
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premium and a sizeable minority strongly disfavour an end of life premium. Many of 
the studies in this review did not examine strength of preference at the individual 
respondent level and were not designed in such a way that nuances and caveats 
regarding respondents’ stated preferences could be captured. The normative basis 
for specifying a measure of average or overall preference in social choices is 
unclear – in the context of aggregating preferences regarding health states, Devlin 
et al. (2017) conclude that there are no strong grounds for favouring any one 
approach. 
Table 2-6 shows how studies that report evidence consistent with an end of life 
premium compare to those that do not. The number of studies included in the 
review is insufficient to permit meaningful testing of statistical associations, so any 
trends observed should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, there is weak 
evidence that studies were more likely to report evidence consistent with an end of 
life premium if they: used the willingness-to-pay method; allowed indifference to be 
expressed; or used visual aids. Each of these variables is discussed in turn below. 
2.4.1 Choice of method 
Most of the studies in this review asked respondents to adopt a social decision-
maker perspective – that is, they were asked to consider questions typically of 
concern to a health care decision-maker (such as whether one patient group or 
another should receive higher priority in the face of scarce shared resources) and to 
answer those questions based on what they consider to be appropriate and 
acceptable for society. The respondent (acting as decision-maker for the purpose of 
the study) would not necessarily expect to benefit personally from their choices. 
The four studies that used the willingness-to-pay approach, on the other hand, 
generally asked respondents to adopt an individual or own health perspective – that 
is, they were asked how much they would pay (from their own pocket) for a given 
improvement in their own health. This method is consistent with the welfarist view 
that confines the evaluative space to individual utility only – the ‘goodness’ of a 
policy can be judged solely on the basis of the utility gains and losses achieved by 
individuals affected by that policy (Brouwer et al., 2008).  
Three of the four willingness-to-pay studies report evidence consistent with an end 
of life premium, based on higher average willingness-to-pay values for a life 
extension in an end of life scenario than for a similar gain (e.g. worth the same 
number of QALYs) in a non-end of life situation. However, and as acknowledged by 
Pennington et al. (2015), willingness-to-pay valuations made by individuals facing 
the prospect of imminent death can be expected to be high because the opportunity 
costs in those circumstances are low or non-existent. Other than the ability to leave 
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a legacy, money is arguably of no use to individuals when they are dead. This is 
often referred to as the ‘dead-anyway’ effect whereby an increase in an individual’s 
mortality risk reduces their expected marginal utility of wealth (thereby increasing 
their willingness-to-pay) since the marginal utility of wealth when alive is greater 
than the marginal utility of wealth when dead (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1996). It is 
therefore understandable and perhaps consistent with utility-maximising behaviour 
for individuals nearing their end of life to be willing to spend most or all of the 
money they have on extending their life, even if the utility gains from the life 
extension are small. If such willingness-to-pay values are then used to inform 
decisions about how to spend a common pool of funding that has been raised from 
members of the public (many of whom will not be at their end of life), then the 
opportunity cost of expenditure on end of life treatments will be higher as it would 
result in foregoing spending on other treatments. It may therefore be considered 
inappropriate to use willingness-to-pay values elicited from an individual 
perspective to inform society-level decision-making. It should be noted, however, 
that Shiroiwa et al. (2010) observed higher values for gains accruing to 
respondents’ family members and to unidentified members of society than those 
accruing to the respondents themselves in five of the six countries studied. The 
authors suggest that this result may reflect altruistic preferences. 
When developing the inclusion criteria for this review, it was deemed appropriate to 
include own health perspective studies that clearly sought to inform health care 
priority-setting policies. Some own health perspective studies that appeared to 
report results of potential relevance to the overall research question were 
nevertheless excluded on the basis that they did not clearly seek to inform health 
care priority-setting policies (e.g. Kvamme et al., 2010). An alternative approach 
would have been to restrict the review to studies adopting a social decision-maker 
perspective. One of the studies that used the willingness-to-pay method would 
continue to be included in the review on the basis that it also reported preferences 
obtained using person trade-off tasks undertaken from a social decision-maker 
perspective (Pinto-Prades et al., 2014). The study by Shiroiwa et al. (2010) would 
be excluded on the basis that it employed a social decision-maker perspective in 
only one task, involving a scenario describing imminent death, so comparisons 
between end of life and non-end of life social decision-maker valuations would not 
be possible. Applying such a restriction would result in a slightly different balance of 
findings across the studies: of the studies that would remain, five report evidence 
consistent with an end of life premium and eight do not.  
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2.4.2 Inclusion of indifference options 
Studies that offered respondents the opportunity to express indifference between 
the alternatives on offer were more likely to report evidence consistent with an end 
of life premium than those that did not. The nature of the indifference options 
available differed across studies. In the choice exercise studies, options such as 
‘Can’t decide’ (Stahl et al., 2008) and ‘I have no preference’ (Shah et al., 2014) 
were presented. In the willingness-to-pay studies, respondents could express 
indifference by stating the same value for two or more different gains. In the 
budget allocation study, respondents could choose to split resources evenly 
between the two recipient groups. In the Q methodology study, respondents were 
required to position seven of the 49 statements in such a way that implied neither 
agreement nor disagreement.   
The way in which indifference options are framed can affect respondents’ 
willingness to choose those options – for example, Shah and Devlin (2012) reported 
that respondents showed an attraction to a 50:50 split when asked to allocate a 
budget between two patient groups but an aversion to an ‘I have no preference’ 
option in a choice exercise involving the same two groups. This finding is supported 
by those of the present review – the sole budget allocation study found that a 
50:50 split was the most popular option, and consequently was one of only three 
studies that both offered an indifference option and did not report evidence 
consistent with an end of life premium. It may be that respondents consider a 
50:50 split (but not an ‘I have no preference’ response) to be a legitimate choice 
when they find it difficult to choose between two options. Alternatively, they may 
be concerned about the implications of expressing indifference in a choice exercise 
– for example, they might be under the impression that failing to choose means 
that neither patient would receive the treatment on offer.  
When respondents are indifferent between the available options but no indifference 
option is available, they are forced to make a choice in order to proceed. In 
principle, these respondents should make their choices at random, which will tend 
to result in a roughly even split between the available options in the choice data. In 
practice, respondents may pursue an alternative choice strategy. For example, 
when faced with a choice between treating an end of life patient and a non-end of 
life patient, a respondent may anticipate other respondents choosing to treat the 
end of life patient but may themselves consider both patients to be equally 
deserving of treatment. If this respondent wishes that both patients should be 
given an equal opportunity to be treated, they may then express a preference for 
treating the non-end of life patient (to counteract the choices they anticipate the 
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other respondents making). This increases the likelihood of the study failing to find 
an overall preference for treating the end of patient. Evidence of such response 
behaviour has been discussed by Shah et al. (2015b).  
It is common for DCEs and studies using internet surveys – both of which are 
becoming increasingly popular in this field – not to include opt-out or indifference 
options. For DCEs, best practice guidelines advise that indifference options are 
often inappropriate as they can have implications for the experimental design and 
lead to the censoring of data (Bridges et al., 2011). For internet surveys, which are 
sometimes viewed with suspicion due to concerns about respondents’ 
attentiveness, indifference options are often avoided on the grounds that they will 
be used a default choice, thus providing respondents with a way to avoid taking 
time to make difficult decisions. If studies are less likely to detect support for an 
end of life premium if they do not include an indifference option, and if the trend for 
studies not to include an indifference option continues, then it can be expected that 
fewer studies will report evidence consistent with an end of life premium going 
forward.  
2.4.3 Use of visual aids 
The use of visual aids appears to be increasing. All but one of the seven studies 
published since 2014 included diagrams designed to help respondents make sense 
of the (often complex) choice tasks. These often took the form of figures depicting 
quality of life on one axis and length of life or time on the other. Visual aids were 
used in all five DCE studies reviewed, and in the majority of studies administered 
using a computer-based approach. 
Studies that used visual aids were more likely to report evidence consistent with an 
end of life premium than those that did not. One possible explanation is that very 
short amounts of time (in most studies respondents were presented with scenarios 
in which at least one patient had less than 12 months left to live) appear starker 
and more dramatic when presented graphically than when described verbally.  
It has been argued that graphs may not be the best way to present scenario 
information to survey respondents due to concerns that they unintentionally lead to 
different respondents interpreting the information in different ways (van de 
Wetering et al., 2015). For example, when faced with diagrams in which better 
quality of life and longer life expectancies are represented by larger areas, some 
respondents may (subconsciously or otherwise) be attracted to the larger areas and 
therefore to the alternatives depicted by diagrams showing longer life expectancies.  
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Such framing effects are clearly a matter of concern, particularly in studies where 
no interviewer is present, since the opportunities for instructing and debriefing 
respondents are very limited. This makes it difficult to know for certain the extent 
to which the choice data truly reflect the respondents’ beliefs and preferences, or 
whether the respondents interpreted and answered the questions as the researcher 
had intended them to. However, this concern is not restricted to the use of visual 
aids. One possibility is that respondents being presented with two or more 
hypothetical patients may mistakenly interpret the task as asking them which 
patient they would prefer to be in the position of rather than which patient they 
consider to be more deserving of treatment. It is not clear that such a 
misinterpretation would be more likely to occur in a survey using a combination of 
text and graphical descriptions than in one using only text descriptions. Indeed, if 
the issue is that respondents being presented with complex choice tasks do not 
always understand what is being asked of them, it seems intuitive to give them 
more, rather than less, assistance. 
Further, if the use of visual aids encourages respondents either to choose the 
patient they would prefer to be in the position of, or to choose the alternative 
associated with larger areas, then this would in most cases result in them being 
more likely to choose to treat patients with longer rather than shorter life 
expectancies. This is inconsistent with the finding of this review that studies using 
visual aids were more likely to report evidence consistent with an end of life 
premium than those that did not. One study that used two different question 
frames to understand respondents’ preferences regarding end of life found that 
many respondents expressed support for prioritising life-extending end of life 
treatments in the DCE tasks (which used visual aids) (Rowen et al., 2016a). 
However, the same respondents then gave responses to more direct attitudinal 
questions (which did not use visual aids) that suggest that they did not believe that 
the NHS should give priority to such treatments. Furthermore, the one study that 
actively set out to examine the impact of visual aids found that the propensity to 
choose to treat the patient group with shorter life expectancy was unaffected by 
whether or not diagrams were used to illustrate the information (Rowen et al., 
2016b).  
The findings of this review may suggest that the likelihood of a study providing 
evidence consistent with an end of life premium is linked to the choice of elicitation 
preference method and to whether indifference options and visual aids were used. 
However, it should also be noted that conflicting results were reported by two 
studies that did not differ in these respects. Shah et al. (2015a) and Rowen et al. 
(2016a) both used the DCE method with forced-choice tasks supported by visual 
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aids (indeed, Shah et al. acknowledge that they based their design on that of the 
Rowen et al. study, using very similar graphs and text descriptions to present 
information to respondents). Both studies also used similar samples – members of 
the UK public recruited from online panels and broadly representative of the 
general population in terms of age and gender.  
2.4.4 Limitations  
Some limitations of the review should be mentioned. Only one database – the SSCI 
– was searched. This is an interdisciplinary database covering around 3,000 
journals, including most major health economics and health policy journals known 
to the author. However, its focus is on social sciences, and does not cover all 
specialist medical and scientific journals that may have published articles that are 
relevant to the research question.    
The approach to identifying terms for the electronic search involved analysing the 
abstracts of key papers already known to the author to detect unique words that 
appeared in at least two of those abstracts. This ‘searching for search terms’ 
exercise was useful and led to the selection of additional terms that increased the 
specificity of the search. However, it could have been extended by examining the 
titles and keywords of the key papers in addition to their abstracts. For example, 
terms such as priority and empirical appear in the titles of the key papers but not in 
their abstracts, and were therefore overlooked. 
Throughout the search strategy development process, efforts were made to make 
the search more efficient – that is, to reduce the number of hits without losing any 
relevant records, and to increase the number of relevant records without 
substantially increasing the number of hits. The impact of changes to the search 
strategy was tested by informally assessing the results each time a change was 
made. For example, when adding a search term a selection of additional records 
identified was examined – the titles and abstracts of the most recent 20 records 
were scanned. A more robust approach would have been to randomly select the 
sample of 20 records. By default, the search results were ordered by publication 
date, so looking only at the first few records rather than at a random selection will 
have led to bias if recently published articles tend to use different terminology from 
older articles. 
The review included only articles that have been published in English. Only two 
records were excluded due to publication in a language other than English (Figure 
2-1), but this could be linked to the choices made regarding data sources and the 
search strategy. It is acknowledged that there may be studies that are relevant to 
the research question that have been published in other languages, and alternative 
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data sources could have been examined in order to identify these. However, it 
would have been very difficult to review these records, given the time constraints 
and limited foreign language skills of the author. 
On a related note, the review was to a large extent motivated by the policy context 
in the UK. The author of this review identifies as a health economics researcher 
based in the UK (the same is true of many of the authors of studies included in the 
review). Hence, the search terms considered are likely to reflect the language used 
by this particular subset of the academic community and may not be well suited for 
identifying, say, articles authored by ethicists or by researchers based in low and/or 
middle income countries.  
Only articles that elicited stated preferences with the intention of informing health 
care priority-setting policies were considered. There were a large number of studies 
that may have contained informative data but did not relate to a priority-setting or 
resource allocation context, such as surveys of end of life patients’ own preferences 
for living longer or maintaining quality of life. However, these studies were not 
relevant to the research question and therefore did not meet the criteria for 
inclusion in the review.  
Whereas reviews of clinical trials are subject to rigorous guidance on search 
methods, data extraction and evidence synthesis (Centre for Reviews and 
Dissemination, 2009; Liberati et al., 2009), such guidance is unavailable for reviews 
of stated preference studies. Although it cannot be claimed that the review is fully 
exhaustive, efforts have been made to be explicit about the methods used (and the 
reasons for using them) and balanced in the presentation of findings. Some of the 
limitations and potential biases associated with the approach have been 
acknowledged, and efforts have been made to minimise these as far as possible.  
As mentioned above, a formal assessment of study quality was not undertaken due 
to the lack of a known, standardised method for doing so. Instead, publication in a 
peer-reviewed journal was relied on as a proxy for quality. None of the studies 
included in the review was judged to be of such poor quality that their findings 
ought to be disregarded. However, it is acknowledged that there may be studies 
that are relevant to the research question that have not been published in a peer-
reviewed journal, such as those in the grey literature (for example, reports of 
NICE’s Citizens’ Council – see NICE, 2017a) and working papers or theses that have 
never been submitted to or accepted by a journal. 
The follow-up of reference lists of the articles whose full texts were reviewed was 
useful – eight of the 20 included articles (40%) were identified in this way. A 
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further step would have been to search for articles that have cited those already 
identified. This technique forms part of a search method known as ‘snowballing’ or 
‘citation pearl growing’ (Paisley, 2014).    
2.4.5 Gaps in the literature  
Given the possibility that the findings of stated preference studies are influenced by 
the choice of elicitation method or by characteristics of the study design, it would 
be informative for studies to use multiple methods or designs in order to test the 
robustness of their results. Most of the studies included in this review used a single 
method and design throughout. Exceptions to this include Pinto-Prades et al. 
(2014), who noted discrepancies between willingness-to-pay and person trade-off 
responses at the within-respondent level (though the same broad conclusion was 
reached using both methods); and Rowen et al. (2016b), who compared the results 
achieved using different modes of administration and question framings.  
A related issue is that few studies sought to understand whether respondents would 
agree with the researchers’ interpretations of their responses to the stated 
preference tasks. Rowen et al. (2016a) inferred from their DCE data that there was 
robust and consistent support for an end of life premium. Yet when asked about the 
prioritisation of end of life patients more directly later in the survey, the majority of 
respondents expressed views that implied the opposite conclusion. It would be 
informative for researchers to test the stability of respondents’ preferences – for 
example, by presenting the policy implications of their earlier choices and checking 
whether they agree with these (Whitty et al., 2014; Shah et al., 2015b). Studies 
applying techniques that are designed to allow unexpected views to emerge, such 
as Q methodology, also offer promise for researchers seeking to make sense of 
apparently inconsistent or counterintuitive preferences. 
As described above, an observed preference for giving priority to the treatment of 
end of life patients may in fact be driven by age- or time-related preferences. 
Several studies in this review did not control for (or even mention) age-related 
preferences, and only one study attempted to control for time-related preferences. 
If age- and time-related preferences are not controlled for, it will not always be 
clear what exactly is driving any observed preference for treating patients with 
shorter life expectancy, particularly if the differences between the life expectancies 
of the candidate beneficiaries are relatively large (e.g. Dolan and Cookson, 2000). 
In the only study that attempted to control for time-related preferences (Shah et 
al., 2014), the authors conjecture that the choices made by respondents may have 
been driven by concern about the suddenness of the patients’ disease progression, 
and therefore how much time they have had to ‘prepare for death’, rather than the 
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fact that they are at the end of life per se. Preferences regarding preparedness 
have received limited attention in the literature to date, and further investigation of 
this issue would be welcomed. 
2.5 Conclusions 
The literature review presented in this chapter has shown that the evidence on 
public preferences regarding end of life treatments is limited (but growing) and 
mixed. The research reported in the remainder of this thesis contributes to the 
evidence base – indeed, empirical studies 2 and 3 (Chapters 4 and 5, respectively) 
were included in the review, having been published in peer-reviewed journals prior 
to May 2016. All four empirical studies in this thesis attempt – using a variety of 
samples, methods and modes of administration – to shed light on the overarching 
research question of whether members of the public wish to place greater weight 
on a unit of health gain for end of life patients than on that for other types of 
patients.  
As noted in 1.9, the evidence was particularly scarce at the time when NICE’s policy 
was introduced. None of the studies included in the review that were published 
prior to 2013 explicitly set out to examine end of life-related preferences. Empirical 
studies 1 and 2 – both of which were conducted in 2011 – were amongst the first to 
investigate public preferences with specific regard to the NICE criteria. Empirical 
study 3 was conducted in 2012, at which time there was a dearth of large-scale 
studies of preferences of the UK public – the UK studies that had been published at 
the time had mostly used small samples of 100 respondents or fewer. It was also 
one of the first studies to have applied the DCE method in the end of life context. 
The review has highlighted a number of potential trends and gaps in the existing 
literature (as of May 2016). It is hypothesised that the findings of a given study of 
end of life-related preferences will be influenced by design choices such as the 
perspective respondents are asked to adopt, whether an indifference option is 
available, and whether visual aids are used to present information. Empirical study 
4 (Chapter 6) uses a multi-arm design to examine the impact of these factors. It 
also attempts to test the stability of respondents’ preferences by using two different 
types of question to elicit information on support for an end of life premium. 
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3 VALUING HEALTH AT THE END OF LIFE: AN 
EXPLORATORY PREFERENCE ELICITATION STUDY 
(EMPIRICAL STUDY 1)15 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes an exploratory preference elicitation study conducted in 
early 2011. It is the first of four empirical studies reported in this thesis, and can be 
considered a pilot for empirical study 2 (Chapter 4). The aim of the study is to 
design and pilot an approach to examining whether a policy of giving higher priority 
to life-extending end of life treatments (as specified by NICE) than to other types of 
treatments is consistent with the preferences of members of the public.  
At the time the study was conducted, it had been acknowledged that there was 
little evidence of public support for the premise underpinning NICE’s end of life 
policy. No comparable studies were available – the studies reviewed in Chapter 2 
that had been published prior to 2011 had all set out to address different research 
questions. 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Survey instrument 
A survey was developed in which respondents were presented with choice tasks 
based on five scenarios (S1 to S5). All respondents considered all five scenarios, in 
the same order. Each scenario presented respondents with information about two 
hypothetical individuals (patient A and patient B) who have been diagnosed with 
illness. This information was presented using written descriptions and diagrams. 
Both patients could benefit from treatment but the respondents were asked to 
assume that the health service had enough funds to treat one but not both of them. 
The question posed to respondents was: “Would you prefer to treat patient A or 
patient B?” (though they were also permitted to indicate that they had no 
preference; see below). The scenarios are replicated in full in Appendix 4, and 
summarised in Table 3-1.  
In scenarios S1, S2 and S3, treatment would extend the life of either patient A or 
patient B by six months (with certainty). The patients differed in terms of age and 
the amount of time between diagnosis and expected death. These scenarios did not 
                                           
15 A previous version of this chapter has been published as: Shah, K., Wailoo, A. and Tsuchiya, A., 2011. 
Valuing health at the end of life: an exploratory preference elicitation study. OHE Research Paper. 
London: Office of Health Economics. 
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examine quality of life – respondents were advised that the patients’ illnesses were 
asymptomatic and that treatment would not affect their quality of life.  
In S4 and S5, the illnesses were described as having a negative effect on quality of 
life, with both patients experiencing their final year of life at 50% of quality of life 
(described to respondents as ‘full health’). In these scenarios, treatment would 
restore patient A to full health (with no effect on life expectancy) or extend the life 
of patient B by one year (with no effect on quality of life). In all cases, the patients’ 
prognoses and gains from treatment were described as if they were known with 
certainty. 
Under the conditions that two years in 50% health is equivalent to one year in full 
health, and that a health gain today is equivalent to an equal-sized health gain in 
the future, both patient A and patient B will gain exactly the same amount of health 
from treatment in all five scenarios – half of a QALY. However, no specific 
explanation of the meaning of 50% health was provided to respondents.  
Table 3-1. Summary of scenarios used in the empirical study 1 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Without treatment 
Patient A life expectancy 10 years 1 year 10 years 1 year 10 years 
Patient A quality of life 100% 100% 100% 50%  50%  
Patient B life expectancy 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year 
Patient B quality of life 100% 100% 100% 50%  50%  
Gains from treatment 
Patient A life expectancy +6 mths +6 mths +6 mths No change No change 
Patient A quality of life No change No change No change +50% +50% a 
Patient B life expectancy +6 mths +6 mths +6 mths +1 year +1 year 
Patient B quality of life No change No change No change No change No change 
Undiscounted QALY gain from treatment b 
Patient A 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 
Patient B 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 
Age of patients A & B are  
same age 
A & B are 
same age 
B is 9 years 
older than A 
A & B are  
same age 
B is 9 years 
older than A 
Timing of scenario  
(when does the treatment 
decision occur) 
At time of A 
& B’s 
diagnosis 
9 years after 
A’s diagnosis 
At time of A 
& B’s 
diagnosis 
At time of A 
& B’s 
diagnosis 
At time of A 
& B’s 
diagnosis 
a Quality of life gain in final year of life only  
b Respondents did not see this information (the term ‘QALY’ was not used at any point in the survey) 
 
Scenario S1 provides a simple test of whether respondents wish to give higher 
priority to the treatment of end of life patients, as the only difference between the 
two patients at the start of the scenario is that patient B has a shorter amount of 
time left to live than patient A (one year would be classed as ‘short life expectancy’ 
under the first criterion of NICE’s end of life policy, whereas 10 years would not).  
However, the scenario design is such that there may be reasons other than 
favouring the treatment of end of life patients for choosing to treat patient B in S1. 
First, without treatment patient A will be nine years older when they die than 
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patient B will be when they die. Hence, a preference to treat patient B may be 
driven by a social preference for giving priority to the young. There is some 
evidence in the literature of public support for age weighting based on equity 
concerns (Dolan et al., 2005; Whitty et al., 2014; Gu et al., 2015). To address this 
issue, scenario S3 replicates S1 except that patient B is nine years older than 
patient A at the start of the scenario, which means that both patients will die at the 
same age without treatment.  
Second, the benefit from treating patient A would not take place until 10 years into 
the future (compared to one year into the future for patient B). Hence, a preference 
for treating patient B may be driven by a preference for enjoying benefits sooner 
rather than later. In general, it is assumed by health care decision-makers in the 
UK that society has a ‘positive time preference’ (HM Treasury, 2003), which means 
that the further into the future benefits are accrued, the lower the value of those 
benefits. To address this issue, scenario S2 replicates S3 except that patient A was 
diagnosed with their illness nine years prior to the start of the scenario. This means 
that the benefits from treating patient A would now take place one year into the 
future – the same as for patient B. Thus both patients are at the ‘end of life’ in S2, 
but patient B has progressed to this stage more suddenly than has patient A. 
As mentioned above, considerations of quality of life are introduced in scenarios S4 
and S5. S4 involves choosing between treatments that extend life and treatments 
that improve quality of life. NICE’s end of life criteria accommodate life extensions 
but not quality of life improvements. Scenario S5 combines elements of S3 and S4 
in that it involves choosing between treating a non-end of life patient (patient A) 
and an end of life patient (patient B) and between a quality of life-improving 
treatment (to patient A) and a life-extending treatment (to patient B).  
Conjectured explanations for different responses to selected key combinations of 
scenarios are presented in Table 3-2. Note that ‘time preference’ refers to a 
preference for enjoying benefits sooner rather than later; ‘age preference’ refers to 
a preference for favouring the treatment of younger patients; and ‘end of life 
preference’ refers to a preference for favouring the treatment of patients with short 
life expectancy who have little time to prepare for death due to the suddenness of 
disease onset. It is conjectured that a supporter of NICE’s end of life policy would 
choose to treat patient B in all scenarios, except perhaps S2 where it is unclear 
whether the supplementary advice applies (the criteria do not distinguish between 
sudden and non-sudden onset or progression of disease). 
 
64 
 
Table 3-2. Conjectured explanations for responses to selected scenario combinations 
Scenario Choice Scenario Choice Conjectured explanation 
S1 A S2 A Preferences run counter to end of life criteria 
S1 A S2 B  
Reverse time and/or age preference  
 
S1 A S2 I 
S1 I S2 B 
S1 B S2 A  
Time and/or age preference S1 B S2 I 
S1 I S2 A 
S1 B S3 B End of life preference  
S1 A S3 A Preferences run counter to end of life criteria 
S1 A S3 B  
Reverse age preference  
 
S1 A S3 I 
S1 I S3 B 
S1 B S3 A  
Age preference  S1 B S3 I 
S1 I S3 A 
S1 B S3 B End of life preference and/or time preference 
S2 A S3 A Preferences run counter to end of life criteria 
S2 A S3 B  
Time preference S2 A S3 I 
S2 I S3 B 
S2 B S3 A  
Reverse time preference  S2 B S3 I 
S2 I S3 A 
S2 B S3 B End of life preference  
S4 A S5 A Preference for quality of life-improving treatments 
S4 A S5 B  
End of life preference and/or time preference  S4 A S5 I 
S4 I S5 B 
S4 B S5 A 
Preferences run counter to end of life criteria / 
reverse time preference 
S4 B S5 I 
S4 I S5 A 
S4 B S5 B Preference for life-extending treatments 
S3 A S5 A Preferences run counter to end of life criteria 
S3 A S5 B  
Preference for life-extending treatments S3 A S5 I 
S3 I S5 B 
S3 B S5 A  
Preference for quality of life-improving treatments S3 B S5 I 
S3 I S5 A 
S3 B S5 B End of life preference and/or time preference 
A = respondent prefers to treat patient A; I = respondent indicates that they have no preference 
between treating patient A and treating patient B; B = respondent prefers to treat patient B 
3.2.2 Administration of survey 
The survey was administered using face-to-face interviews undertaken by the 
author. All interviews were carried out in a one-to-one setting in meeting rooms at 
the University of Sheffield’s School of Health and Related Research.  
Respondents were given a paper questionnaire (Appendix 4) and considered the 
scenarios one at a time. They were asked to read the description for each scenario 
before informing the interviewer of their answer. The aim was to elicit considered 
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responses, so respondents were encouraged to ‘think aloud’ and to discuss the 
reasons for their choices with the interviewer. They were also permitted to amend 
their responses in earlier scenarios if they changed their mind during the course of 
the interview. The interviewer emphasised that a ‘no preference’ response was 
acceptable. 
After completing the final scenario, the respondents were asked a series of probing 
questions designed to elicit qualitative information about the thinking behind their 
responses. Background information (age, gender, experience of serious illness) was 
collected at the end of the interview. All interviews were audio recorded with the 
permission of the respondents.  
3.2.3 Sample 
The survey was administered on a convenience sample of members of non-
academic staff and postgraduate research students at the University of Sheffield 
(excluding those in the Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and Health). The target 
sample size of 20 respondents was determined on the basis of available time and 
resources. The sample was recruited using two methods: (1) email invitation to 
participate sent to administrative, facilities, specialist and technical staff and 
postgraduate research students at the University of Sheffield (excluding those in 
the Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and Health); and (2) recruitment flyer posted in 
areas used by facilities staff at the University of Sheffield. Respondents received a 
£5 gift voucher to thank them for their participation. 
3.2.4 Ethical approval 
The survey design and sample recruitment procedures were reviewed and approved 
by the Research Ethics Committee at the School of Health and Related Research via 
the University of Sheffield Ethics Review Procedure. 
3.2.5 Methods of analysis 
Descriptive statistics were reported in order to summarise the sample and 
responses to the scenario questions. For the pairs of scenarios presented in Table 
3-2, the numbers and proportions of respondents making each combination of 
choices were analysed using cross-tabulations. Due to the small sample size and 
exploratory nature of the study, no statistical tests were conducted. 
Comments made by respondents, either when explaining their choices or when 
responding to the probing questions, were summarised by the author using 
paraphrasing or direct quotations.  
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3.3 Results 
Interviews were completed by 21 respondents in April 2011. The background 
characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 3-3. The sample includes a 
larger proportion of females than in the general population (Office for National 
Statistics, 2011). The age distribution is broadly similar to that of the general 
population when only individuals of working age (18 to 65 years) are considered. 
The convenience nature of the sample means that it excludes individuals who are 
unemployed and those who are employed in a professional role. 
 
Table 3-3. Sample background characteristics 
  n % Population 
Total  21 100.0%  
Age (years) 18-29 4 19.0% 21% 
30-44 7 33.3% 26% 
45-59 9 42.9% 25% 
60+ 1 4.8% 28% 
Gender Female 15 71.4% 51% 
Male 6 28.6% 49% 
Experience of 
serious illness 
In themselves 1 4.8%  
In their family 17 81.0%  
In caring for 
others 
7 33.3%  
Work status a Staff  20 95.2%  
Student  2 9.5%  
a One respondent was included under both categories (part-time postgraduate student, part-time 
administrative staff) 
All interviews lasted for between 20 and 35 minutes. All 21 respondents completed 
all five scenarios and answered all of the relevant probing questions. Data 
saturation was reached after approximately 15 interviews. 
3.3.1 Response data 
Table 3-4 reports aggregate response data for each of the five scenarios. Four 
respondents (19.0%) preferred to treat patient B in all five scenarios. 
Table 3-4. Aggregate response data for all scenarios 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Prefer to treat 
patient A 
3 (14.3%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (28.6%) 12 (57.1%) 6 (28.6%) 
No preference 2 (9.5%) 4 (19.0%) 3 (14.3%) 3 (14.3%) 2 (9.5%) 
Prefer to treat 
patient B 
16 (76.2%) 17 (81.0%) 12 (57.1%) 6 (28.6%) 13 (61.9%) 
Total 21 (100.0%) 21 (100.0%) 21 (100.0%) 21 (100.0%) 21 (100.0%) 
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Table 3-5 to Table 3-9 provide cross-tabulations of the response data for the 
combinations of scenarios shown in Table 3-2. In these tables, the value in each 
cell refers to the number of respondents expressing that set of preferences. 
Table 3-5. Cross-tabulation – S1 versus S2 
 
S1 
S2 
Prefer A No preference Prefer B Total 
Prefer A 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (14.3%) 3 (14.3%) 
No preference 0 (0.0% 2 (9.5%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (9.5%) 
Prefer B 0 (0.0%) 2 (9.5%) 14 (66.7%) 16 (76.2%) 
Total 0 (0.0%) 4 (19.0%) 17 (81.0%) 21 (100.0%) 
In S1, patient A and patient B are the same age today, and without treatment patient A will be nine 
years older when they die than patient B will be when they die; the treatment decision occurs at the 
time of diagnosis for both patient A and patient B. In S2, patient A and patient B are the same age 
today, and without treatment both patients will be the same age when they die; the treatment decision 
occurs at the time of diagnosis for patient B and nine years after the time of diagnosis for patient A. 
Most respondents preferred to treat patient B in both scenarios S1 and S2. In 
general, they claimed (both whilst thinking aloud and when answering the probing 
follow-up questions) that the rationale behind their choices was the same in both 
scenarios, but that the choice in S2 was more difficult.  
Three respondents preferred to treat patient A in S1. The main argument given for 
this was that it was ‘not worth’ giving an extra six months to someone with as short 
a time to live as patient B – rather, the life extension would be more valuable if 
given to someone who has more time to participate in society and who has a better 
opportunity to get their life in order (and could therefore make the most out of the 
additional time offered by treatment). All three respondents then switched to 
choosing to treat patient B in S2. Despite interviewer probing, the respondents 
were unable to articulate clearly the reasons for this shift in choices.  
Two respondents switched from choosing to treat patient B in S1 to having no 
preference in S2, arguing that although patient A would have had more time to 
prepare for death than patient B in S2, it would be unfair to assume that they will 
have made good use of that time. 
Table 3-6. Cross-tabulation – S1 versus S3 
 
S1 
S3 
Prefer A No preference Prefer B Total 
Prefer A 3 (14.3%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (14.3%) 
No preference 0 (0.0%) 2 (9.5%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (9.5%) 
Prefer B 3 (14.3%) 1 (4.8%) 12 (57.1%) 16 (76.2%) 
Total 6 (28.6%) 3 (14.3%) 12 (57.1%) 21 (100.0%) 
In S1, patient A and patient B are the same age today, so without treatment patient A will be nine years 
older when they die than patient B will be when they die. In S3, patient B is nine years older than 
patient A, so without treatment both patients will be the same age when they die. 
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Of the respondents who preferred to treat patient B in S1, the majority also 
preferred to treat patient B in S3, although one switched to having no preference 
and three switched to choosing to treat patient A. The respondent who switched to 
having no preference expressed worry about the presence of specific information on 
patients’ ages – whilst thinking aloud, they said to themselves: “is it justifiable to 
take these things into account?” They eventually said that they were unwilling to 
choose between the patients because they did not feel that it was appropriate to 
make prioritisation decisions based on current age. They added that if they were 
forced to choose then then could not help but take age into account, given the 
prominence of the information about age in the scenario description. They chose 
not to amend their responses to the previous scenarios. 
Of the three respondents who switched to preferring to treat patient A in S3, two 
said that their decision was based on a concern for treating the young (“gives the 
chance to the younger patient”). The fact that both patients would die at the same 
age without treatment was not considered important by these respondents – their 
concern was about how old the patients are now. The third respondent who made 
this switch said that they had imagined that the patients were children, and that 
their preference for treating patient A was based on a desire or duty to protect the 
very young. 
It should be noted that although most respondents quickly recognised that the only 
difference between S1 and S3 was the ages of the patients, the two that did not 
immediately recognise this both switched from preferring to treat patient B in S1 to 
preferring to treat patient A in S3. However, both respondents displayed a good 
level of understanding after clarification had been provided by the interviewer, so 
their choices should not be interpreted as having been driven by misunderstanding. 
Table 3-7. Cross-tabulation – S2 versus S3 
 
S2 
S3 
Prefer A No preference Prefer B Total 
Prefer A 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
No preference 1 (4.8%) 2 (9.5%) 1 (4.8%) 4 (19.0%) 
Prefer B 5 (23.8%) 1 (4.8%) 11 (52.4%) 17 (81.0%) 
Total 6 (28.6%) 3 (14.3%) 12 (57.1%) 21 (100.0%) 
In S2, the treatment decision occurs at the time of diagnosis for patient B and nine years after the time 
of diagnosis for patient A. In S3, the treatment decision occurs at the time of diagnosis for both patient 
A and patient B. 
Of the respondents who preferred to treat patient B in S2, 64.7% preferred to treat 
patient B in S3; the majority of the remaining respondents switched to preferring to 
treat patient A. One respondent chose to treat patient B in S3 but had no 
preference in S2. Their reasoning was that patient A could be viewed as the better 
off of the two patients in S3 (and indeed in S1) due to having nine extra years to 
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prepare for death, but it seems unfair to take this into account in S2 as patient A 
may not have made good use of this time. Five respondents went further, choosing 
to treat patient A in S3. Some of these respondents did so due to a concern for the 
young (described above in the discussion of S1 versus S3), whilst the others did so 
due to a belief that the life extension should be given to the patient who has more 
time to participate in society (described above in the discussion of S1 versus S2).  
Table 3-8. Cross-tabulation – S4 versus S5 
 
S4 
S5 
Prefer A No preference Prefer B Total 
Prefer A 6 (28.6%) 1 (4.8%) 5 (23.8%) 12 (57.1%) 
No preference 0 (0.0%) 1 (4.8%) 2 (9.5%) 3 (14.3%) 
Prefer B 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (28.6%) 6 (28.6%) 
Total 6 (28.6%) 2 (9.5%) 13 (61.9%) 21 (100.0%) 
In both S4 and S5, treating patient A would generate a quality of life improvement and treating patient 
B would generate a life extension. In S4, without treatment both patient A and patient B will live for one 
year in 50% health. In S5, without treatment patient A will live for 10 years in 50% health and patient B 
will live for one year in 50% health.     
Just over half of the respondents preferred to treat patient A in S4, which indicates 
that they prefer to give priority to quality of life-improving rather than life-
extending treatments for patients with one year of life expectancy. Half of those 
respondents then switched either to preferring to treat patient B or to having no 
preference in S5. A conjectured explanation for these combinations of choices is 
that whilst a preference for quality of life-improving treatments continues to exist in 
S5, this preference is outweighed by the preference to prioritise the treatment of 
those with short life expectancy. In general, the comments made by respondents 
support this explanation.  
Table 3-9. Cross-tabulation – S3 versus S5 
 
S3 
S5 
Prefer A No preference Prefer B Total 
Prefer A 4 (19.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (9.5%) 6 (28.6%) 
No preference 0 (0.0%) 1 (4.8%) 2 (9.5%) 3 (14.3%) 
Prefer B 2 (9.5%) 1 (4.8%) 9 (42.9%) 12 (57.1%) 
Total 6 (28.6%) 2 (9.5%) 13 (61.9%) 21 (100.0%) 
 
Of the 12 respondents who chose to treat patient B (the end of life patient) in S3, 
most also chose to treat patient B in S5. Three respondents switched to preferring 
to treat patient A or having no preference in S5 – all three claimed that the 
preference for quality of life-improving treatments outweighed (or in one case, 
cancelled out) the preference for prioritising end of life treatments in this scenario.  
3.3.2 Responses to probing questions 
Responses to the probing questions are summarised below. 
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Q1. How did you find the survey? 
Almost all of the respondents said that they found the survey interesting. Some 
mentioned that the scenarios were unpleasant to think about, but none suggested 
that they regretted taking part. This supports the interviewer’s observation that all 
respondents were highly engaged throughout the interviews. 
Q2. To what extent do you feel you understood the questions being asked? 
Almost all of the respondents said that they felt that they had understood the 
questions well, although in a few cases this was not always consistent with the 
interviewer’s observation that they were hesitant or confused at some points during 
the interview. Where misunderstanding did occur, respondents typically blamed 
their inattentiveness rather than the way in which the information had been 
presented. 
Q3. What did you think about the graphical illustrations of the scenarios? 
Most of the respondents said that the diagrams were helpful. A few respondents 
were particularly approving, claiming that they relied on them heavily. On the other 
hand, some respondents said that they did not use them at all. A few respondents 
indicated that they were confused by the distinction between health without 
treatment and health gains from treatment in the diagrams. 
Q4. How difficult did you find it to decide on your answers? 
Some respondents said that they found it very difficult to decide without more 
information (in particular, information on whether the patients were children or 
adults); others said that they found it easier to make decisions without such 
complicating factors.  
The general consensus was that scenarios S4 and S5 were more difficult to answer 
than the previous three scenarios. This was due in part to respondents not having 
clear or considered reasons for preferring either quality of life improvements or life 
extensions, and in part to the lack of clarity about what exactly is meant by ‘50% 
health’.  
Q5. In some of the tasks, you preferred to treat neither patient A nor 
patient B. Can you tell me a bit more about why you were unwilling or 
unable to choose between them? 
Only six respondents expressed ‘no preference’ in any of the scenarios. One 
respondent declined to choose between patient A and patient B in all scenarios. 
They felt that both patients were equally entitled to treatment, and that differences 
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between the patients are not relevant in terms of their claims to health care. Other 
reasons given for expressing no preference included: not having enough 
information to justify choosing between the two patients; belief that the patients 
are equally worthy of treatment; and lack of clarity about what is meant by ‘50% 
health’ (one respondent claimed that if 50% health still allows you to ‘enjoy what’s 
left’, then they would prefer to treat patient B in S4, but if 50% health would 
prevent you from enjoying your remaining life, then they would prefer to treat 
patient A). 
Q6. When deciding which patient to treat, what sorts of things did you take 
into account? 
Aside from the factors discussed in probing questions 7 to 10 (see below), a 
number of other considerations were mentioned in response to this question. 
Several respondents said their thinking had been guided by personal experiences of 
seeing friends and family in serious ill health. Several respondents spoke of trying 
to put themselves ‘in the shoes’ of the hypothetical patients – that is, trying to 
imagine what they would want for themselves if they were in the position of patient 
A or patient B.  
A number of respondents referred to the idea of treatment giving patient B a 
greater ‘proportional’ or ‘percentage’ gain in life extension. In S1, for example, 
these respondents claimed that their preference for treating patient B would hold as 
long as patient B was gaining proportionately more time than patient A (i.e. more 
than 2.6 weeks). Some respondents referred to an objective of achieving fairness 
and/or equality, suggesting that the treatment should be given to whichever patient 
is deemed to be the ‘worse off’. 
Regarding scenarios S4 and S5, some respondents justified their preference for 
treating patient A by explaining that whereas they could reasonably assume that 
‘everyone wants better quality of life’, it could not be assumed that ‘everyone wants 
to live longer’.  
Other considerations mentioned included: ‘suffering’; ‘how much one treasures life’; 
the personal and family circumstances of the patients; how able patients are to 
adapt to the idea that they are dying; and any other health problems that the 
patients might be facing. 
Q7. When deciding which patient to treat, did you think about how old the 
patients would be when they die? 
Most respondents said that they thought about age but did not take it into account 
when making their choices. As described above, those respondents that did 
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explicitly take age into account tended to be more concerned about age at 
treatment than about age at death. Some respondents felt strongly that age should 
not be used as a priority-setting criterion.  
Q8. When deciding which patient to treat, did you think about whether the 
patients would have sufficient time to ‘prepare for death’? 
Almost all of the respondents said that they took this factor into account. Of those 
that did not, one respondent questioned whether having 10 years to live before a 
specified time of death is a good or a bad thing (due to disutility from knowing that 
you are going to die). Another respondent said that they were “not from a culture 
that does great death preparation” and therefore questioned the value of having 
extra ‘time to prepare’. 
Q9. When deciding which patient to treat did you think about the fact that 
some of the benefits of treatment wouldn’t take place until far away into 
the future? 
Almost all of the respondents answered no to this question, claiming that the only 
way in which timing matters is in terms of how much time the patients have in 
good health before reaching their end of life. A few respondents said that when 
considering longer timeframes it would be reasonable to hope for the possibility of 
medical breakthroughs or further treatment (if the respondents brought this up 
whilst considering the scenarios, the interviewer emphasised that it should be 
assumed that further treatment would not be possible).  
Q10. Thinking about scenarios 4 and 5, when deciding which patient to 
treat, did you think about the possibility that being in only 50% health 
would involve being a burden on others or on society? 
A slight majority of respondents said that they did not think about this possibility. 
Some respondents said that they were aware of but specifically ignored this issue 
as they were not asked to consider it. A few respondents rejected the idea that 
people in poor health can be described as a burden. Of those that considered this 
possibility, only one respondent suggested that it had been a deciding factor in 
their choices. Considerations mentioned by respondents included: the need for 
caregivers; the inability to work (and associated loss of income and production); 
and the cost of adjusting one’s home to accommodate a disabled person. 
Q11. Might your answers have been different if you had been asked to 
choose which of two groups of patients to allocate health care funding to, 
as opposed to which of two patients to treat? 
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Most respondents said that considering groups would make no difference – the 
principles behind their decision-making would remain the same. Some suggested 
that it would be easier to make decisions when considering groups, as this would 
make the scenario more impersonal and therefore less ‘heart-wrenching’. Others 
suggested that there would be a case for dividing resources amongst groups (with 
an even or uneven split), something that was not possible in the single treatment, 
two patient scenario.  
Q12. “Society has a special responsibility towards those who have a short 
time left to live.” What are your thoughts about this statement? 
Most respondents agreed with this statement, though several were uncertain about 
the definitions of the terms ‘society’ and ‘special’. A few respondents strongly 
disagreed with the statement, claiming that those with a short time left to live are 
no more important or worthy of treatment than anyone else. Several respondents 
claimed that caring for those at the end of life is not exclusively a health care 
system responsibility, arguing that society should focus on palliative care and 
objectives relating to ensuring sociability, comfort and dignity, rather than on life-
extending health care technologies. 
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3.4 Discussion 
This study piloted an approach to eliciting public preferences regarding life-
extending end of life treatments. The purpose of the study was not to elicit 
preferences that can readily be used for decision-making, but to inform the design 
and methods of larger-scale, representative sample studies. The study was 
completed without any major problems, and offers support for the use of face-to-
face interviews for this type of survey. The results provide some indication of public 
support for a policy that prioritises the treatment of patients with short life 
expectancy and whose disease onset has been sudden. However, all findings should 
be interpreted with caution, given the small sample size and exploratory nature of 
the study. The study highlighted a number of issues that warrant further 
investigation, some of which are examined below. 
3.4.1 Unexpected rationales for choices 
The comments made by respondents as they completed the survey indicate that a 
number of rationales exist for making priority-setting choices that had not been 
anticipated by the author. For example, it had not been anticipated that any 
respondents would prefer to treat patient A in S1. Yet three respondents did, 
arguing that it would be more valuable to give a life extension to someone who has 
more time to participate in society and who has a better opportunity to get their life 
in order. The fact that these respondents did not consider six months to be a 
worthwhile life extension for individuals with one year left to live indicates that they 
would also consider the three-month minimum standard applied in NICE’s criteria to 
be insufficient. 
It was hypothesised that if respondents switched from choosing to treat patient B in 
S1 to having no preference in S2, then the S1 choice will have been driven by time 
and/or age-related preferences. In fact, the two respondents who made this switch 
gave a different explanation, appearing to treat the additional time that patient A 
has as a ‘sunk benefit’. Their argument was that if a benefit is yet to be enjoyed 
then it should be taken into account, but it has already passed then it should not. It 
had not been anticipated that respondents would apply a sunk benefit concept in 
their decision-making.  
Finally, it had been anticipated that those respondents who used age information to 
decide which patient to treat would tend to choose to treat the patient who would 
be younger at their time of death. This would be consistent with a fair innings type 
argument (Williams, 1997) since the patient who would die younger in absence of 
treatment will have enjoyed a smaller amount of lifetime health, ceteris paribus. In 
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fact, some respondents sought to give priority to the patient who was younger at 
the time of treatment.    
These examples show that people support a variety of principles of justice and 
rationing that may not be immediately obvious to researchers. It is therefore 
important to capture not only respondents’ choices but also the reasons for those 
choices in order to understand fully the nature of their preferences.  
3.4.2 Having no preference 
Very few respondents indicated they had no preference between treating patient A 
and patient B. This (lack of) preference accounted for only 13% of all choices made. 
It may be the case that respondents’ observed reluctance to express indifference 
was driven by the survey design. Beneath the written description and diagram for 
each scenario in the paper questionnaire (see Appendix 4), the prompt ‘Would you 
prefer to treat patient A or patient B?’ was presented. Although the interviewer 
made efforts to emphasise that a ‘no preference’ choice was acceptable, both at the 
beginning of the interview and whenever respondents displayed uncertainty, the 
fact that this option was not included in the written instructions may have resulted 
in a framing effect whereby it was deemed by respondents to be a unconventional 
response. It is recommended that in future studies any ‘no preference’ option 
should be included explicitly and given the same weight as competing options in 
any written and oral instructions. It is important to include a ‘no preference’ option, 
as this represents a defensible position for respondents who believe that end of life 
treatments should be given neither higher nor lower priority than any other 
treatments.     
3.4.3 Interpreting ‘50% health’ 
Some respondents appeared to find the concept of ‘50% health’ confusing. The 
reason that a percentage weight was used rather than a qualitative label was to 
minimise ambiguity about the severity of the imperfect health state in relation to 
perfect health. In practice, however, the way in which ‘50% health’ was interpreted 
also differed from respondent to respondent. When describing their reasons for 
choosing to treat patient A in S4, some respondents appeared to be valuing one 
year in full health more highly than two years in 50% health, and it was not always 
clear whether this was based on a social preference or on a belief that the former is 
more desirable than the latter for the patients themselves. A possible solution 
would to emphasise the fact that 50% health should be interpreted as half as 
desirable as perfect health – for example, by adding the sentence: ‘Patients have 
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told us that being in this health state for two years is equally desirable as being in 
full health for one year; we will therefore call this 50% health’. 
3.5 Conclusions  
This chapter has described an exploratory study that developed and piloted an 
approach for examining public support for giving higher priority to life-extending 
end of life treatments than to other types of treatments. The study was conducted 
successfully – respondents claimed to have found the survey interesting and the 
questions easy to understand. This suggests that a similar approach can be used 
for a larger study using a sample that is more representative of the general 
population.  
Some aspects of the study design need refining, such as the explicit inclusion of an 
indifference option and the provision of guidance on how to interpret the concept of 
50% health. Further, in order to inform the research question of this thesis, it is 
necessary to use a general public sample (rather than a convenience sample 
comprising university staff and students) and to collect sufficient data to be able to 
assess quantitatively the extent of support for an end of life premium. These 
limitations are addressed in empirical study 2 (Chapter 4).
77 
 
4 VALUING HEALTH AT THE END OF LIFE: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF PUBLIC PREFERENCES (EMPIRICAL STUDY 
2)16 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the second of the four empirical studies, conducted in mid-
2011 following the successful completion of empirical study 1 (Chapter 3). The aim 
of this study is to examine whether a policy of giving higher priority to life-
extending end of life treatments (as specified by NICE) than to other types of 
treatments is consistent with the preferences of members of the public.  
Specific objectives are to test the following null hypotheses: 
 People place no more weight on a unit of health gain for end of life patients 
than on that for non-end of life patients, ceteris paribus. 
 Any observed preferences regarding an end of life premium are unaffected 
by whether or not the end of life patient is older than the non-end of life 
patient.  
 Any observed preferences regarding an end of life premium are unaffected 
by time preference.  
 People place no more weight on life-extending treatments than on quality 
of life-improving treatments for end of life patients, controlling for the size 
of the gain.  
 Any observed preferences between quality of life-improving and life-
extending treatments for end of life patients are unaffected by the ages of 
the patients. 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Survey instrument 
To test the hypotheses listed above, a survey was used, an earlier version of which 
was developed and piloted in empirical study 1 (Chapter 3). Hence, many aspects 
of the survey in this study are similar or identical to the empirical study 1 survey 
and are therefore not described in detail in this chapter. 
                                           
16 A previous version of this chapter has been published as: Shah, K.K., Tsuchiya, A., Wailoo, A.J., 2014. 
Valuing health at the end of life: an empirical study of public preferences. European Journal of Health 
Economics, 15, 389-399. 
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The survey included six scenarios (S1 to S6), preceded by a warm-up scenario 
(S0). All respondents considered all scenarios, in the same order. As with empirical 
study 1, respondents were presented with written descriptions and diagrams 
showing two hypothetical individuals (patient A and patient B) who have been 
diagnosed with illness. Both patients could benefit from treatment but the 
respondents were asked to assume that the health service had enough funds to 
treat one but not both of them. 
Each scenario comprised two tasks. The first task required respondents to indicate 
which of three statements best described their view:  
 I would prefer the health service to treat patient A 
 I have no preference 
 I would prefer the health service to treat Patient B 
All three response options were given equal visual prominence. 
The second task required respondents to consider a list of 18 statements, each 
describing a possible reason for their choice in the first task (reproduced in 
Appendix 6). They were asked to indicate, by ticking the relevant boxes, which of 
those statements were consistent with their own reasons. This task is hereafter 
referred to as the ‘tick-box task’. 
The scenarios are replicated in full in Appendix 6 and summarised in Table 4-1. In 
S1, S2 and S3, treatment would extend the life of either patient A or patient B by 
six months (with certainty); the patients differed in terms of age and the amount of 
time between diagnosis and expected death. These scenarios did not examine 
quality of life – respondents were advised that the patients’ illnesses were 
asymptomatic and that treatment would not affect their quality of life. S1, S2 and 
S3 in this study correspond to S1, S3 and S2 in empirical study 1, respectively (the 
ordering of S2 and S3 in the sequence of scenarios was reversed in this study). 
In S4, S5 and S6, the illnesses were described as having a negative effect on 
quality of life, with both patients experiencing their final year of life at 50% of full 
health. The concept of ‘50% health’ was explained to respondents as follows: 
‘Patients have told us that being in this health state for two years is equally 
desirable as being in full health for one year’. In these scenarios, treatment would 
restore patient A to full health (with no effect on life expectancy) or extend the life 
of patient B by one year (with no effect on quality of life). S4 and S5 in this study 
build on S4 in empirical study 1, adding information on the specific ages of the 
patients, while S6 in this study corresponds to S5 in empirical study 1.  
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Table 4-1. Summary of scenarios used in empirical study 2 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 
Without treatment 
Patient A life expectancy 10 years 10 years 1 year 1 year 1 year 10 years 
Patient A quality of life 100% 100% 100% 50%  50% 50%  
Patient B life expectancy 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year 
Patient B quality of life 100% 100% 100% 50%  50% 50%  
Gains from treatment 
Patient A life expectancy 
+6 
months 
+6 
months 
+6 
months 
No 
change 
No 
change 
No 
change 
Patient A quality of life 
No 
change 
No 
change 
No 
change 
+50% +50% +50% a 
Patient B life expectancy 
+6 
months 
+6 
months 
+6 
months 
+1 year +1 year +1 year 
Patient B quality of life 
No 
change 
No 
change 
No 
change 
No 
change 
No 
change 
No 
change 
Undiscounted QALY gain from treatment b 
Patient A 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 
Patient B 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 
Age of patients 
A & B are  
same age 
(adults) 
B is 9 
years 
older than 
A (adults) 
A & B are 
same age 
(adults) 
A & B are  
same age  
(30 years 
old) 
A & B are  
same age  
(70 years 
old) 
B is 9 
years 
older than 
A (adults) 
Timing of scenario  
(when does the 
treatment decision 
occur) 
At time of 
A & B’s 
diagnosis 
At time of 
A & B’s 
diagnosis 
9 years 
after A’s 
diagnosis 
At time of 
A & B’s 
diagnosis 
At time of 
A & B’s 
diagnosis 
At time of 
A & B’s 
diagnosis 
a Refers to the quality of life improvement in the patient’s final year of life  
b Respondents did not see this information (the term ‘QALY’ was not used at any point in the survey) 
 
Under the conditions that two years in 50% health is equivalent to one year in full 
health, and that a health gain today is equivalent to an equal-sized health gain in 
the future, both patients will gain exactly the same amount of health from 
treatment in all six scenarios – half of a QALY. Unlike in empirical study 1, a specific 
explanation of the meaning of 50% health was provided to respondents (see 
above). 
Explanations of scenarios S1, S2 and S3 are provided in the description of empirical 
study 1 (see 3.2.1) and are not repeated here, though the reader is reminded that 
S2 in empirical study 1 corresponds to S3 in the current study, and vice versa. As 
mentioned above, considerations of quality of life are introduced in scenarios S4, 
S5 and S6. S4 and S5 involve choosing between treatments that extend life and 
treatments that improve quality of life. The two scenarios are identical except for 
the ages of the patients. In S4, both patients are younger adults (30 years old). In 
S5, they are older adults (70 years old). Comparing the results of S4 and S5 
therefore provides an indication of whether the preference for a particular type of 
treatment (life-extending or quality of life-improving) for end of life patients is 
dependent on the life stage of the patients. Scenario S6 combines elements of S2 
and S4/S5 in that it involves choosing between treating a non-end of life patient 
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(patient A) and an end of life patient (patient B) and between a quality of life-
improving treatment (to patient A) and a life-extending treatment (to patient B).  
It is conjectured that a supporter of NICE’s end of life policy would choose to treat 
patient B in all scenarios, except perhaps S3 where it is less clear whether the 
supplementary advice applies.    
Warm-up scenario S0 involved choosing between giving a two-year life extension to 
a patient with 10 years of life expectancy in full health and a six-month life 
extension to a patient with one year of life expectancy in full health. S0 was 
included as a practice task to familiarise the respondent with the priority-setting 
exercise. The responses for S0 have not been analysed and are not reported here.  
4.2.2 Administration of survey 
The survey was administered using face-to-face interviews, undertaken by a team 
of six interviewers employed by a market research agency, Accent. The 
interviewers completed training on the specifics of the methodology and procedures 
for this study. All interviews were carried out in a one-to-one setting in the homes 
of respondents.  
Background information (age group, gender, social grade) was collected at the 
beginning of the interview. Respondents then considered the scenarios one at a 
time, progressing to the next scenario once they had been given time to consider 
their views and had provided answers to the questions. The interviewers permitted 
respondents to amend their responses to earlier questions if they changed their 
mind during the course of the interview. 
Information about the scenarios was presented in three ways: (1) the full scenario 
description was read aloud to the respondent by the interviewer, following a script; 
(2) key pieces of information were presented schematically using a diagram; and 
(3) key pieces of information were presented in a summary table beneath the 
diagram. The interview materials are reproduced in Appendix 6. The diagrams and 
summary tables were included in a paper booklet handed to each respondent. 
These booklets were also used to record respondents’ answers to the questions.  
After concluding the interview, the interviewer was asked to answer three 
‘diagnostic’ multiple choice questions. These were concerned with assessing: (1) 
how well the respondent had understood and carried out the tasks; (2) how much 
effort and concentration the respondent had put into the tasks; and (3) the extent 
to which there were disruptions and interruptions in the interview environment. 
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All data were collated and entered into an Excel database by the agency. 
4.2.3 Sample 
The survey was administered on a sample of adult members of the general public, 
split evenly between two areas of southeast England (London and Kent). The target 
sample size of 50 respondents was determined on the basis of available resources. 
A ‘minimum quota’ approach was used to recruit a sample that was broadly 
representative of the general population in terms of age, gender and social grade. 
The sample was recruited using a ‘door knock’ approach, with the interviewer 
approaching a household member of every fourth home in a randomly allocated 
postal area and scheduling interview appointments for those individuals that agreed 
to participate. A small cash payment was offered as an incentive for participation.   
4.2.4 Ethical approval 
The survey design and sample recruitment procedures were reviewed and approved 
by the Research Ethics Committee at the School of Health and Related Research via 
the University of Sheffield Ethics Review Procedure. 
4.2.5 Piloting  
As mentioned above, the survey used in this study was developed and piloted in 
empirical study 1 (Chapter 3). The pilot was completed successfully, indicating that 
a similar approach could be used for a larger study using a general public sample.  
The findings from empirical study 1 informed the design of the current study in a 
number of ways, in particular: the inclusion of a warm-up scenario; the 
specification that both patients are adults; the inclusion of two scenarios (S4 and 
S5) exploring the extent to which preferences regarding end of life treatments are 
driven by considerations of the ‘life stage’ of patients; the reversal of the order in 
which S2 and S3 appeared in the sequence of scenarios; equal visual prominence 
for all three response options in respondents’ answer booklets; increased clarity in 
the description of what is meant by ‘50% health’; and changes to the ways in which 
information about the scenarios was presented to respondents. The list of 
statements included in the tick-box task for each scenario was developed in 
accordance with the qualitative data obtained in the pilot. 
4.2.6 Methods of analysis 
Descriptive statistics were reported in order to summarise the sample and 
responses to the scenario questions. Comparisons between scenarios were 
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assessed using the Pearson’s chi-squared test. In each case, the test was for an 
association between choosing to treat patient B in one scenario and choosing to 
treat patient B in the other scenario. The binomial test was used to assess whether 
the majority of respondents chose to treat the end of life patient in S1, and whether 
the majority chose to provide the life-extending treatment over the quality of life-
improving treatment in S4. Probability values (p-values) of the test statistics were 
used to assess the strength of the evidence against the null hypotheses (Fisher, 
1956). P-values below 0.05 were considered ‘strong’ evidence against the null 
hypothesis, while p-values between 0.05 and 0.1 were considered ‘weak’ evidence. 
For each scenario, a list of inconsistent sets of responses (either a tick-box 
response that contradicts a given choice task response; or a tick-box response that 
contradicts another tick-box response) was generated. The number of respondents 
whose data contained at least one inconsistent set of responses was counted. 
4.3 Results 
Interviews were completed by 50 respondents in July 2011. The background 
characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 4-2. The sample includes a 
larger proportion of older individuals, and a smaller proportion of middle-aged 
individuals, than in the general population (Office for National Statistics, 2011). The 
sample also includes a relatively large proportion of individuals in the lowest social 
grades (National Readership Survey, 2012-3). 
Table 4-2. Sample background characteristics 
  n % Population 
Total  50 100%  
Age (years)   18-34 14 28% 29% 
  35-64 18 36% 50% 
  65+ 18 36% 21% 
Gender   Female 24 48% 51% 
  Male 26 52% 49% 
Social grade a A 1 2% 4% 
B 7 14% 22% 
C1 17 34% 29% 
C2 6 12% 21% 
DE 19 38% 23% 
a Refers to the occupation/qualifications/responsibilities of the chief wage earner of the respondent’s 
household; see National Readership Survey (2012-13). 
All 50 respondents completed the survey in full. According to the interviewers, the 
majority of interviews were carried out in distraction-free environments with 
respondents who concentrated on and showed a good understanding of the survey 
tasks. 
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4.3.1 Response data 
Table 4-3 reports aggregate response data for each of the six scenarios. 
Table 4-3. Aggregate response data for all scenarios 
  S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 
Prefer to treat 
patient A 
13 (26%) 16 (32%) 16 (32%) 29 (58%) 28 (56%) 31 (62%) 
No preference 7 (14%) 12 (24%) 13 (26%) 10 (20%) 11 (22%) 7 (14%) 
Prefer to treat 
patient B 
30 (60%) 22 (44%) 21 (42%) 11 (22%) 11 (22%) 12 (13%) 
Total 50 (100%) 50 (100%) 50 (100%) 50 (100%) 50 (100%) 50 (100%) 
 
In S1, S2 and S3, preferring to treat patient B (the patient whose life expectancy is 
shorter or who has known about their illness for less time) was the most popular 
choice, although it is only in S1 that the majority of respondents (60%) made this 
choice. In all three scenarios, there were more respondents who preferred to treat 
patient A than there were respondents who indicated that they had no preference 
between the two patients. The proportion of respondents choosing to treat the end 
of life patient in S1 is statistically significantly greater than 50% at the 10% level of 
confidence but not at the 5% level (binomial test using normal approximation; 
p=0.08). Hence, the hypothesis that people place no more weight on a unit of 
health gain for end of life patients than on that for non-end of life patients 
(hypothesis 1) is rejected.  
In S4 and S5, the majority of respondents (58% and 56%, respectively) preferred 
to treat patient A, for whom treatment would deliver a quality of life improvement 
worth half a QALY. The remainder of respondents were roughly evenly split 
between preferring to treat patient B – for whom treatment would deliver a life 
extension worth half a QALY – and having no preference. In S6, the majority of 
respondents (62%) preferred to treat patient A, which involved giving a quality of 
life improvement worth half a QALY to the non-end of life patient. 
Table 4-4 to Table 4-7 provide cross-tabulations of the response data from selected 
combinations of scenarios that can be used to test the hypotheses set out in 4.1. In 
these tables, the values in each cell refers to the number and proportion of 
respondents expressing that set of preferences. 
The most common pair of choices in S1 and S2 was to prefer to treat patient B in 
both scenarios (made by 19 respondents – 38%) (Table 4-4). The most common 
reasons given in the tick-box task for preferring to treat patient B were that this 
choice benefits the patient ‘who is closest to death’ and who has ‘less time to 
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prepare for death’. Four respondents (8%) switched from preferring to treat patient 
B in S1 to having no preference in S2. Three of these respondents indicated in the 
tick-box task for S1 that their choice ‘benefits the patient who will die at a younger 
age’. A further seven respondents (14%) preferred to treat patient B in S1 and to 
treat patient A in S2. There does not appear to be a consensus set of reasons given 
for this pair of choices. Three of these respondents did not give any reasons linked 
to the ages of patients; of the four that did give reasons linked to age, two gave 
reasons that were factually incorrect (for example, stating that treating patient A in 
S2 involved benefiting the patient ‘who will die at an older age’).  
The second most common pair of choices was to prefer to treat patient A in both 
scenarios (made by eight respondents – 16%). Almost all of the respondents who 
chose to treat patient A indicated in the tick-box tasks that they did so because 
they wished to benefit the patient ‘who has longer left to live’. Overall, the 
association between patient age and the propensity to favour the treatment of the 
end of life patient is not statistically significant (chi-squared test; p=0.16). Hence, 
the hypothesis that preferences regarding an end of life premium are unaffected by 
whether or not the end of life patient is older than the non-end of life patient 
(hypothesis 2) cannot be rejected. 
Table 4-4. Cross-tabulation – S1 versus S2 
 
S1 
S2 
Prefer A No preference Prefer B Total 
Prefer A 8 (16%) 3 (6%) 2 (4%) 13 (26%) 
No preference 1 (2%) 5 (10%) 1 (2%) 7 (14%) 
Prefer B 7 (14%) 4 (8%) 19 (38%) 30 (60%) 
Total 16 (32%) 12 (24%) 22 (44%) 50 (100%) 
In S1, patient A and patient B are the same age today, so without treatment patient A will be nine years 
older when they die than patient B will be when they die. In S2, patient B is nine years older than 
patient A, so without treatment both patients will be the same age when they die. 
The most common pair of choices in S2 and S3 was to prefer to treat patient B in 
both scenarios (made by 10 respondents – 20%) (Table 4-5). The majority of the 
respondents who made this pair of choices ticked the box that read ‘My choice 
benefits the patient with less time to prepare for death’ for both scenarios. Eight of 
the 10 respondents ticked the box that read ‘My choice benefits the patient who is 
closest to death’ for S2, whilst three gave the equivalent reason for S3, when the 
statement was factually incorrect.  
Five respondents (10%) preferred to treat patient B in S2 and had no preference in 
S3. Of these respondents, only one ticked the box for S2 that read ‘My choice 
delivers the benefit today rather than far away in the future’. More popular reasons 
given for preferring to treat patient B in S2 were that patient B: ‘is older today’, 
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‘has less time to prepare for death’, and/or ‘can make the most of their remaining 
time’.  
Seven respondents (14%) preferred to treat patient B in S2 and to treat patient A 
in S3. There does not appear to be a consensus set of reasons given for this pair of 
choices. The most commonly given reason was that preferring to treat patient B in 
S2 ‘delivers the benefit today rather than far away in the future’ (three of the seven 
respondents ticked this box). A further seven respondents (14%) preferred to treat 
patient A in S2 and to treat patient B in S3. The only reason that was given 
consistently for this pair of choices was that patient A has ‘longer left to live’ in S2 
(six of the seven respondents ticked this box).  
Overall, there is no statistically significant evidence of an association between the 
timing of the scenario and the propensity to favour the treatment of patient B (chi-
squared test; p=1.00). Hence, the hypothesis that preferences regarding an end of 
life premium are unaffected by time preference (hypothesis 3) cannot be rejected. 
Table 4-5. Cross-tabulation – S2 versus S3 
 
S2 
S3 
Prefer A No preference Prefer B Total 
Prefer A 6 (12%) 3 (6%) 7 (14%) 16 (32%) 
No preference 3 (6%) 5 (10%) 4 (8%) 12 (24%) 
Prefer B 7 (14%) 5 (10%) 10 (20%) 22 (44%) 
Total 16 (32%) 13 (26%) 21 (42%) 50 (100%) 
In S2, the treatment decision occurs at the time of diagnosis for both patient A and patient B. In S3, the 
treatment decision occurs at the time of diagnosis for patient B and nine years after the time of 
diagnosis for patient A. 
The majority of respondents made the same choice in both S4 and S5 – 22 
respondents (44%) preferred to treat patient A in both scenarios; 8 respondents 
(16%) expressed no preference in both scenarios; and six respondents (12%) 
preferred to treat patient B in both scenarios (Table 4-6). Five respondents (10%) 
preferred to treat patient B in S4 and to treat patient A in S5. Four respondents 
(8%) made the reverse pair of choices, preferring to treat patient A in S4 and to 
treat patient B in S5. Some, but less than half, of the respondents who made each 
pair of choices gave reasons that were consistent with those choices – i.e. by 
ticking the relevant box that read ‘I think it is better to [improve health/extend life] 
than to [extend life/improve health] in this situation’. Another commonly given 
reason (particularly for respondents who preferred to treat patient A in S4 and to 
treat patient B in S5) was that their choice ‘benefits the patient who can make the 
most out of their remaining time’.  
Considering all of the 14 respondents who did not make the same choice in both S4 
and S5, there was no consensus as to whether it is preferable to give a quality of 
86 
 
life improvement to a younger adult and a life extension to an older adult, or vice 
versa. In fact, the data suggest a fairly even split between these two views. 
Overall, the proportion of respondents choosing to provide the life-extending 
treatment is statistically significantly less than 50% (binomial test using normal 
approximation; p<0.01). Hence, the hypothesis that people place no more weight 
on life-extending treatments than on quality of life-improving treatments for end of 
life patients (hypothesis 4) cannot be rejected. However, there is no statistically 
significant evidence of an association between the life stage of the patient and the 
propensity to choose either of these types of treatment (chi-square test of 
association; p=0.97). Hence, the hypothesis that preferences between quality of 
life-improving and life-extending treatments for end of life patients are unaffected 
by the ages of the patients (hypothesis 5) cannot be rejected. 
Table 4-6. Cross-tabulation – S4 versus S5 
 
S4 
S5 
Prefer A No preference Prefer B Total 
Prefer A 22 (44%) 3 (6%) 4 (8%) 29 (59%) 
No preference 1 (2%) 8 (16%) 1 (2%) 10 (20%) 
Prefer B 5 (10%) 0 (0%) 6 (12%) 11 (22%) 
Total 28 (56%) 11 (22%) 11 (22%) 50 (100%) 
In S4, both patients are 30 years old. In S5, both patients are 70 years old.  
The most common pair of choices in S2 and S6 was to prefer to treat patient B in 
S2 and to treat patient A in S6 (made by 15 respondents – 30%) (Table 4-7). The 
most commonly given reasons for this pair of choices were that treating patient B in 
S2 ‘benefits the patient with less time to prepare for death’; and that ‘it is better to 
improve health than extend life’ in the situation depicted in S6 (both boxes were 
ticked by seven of the 15 respondents). A small number of respondents ticked 
boxes relating to age and/or the timing of the benefits to explain their choices. 
Overall, there is statistically significant evidence of an association between the 
availability of quality of life-improving treatment and the propensity to give priority 
to the life-extending end of life treatment at the 10% level of confidence, but not at 
the 5% level (chi-squared test; p=0.06).  
Table 4-7. Cross-tabulation – S2 versus S6 
 
S2 
S6 
Prefer A No preference Prefer B Total 
Prefer A 10 (20%) 2 (4%) 4 (8%) 16 (32%) 
No preference 6 (12%) 5 (10%) 1 (2%) 12 (24%) 
Prefer B 15 (30%) 0 (0%) 7 (14%) 22 (44%) 
Total 31 (62%) 7 (14%) 12 (24%) 50 (100%) 
In S2, the choice is between giving a life extension worth ½ QALY to the non-end of life patient (patient 
A) and a life extension worth ½ QALY to the end of life patient. In S6, the choice is between giving a 
quality of life. improvement worth ½ QALY to the non-end of life patient (patient A) and a life extension 
worth ½ QALY to the end of life patient (patient B).  
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Across the six scenarios, there were 70 instances of respondents giving reasons in 
the tick-box task that were inconsistent with their choice or with other reasons they 
gave for making the choice in the same scenario. More than half of these 
observations came from six respondents who each failed the ‘consistency checks’ 
on four or more occasions. The majority of respondents did not fail any of these 
checks. The ‘None of the above’ box was ticked on six occasions across all 
scenarios, five of which were for the tick-box task for S3. In all cases, respondents 
who ticked the ‘None of the above’ box did not tick boxes describing any other 
reasons. 
Considering the various combinations of choices made across all six scenarios, 39 
different sets of choices were made by the 50 respondents. The most popular set of 
choices (BBBAAA) was made by four respondents (8%); most sets were made by 
only one respondent.17 Three respondents expressed no preference throughout the 
six scenarios (IIIIII). No respondents made the set(s) of choices implied by the 
NICE end of life policy of giving greater priority to life-extending end of life 
treatments than to both non-end of life treatments and quality of life-improving end 
of life treatments (BBBBBB or BBIBBB).   
4.4 Discussion 
This study elicited the preferences of a sample of 50 members of the general public 
in England over health care priority-setting scenarios. Whilst the results should be 
interpreted with a degree of caution given the limited size and geographic coverage 
of the sample, they provide a number of insights on whether there is public support 
for a policy that places greater weight on life-extending end of life treatments (as 
specified by NICE) than on other types of treatments.  
The results suggest that: (1) there is weak evidence that people place greater 
weight on the treatment of end of life patients than on the treatment of non-end of 
life patients; (2) there is no evidence that concern about age is a motivating factor 
for giving higher priority to the treatment of end of life patients; (3) there is no 
evidence that time preference is a motivating factor for giving higher priority to the 
treatment of end of life patients; (4) there is strong evidence that people do not 
place greater weight on life-extending than on quality of life-improving treatments 
for end of life patients; and (5) there is no evidence that concern about the life 
stage of end of life patients is a motivating factor for preferring either life-extending 
or quality of life-improving treatments for those patients. 
                                           
17 Note that in these sets of choices, A (B) indicates that the respondent preferred to treat patient A (B), 
and I indicates that the respondent had no preference  
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The fact that the most popular choice was to treat patient B in S1 and S2 indicates 
support for prioritising the treatment of patients with short life expectancy, but in 
both cases there is no statistically significant evidence at the 5% level that the 
majority of respondents held this view. Moreover, a non-trivial minority of 
respondents indicated the opposite – that is, they preferred to give higher priority 
to the treatment of patients with longer life expectancy. Data from the tick-box 
tasks suggest that such preferences may be driven by a belief that patients with 
longer life expectancy are better placed to make the most out of a short life 
extension. 
The most popular choice in S3 was also to treat patient B. This preference may be 
driven by concern about how much time the patient has had to ‘prepare for death’. 
Since patient B’s disease progression has been more sudden, they have had less 
time to prepare for death. The reasons given for choosing to treat patient B in the 
tick-box task for S3 support this explanation.   
The response data for S4 and S5 provide evidence of an overall preference for 
giving priority to quality of life-improving rather than life-extending treatments for 
patients with short life expectancy. Furthermore, the data for S6 suggest that some 
respondents prefer to give priority to quality of life-improving over life-extending 
treatments even when the quality of life improvement accrues to a non-end of life 
patient and the life extension (of equal size, in QALY terms) accrues to an end of 
life patient. One interpretation of these results is that the preference for giving 
priority to quality of life-improving treatments is so strong that it outweighs any 
preference for giving priority to end of life treatments. Another interpretation is that 
the respondents have misunderstood (or rejected) the concept of the QALY, 
believing that a half-QALY quality of life improvement is in fact more desirable than 
a half-QALY life extension for the patients themselves. This issue is likely to exist in 
any study where quality of life needs to be quantified in this manner. 
Comparing the response data for S1 and S2 allowed an assessment of whether 
respondents’ preferences for treating the end of life or the non-end of life patient 
depended on the ages at which the patients would die without treatment. Similarly, 
comparing the response data for S4 and S5 allowed an assessment of whether 
respondents’ preferences for either life-extending or quality of life-improving 
treatments for end of life patients depended on the life stage of the patients (i.e. 
whether they were younger adults or older adults). In both cases, the particular 
combinations of ages that were used in the scenarios do not appear to have 
influenced the choices of most of the respondents. However, concerns about age 
might have been more evident had the difference in ages been greater in S1 and 
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S2, or if different life stages had been presented in S4 and S5 (for example, if the 
patients were described as teenagers aged 15 years in S4 and as elderly individuals 
aged 90 years in S5).   
In all six scenarios, the least popular choice was for respondents to express no 
preference between treating patient A and patient B. This is consistent with findings 
from empirical study 1 (see 3.4.2) and adds to the evidence that people do not 
support a strict health-maximisation objective when making priority-setting choices 
(Dolan et al., 2005), choosing instead to prioritise based on characteristics of the 
patients, diseases or treatments under consideration. It may be the case, however, 
that for some respondents health-maximisation is the primary objective, but when 
there is nothing to choose between the two patients in terms of (undiscounted) 
health gain, they refer to other factors (such as life expectancy without treatment) 
as a ‘tie breaker’. Following concerns about framing effects in empirical study 1, 
steps were taken to make the ‘no preference’ option explicit and prominent in this 
study so as to make it clear that this was an acceptable response and that 
respondents were not obliged to choose to treat patient A or patient B. The tick-box 
task for each scenario also included several statements referring to reasons for 
having no preference. However, most respondents still preferred to treat one 
patient or the other, and in general provided reasons in the tick-box tasks that 
were consistent with their choices.  
There cannot be described to be a ‘consensus’ combination of preferences – the 
most popular set of choices (BBBAAA) was made by only four respondents (8%). 
This set of choices indicates a preference for giving priority to those at the end of 
life (preferring to treat patient B in S1 and S2) and whose disease progression has 
been sudden (preferring to treat patient B in S3); a preference for quality of life-
improving rather than life-extending treatments (preferring to treat patient A in S4 
and S5); and a preference for quality of life-improving treatments that outweighs 
the preference for giving priority to those at the end of life (preferring to treat 
patient A in S6). 
It is difficult to describe a single approach to priority-setting that reflects the 
heterogeneous preferences elicited in this study. It is of note, however, that no 
respondents made the set of choices implied by the NICE end of life policy of giving 
greater priority to life-extending end of life treatments than to both non-end of life 
treatments and quality of life-improving end of life treatments (BBBBB or BBIBBB).  
The study results suggest that the NICE’s policy may be insufficient in two ways. 
First, whilst it is concerned with patients’ remaining life years, the supplementary 
advice does not distinguish between sudden and non-sudden disease progression. 
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Findings from empirical study 1 (see 3.3.2), coupled with an examination of the 
reasons given by respondents in the tick-box tasks in this study, suggest that for 
many people the preference for prioritising the treatment of end of life patients is 
driven by concern about how much time the patients will have had to prepare for 
death. This may explain why over 40% of respondents preferred to treat patient B 
in S3, despite the fact that patient B is no closer to their end of life than patient A 
in that scenario. Nevertheless, it should be noted that no respondents made the 
BBBBBB set of choices (which implies support for an adjusted NICE policy that also 
gives priority to patients whose disease progression has been most sudden). It 
should also be noted that of the six occasions when respondents ticked the box that 
read ‘None of the above’ when providing reasons for their choices, five referred to 
their choice in S3. This suggests that there are rationales for choosing either 
patient A or patient B in S3 beyond those that had been conjectured, and that more 
work is needed to better understand people’s preferences regarding prioritisation 
according to the speed of disease progression. 
Second, the NICE policy involves giving greater weight to life-extending but not to 
quality of life-improving treatments for those at the end of life. This is inconsistent 
with the finding in this study that many respondents favoured the prioritisation of 
the quality of life-improving treatment over the life-extending treatment in S4, S5 
and S6.  
Whilst the results of this study provide an indication of whether there is public 
support for the policy of giving higher priority to life-extending end of life 
treatments than to other types of treatments, they do not give any indication of the 
strength of preferences for any individual respondent, nor do they indicate whether 
the cut-offs in the current NICE criteria (for example, defining short life expectancy 
as ‘normally less than 24 months’) are commensurate with public preferences.  
Nevertheless, there are a number of ways in which the findings of this study can 
help inform the design of future studies of public preferences regarding the value of 
end of life treatments. A key challenge for stated preference studies is defining 
attributes and levels that are policy relevant and salient to respondents (Lancsar 
and Louviere, 2008). This study has provided evidence to suggest that the amount 
of time the patient has had to prepare for death and the nature of the health gain 
offered by the treatment (quality of life-improving or life-extending) are key drivers 
of preferences. It is therefore recommended that future studies should seek to 
better understand the strength of preferences regarding these attributes. On the 
other hand, this study provided little evidence to suggest that respondents’ 
preferences regarding end of life treatments are influenced by the age of the 
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patients. However, it should be borne in mind that preferences were sought only 
regarding younger adults and older adults – scenarios examining children, for 
example, may well have generated different results. It is necessary to include a 
greater variety of levels for attributes such as life expectancy in order to 
understand whether those attributes exhibit non-linear or threshold effects on 
respondents’ preferences. For instance, people may prefer to give priority to 
patients with shorter life expectancy up to a point, but when the life expectancy 
becomes extremely short (for example, less than three months) then this 
preference may no longer hold. 
In this study, all of the scenarios were designed such that both patients received 
the same amount of undiscounted health gain – half a QALY in all cases. In reality, 
the NICE end of life policy has led to a situation whereby some end of life 
treatments offering very small improvements in health have been recommended for 
use in the NHS (Longson and Littejohns, 2009), whilst non-end of life treatments 
offering much larger benefits have not been recommended. It would therefore be 
useful to understand the extent to which people are willing to sacrifice overall 
health benefit in order to give priority to the treatment of end of life patients. This 
could be examined by varying the levels of the ‘health gain from treatment’ 
attribute. 
Public preference studies can help develop an understanding of what people 
consider to be appropriate and acceptable for society. In order to obtain a 
comprehensive picture, however, it is important to capture not only respondents’ 
choices but also the reasons for their choices. The tick-box tasks were valuable in 
this respect, but were limited in that many respondents simply ticked boxes that 
referred to ‘factually correct’ statements but did not necessarily offer any insight 
into the nature of their preferences. Moreover, a large number of respondents gave 
reasons that were inconsistent with each other or with their choices. Future studies 
should consider alternative ways of eliciting information to aid the interpretation of 
observed preferences. 
4.5 Conclusions  
This chapter has described a small-scale study that examined whether the policy of 
giving higher priority to life-extending end of life treatments (as specified by NICE) 
than to other types of treatments is consistent with the preferences of members of 
the general public. The results provide some weak evidence of public support for 
giving priority to patients with relatively short life expectancy, but it should be 
noted that a sizeable minority of respondents expressed the opposite preference. 
The current NICE policy does not cover quality of life-improving end of life 
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treatments, and is not concerned with whether the treatments under appraisal are 
indicated for patients whose disease progression has been sudden. Yet the results 
of this study suggest that people’s preferences regarding the value of end of life 
treatments may be influenced by these factors.  
Given the small sample, limited range of scenarios, and fragility of some of the 
results, the findings of this chapter should not be taken as definitive. A larger scale 
study, designed to examine more robustly people’s preferences regarding end of 
life treatments, is recommended. Empirical study 3 (Chapter 5) addresses some of 
the limitations described above. By varying the gains from treatment across 
alternatives and choice tasks, empirical study 3 provides information about the 
trade-off between health-maximisation and giving priority to end of life treatments. 
It also investigates the extent to which the cut-offs in the NICE criteria are 
consistent with public preferences. 
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5 VALUING HEALTH AT THE END OF LIFE: A STATED 
PREFERENCE DISCRETE CHOICE EXPERIMENT 
(EMPIRICAL STUDY 3)18 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the third of the four empirical studies, conducted in 2012. At 
that time, evidence of public preferences regarding NICE’s policy remained scarce. 
Empirical study 2 (Chapter 4) had provided weak and tentative evidence of support 
for an end of life premium, and had concluded with a recommendation to undertake 
a more robust and larger scale examination of end of life-related preferences. 
Empirical study 3 advances the previous studies by exploring whether and how 
people would sacrifice overall health gains in order to give priority to end of life 
patients, and by testing alternative operationalisations of NICE’s policy.  
As in empirical study 2, the aim is to examine whether the policy of giving higher 
priority to life-extending end of life treatments (as defined by NICE) than to other 
types of treatments is consistent with the preferences of members of the general 
public. A large-scale web-based DCE is used to address this research question. The 
study is one of the first to have applied the DCE method to examine preferences in 
the end of life context. The predicted probability approach used by Green and 
Gerard (2009) is followed in order to present results on a probability scale with 
ratio level properties, thereby allowing an assessment of the strength of 
preferences between competing profiles or scenarios. 
A secondary objective is to examine further the question of whether people’s 
preferences regarding the treatment of end of life patients are affected by how long 
those patients have known about their prognosis. 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Survey instrument 
5.2.1.1 Framework 
There are many stated preference techniques that can be used to elicit public 
preferences regarding health care priority-setting (Ryan et al., 2001). Health 
economists typically prefer choice-based methods that reflect the view that the 
value of something is measured by how much one is willing to trade or sacrifice to 
                                           
18 A previous version of this chapter has been published as: Shah, K.K., Tsuchiya, A. and Wailoo, A.J., 
2015. Valuing health at the end of life: a stated preference discrete choice experiment. Social Science 
and Medicine 124, 48-56. 
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obtain it. The literature review identified eight types of choice-based methods that 
have been used in studies reporting evidence on preferences regarding end of life 
treatments (see 2.3.4), including simple choice exercises as used in empirical 
studies 1 and 2 in this thesis (Chapters 3 and 4, respectively).  
A specific variant of choice exercise, the DCE, produces quantitative trade-offs 
between different factors based on hypothetical choices (Louviere et al., 2000). 
DCEs are typically implemented in surveys comprising several ‘choice sets’, each 
containing competing alternative ‘profiles’ described using ‘attributes’ and a range 
of attribute ‘levels’. Respondents are asked to choose between these alternative 
profiles, and the resulting choices are analysed to estimate the relative contribution 
of each of the attribute levels to overall utility (Lancsar and Louviere, 2008). 
DCE data are modelled within a random utility framework, which assumes the utility 
(𝑈𝑛𝑗) that respondent n obtains from choosing alternative j can be separated into an 
explainable component (𝑉𝑛𝑗) and an unexplainable component (𝜀𝑛𝑗): 
𝑈𝑛𝑗 = 𝑉𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗 
The researcher does not observe 𝜀𝑛𝑗 and treats it as random. 𝑉𝑛𝑗 is the indirect 
utility function in which the attributes of the alternatives are arguments. The 
probability that the respondent chooses alternative i over alternative j is given by: 
 𝑃𝑛𝑖 = Pr(𝑉𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑛𝑖 > 𝑉𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗)  ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
        = Pr(𝑉𝑛𝑖 − 𝑉𝑛𝑗 > 𝜀𝑛𝑗 − 𝜀𝑛𝑖)  ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
Assuming that the random terms are independently and identically distributed, the 
conditional logit model can be used to derive probability outcomes across a choice 
set (Louviere et al., 2000). The predicted probability of alternative i being chosen 
from the complete set of alternatives (j=1,…,J) is given by: 
 𝑃𝑛𝑖 =
𝑒𝑉𝑛𝑖
∑ 𝑒
𝑉𝑛𝑗J
𝑗=1
  𝑗 = 1, … , J  
The number of studies using DCEs in health economics has grown rapidly in recent 
years (de Bekker-Grob et al., 2012; Clark et al., 2014), though until the early 
2000s most applications had been concerned with eliciting individual personal 
preferences from respondents who had been asked to consider the choice context 
as it applied to themselves (Green and Gerard, 2009). An increasing trend, 
however, is to use DCEs to examine social preferences whereby respondents are 
asked to adopt a social decision-maker perspective and consider choices involving 
other people in society (Whitty et al., 2014). This is the context adopted in this 
study. 
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5.2.1.2 Attributes and levels 
The selection of attributes and levels (Table 5-1) was based on NICE’s criteria (see 
1.8.2) and informed by the findings of empirical studies 1 and 2. ‘Life expectancy 
without treatment’ and ‘life expectancy gain from treatment’ were included as 
attributes as these form the basis for the critera in NICE’s end of life policy. The 
levels for these attributes were selected so as to examine whether there is a case 
for amending the cut-offs implied by the existing criteria. For life expectancy 
without treatment, a level representing the current cut-off of 24 months was 
included, as well as two levels smaller and two levels larger than this cut-off (three 
months, 12 months; 36 months, 60 months). An even larger level of 120 months 
(or 10 years) was considered but omitted due to concerns about how the durations 
would be displayed visually using computer-based diagrams (see Figure 5-1). 
Similarly, the current ‘life expectancy gain from treatment’ cut-off of three months 
was included, as well as two smaller and two larger levels (one month, two months; 
six months, 12 months). In addition, 0 months was included in order to examine 
preferences for end of life treatments that offer no life extension. 
Table 5-1. Attributes and levels used in the study 
Attribute Unit Levels 
Life expectancy without treatment  months 3, 12, 24, 36, 60  
Quality of life without treatment  % 50, 100 
Life expectancy gain from treatment  months 0, 1, 2, 3, 6, 12  
Quality of life gain from treatment % 0, 25, 50 
 
The inclusion of quality of life attributes was driven by the finding in empirical 
studies 1 and 2 that many respondents appeared to favour the prioritisation of 
quality of life-improving treatments over life-extending treatments for end of life 
patients. The term ‘quality of life’ was not used in the survey itself; following Rowen 
et al. (2016a), this attribute was described using a health scale ranging from ‘dead’ 
(0%) to ‘full health’ (100%).  
Whilst other studies have presented quality of life using a wide range of levels – see 
Baker et al. (2010a), for example – the piloting work in empirical study 1 indicated 
that this may be challenging for respondents to interpret (see 3.4.3). Hence, only 
two levels were selected for the ‘quality of life without treatment’ attribute: 50% 
and 100%. The concept of ‘50% health’ was explained in the instructions as follows 
(consistent with the instruction provided to respondents in empirical study 2): 
‘Suppose there is a health state which involves some health problems. If patients 
tell us that being in this health state for 2 years is equally desirable as being in full 
health for 1 year, then we would describe someone in this health state as being in 
50% health.’ The three levels for the ‘quality of life gain from treatment’ attribute 
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were designed to represent treatments that: (1) offer no health improvement (0% 
gain); (2) restore the patient to full health (50% gain); and (3) offer some 
improvement but do not restore the patient to full health (25% gain). 
Other potential attributes, such as the patient’s age or past health, were considered 
but eventually omitted from the final study design in order to restrict the 
complexity of the choice tasks. Whilst the literature is inconclusive with regard to 
the number of attributes that should be included in DCEs, some researchers have 
suggested that when tasks become too complex respondents may not make trade-
offs but instead adopt other decision heuristics or lexicographic decision rules (Witt 
et al., 2009). This study therefore followed a parsimonious approach, focusing on 
the attributes that are most salient to the policy context for NICE.     
On the other hand, the results of empirical studies 1 and 2 suggested that people’s 
preferences regarding end of life treatments may be guided by how long the 
patients have known about their illness or prognosis. A patient who has only just 
found out about their illness may be prioritised differently from one who has known 
about their illness for some time, even if both patients’ life expectancies are similar 
(Table 4-5). A number of approaches for examining preferences regarding this issue 
were considered. Due to the complexities involved in incorporating a ‘time with 
knowledge of illness’ attribute into the experimental design, a pragmatic decision 
was made to restrict the attributes in the DCE tasks to those listed in Table 5-1, 
and to add two further ‘extension’ pairwise choice tasks to the survey which 
focused specifically on the impact of this additional attribute. These extension tasks 
do not form part of the experimental design for the DCE but were designed so as to 
enable direct comparisons with the corresponding ‘standard’ tasks. See 5.2.1.4 for 
details. 
5.2.1.3 Experimental design 
A full factorial design using the attributes and levels listed in Table 5-1 would have 
resulted in 5*2*6*3 = 180 possible profiles, but some combinations would result in 
implausible scenarios. The sum of quality of life without treatment and quality of 
life gain from treatment cannot exceed 100% as it is not possible to have a health 
state that is better than full health. A constraint that the sum of life expectancy 
gain from treatment and quality of life gain from treatment must be greater than 
zero was also imposed, or else the treatment would offer no improvement. 
Imposing these constraints suppressed 70 of the 180 possible profiles, leaving 110 
profiles and 5,995 possible pairwise choices sets to select from. 
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Using the Stata software package (StataCorp, 2013), 80 pairwise choice sets were 
constructed from these 110 profiles using a D-optimality algorithm (Carlsson and 
Martinsson, 2003) with the attribute coefficients set to zero. The design allowed for 
the estimation of both main effects and selected interaction effects (see 5.2.6). All 
of the choice sets were checked for plausibility, and no manual alteration of the 
design was required. 
There is little guidance in the literature on the optimal number of DCE tasks to ask 
each respondent to complete in a single survey. The social preference DCE studies 
summarised by Green and Gerard (2009) used between one and 18 choice sets per 
respondent, whilst in a review of 79 studies, Marshall et al. (2010) report that the 
majority of studies used between seven and 15 choice sets. The 80 choices sets in 
this study were organised into eight blocks of 10 choices. Each of the 80 choice sets 
was also assigned to one of 13 different ‘choice types’ according to the nature of 
the choice being depicted (Table 5-4). For example, in 10 of the 80 choice sets, the 
patient with shorter life expectancy without treatment gains more quality of life 
from treatment than the patient with longer life expectancy (choice type 3). 
Similarly, in 11 of the 80 choice sets, both patients have the same amount of life 
expectancy and quality of life without treatment, but one patient gains more life 
expectancy and more quality of life from treatment than the other (choice type 1). 
Assuming that that larger health gains should always be preferred to smaller health 
gains, ceteris paribus (an assumption that is inherent to a QALY-maximisation 
approach to resource allocation), choosing the patient who gains more life 
expectancy and quality of life from treatment can be regarded as the dominant 
option and should always be preferred. These choice sets therefore provide an 
opportunity to test whether respondents’ preferences conform to this type of 
monotonicity (a large proportion of respondents failing to choose the dominant 
option could be considered to be a sign of poor data quality). A balance of choice 
types across the blocks was sought. For example, all of the blocks contained at 
least one (but no more than two) choice sets of type 1. Apart from this manual 
distribution of choice types, the choice sets were assigned to blocks at random.  
When asked to choose between multiple options laid out next to each other, it is 
possible that a ‘left-hand-side’ bias may exist if respondents (subconsciously or 
otherwise) treat the option on the left as the default choice (Spalek and Hammad, 
2005). Similarly, a ‘top-to-bottom’ bias may exist when information or options are 
laid out one on top of the other (Mulhern et al., 2016). To control for potential bias 
due to the positioning of options, eight ‘mirror’ blocks were generated to match the 
eight blocks mentioned above. These consisted of the same 10 choice sets but 
switched the labels assigned to the two alternatives – i.e. the alternative labelled as 
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‘patient A’ in the original block choice set appeared as ‘patient B’ in the 
corresponding mirror block choice set (and vice versa). Including these mirror 
blocks meant that there were a total of 16 different versions of the survey. 
5.2.1.4 Extension tasks 
As mentioned above, extension choice sets were included at the end of each block 
to examine whether respondents’ choices are influenced by information about how 
long the patients have known about their illness. Each extension choice set 
replicated the scenario depicted in one of the DCE choice sets, but adding 
information that one of the patients had known about their illness for two years 
whereas the other patient had just found out about their illness. An example is 
shown in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2. Example of standard and corresponding extension choice set 
 Standard DCE choice set Corresponding extension choice set 
Attribute Patient A Patient B Patient A Patient B 
Life expectancy 
without treatment  
12 months 3 months 12 months 3 months 
Quality of life without 
treatment  
50% 50% 50% 50% 
Life expectancy gain 
from treatment  
1 month 6 months 1 month 6 months 
Quality of life gain 
from treatment 
25% 25% 25% 25% 
How long patient has 
known about illness 
No information provided 0 years  
(just found out) 
2 years 
 
 
In the standard DCE choice set, patient B is in poorer health than patient A without 
treatment (three months of life expectancy at 50% quality of life versus 12 months 
of life expectancy at 50% quality of life). Choosing to treat patient B would be 
consistent with a preference for giving priority to those who are worse off without 
treatment. In the extension choice set, the respondent is told that patient B has 
known about their illness for two years whereas patient A has only just learned of 
their illness. Some respondents who chose to treat patient B in the standard DCE 
choice set may have done so because of a concern about how little time they have 
to ‘get their affairs in order’. If so, they may switch to choosing to treat patient A in 
the extension choice set, as patient A will have had less time to prepare than 
patient B when taking into account the time with knowledge of their prognosis.  
Eight standard DCE choices sets were hand-picked to form the basis for the 
extension tasks. The selection was guided by judgements about whether the choice 
sets depicted scenarios of particular interest (such as the example shown in Table 
5-2) and by considerations about whether they could be presented graphically 
using a format similar to the one used for the standard DCE choice sets. 
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Two extension choice sets were included in each block and presented to 
respondents after they had completed the 10 standard DCE choice sets. One of the 
extension choice sets replicated a standard DCE choice set that respondents in that 
block would have already completed, to allow within-respondent comparisons; the 
other replicated a standard DCE choice set from a different block. The latter was 
always presented first, so respondents were never faced with an extension choice 
set immediately following the standard DCE choice set upon which the extension 
choice set had been based. For every choice set in which the time with knowledge 
was given to one of the patients, there was corresponding choice set (in a different 
block) which was identical except that the time with knowledge was given to the 
other patient. As with the standard DCE choice sets, mirror choice sets were used in 
an attempt to control for potential top-to-bottom bias. 
5.2.1.5 Presentation of choice tasks 
Following empirical studies 1 and 2, the attributes and levels were presented as 
characteristics of two hypothetical patients (patient A and patient B) and the effects 
of the treatments available to them. Adapting the design of an existing survey used 
in research elsewhere (Rowen et al., 2016a), the information was presented using a 
combination of diagrams and text descriptions (Figure 5-1). The diagrams used a 
horizontal scale to represent life expectancy and a vertical scale to represent 
quality of life (described in the survey as ‘health’). They appeared directly above 
the corresponding text descriptions, which were presented using bullet points. The 
use of both diagrams and text to present the choice set information was informed 
by feedback provided by respondents in empirical study 1 (see 3.3.2). Due to space 
restrictions, the diagrams and text for patient A always appeared directly above the 
diagrams and text for patient B, with the choice options at the bottom. 
The survey began with instructions (reproduced in full in Appendix 8) introducing 
the diagrams as a way of showing how different illnesses and treatments affect 
people’s health and life expectancy. Respondents were asked which patient they 
thought should be treated, assuming that the health service had only enough funds 
to treat one of the two patients, and that there were no alternative treatments 
available. It was emphasised that there were no right or wrong answers.  
Respondents were advised that they would be given information about the patients’ 
health and life expectancy with and without treatment, but that no other 
information about the patients was available (except that they were both adults). 
To prevent respondents from making choices based on hope that a cure for the 
illnesses may be found in the future, they were told that ‘the nature of the illnesses 
is such that further treatment will not be possible if either patient is not treated 
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today – this is the only opportunity for treatment.’ Although such ‘hope effects’ may 
exist and influence people’s choices regarding priority-setting, they were not 
considered pertinent to this study. The treatments typically considered under 
NICE’s end of life policy tend not to offer life extensions that are long enough for 
the realistic possibility of cures being discovered and made available for use during 
the intervening period.  
Figure 5-1. Example of DCE task diagram and text 
 
No indifference or ‘status quo’ option was offered. The use of questions involving 
forced choices without an indifference option is a departure from the approach used 
in empirical studies 1 and 2, and was informed by a number of considerations. 
First, it was felt that even if respondents found it difficult to choose between the 
two patients, they would nevertheless prefer to treat one of them rather than to 
treat neither, since some health gain is preferable to the baseline of no health gain 
to either. Second, it was suspected that such an option may be used as a default 
(‘opt-out’) choice, thus providing a way for respondents to avoid taking time to 
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make difficult decisions. This was a particular concern due to the unsupervised, 
self-complete survey setting (see 5.2.2), which may encourage respondents to seek 
shortcuts in order to complete the survey as quickly as possible. Bridges et al. 
(2011) advise that the inclusion of indifference options results in the censoring of 
data, which can limit researchers’ ability to estimate the underlying preference 
structure. Finally, if respondents are genuinely indifferent between treating the two 
patients, this should result in a roughly even split between patient A and patient B 
in the choice data. The use of mirror choice sets controls for the possibility that 
respondents will revert to a default choice, such as the patient presented first, 
every time they are unable to choose between the patients.      
The 10 standard DCE tasks were presented to respondents in a random order so as 
to ensure that order bias was not systematic across the sample. After the standard 
tasks, further instructions were provided to explain the additional ‘time with 
knowledge’ attribute. The diagrams were modified to incorporate this attribute 
(Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3). Respondents were again asked to indicate which 
patient they thought should be treated. After completing the extension tasks, 
respondents were asked background questions. Finally, they were invited to leave 
feedback using an open-ended comment box. The survey allowed respondents to 
go back to previous questions and change their answers if they so wished. 
Figure 5-2. Extension task diagram example (time with knowledge = 2 years) 
 
Figure 5-3. Extension task diagram example (time with knowledge = 0 years) 
 
102 
 
5.2.2 Administration of survey 
The choice sets were included in a self-completion survey administered over the 
internet. The survey was developed in collaboration with epiGenesys, a software 
development company. 
Internet surveys offer a quick and cost-effective means of collecting a large amount 
of choice data. Large samples are difficult to achieve using other modes of 
administration: postal self-complete surveys have very low responses rates; 
surveys administered as part of face-to-face interviews are expensive to manage; 
and the complexity of the questions in this study precluded the use of telephone-
based data collection. By comparison, internet surveys can be custom-designed to 
present information and to collect, store and export data in a clear, user-friendly 
manner.  
Interviewer-led survey administration is often preferred because the interviewer 
can explain the instructions more fully if required (Bridges et al., 2011), and 
respondents may be more likely to give their full attention to the survey whilst 
being guided (Shah et al., 2013b). However, the use of interviewers can lead to 
forms of interviewer bias – for example, if when explaining the instructions the 
interviewer gives subtle clues that influence the respondent towards certain 
preferences or choice strategies. With internet surveys, the questions and 
instructions are presented in the same manner to all respondents (although 
presentation may differ according to the hardware or software being used, it is 
reasonable to assume that any variability will be random and unlikely therefore to 
result in systematic bias). 
The vast majority of households in the UK now have access to the internet (Office 
for National Statistics, 2016), but there remain concerns about the extent to which 
a sample of online panel members can be representative of the general population. 
Although quotas can be used to ensure representativeness in terms of certain 
observable characteristics (such as age), it is likely that the sample will still be 
systematically different in terms of other unobservable characteristics. However, 
this issue is not specific to web-based data collection. The types of individuals who 
are willing to complete postal surveys or to allow interviewers into their homes for 
face-to-face interviews, for example, are similarly unlikely to be representative of 
the general population. Some market research agencies advise that providing an 
incentive for completing surveys can help to improve representativeness as an 
unpaid survey is more likely to be completed only by those passionately interested 
in the subject of that particular survey (YouGov, 2017). 
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5.2.3 Sample 
The survey was administered on a sample of adult members of the general public in 
England and Wales, all of whom were members of a panel of a market research 
agency, ResearchNow. A ‘minimum quota’ approach, combined with a targeted 
invitation strategy, was used to ensure that the sample was broadly representative 
of the general population in terms of key observable characteristics. The target 
sample size of 4,000 was determined on the basis that this was the largest sample 
that could be recruited within the required timelines. Individuals who had recently 
completed health-related surveys were not invited to take part. The average panel 
member completes six surveys per year. Completion statistics, including the age, 
gender and social grade of respondents who had completed the survey, were 
checked daily and used to guide the targeting of invitations. Once a quota for a 
particular subgroup had been reached, individuals attempting to access the survey 
who fell within that subgroup were ‘screened out’ and informed that they were not 
eligible to take part. Once respondents had been ‘screened in’ and given their 
informed consent to take part, they were randomly assigned to one of the 16 
blocks. Respondents were compensated by way of ‘reward points’ which can be 
redeemed for gift vouchers or charity donations. 
5.2.4 Ethical approval 
The survey design and sample recruitment procedures were reviewed and approved 
by the Research Ethics Committee at the School of Health and Related Research via 
the University of Sheffield Ethics Review Procedure. The ethics approval required 
the destruction of any information provided by respondents who did not complete 
the survey in full. 
5.2.5 Piloting  
The main study was preceded by a pilot, which used a convenience sample of 12 
members of non-academic staff and postgraduate research students at the 
University of Sheffield (excluding those in the Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and 
Health or the Department of Economics). The pilot comprised face-to-face 
interviews conducted by author in which respondents completed the survey 
(accessed via a laptop connected to the internet) without assistance, and then 
answered probing questions designed to elicit feedback and concerns about the 
survey and approach. 
The pilot was completed successfully, supporting the acceptability of the text and 
diagrams used in the survey and the feasibility of the proposed methods (choice of 
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attribute levels, forced choices, web-based survey, randomisation processes). The 
instructions and choice tasks were described by most of the pilot respondents as 
being clear and easy to follow. Some of the wording of the instructions was 
improved following feedback from two of the respondents. All of the respondents 
stated that they were able to understand and complete the questions without 
assistance. The levels of understanding and engagement (as perceived by the 
interviewer) were high. Respondents spent between six and 14 minutes completing 
the questions (mean: 9 minutes and 10 seconds). 
Further testing was conducted by way of a ‘soft launch’ data collection strategy. 
Once approximately 750 respondents had completed the survey, the survey was 
closed and the data were checked for issues. Whilst the average time taken to 
complete the questions (choice tasks and follow-up questions) was consistent with 
the pilot (mean: 9 minutes and 44 seconds), it was noted that 14 respondents 
(2%) completed the questions in less than three minutes. It was questioned 
whether it was possible to complete the survey this quickly whilst paying adequate 
attention to the tasks at hand. When faced with choice sets in which one alternative 
dominated the other, nine of these 14 respondents (64%) failed to choose the 
dominant alternative. Since patient A and patient B were overall equally likely to be 
represent the dominant alternative in these choice sets, a respondent who is not 
taking the survey seriously (for example, making choices at random) is expected to 
have a 50% chance of choosing the dominant alternative. By comparison, only 12% 
of respondents who spent at least three minutes completing the questions failed to 
choose the dominant alternative. It was therefore deemed reasonable to exclude 
from the analysis data for respondents who completed the questions in less than 
three minutes on grounds of poor data quality.  
The soft launch approach also provided an opportunity to examine the open-ended 
comments left by respondents, in case these highlighted any problems with the 
survey. Of the 100 or so comments that had been left, the majority were positive 
(for example: “very well set out and easy to navigate”). Three respondents left 
comments about one of the background questions, stating that they were unsure 
about which category they belonged to when asked about the occupation of the 
chief income earner of their household. The instructions to the question were 
amended to address these comments. No other changes to the survey were 
deemed necessary in light of the soft launch data analysis.   
5.2.6 Methods of analysis 
Descriptive analyses were used to determine the ‘level of agreement’ amongst 
respondents (the proportion choosing the majority choice) for each choice set. The 
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average level of agreement for each choice type (see 5.2.1.3) was then calculated 
by grouping choice sets according to the nature of the choices depicted. 
The choice data were modelled using a random utility maximisation framework 
(Louviere et al., 2000) and the Stata software package. As the data were binary 
choice data – 1 representing one option being chosen and 0 representing the other 
being chosen – conditional logit regressions were used. 
The model estimated is of the form: 
𝑉 = 𝛽1𝐿𝐸 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑂𝐿 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
+𝛽3(𝑄𝑂𝐿 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝐿𝐸 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) 
+𝛽4(𝐿𝐸 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝑄𝑂𝐿 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) 
+𝛽5(𝐿𝐸 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝑄𝑂𝐿 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛) 
+𝛽6𝐸𝑂𝐿 
The deterministic component of the utility function (V) is a function of the attribute 
levels between alternatives, where the coefficients β1 to β6 are estimated in the 
model. The explanatory variables LE (life expectancy) without treatment and QOL 
(quality of life) without treatment represent the baseline health of the patients. The 
three interactions terms together make up QALY gains (quality of life improvement 
for a given level of life expectancy; life extension for a given level of quality of life; 
and life extension combined with quality of life improvement). These variables were 
treated as continuous. An end of life dummy variable was also included. This took a 
value of 1 for profiles that would meet the NICE criteria for defining a life-extending 
end of life treatment (i.e. life expectancy without treatment of less than or equal to 
24 months; life expectancy gain of greater than or equal to three months) and 0 
otherwise.19 The performance of models both with and without the end of life 
dummy was assessed by examining the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria 
(Akaike, 1973; Schwartz, 1978) and conducting likelihood ratio tests.  
The coefficients estimated in the model can be summed to give the overall utility 
for each profile (combination of attribute levels). This gives an indication of the 
relative social value of the 110 profiles in the experimental design. As described in 
5.2.1.1, the probability of choosing a given profile from the complete set of profiles 
can be predicted from the model estimates. Following the approach used by Green 
and Gerard (2009), the relative predicted probabilities for all of the 110 profiles 
were calculated, allowing comparisons between the profiles with higher probabilities 
                                           
19 An alternative model, in which the end of life dummy was defined in terms of life expectancy without 
treatment but not life expectancy gain, was also tested. 
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(those which are likely to be most preferred overall) with those with lower 
probabilities (those which are likely to be least preferred overall). 
Finally, a selection of respondent subgroups whose choices may be expected to 
differ from those of the rest of the sample were defined a priori. These were: (1) 
respondents with experience of close friends or family with terminal illness; (2) 
respondents with responsibility for children aged under 18 years; (3) respondents 
who opted to leave a comment in the open-ended box at the end of the survey (this 
was not mandatory); and (4) respondents who completed the questions much 
quicker than average. Family circumstances and personal experience of terminal 
illness were mentioned as influences on respondents’ preferences in empirical study 
1 (see 3.3.2); whether a comment was left and how quickly the questions were 
completed may be indicators of respondent engagement. For each subgroup, the 
best fitting model was estimated and the results were compared to those of the 
same model using the full sample.  
Throughout the analyses a zero discount rate was assumed based on the lack of 
evidence from empirical studies 1 and 2 that time preference is a motivating factor 
for giving higher priority to the treatment of end of life patients. 
5.3 Results 
Data collection was undertaken in early 2012. In total, 43,000 individuals were 
invited by email to take part in the survey, of whom 5,308 clicked on the link to 
access the survey (response rate: 12.3%). Of the individuals who accessed the 
survey, 4,008 completed the survey in full (completion rate: 75.5%). The 
remainder either did not give consent to take part, or began the survey but 
dropped out without completing all of the questions. The response and completion 
rates for this survey are consistent with those of similar internet surveys whose 
sample comprised members of ResearchNow’s panel. 
As mentioned above (see 5.2.5), it was agreed that data for respondents who spent 
less than three minutes on the questions would be suppressed from the final data 
set. This cut-off excluded 39 respondents, leaving a sample of 3,969 respondents 
(47,628 pairwise observations). Of these 47,628 observations, 39,690 were for the 
standard DCE tasks to be analysed using the conditional logit model; the remaining 
7,938 were for the extension tasks.  
The background characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 5-3. By 
design, the sample was broadly representative of the general population with 
respect to age and gender (Office for National Statistics, 2011). Despite the use of 
quotas to seek representativeness in terms of social grade, the sample comprised a 
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slightly larger proportion of individuals in the highest and very lowest grades than 
in the general population (National Readership Survey, 2012-3), presumably due to 
changes in circumstances since these individuals joined the panel.  
Table 5-3. Sample background characteristics 
  n % Population 
Total  3,969 100.0%  
Age (years) 18-29 730 18.4% 21% 
30-44 1,087 27.3% 26% 
45-59 855 21.5% 25% 
60+ 1,297 32.7% 28% 
Gender Female 2,027 51.1% 51% 
Male 1,942 48.9% 49% 
Social grade a A 221 5.6% 4% 
B 1,114 28.1% 22% 
C1 1,150 29.0% 29% 
C2 645 16.3% 21% 
D 357 9.0% 15% 
E 482 12.1% 8% 
Household 
composition 
Responsible for children 963 24.3%  
Not responsible for children 3,006 75.7%  
Education 
 
None beyond minimum school 
leaving age 
889 
 
22.4% 
 
 
Beyond minimum school 
leaving age; no degree 
1,244 
 
31.3% 
 
 
Beyond minimum school 
leaving age; degree 
1,836 46.3%  
Self-reported 
general health  
Very good 1,008 25.4%  
Good 1,958 49.3%  
Fair 770 19.4%  
Poor 210 5.3%  
Very poor 23 0.6%  
Experience of close 
friends or family 
with terminal illness 
Yes 2,689 67.8%  
No 1,197 30.2%  
Question skipped by 
respondent 
83 2.1%  
a Refers to the occupation/qualifications/responsibilities of the chief wage earner of the respondent’s 
household; see National Readership Survey (2012-13). 
Three hundred and eighty-nine respondents (9.8%) failed to choose the dominant 
option when faced with choice sets in which one alternative dominated the other 
(i.e. where both patients have the same amount of life expectancy and quality of 
life without treatment, but one patient gains more life expectancy and more quality 
of life from treatment than the other). However, it is not necessarily the case that 
these preferences are ‘irrational’ – Lancsar and Louviere (2006) warn against 
researchers imposing their own preferences by deleting responses that do not 
conform to their expectations. Data for these respondents were therefore included 
in the analysis.  
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5.3.1 Descriptive statistics of the choices made 
Table 5-4 reports the average level of agreement for the choice sets belonging to 
each choice type (see 5.2.1.3). The majority of respondents chose to treat the 
patient who gains more from treatment, regardless of whether that patient is better 
or worse off without treatment. This is demonstrated by the high levels of 
agreement for choice sets corresponding to choices types 2, 13 and 6. Across the 
three choice sets in which the gains from treatment are the same for both patients 
and one patient is worse off without treatment in terms of both life expectancy and 
quality of life (choice type 10), the better off patient was chosen 66% of the time. 
Table 5-4. Average level of agreement, by choice type 
Choice 
type 
No. 
choice 
sets Description 
Level of 
agreement (% 
respondents who 
chose patient X) 
2 11 
Both patients have the same LE / QOL without 
treatment. Patient X gains more LE and more QOL 
from treatment than patient Y.  92% 
13 5 
Patient X has shorter LE and higher QOL without 
treatment and gains more LE from treatment than 
patient Y. 85% 
6 1 
Patient X has lower QOL without treatment and gains 
more LE and more QOL from treatment than patient Y. 85% 
1 14 
Patient X has longer LE without treatment and gains 
more QOL from treatment than patient Y. 78% 
12 2 
Patient X has shorter LE without treatment and gains 
more LE from treatment than patient Y. 76% 
9 4 
Patient X has longer LE without treatment and gains 
more LE from treatment than patient Y. 74% 
11 2 
Patient X has longer LE and lower QOL without 
treatment and gains more QOL from treatment than 
patient Y. 72% 
8 4 
Patient X has shorter LE without treatment and higher 
QOL without treatment than patient Y. Both patients 
gain same amount of LE / QOL from treatment. 68% 
7 5 
Patient X has shorter LE and lower QOL without 
treatment and gains more QOL from treatment than 
patient Y. 68% 
10 3 
Patient X has longer LE and higher QOL without 
treatment than patient Y. Both patients gain same 
amount of LE / QOL from treatment.  66% 
3 10 
Patient X has shorter LE without treatment and gains 
more QOL from treatment than patient Y. 62% 
4 10 
Both patients have the same LE / QOL without 
treatment. Patient X gains more QOL from treatment; 
patient Y gains more LE from treatment. 59% 
5 9 
Patient X has lower QOL without treatment and gains 
more QOL and less LE from treatment than patient Y. 58% 
 
Overall, there was a statistically significant tendency (Student’s t-test; p<0.01) to 
choose to treat the alternative labelled patient B (the alternative appearing at the 
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bottom of the respondent’s screen). Examining differences between mirror blocks, 
wherever the most popular choice was patient A (B) in the original block, the most 
popular choice was always patient B (A) in the corresponding mirror block.  
5.3.2 Discrete choice model results 
Table 5-5 reports the results of the conditional logit modelling. Note that the 
parameters have been coded such that that one year in full health is given a value 
of 1. The results of two models are presented – one with and one without the end 
of life dummy variable described in 5.2.6. The model with the end of life dummy 
performed better according to the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria and 
likelihood ratio tests (p<0.01).  
Table 5-5. Conditional logit modelling results 
Attribute 
Model without end of life dummy a Best fitting model (with end of life 
dummy) b  
Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value 
LE without 
treatment -0.10715 0.00696 0.00 -0.06945 0.00736 0.00 
QOL without 
treatment -0.06357 0.04877 0.19 0.00051 0.04936 0.99 
Interaction: QOL 
gain # LE without 
treatment  0.81567 0.01652 0.00 0.84535 0.01682 0.00 
Interaction: LE 
gain # QOL 
without treatment 2.71342 0.05990 0.00 2.39408 0.06305 0.00 
Interaction: LE 
gain # QOL gain 3.17557 0.10330 0.00 2.76204 0.10616 0.00 
End of life dummy N/A N/A N/A 0.37253 0.02510 0.00 
 a Akaike information criterion = 43577; Bayesian information criterion = 43623 
 b Akaike information criterion = 43358; Bayesian information criterion = 43414 
In both models, the coefficient for life expectancy without treatment is negative and 
statistically significant, which indicates that respondents were more likely to choose 
to treat the patient with shorter life expectancy without treatment, ceteris paribus. 
The coefficient for quality of life without treatment is not statistically significant in 
either model. The coefficients for the three interactions that make up QALY gains 
are all positive and statistically significant, and considerably larger in magnitude 
than the coefficient for life expectancy without treatment. The coefficient for the 
interaction between life expectancy gain and quality of life without treatment is 
substantially larger than the coefficient for the interaction between quality of life 
gain and life expectancy without treatment. This indicates that respondents’ choices 
are driven by life extensions to a greater degree than by quality of life 
improvements. The coefficient for the end of life dummy is positive and statistically 
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significant, which indicates that respondents are more likely to choose a treatment 
that meets the NICE criteria than one that does not.  
To assist interpretation of the model results, Table 5-6 presents the utility scores 
based on the best fitting model for a selection of the profiles, as well as the 
predicted probability of choosing each profile from the full set of 110 profiles. A 
table showing the same information for all 110 profiles can be found in Appendix 
12.  
Table 5-6. Estimated utility score and probability of choice for the highest/lowest ranked 
profiles 
Rank 
LE 
without 
treatment 
(mths) 
QOL 
without 
treatment 
(%) 
LE 
gain 
(mths) 
QOL 
gain 
(%) 
QALYs 
without 
treatment 
QALYs 
gained  Utility Prob. 
Cumul. 
Prob. 
1 60 50 12 50 2.500 3.500 4.3445 0.1351 0.1351 
2 36 50 12 50 1.500 2.500 3.6380 0.0667 0.2018 
3 12 50 12 50 0.500 1.500 3.3041 0.0477 0.2495 
4 24 50 12 50 1.000 2.000 3.2848 0.0468 0.2964 
5 60 50 6 50 2.500 3.000 3.0554 0.0372 0.3336 
6 3 50 12 50 0.125 1.125 3.0392 0.0366 0.3702 
7 3 100 12 0 0.250 1.000 2.7498 0.0274 0.3976 
8 12 100 12 0 1.000 1.000 2.6977 0.0260 0.4237 
9 60 50 12 25 2.500 2.000 2.5973 0.0235 0.4472 
10 60 50 3 50 2.500 2.750 2.4109 0.0195 0.4668 
11 12 50 12 25 0.500 1.000 2.4022 0.0194 0.4861 
12 36 50 6 50 1.500 2.000 2.3490 0.0184 0.5045 
13 36 50 12 25 1.500 1.500 2.3135 0.0177 0.5222 
14 3 50 12 25 0.125 0.813 2.2958 0.0174 0.5396 
15 24 100 12 0 2.000 1.000 2.2557 0.0167 0.5564 
16 60 50 2 50 2.500 2.667 2.1961 0.0158 0.5721 
17 36 100 12 0 3.000 1.000 2.1862 0.0156 0.5878 
18 24 50 12 25 1.000 1.250 2.1716 0.0154 0.6031 
19 60 100 12 0 5.000 1.000 2.0474 0.0136 0.6167 
20 12 50 6 50 0.500 1.000 2.0150 0.0132 0.6299 
- - - - - - - - - - 
10 most 
preferred 
profiles 2.750 0.600 0.875 0.375 1.438 2.038 3.1121 0.04668  
20 most 
preferred 
profiles 2.638 0.625 0.846 0.313 1.600 1.680 2.6677 0.03149  
55 most 
preferred 
profiles 2.268 0.600 0.558 0.277 1.305 1.201 1.7856 0.01570  
55 least 
preferred 
profiles 2.232 0.627 0.170 0.132 1.457 0.310 0.3081 0.00249  
20 least 
preferred 
profiles 2.488 0.625 0.117 0.050 1.644 0.093 0.0156 0.00179  
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Rank 
LE 
without 
treatment 
(mths) 
QOL 
without 
treatment 
(%) 
LE 
gain 
(mths) 
QOL 
gain 
(%) 
QALYs 
without 
treatment 
QALYs 
gained  Utility Prob. 
Cumul. 
Prob. 
10 least 
preferred 
profiles 3.225 0.600 0.108 0.025 2.013 0.069 -0.0687 0.00164  
- - - - - - - - - - 
91 24 50 3 0 1.000 0.125 0.1606 0.0021 0.9662 
92 12 50 0 25 0.500 0.250 0.1421 0.0020 0.9683 
93 12 100 1 0 1.000 0.083 0.1306 0.0020 0.9703 
94 12 50 2 0 0.500 0.083 0.1303 0.0020 0.9723 
95 36 50 3 0 1.500 0.125 0.0912 0.0019 0.9742 
96 3 50 0 50 0.125 0.125 0.0886 0.0019 0.9761 
97 3 50 1 0 0.125 0.042 0.0826 0.0019 0.9780 
98 24 100 1 0 2.000 0.083 0.0611 0.0019 0.9799 
99 24 50 2 0 1.000 0.083 0.0609 0.0019 0.9817 
100 60 100 2 0 5.000 0.167 0.0523 0.0018 0.9836 
101 3 50 0 25 0.125 0.063 0.0357 0.0018 0.9854 
102 12 50 1 0 0.500 0.042 0.0306 0.0018 0.9872 
103 36 100 1 0 3.000 0.083 -0.0083 0.0017 0.9889 
104 36 50 2 0 1.500 0.083 -0.0086 0.0017 0.9907 
105 24 50 1 0 1.000 0.042 -0.0389 0.0017 0.9924 
106 60 50 3 0 2.500 0.125 -0.0477 0.0017 0.9940 
107 36 50 1 0 1.500 0.042 -0.1083 0.0016 0.9956 
108 60 100 1 0 5.000 0.083 -0.1472 0.0015 0.9971 
109 60 50 2 0 2.500 0.083 -0.1475 0.0015 0.9986 
110 60 50 1 0 2.500 0.042 -0.2472 0.0014 1.0000 
Note: all outcomes are undiscounted 
The highest ranked profiles all involve substantial treatment gains. All of the 
profiles ranked between 1st and 25th involve a life expectancy gain of 12 months 
and/or a quality of life gain of 50%. By contrast, the lowest ranked profiles mostly 
involve a small life expectancy gain and no quality of life gain. A similar pattern 
with respect to life expectancy without treatment does not exist – profiles involving 
the highest and lowest levels for this attribute (60 months and three months, 
respectively) appear at both the top and the bottom of Table 5-6. Quality of life 
without treatment is 50% in most of the highest ranked profiles, but this is always 
accompanied by a non-zero quality of life gain from treatment. There is little 
difference between the highest and lowest ranked profiles in terms of QALYs 
without treatment – the key driver is the difference in the sizes of the QALY gains 
from treatment. 
Figure 5-4 illustrates the levels of QALYs without treatment and QALYs gained from 
treatment associated with all of the 110 profiles, where the horizontal axis 
represents the standardised predicted probabilities from the lowest (least preferred) 
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to the highest (most preferred) profile. Whilst the patterns are noisy, the green 
linear trend line for QALYs gained from treatment has a clear upward slope (the 
larger the size of the QALY gains, the greater the probability of the profile being 
chosen). The blue linear trend line for QALYs without treatment is relatively flat, 
indicating that the number of QALYs without treatment does not have a major 
effect on the probability of the profile being chosen.  
Figure 5-4. QALYs without and gained from treatment – all profiles 
 
5.3.3 Subgroup analysis 
As described in 5.2.6, respondents were assigned to subgroups according to their 
responses to the background questions (whether or not they have experience of 
terminal illness in close friends or family; whether or not they have children) or to 
the ways in which they completed the survey (whether they left a comment or not; 
how quickly they completed the survey). The best fitting models were estimated for 
each subgroup and the results were compared to those of the same model using 
the full sample. This analysis indicated no difference in the signs or approximate 
magnitude of the coefficients for any of the subgroups compared with the entire 
sample (except for the coefficient for quality of life without treatment, which was 
not robust across models and never found to be statistically significant).  
The best fitting model was also run excluding the 389 respondents who failed to 
select the dominant alternative when faced with choice sets in which one 
alternative dominated the other. Excluding these respondents did not affect the 
conclusions from the regression results. 
5.3.4 Extension tasks 
Comparing the response data for the extension tasks with the data for the 
corresponding standard DCE tasks allows the testing of whether respondents are 
more likely to choose to treat the patient who has just found out about their illness 
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(for example, due to concerns about how long they have to prepare for death). In 
all of the 16 extension tasks, being told that one of the patients has known about 
their illness for two years increased the proportion of respondents choosing to treat 
the other patient compared to when no 'time with knowledge' information is 
provided. In six of the 16 cases, this increase was sufficiently large that the 
majority choice in the extension task flipped from the majority choice in the 
corresponding standard task. Figure 5-5 presents the impact on choices of 
providing information on how long the patients have known about their illness, 
summed across all 16 extension tasks. 
Figure 5-5. Impact of providing ‘time with knowledge’ information (all extension tasks) 
  
The choice set that formed the basis for the example in Table 5-2 was identified 
during the study design phase as being of particular interest. Quality of life (both 
before and after treatment) is the same for both patients. One patient has shorter 
life expectancy without treatment than the other (3 months < 12 months), and 
despite gaining more life expectancy from treatment (6 months > 1 month), that 
patient continues to have shorter life expectancy after being treated (9 months < 
13 months). If people wish to give priority to those with shorter life expectancy and 
prefer larger health gains to smaller health gains, then it is expected that most 
people would choose to treat this 'worse off, larger gain' patient. This is indeed the 
case in the two standard DCE tasks that mirror each other (75% and 78% of 
respondents chose to treat this patient). 
In two of the extension tasks based on this choice set (and its mirror), respondents 
were told that the ‘worse off, larger gain’ patient found out about their illness two 
years ago, while the other (‘better off, smaller gain’) patient had only just found 
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out about their illness. This means that despite their shorter life expectancy, the 
‘worse off, larger gain’ patient will have had longer to prepare for death (25 months 
> 12 months). In light of this new information, a smaller proportion, but still the 
majority, of respondents chose to treat this patient (57% and 57%). 
5.4 Discussion 
This study used a web-based DCE to elicit the preferences of a large general public 
sample in England and Wales over a range of health care priority-setting scenarios, 
focusing on social preferences regarding the prioritisation of treatments for patients 
with short life expectancy. The results show that choices about which patient to 
treat are influenced more by the sizes of the gains achievable from treatment than 
by patients’ life expectancy or quality of life in absence of treatment. The profiles 
most likely to be chosen were those with the highest levels of both life expectancy 
gain (12 months) and quality of life gain (50%). Likewise, the profiles least likely to 
be chosen were those with very small gains. On the other hand, the data suggest 
that the level of life expectancy without treatment in a given profile has little impact 
on the likelihood of that profile being chosen. There is certainly no indication that 
being at the end of life is the driving factor; in fact, the average level of life 
expectancy without treatment in the 55 profiles most likely to be chosen is almost 
identical to that in the 55 profiles that are least likely to be chosen (Table 5-6).  
Analysis at the individual choice set level confirms this: in several of the choice sets 
showing the highest levels of agreement amongst respondents (Table 5-4), the 
most popular choice was to treat the patient with longer left to live and for whom 
treatment offered larger health gains, in favour of the patient with shorter life 
expectancy. The overall view seems to be that giving priority to those who are 
worse off is desirable, but only if the gains from treatment are substantial. 
The results show that people’s preferences are heterogeneous. Although the 
conditional logit model did not account for the panel nature of the data, the analysis 
of choice frequencies at the individual respondent level showed that some 
respondents appeared to support a QALY-maximisation type objective throughout; 
a small minority always sought to treat those who are worse off without treatment; 
but the majority seemed to advocate a mixture of the two approaches. These 
heterogeneous preferences do not appear to be well predicted by respondents’ 
observable characteristics (see Appendix 13). 
The finding of this study that respondents attach relatively little weight to how 
much life expectancy (and quality of life) without treatment patients have does not 
necessarily refute evidence elsewhere in the literature of popular support for the 
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use of severity as a priority-setting criterion (Shah, 2009). This study focused on a 
small range of scenarios, all of which involved relatively poor prognoses (in terms 
of life expectancy). Across all of the profiles included in the design, the patient who 
is ‘best off’ without treatment would still die within five years. Thus, in effect, all of 
the profiles in the study describe patients who are at or near their end of life to 
some extent. It is not possible from these data alone to infer whether the 
importance of the life expectancy without treatment attribute would be markedly 
different in a survey asking respondents to choose between treating patients with 
very short life expectancies and treating patients with much longer life expectancies 
(for example, patients with 30 years of remaining life, who clearly cannot be 
described as ‘end of life’). 
The outcomes examined in this study were not adjusted to account for any possible 
social time preference. Applying a positive discount rate would likely further 
strengthen the finding that respondents do not place special value on treating 
patients with short life expectancy, though the effect of discounting is expected to 
be quite small given the relatively short timeframes included in the study design. 
The internet survey provided an efficient means of obtaining a large sample. The 
response rate observed is not unusual for a non-probability-based panel sample, 
and cannot easily be compared with response rates from studies using different 
modes of administration (for example, because many of the individuals invited to 
take part may not be active members of the panel) (Baker et al., 2010b). However, 
this mode of administration offers limited opportunity for debriefing with 
respondents about their experience of completing the survey (although the earlier 
studies and piloting were useful in this respect). The study was designed in such a 
way that the ranking of the profiles would not be expected to differ if some 
respondents failed to pay adequate attention to the choice tasks (for example, 
making choices at random). Nevertheless, if respondents had failed to understand 
the instructions, then this could be problematic. For example, they may mistakenly 
believe that the tasks require them to choose which patient they would prefer to be 
in the position of, rather than which patient they would prefer the health service to 
treat. A useful addition to future stated preference studies, particularly those 
administered in an unsupervised setting, would be to design follow-up questions 
that can be used to check whether respondents agree with the policy implications of 
their responses to the DCE questions. For example, asking respondents to rank a 
variety of statements describing different priority-setting approaches according to 
the extent to which they agreed with them would provide information about which 
broad priority-setting objectives they find most and least acceptable. A more 
explicit method would be to present respondents with a statement such as ‘the 
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health service should give priority to extending the life of patients who are expected 
to die soon as a result of a medical condition’ and ask them to indicate whether 
they agreed or disagreed with that statement. This would allow the checking of 
whether respondents agree with a policy statement that appears to match their 
responses in the DCE tasks. A high level of agreement would add legitimacy to the 
DCE results.  
The finding that respondents were more likely to choose the alternative appearing 
at the bottom of the screen is consistent with findings reported elsewhere in the 
literature on bias due to the positioning of choice options (Spalek and Hammad, 
2005). The use of randomisation procedures and mirror choice sets to minimise the 
impact of ordering-related biases is recommended. 
Results from the extension tasks show that including information about the amount 
of time that patients have known about their prognosis has a clear impact on 
preferences – specifically, holding all else constant, respondents are less likely to 
choose to treat a patient if that patient has known about their illness for two years 
than if they have only just found out about their illness. This suggests that the 
observed tendency to give priority to the end of life patient may be driven by 
concerns about the patient’s ability to prepare for death rather than the amount of 
time they have left to live per se. The fact that this time with knowledge attribute 
was clearly the main subject of the extension task instructions and questions (see 
Appendix 9) is likely to have resulted in a focusing effect whereby respondents 
placed more importance on this attribute than they otherwise might have done. 
Furthermore, the extension tasks in this study did not allow for the elicitation of the 
strength of respondents’ preferences. Further investigation of preferences regarding 
preparedness is recommended. 
NICE’s current criteria for determining whether a treatment should be a candidate 
for special consideration are that it is indicated for patients with less than 24 
months of life expectancy and that it extends life by at least three months. Hence, 
a treatment offering 0.5 QALYs through a 12 month life expectancy gain (and no 
quality of life gain) to patients with 24 months life expectancy at 50% quality of life 
without treatment would meet these criteria. An alternative treatment, also offering 
0.5 QALYs through a 25% quality of life gain (and no life expectancy gain) to the 
same patients would not meet the criteria for being eligible for special 
consideration. The results of this study indicate that the profile representing the 
former treatment would in fact be more likely to be chosen (ranked 44th with a 
0.51% probability of being chosen) than the profile representing the latter 
treatment (ranked 83rd; 0.23%) (Appendix 12). This suggests that the focus on life 
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extensions and absence of quality of life improvements in the criteria may be 
consistent with public preferences, although some of the descriptive statistics 
analysis (Table 5-4) suggests otherwise.    
An examination of the impact of marginal changes in any of the attribute levels 
from a profile representing a treatment that just meets the current NICE end of life 
criteria suggests that amending the life expectancy without treatment criterion 
would not have a major effect on utility. The predicted probability of choosing a 
profile involving a life expectancy gain of three months is much the same 
regardless of whether the patient’s life expectancy without treatment is three, 24 or 
36 months. By comparison, a profile involving a life expectancy gain of six months 
is considerably more likely to be chosen than an otherwise identical profile involving 
a life expectancy gain of three months. The coefficient for the ‘alternative’ end of 
life dummy (defined in terms of life expectancy without treatment but not life 
expectancy gain) was small and not statistically significant. This suggests that any 
observed support for NICE’s end of life policy amongst this sample requires that the 
policy includes a life extension criterion. 
5.5 Conclusions  
This chapter has described a large-scale DCE that examined whether the policy of 
giving higher priority to life-extending end of life treatments (as specified by NICE) 
than to other types of treatments is consistent with the preferences of members of 
the general public. The results provide little evidence of support for an end of life 
premium. When asked to make decisions about the treatment of hypothetical 
patients with relatively short life expectancies, most respondents’ choices were 
driven by the size of the gains offered by treatment. 
Given the aim of the study, the DCE method was useful in that it facilitated the 
inclusion of multiple levels for each attribute, including levels smaller than, equal 
to, and larger than those implied by NICE’s end of life criteria. The analytical 
approach also allowed choice probabilities to be predicted for all possible 
combinations of attributes and levels. However, due to concerns about the 
complexity of the experimental design and the resulting choice sets, only four 
attributes were included in the standard DCE tasks. This meant that preferences 
regarding preparedness had to be examined using separate extension tasks 
(potentially leading to focusing effects) and other attributes of interest – such as 
patient age – were omitted altogether. Unlike in empirical studies 1 and 2, no 
indifference option was available to respondents. On the other hand – and 
consistent with empirical studies 1 and 2 – all tasks used diagrams to present 
information to respondents. The next, and fourth, empirical study (Chapter 6) 
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examines whether people’s stated preferences regarding end of life treatments are 
sensitive to these framing choices and to other study design considerations. 
Empirical study 4 also further investigates the issue of preparedness, and addresses 
a key limitation of empirical study 3 by using attitudinal questions to assess 
whether respondents agree with the policy implications of their responses to trade-
off tasks. 
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6 VALUING HEALTH AT THE END OF LIFE: AN 
EXAMINATION OF FRAMING EFFECTS AND STUDY 
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS (EMPIRICAL STUDY 4) 
6.1 Introduction 
The literature review (Chapter 2) identified several studies reporting evidence 
consistent with an end of life premium, and a similar number of studies reporting 
evidence not consistent with an end of life premium. The question of whether 
members of the public wish to place greater weight on a unit of health gain for end 
of life patients than on that for other types of patients thus remains unresolved.  
The review highlighted a number of gaps in the literature. Age-related preferences 
were not controlled for in some studies, which makes it difficult to disentangle 
preferences for prioritising the treatment of end of life patients from preferences for 
prioritising the treatment of the relatively young (or old). Aside from the author’s 
own studies, none of the studies reviewed attempted to control for time-related 
preferences. The findings of empirical studies 1, 2 and 3 (Chapters 3, 4 and 5, 
respectively) all suggest that the preference for prioritising the treatment of end of 
life patients (where observed) may be driven by concern about how little time those 
patients have known about their prognosis, and therefore how little time they have 
to prepare for death. The issue of preparedness has generated interest amongst 
academic and industry audiences during presentations and discussions of the 
findings of empirical studies 2 and 3 (Cowell, W., 2013, personal communication, 
26 March; Longworth, L., 2013, personal communication, 26 March; McHugh, N., 
2013, personal communication, 26 March). However, with the exception of Cookson 
(2013) and McHugh et al. (2015), it has received limited attention in the literature 
to date. 
A further gap in the literature is that few studies tested the robustness of their 
results – for example, by checking whether respondents agreed with researchers’ 
interpretations of their responses to the choice tasks; or by checking whether 
consistent results could be obtained using different study designs or methodologies. 
The review provided some evidence that the results of the empirical studies may 
have been influenced by the choice of method and the way in which the choice 
tasks were framed20 and operationalised. For example, studies that included visual 
                                           
20 Following Plous (1993), framing effects are defined as an example of cognitive bias whereby people’s 
reaction to a given choice is influenced by the way is which that choice is presented – for example, using 
visual or non-visual presentation. Framing is considered problematic in stated preference research 
because it results in respondents making choices using irrelevant information that is not intended to 
convey information about the value of the choice options (Luchini and Watson, 2013). Framing effects 
can be distinguished from the effects of study design choices that are intended to provide relevant 
information to respondents, such as the choice of study perspective. 
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aids and/or indifference options, and studies instructing respondents to adopt an 
individual/own health perspective (as opposed to a social decision-maker 
perspective) appear more likely than average to report evidence consistent with an 
end of life premium. However, the small number of studies in the sample makes it 
difficult to make conclusive claims about the existence of such effects. 
The choice of perspective to be used when eliciting health care priority-setting 
preferences has been discussed in the literature (Dolan et al., 2003; Tsuchiya and 
Watson, forthcoming). It should be noted that all of the individual perspective 
studies included in the literature review used the willingness-to-pay method, which 
may have been a more influential factor than the choice of study perspective per 
se. 
The findings of the review, coupled with the fact that empirical studies 2 and 3 
reported qualitatively different results, provide the motivation for empirical study 4, 
reported in this chapter. This study seeks to address the same overall research 
question as the previous studies, whilst additionally testing several hypotheses 
based on research questions arising from the literature review. 
The aim of this study is to add to the literatures on people’s preferences regarding 
health care priority-setting (in particular, regarding the prioritisation of the 
treatment of end of life patients) and on framing effects in stated preference 
research. 
Specific objectives are to test the following null hypotheses: 
1. People place no more weight on a unit of health gain for end of life patients 
than on that for other types of patients, ceteris paribus. 
2. Any observed preferences regarding an end of life premium are unaffected 
by whether or not the end of life patient is older than the non-end of life 
patient. 
3. Any observed preferences regarding an end of life premium are unaffected 
by whether or not the end of life patient has known about their prognosis for 
longer than the non-end of life patient.  
4. People place no more weight on life-extending treatments than on quality of 
life-improving treatments for end of life patients, controlling for the size of 
the gain. 
5. Any observed preferences regarding an end of life premium are unaffected 
by whether the end of life treatment is quality of life-improving or life-
extending. 
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6. Any observed preferences between quality of life improvements and life 
extensions are unaffected by whether the gains occur in an end of life or a 
non-end of life context. 
7. Any observed preferences regarding an end of life premium are unaffected 
by whether the preferences are being elicited from an individual or a social 
decision-maker perspective. 
8. Any observed preferences regarding an end of life premium are unaffected 
by whether visual aids are included in the stated preference survey. 
9. Any observed preferences regarding an end of life premium are unaffected 
by whether an indifference option is included (or by the wording of the 
indifference option) in the stated preference survey. 
A further objective is to examine the consistency of people’s views by using two 
different approaches (choice exercise and attitudinal statements with Likert item 
responses) to infer their preferences in relation to the hypotheses above.  
6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Survey instrument 
A self-completion internet survey was developed in collaboration with epiGenesys, a 
software development company. The same company was commissioned to help 
develop the survey used in empirical study 3 (see 5.2.1.5). The survey comprised 
the following elements (in order): 
 Background / screening questions  
 Information sheet and consent form 
 Instructions (including explanation of the diagrams, if relevant) 
 Seven scenarios (S1 to S7) requiring respondents to adopt a social decision-
maker perspective 
 Two debrief questions (Likert items) 
 One scenario (S8) requiring respondents to adopt an individual perspective 
 Six attitudinal questions (Likert items) 
 Further background questions  
See Appendix 16 for an outline of the survey with screenshots of each element. 
The primary method used in this study was a choice exercise similar to that used in 
empirical studies 1 and 2. The DCE approach was not used in this study. This 
method is useful when it is desirable to examine multiple levels for a small number 
of attributes and to predict preferences over scenarios that are not actually 
presented (as was the case for empirical study 3), but it is less suitable when 
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testing hypotheses regarding the isolated impact of a large number of attributes 
and study design approaches. 
6.2.1.1 Scenarios S1 to S7 
Following the approach used in empirical studies 1, 2 and 3, each scenario 
presented information about two hypothetical individuals (patient A and patient B). 
Both patients could benefit from treatment, and the respondents were asked to 
assume that the health service had enough funds to treat one but not both of them. 
The patients and their circumstances were described in terms of the following 
attributes: 
 Age today (years) 
 Age at death without treatment (years) 
 Timing of diagnosis (the patients were described either as having ‘just been 
diagnosed’ or as having been ‘diagnosed 5 years ago’) 
 Life expectancy without treatment (from today) (years) 
 Quality of life without treatment (%)21 
 Gain from treatment (months or %, depending on whether the gain was a 
life extension or a quality of life improvement, respectively) 
The initial question in each scenario required respondents to adopt the perspective 
of a social decision-maker and to indicate which of the following statements best 
described their view: (1) I would prefer the health service to treat patient A; or (2) 
I would prefer the health service to treat patient B. Some of the respondents were 
also offered a third option whereby they could express indifference between 
treating patient A and patient B (see 6.2.1.6).  
Table 6-1 summarises the information provided to the respondents for scenarios S1 
to S7.  
Scenario S1 tests whether respondents wish to give priority to the end of life 
patient (patient A, whose life expectancy of one year without treatment meets the 
NICE criterion for defining ‘short life expectancy’) or to the non-end of life patient 
(patient B, whose life expectancy of five years does not meet the NICE criterion). 
The only other difference between the two patients is that patient A is described as 
being four years older than patient B today, though both patients would die at the 
same age without treatment. A preference for treating patient A can be interpreted 
as evidence consistent with an end of life premium (hypothesis 1). 
                                           
21 Note that, as with the previous empirical studies, the terms ‘health’ and ‘general health’ (distinct from 
life expectancy) were presented to respondents rather than ‘quality of life’. In what follows, the term 
‘quality of life’ is used unless specifically referring to the wording of the survey or when the more general 
meaning of the term ‘health’ (encompassing both quality of life and length of life) is intended. 
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Table 6-1. Summary of scenarios S1 to S7 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 
Age today  
  Patient A  49 years 69 years 49 years 49 years 49 years 50 years 49 years 
  Patient B 45 years 45 years 45 years 49 years 45 years 50 years 49 years 
Age at death without treatment  
  Patient A 50 years 70 years 50 years 50 years 50 years 80 years 50 years 
  Patient B 50 years 50 years 50 years 50 years 50 years 80 years 50 years 
Timing of diagnosisa 
  Patient A JD JD 5Y JD JD JD JD 
  Patient B JD JD JD JD JD JD JD 
Life expectancy without treatment  
  Patient A 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year 30 years 1 year 
  Patient B 5 years 5 years 5 years 1 year 5 years 30 years 1 year 
Quality of life without treatment 
  Patient A 100% 100% 100% 50% 50% 50% 100% 
  Patient B 100% 100% 100% 50% 50% 50% 100% 
Life expectancy gain from treatment  
  Patient A +12 mths +12 mths +12 mths None None None +6 mths 
  Patient B +12 mths +12 mths +12 mths +12 mths +12 mths +12 mths +12 mths 
Quality of life gain from treatment 
  Patient A None None None +50% +50% +50%c None 
  Patient B None None None None None None None 
Undiscounted QALY gain from treatmentb 
  Patient A 1 QALY 1 QALY 1 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 
  Patient B 1 QALY 1 QALY 1 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 0.5 QALY 1 QALY 
a JD: just been diagnosed; 5Y: diagnosed five years ago 
b Respondents did not see this information (the term ‘QALY’ was not used at any point in the survey) 
c Quality of life gain achieved in final year of life only 
In order to examine whether any observed preference for treating end of life 
patients over non-end of life patients is driven by the relative current ages of the 
patients, scenario S2 replicates S1 except that patient A is 69 years today (rather 
than 49 years) and would die aged 70 years without treatment (rather than 50 
years). If respondents switch from preferring to treat patient A in S1 to preferring 
to treat patient B in S2, this can be interpreted as evidence that the preference for 
treating the end of life patient depends on the age of the patient (hypothesis 2). 
In order to examine whether any observed preference for treating end of life 
patients over non-end of life patients is driven by how long the patients have 
known about their prognosis, scenario S3 replicates S1 except that patient B’s 
illness is described as having been diagnosed five years ago (rather than having 
just been diagnosed). Patient A’s illness is described as having just been diagnosed 
in both S1 and S3. Hence, while patient A’s life expectancy without treatment is 
shorter than that of patient B, patient A has known about, and (by their expected 
time of death) will have known about, their prognosis for longer than patient B. If 
respondents switch from preferring to treat patient A in S1 to preferring to treat 
patient B in S3, this can be interpreted as evidence that the preference for treating 
the end of life patient depends on how long the patient has known about their 
prognosis (hypothesis 3). 
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In scenarios S1 to S3, the patients’ illnesses were described as affecting their life 
expectancy but not their general level of health (as noted above, the terms ‘health’ 
and ‘general health’ were used in the survey to distinguish quality of life from 
length of life), and the treatments available were described as offering life 
extensions but would not affect their general level of health. In scenario S4, on the 
other hand, both patients are described as experiencing a poorer level of health as 
a result of their illnesses – they would be in ‘50% health’ without treatment. The 
treatment for patient A would restore them to full health (with no effect on life 
expectancy), whereas the treatment for patient B would extend their life by 12 
months (with no effect on general health). An observed preference for treating 
patient A or patient B therefore indicates whether people wish to give higher 
priority to quality of life-improving or life-extending treatments for end of life 
patients, respectively (hypothesis 4). 
Scenario S5 replicates S4 except that patient B is now described as being 45 years 
old today (rather than 49 years old) and has a life expectancy of five years without 
treatment (rather than one year). The choice in this scenario is therefore between a 
quality of life improvement for an end of life patient and a life extension for a non-
end of life patient. If respondents switch from preferring to treat patient A in S1 to 
preferring to treat patient B in S5, this can be interpreted as evidence that the 
preference for treating the end of life patient relies on the treatment for the end of 
life patient being life-extending (hypothesis 5). 
The findings of empirical study 2 suggest that the majority of respondents will 
choose to treat patient A in S4. This would imply that people believe that quality of 
life-improving end of life treatments should be prioritised over life-extending end of 
life treatments. In the instructions, the concept of ’50% health’ was explained as 
follows:  
Suppose there is a health state which involves some health problems. If 
patients tell us that being in this health state for 2 years is equally desirable 
as being in full health for 1 year, then we would describe someone in this 
health state as being in 50% health. 
Based on such an assumption, a 50% quality of life improvement (lasting 12 
months) can be said to be generate gains for patient A that are equal in size to the 
gains for patient B generated by a 12-month life extension (at 50% quality of life). 
If respondents still express a preference for treating patient A, this suggests that 
they consider the quality of life improvement to be more socially valuable than the 
life extension, at least in the end of life context where both patients have one year 
left to live. The purpose of scenario S6 was to test whether quality of life 
improvements or life extensions were preferred in a non-end of life context. 
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Depending on whether respondents make the same or different choices in S4 and 
S6, the results could imply either that the preferences observed in S4 are specific 
to the end of life context or that the respondents are seeking to impose a (general, 
non-end of life-specific) social value judgement onto the QALY model (Mason et al., 
2011). Switches in choices between S4 and S6 can be interpreted as evidence that 
the preference between quality of life improvements and life extensions is context-
specific (hypothesis 6). 
Given concerns about the quality of internet survey data (Rowen et al., 2016a), it is 
useful to include a task that can act as a ‘rationality check’, helping to identify 
respondents whose choices suggest a poor level of attentiveness, engagement or 
understanding. Scenarios S1 to S6 were designed such that both patients gained 
the same number of undiscounted QALYs from treatment (1 QALY in S1, S2 and 
S3; half a QALY in S4, S5 and S6). Scenario S7, on the other hand, involves a 
choice between a smaller life extension (6 months) for patient A and a larger life 
extension (12 months) for patient B, with all other attributes at the same level in 
both alternatives. A respondent who supports a QALY-maximisation objective to 
health care priority-setting, or indeed simply one who considers a greater number 
of QALYs gained to be a good thing, should in theory consider treating patient B to 
be more valuable than treating patient A. Even respondents who reject the notion 
that priority-setting decisions should be guided by information about the size of the 
QALY gains should (in theory) be indifferent between treating patient A and patient 
B. Hence, treating patient A can be described as a weakly dominated option.  
6.2.1.2 Follow-up questions for scenarios S1 to S7 
Respondents who expressed a preference for treating either patient A or patient B 
in the initial question in each scenario were then asked a follow-up question. 
Respondents who expressed indifference between treating patient A and patient B 
(when such an option was available) were not asked this question.   
The follow-up question was designed to identify the point at which the respondents 
were indifferent between treating patient A and patient B. The format of the 
question was similar to that used by Abel Olsen (2013), and was worded as follows: 
Your choice was to treat patient [A/B], who would gain [6 months/12 
months/50% health] from treatment. 
How much shorter would that [6 month/12 month/50% health] gain need 
to be for you to think that treating either patient would be equally good? 
In each follow-up question, respondents were able to select one response from a 
drop-down list. If their initial choice was to treat a patient whose life would be 
extended by 12 months as a result of treatment, the follow-up options were: less 
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than 1 month; 1 month; 2 months; 3 months; 4 months; 5 months; 6 months; 7 
months; 8 months; 9 months; 10 months; 11 months; 12 months. If their initial 
choice was to treat a patient whose life would be extended by six months as a 
result of treatment (i.e. if they chose to treat patient A in S7), the follow-up options 
were: less than 1 month; 1 month; 2 months; 3 months; 4 months; 5 months; 6 
months. If their initial choice was to treat a patient whose quality of life would be 
improved by 50% as a result of treatment, the follow-up options were: less than 
10%; 10%; 20%; 30%; 40%; 50%.  
In each case, the maximum value in the list of response options was equal to size 
of gain for the patient whose treatment the respondent had expressed preference 
for in the initial question. Hence, respondents were not forced to reduce the size of 
gain for their initially preferred patient if they did not wish to. In such cases, their 
response in the follow-up question could imply that they had in fact been indifferent 
between treating patient A and treating patient B in the initial question, even if they 
had been offered an indifference option (as was the case for some respondents) 
and had opted against choosing it. 
6.2.1.3 Debrief questions regarding scenarios S1 to S7 
Following the completion of the questions for scenarios S1 to S7, respondents were 
asked to indicate, using a five-point scale, the extent to which they agreed or 
disagreed with two statements (Likert items): 
1. I found it difficult to decide on my answers to the questions 
2. It was difficult to understand the questions I was asked 
6.2.1.4 Scenario S8 
Scenario S8 was included in order to examine whether an observed preference 
regarding an end of life premium (if any) is affected by the perspective adopted by 
the survey respondents (hypothesis 7). Respondents were asked to imagine that 
they could be one of the patients in need of treatment, and were presented with 
two possible states of the world (presented as scenario A and scenario B), each 
with a 50% chance of occurring. In scenario A, the respondent is 49 years old with 
a (just-diagnosed) life expectancy of one year (in good health) without treatment. 
In scenario B, the respondent is 45 years old with a (just-diagnosed) life 
expectancy of five years (in good health) without treatment. Scenarios A and B in 
S8 corresponded to the circumstances facing patient A and patient B (respectively) 
in S1. As with S1, a treatment taken at the time of diagnosis would generate a life 
extension of one year in good health, but the health service had enough funds to 
make the treatment available in one of the scenarios A and B, but not both.    
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The question posed to respondents was worded as follows:  
Suppose the health service has enough funds to make either treatment 
A or treatment B available, but not both. Without knowing which 
scenario will occur (but knowing that both have an equal chance of 
occurring), what would you prefer? 
Respondents could respond by indicating a preference for either treatment A or 
treatment B being available, or by selecting an indifference option (see 6.2.1.6). S8 
did not include a follow-up question. 
The preamble for S8 acknowledged that the scenarios described may be considered 
unrealistic, with the intention of preventing respondents from becoming 
preoccupied by their hypothetical nature. This strategy is related to the use of 
‘cheap talk’ (Cummings and Taylor, 1999) in contingent valuation studies to 
mitigate the impact of hypothetical bias (where people’s stated preferences differ 
from their actual preferences). The purpose of cheap talk is to make respondents 
aware of the research question and to promote engagement, effort and attention to 
the choice task (Özdemir et al., 2009).   
6.2.1.5 Attitudinal questions 
A concern associated with stated preference studies is that it is unclear whether 
respondents completing abstract choice tasks would agree with the policy 
implications (and researchers’ interpretations) of their responses. Following the 
methods used by Rowen et al. (2016a; see Rowen et al., 2014 for full details) and 
Shah et al. (2015b), respondents were presented with a series of attitudinal 
questions intended to capture their general views about health care priority-setting, 
in a way that avoids the intricacies and hypothetical nature of the earlier scenario-
based choice tasks.  
Each attitudinal question presented a general view about priorities for the health 
service, and asked respondents to indicate, using a five-point scale, the extent to 
which they agreed or disagreed with that statement. The statements were as 
follows: 
1. The health service should give priority to extending the life of patients who 
are expected to die soon as a result of a medical condition. 
Agreeing with statement 1 could be interpreted as evidence of support for an end of 
life premium.   
2. The health service should give priority to treating patients who will get the 
largest amount of benefit from treatment. 
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Agreeing with statement 2 could be interpreted as evidence of support for a QALY-
maximisation approach to health care priority-setting. 
3. The health service should give the same priority to treating all patients, 
regardless of how ill they are or when they will die. 
Agreeing with statement 3 could be interpreted as evidence of a rejection of 
prioritisation. 
4. The health service should give priority to improving the quality of life of 
patients who are expected to die soon as a result of a medical condition. 
Agreeing with statement 4 could be interpreted as evidence of support for 
prioritising quality of life-improving end of life treatments over life-extending end of 
life treatments. 
5. The health service should give priority to extending the life of patients who 
are expected to die soon as a result of a medical condition. 
Agreeing with statement 5 could be interpreted as evidence of support for 
prioritising life-extending end of life treatments over quality of life-improving end of 
life treatments. 
6. The health service should give equal priority to improving the quality of life 
and extending the life of patients who are expected to die soon as a result of 
a medical condition. 
Agreeing with statement 6 could be interpreted as evidence of support for giving 
equal priority to quality of life-improving end of life treatments and life-extending 
end of life treatments. The statements were presented in two batches, with 
statements 1, 2 and 3 presented together first, followed by statements 4, 5 and 6 
(see 6.2.5).  
6.2.1.6 Study design 
Respondents were randomly allocated to one of six versions of the survey (Table 
6-2). In versions 4, 5 and 6, only tables and text descriptions were used to present 
the scenario information. In versions 1, 2 and 3, diagrams (similar to those used in 
empirical study 3, which in turn had adapted the design of an existing survey used 
by Rowen et al., 2016a) were used in addition to the tables and text descriptions. 
Visual aids were used only in the initial questions in scenarios S1 to S7; S8 and the 
follow-up questions in S1 to S7 did not use visual aids.  
Hereafter, versions 1, 2 and 3 are referred to collectively as the ‘visual aid’ arm; 
and versions 4, 5 and 6 are referred to collectively as the ‘no visual aid’ arm. See 
Figure 6-1 and Figure 6-2 for screenshots showing how the initial question for S1 
was presented in the visual aid arm and the no visual aid arm, respectively.  
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Table 6-2. Study arms and survey versions 
 Visual aid arm No visual aid arm 
Forced choice arm Version 1 Version 4 
Indifference arm Indifference option 1 arm Version 2 Version 5 
Indifference option 2 arm Version 3 Version 6 
 
Figure 6-1. Screenshot from survey (S1; visual aid arm; forced choice arm) 
 
Figure 6-2. Screenshot from survey (S1; no visual aid arm; indifference option 1 arm) 
 
In versions 1 and 4, respondents could only choose between treating patient A and 
treating patient B – no indifference option was available. In versions 2 and 5, an 
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indifference option was offered, worded as follows: ‘I have no preference (I do not 
mind which patient is treated)’. In version 3 and 6, a different indifference option 
was offered, worded as follows: ‘Both patients should have an equal chance of 
being treated (tossing a coin would be a fair way to make the choice)’. In all cases, 
only one of the available response options could be selected in any given scenario.  
In scenario S8, all respondents, regardless of which version they had been 
allocated to, could choose between three options: ‘I would prefer treatment A to be 
available’; ‘I have no preference (I do not mind which treatment is available)’; and 
‘I would prefer treatment B to be available’.  
Hereafter, versions 1 and 4 are referred to collectively as the ‘forced choice’ arm; 
versions 2 and 5 are referred to collectively as the ‘indifference option 1’ arm; 
versions 3 and 6 are referred to collectively as the ‘indifference option 2’ arm; and 
versions 2, 3, 5 and 6 are referred to collectively as the ‘indifference’ arm. The 
screenshot in Figure 6-1 shows the choices available in the forced choice arm, and 
Figure 6-2 shows the choices available in the indifference option 1 arm. 
The order in which scenarios S1 to S6 was presented was randomised for each 
respondent, with S7 and then S8 always following.  
6.2.2 Administration of survey 
An internet survey (as used in empirical study 3) was used in favour of face-to-face 
interviews (as used in empirical studies 1 and 2) for this study. The main reason for 
this was a desire for a large sample, which is necessary in order to conduct 
meaningful statistical analyses and to allow respondents to be divided into multiple 
study arms. The budget available for data collection was insufficient for a large-
sample study involving face-to-face interviews. Other benefits of internet surveys 
are described in 5.2.2. 
6.2.3 Sample 
A target sample size of 2,400 was sought. This was determined by availability of 
resources and judgements that the sample needed to be sufficiently large so as to 
permit meaningful statistical analyses of data collected within individual arms and 
survey versions. The sample comprised adult members of the UK general public, 
who were members of a panel of a research agency, ResearchNow. The same panel 
was used to recruit respondents for empirical study 3. As with empirical study 3, 
quotas and a targeted invitation strategy were used to ensure that the sample was 
representative of the general population in terms of selected observable 
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characteristics: age, gender and social grade. Respondents were compensated by 
way of reward points which can be redeemed for gift vouchers or charity donations.  
6.2.4 Ethical approval 
The survey and sample recruitment procedures were reviewed and approved by the 
Research Ethics Committee at the School of Health and Related Research via the 
University of Sheffield Ethics Review Procedure. 
6.2.5 Piloting 
A pilot was used to test a draft version of the survey in February 2016. A 
convenience sample of members of non-academic staff at the University of 
Sheffield participated in face-to-face computer-assisted personal interviews 
conducted by the author. It was made clear that the purpose of the interview was 
to seek feedback from respondents in order to improve the survey. In each 
interview, the respondent completed the draft survey on a desktop computer, with 
the author observing but not assisting or interfering. Following an interview guide 
(Appendix 18), the author then asked the respondent a series of debrief questions. 
Each respondent was given a £10 gift voucher to thank them for their participation. 
Twelve interviews were scheduled, with the intention that the six survey versions 
would be completed by two respondents each. Two of the respondents dropped out 
prior to their interviews, but it was not deemed necessary to replace them since the 
later interviews were not generating new insights. This meant that survey versions 
1, 2, 4 and 6 were each completed by two respondents; and versions 3 and 5 were 
each completed by one respondent.  
The pilot was completed successfully overall, with respondents mostly able to 
understand and complete the survey without assistance. The scenario order 
randomisation procedure was shown to be working as intended. Respondents 
required between 13 and 28 minutes to complete the survey (mean: 19.9 minutes; 
median: 20.0 minutes). The full interviews lasted between 23 and 39 minutes 
(mean: 31.7 minutes; median: 34.0 minutes). Responses to the debrief questions 
are summarised below. 
6.2.5.1 Summary of responses to the debrief questions 
Q1. How did you find the survey? 
All but one of the 10 respondents gave positive responses to this question, stating 
that they found the survey enjoyable and/or interesting. The one respondent who 
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did not enjoy the survey described it as “challenging” and referred to the “weight of 
responsibility” they felt whilst answering the questions.  
Q2. Do you feel you understood the questions you were asked? 
All of the respondents answered “yes” to this question, though two respondents 
added the caveat that they struggled to understand the follow-up question in each 
scenario. Another respondent noted that the questions required a lot of thought and 
that they often needed to read the text twice before they understood what was 
required of them. 
Q3. Did the instructions adequately prepare you for the questions? 
All but one of the respondents answered “yes” to this question, including the 
respondent who had indicated in their response to Q1 that they had not enjoyed 
the survey. One respondent expressed the view that the instructions did not 
prepare them for what was to come, but that everything made sense once they 
were presented with the questions themselves, and that they would not 
recommend making major changes to the instructions. 
Q4. What did you think about the option that did not involve choosing to 
treat either patient A or patient B? [indifference arm only] 
All of the six respondents who were asked this question indicated that the 
indifference option made sense to them. Three of those respondents noted that 
they never felt the need to choose this option, with one stating that they 
interpreted it as a “don’t know” option. 
Q5. What did you think about the diagrams used to illustrate the 
scenarios? 
All of the five respondents who were asked this question indicated that the 
diagrams were clear and easy to understand, with one additionally stating that they 
were “really helpful”. One respondent asked whether colour-blind individuals would 
be able to distinguish between the colours in the diagrams. 
Q6. In each scenario, after choosing which patient you thought should be 
treated, you were asked what size that patient’s gain from treatment 
would need to be for both patients to have equal priority. Was this clear? 
Responses to this question (which 10 respondents were asked) were mixed. Four 
respondents said that the question was clear and easy to understand, though not 
necessarily easy to answer. Three respondents said that the question had confused 
them. Several respondents offered suggestions for improving the wording of the 
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question. A common suggestion was to ask respondents what would make them 
“switch” [choices]. 
Q7. You were then asked to select your response from a list. Did the 
response you had in mind appear in this list? 
Most of the respondents answered “yes” to this question. In the draft survey, the 
minimum response options in the follow-up questions were 1 month and 10% 
quality of life. Three respondents suggested including a smaller option, such as 0 
months or ‘less than 1 month’, in order to capture stronger preferences. 
Q8. This scenario [screenshot of S3 shown to respondent] asked you to 
consider one patient who has just been diagnosed with an illness and 
another who has known about their illness for five years. How did you find 
this scenario, compared to the other scenarios? 
All of the respondents indicated that this scenario was easy to understand, though 
two noted that it was very difficult to answer. One respondent pointed out the fact 
that the description for one patient was longer and more detailed than that for the 
other, but did not suggest any changes to the text.  
Q9. This scenario [screenshot of S6 shown to respondent] asked you to 
consider two patients whose illnesses do not affect how long they will live 
for, and any benefits from treatment would not take place for another 30 
years. How did you find this scenario, compared to the other scenarios? 
All but one of the respondents indicated that this scenario was easy to understand. 
Three respondents referred to the scenario as being strange and/or unrealistic. One 
of those respondents sought clarity about the “waves” on the graph axis (used to 
indicate a discontinuity in the axis). 
Q10. This scenario [screenshot of S8 shown to respondent] asked you to 
imagine that you could be one of the patients in need of treatment, and 
therefore focused on your own life rather than on the lives of others. How 
did you find this scenario, compared to the other scenarios?  
All of the respondents indicated that this scenario was easy to understand, with 
about half stating that it was similar to the other scenarios. One respondent 
described the scenario as “quite long-winded”. Another respondent suggested that 
the age specified in the scenarios may not be relevant to some respondents. 
Finally, one respondent suggested making it clearer that scenario S8 refers to the 
respondent’s own health whereas the preceding scenarios refer to the health of 
other people. 
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Q11. These [attitudinal] questions asked you to indicate the extent to 
which you agreed or disagreed with a particular statement. What did you 
think of these questions? 
Although all of the respondents indicated that these questions were worded well 
and easy to understand, several noted that they had wanted to agree with all of the 
statements and acknowledged that they may have provided conflicting responses. 
Four respondents suggested displaying conflicting statements together in order to 
give a better sense of what might have to be given up by choosing a certain priority 
for the health service. 
Q12. Do you have any other suggestions for improving the survey? 
Two respondents suggested revising the wording of the follow-up questions in each 
scenario. Two respondents suggested allowing respondents to go back and revise 
their earlier choices. One respondent described scenarios S1 to S7 as 
“dehumanised”, suggesting that this could be addressed by including a cartoon 
image of a person to accompany the descriptions. 
6.2.5.2 Improvements made as a result of the pilot 
A number of improvements were made to the survey as a result of observations 
made by the author and feedback provided by the pilot respondents.  
Emboldening was added to highlight important words in some of the questions and 
text descriptions. Two feedback questions were added to the end of scenarios S1 to 
S7, seeking respondents’ views about how difficult they had found it to understand 
the questions and to decide on their answers, respectively. 
The wording of the follow-up question was revised substantially. Previously, the 
question was worded as follows (the wording used when respondents had originally 
chosen to give a 12-month life extension to patient A is shown as an example): 
You indicated that you would prefer the health service to treat Patient 
A. We assume that if the effect of Patient A’s treatment had been 
smaller, you would have been more likely to choose to treat Patient 
B instead. 
What size would Patient A’s gain from treatment need to be for the 
two patients to have equal priority? 
Following the pilot, this was amended to: 
Your choice was to treat Patient A, who would gain 12 months from 
treatment. 
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How much shorter would that 12 month gain need to be for you to 
think that treating either patient would be equally good? 
An extra response option was added to the drop-down menus used in the follow-up 
questions. When respondents were choosing from a range of life extension sizes, an 
option of ‘Less than 1’ [month] was added. When respondents were choosing from 
a range of percentage quality of life gain sizes, an option of ‘Less than 10’ [%] was 
added. 
The format of the attitudinal questions was also revised substantially. Previously, 
each statement was presented as a standalone question, with no opportunity to 
view competing (and potentially conflicting) statements. Following the pilot, the 
format was revised such that statements 1, 2 and 3 were presented together, and 
statements 4, 5 and 6 were also presented together. The statement for which a 
response was being sought was highlighted using emboldened text, with the other 
two statements greyed out but still visible.  
Finally, a small number of typos were corrected. 
6.2.6 Methods of analysis 
Descriptive statistics were reported in order to summarise the sample, time taken 
to complete the survey, and responses to the scenario questions. For scenarios S1 
to S7, respondents’ choices were assigned to one of three categories:  
A Respondent in the indifference arm indicated a preference for treating 
patient A; respondent in the forced choice arm indicated a preference for 
treating patient A and then provided a value in the follow-up question that 
was lower than the initial size of gain for patient A 
I Respondent in the indifference arm selected the indifference option; 
respondent in the forced choice arm provided a value in the follow-up 
question that was identical to the initial size of gain for their preferred 
patient  
B Respondent in the indifference arm indicated a preference for treating 
patient B; respondent in the forced choice arm indicated a preference for 
treating patient B and then provided a value in the follow-up question that 
was lower than the initial size of gain for patient B 
The number and proportion of respondents in each choice category, and the 
number and proportion of respondents selecting each response option in the follow-
up questions, was reported, both overall and by study arm.  
Comparisons between arms and between scenarios were assessed using the 
Pearson’s chi-squared test. In each case, the test was for an association between 
choosing to treat patient A in one scenario (or arm) and choosing to treat patient A 
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in the other scenario (or arm). The binomial test was used to assess whether the 
majority of respondents chose to treat the end of life patient in S1, and whether the 
majority chose to provide the life-extending treatment over the quality of life-
improving treatment in S4.  
Two potential indicators of poor data quality or lack of respondent engagement 
were defined: choosing the dominated option in S7; and completing the survey in 
less than half of the median time taken. The impact of excluding respondents 
meeting one or both of these indicators was assessed, focusing on S1 (which 
involved choosing between treating an end of life patient and treating a non-end of 
life patient).   
A multiple logistic regression was used to assess the impact of respondent 
background characteristics on the likelihood of choosing to give priority to the end 
of life patient in S1. The model was of the form: 
 y = Xβ + ε 
where y is a binary dependent variable taking a value of 1 if respondents chose to 
treat patient A (the end of life patient) in S1, and 0 otherwise; X represents the 
explanatory variables; and ε represents the error term capturing other factors. 
The explanatory variables included were: age (age of respondent, in whole years); 
gender (taking a value of 1 if respondent is male; 0 if respondent is female); social 
grade (taking a value of 1 if respondent is in higher social grades A, B or C1; 0 if 
respondent is in lower social grades C2, D or E); children (taking a value of 1 if 
respondent has responsibility for children; 0 if respondent does not); degree 
(taking a value of 1 if respondent has a degree; 0 if respondent does not); health 
limitations (taking a value of 0 if respondent is not limited by disability or health 
problems; 1 if respondent is limited ‘a little’; 2 if respondent is limited ‘a lot’); and 
experience of terminal illness (taking a value of 1 if respondent has had experience 
of terminal illness in close friends or family; 0 if respondent has not; respondents 
who did not wish to answer the question were coded as missing). Two binary 
control variables were also included to denote whether the respondent was in the 
forced choice arm (taking a value of 1 if respondent was in the forced choice arm; 0 
if respondent was in the indifference arm) and in the visual aid arm (taking a value 
of 1 if respondent was in the visual aid arm; 0 if respondent was in the no visual 
aid arm), respectively. 
A zero discount rate was assumed in all analyses. This is consistent with the 
approach used in empirical studies 2 and 3. Analyses were undertaken using the 
Microsoft Excel and Stata (StataCorp, 2013) software packages. 
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6.3 Results 
Data collection was undertaken in March 2016. This commenced with a soft launch 
whereby the survey was closed after approximately 15% of the target number of 
completes had been achieved, in order to check the data for issues. No issues were 
observed, so the survey were re-opened until the target sample size had been 
achieved. 
Of the 3,736 individuals who attempted to access the survey, 2,401 (64.3%) were 
included in the sample for analysis (Table 6-3). The remaining 1,335 individuals 
were excluded because: they did not meet the sampling quota requirements (and 
were therefore ‘screened out’); they did not give consent to take part; they 
dropped out part-way through the survey; or they completed the survey in less 
than 271.8 seconds (‘speeders’). The completion time cut-off of 271.8 seconds was 
one-third of the median completion time amongst the soft launch sample – it was 
agreed with ResearchNow that these respondents would be replaced. 
Table 6-3. Survey completion and exclusion statistics 
 n 
% of all 
accessed 
% of all 
screened in 
% of all 
consents 
% of all 
completes 
Accessed 3736      
Screen-outs 89  2.4%    
Non-consents 227  6.1% 6.2%   
Non-completes 961  25.7% 26.4% 28.1%  
Speeders 58  1.6% 1.6% 1.7% 2.4% 
Include in sample for analysis 2401  64.3% 65.8% 70.2% 97.6% 
 
On average, respondents in the forced choice arm and the visual aid arm spent 
statistically significantly longer on the survey than did respondents in the 
indifference arm and the no visual aid arm, respectively (Table 6-4) (forced choice 
vs. indifference: Welch’s t-test; p<0.01; visual aid vs. no visual aid: Welch’s t-test; 
p<0.01).  
Table 6-4. Time taken (in minutes) to complete survey  
Overall 
(n=2,401) 
Forced choice 
(n=807) 
Indifference 
(n=1,594) 
Visual aid 
(n=1,202) 
No visual aid 
(n=1,199) 
Mean 16.7  17.7  16.3  17.6  15.9  
Median 14.1  15.0  13.8  14.9  13.5  
SD 10.9  11.6  10.5  11.4  10.2  
 
Table 6-5 presents the background characteristics of the sample. The sample was 
representative of the general population with respect to age, gender and social 
grade (Office for National Statistics, 2011; National Readership Survey, 2015). The 
study arms were well balanced in terms of their composition. 
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Table 6-5. Sample background characteristics   
Sample (all 
versions) 
Forced choice  
(ver. 1,4) 
Indifference 
(ver. 2,3,5,6)  
Visual aid  
(ver. 1,2,3) 
No visual aid 
(ver. 4,5,6) 
Population Empirical 
study 2   
n % n % n % n % n % % % 
Total 
 
2401  100.0% 807  100.0% 1594  100.0% 1202  100.0% 1199  100.0%   
Age (years) 18-29  477  19.9% 165  20.4% 312  19.6% 241  20.0% 236  19.7% 21% 18% 
30-44  633  26.4% 225  27.9% 408  25.6% 323  26.9% 310  25.9% 26% 27% 
45-59  597  24.9% 178  22.1% 419  26.3% 302  25.1% 295  24.6% 25% 22% 
60+ 694  28.9% 239  29.6% 455  28.5% 336  28.0% 358  29.9% 28% 33% 
Gender Female 1235  51.4% 429  53.2% 806  50.6% 615  51.2% 620  51.7% 51% 51% 
Male 1166  48.6% 378  46.8% 788  49.4% 587  48.8% 579  48.3% 49% 49% 
Social grade a A 93  3.9% 26  3.2% 67  4.2% 42  3.5% 51  4.3% 4% 6% 
B 534  22.2% 176  21.8% 358  22.5% 271  22.5% 263  21.9% 23% 28% 
C1 745  31.0% 260  32.2% 485  30.4% 381  31.7% 364  30.4% 27% 29% 
C2 525  21.9% 174  21.6% 351  22.0% 267  22.2% 258  21.5% 21% 16% 
D 290  12.1% 97  12.0% 193  12.1% 138  11.5% 152  12.7% 16% 9% 
E 214  8.9% 74  9.2% 140  8.8% 103  8.6% 111  9.3% 9% 12% 
Household 
composition 
With children 765  31.9% 245  30.4% 520  32.6% 388  32.3% 377  31.4%  24% 
Without children 1636  68.1% 562  69.6% 1074  67.4% 814 67.7% 822 68.6%  76% 
Education None beyond min. 
school leaving age 
559 23.3% 181 22.4% 378 23.7% 286 23.8% 273 22.8%  22% 
Beyond min. school 
leaving age; no degree 
768 32.0% 243 30.1% 525 32.9% 387 32.2% 381 31.8%  31% 
Beyond min. school 
leaving age; degree 
1074 44.7% 383 47.5% 691 43.4% 529 44.0% 545 45.5%  46% 
Self-reported 
general health  
Very good 507 21.1% 181 22.4% 326 20.5% 248 20.6% 259 21.6%  25% 
Good 1144 47.6% 377 46.7% 767 48.1% 588 48.9% 556 46.4%  49% 
Fair 575 23.9% 192 23.8% 383 24.0% 291 24.2% 284 23.7%  19% 
Poor 157 6.5% 52 6.4% 105 6.6% 71 5.9% 86 7.2%  5% 
Very poor 18 0.7% 5 0.6% 13 0.8% 4 0.3% 14 1.2%  1% 
Experience of 
terminal illness 
in friends/family  
Yes 1513 63.0% 507 62.8% 1006 63.1% 766 63.7% 747 62.3%  68% 
No  803 33.4% 277 34.3% 526 33.0% 394 32.8% 409 34.1%  30% 
Question skipped 85 3.5% 23 2.9% 62 3.9% 42 3.5% 43 3.6%  2% 
a Refers to the occupation/qualifications/responsibilities of the chief wage earner of the respondent's household; see National Readership Survey (2015).
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6.3.1 Aggregate responses to scenario questions 
Table 6-6 to Table 6-13 report the aggregate response data for each scenario, both 
overall and by study arm. In each column in these tables, the modal choice is 
emboldened. 
Table 6-6 shows that in S1, the most common choice overall was to express 
indifference. The proportion of respondents choosing to treat the end of life patient 
is statistically significantly different from (less than) 50% (binomial test; one-sided 
test: p<0.01; two-sided test: p<0.01). Hence, the hypothesis that people place no 
more weight on a unit of health gain for end of life patients as on that for other 
types of patients (hypothesis 1) cannot be rejected. 
Table 6-6. S1: End of life patient (A) vs. non-end of life patient (B)  
Overall Forced choice Indifference 
option 1 
Indifference 
option 2 
No visual aid Visual aid 
A 765 (31.9%) 316 (39.2%) 238 (29.8%) 211 (26.5%) 380 (31.7%) 385 (32.0%) 
I 833 (34.7%) 206 (25.5%) 298 (37.3%) 329 (41.3%) 440 (36.7%) 393 (32.7%) 
B 803 (33.4%) 285 (35.3%) 262 (32.8%) 256 (32.2%) 379 (31.6%) 424 (35.3%) 
Total 2401 (100.0%) 807 (100.0%) 798 (100.0%) 796 (100.0%) 1199 (100.0%) 1202 (100.0%) 
 
Table 6-7 shows that treating a 45 year old patient with five years of life 
expectancy without treatment was preferred by the majority of respondents to 
treating a 69 year old patient with one year of life expectancy without treatment. 
The proportion of respondents choosing the former option represents the largest 
majority across all scenarios. Scenario S2 is one of only two scenarios (the other 
being S5) with a robust modal response across all study arms. 
Table 6-7. S2: Older end of life patient (A) vs. younger non-end of life patient (B)  
Overall Forced choice Indifference 
option 1 
Indifference 
option 2 
No visual aid Visual aid 
A 340 (14.2%) 140 (17.3%) 107 (13.4%) 93 (11.7%) 168 (14.0%) 172 (14.3%) 
I 623 (25.9%) 213 (26.4%) 187 (23.4%) 223 (28.0%) 316 (26.4%) 307 (25.5%) 
B 1438 (59.9%) 454 (56.3%) 504 (63.2%) 480 (60.3%) 715 (59.6%) 723 (60.1%) 
Total 2401 (100.0%) 807 (100.0%) 798 (100.0%) 796 (100.0%) 1199 (100.0%) 1202 (100.0%) 
 
Comparing Table 6-6 with Table 6-8 shows that when the end of life patient was 
revealed to have known about their prognosis for some time (as in S3), there was a 
slight shift towards preferring to treat the non-end of life patient who has only just 
learned of their prognosis. As in S1, however, the most common choice in S3 
overall was to express indifference. 
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Table 6-8. S3: End of life patient with more time with knowledge (A) vs. non-end of life 
patient with less time with knowledge (B)  
Overall Forced choice Indifference 
option 1 
Indifference 
option 2 
No visual aid Visual aid 
A 579 (24.1%) 254 (31.5%) 169 (21.2%) 156 (19.6%) 277 (23.1%) 302 (25.1%) 
I 914 (38.1%) 191 (23.7%) 344 (43.1%) 379 (47.6%) 458 (38.2%) 456 (37.9%) 
B 908 (37.8%) 362 (44.9%) 285 (35.7%) 261 (32.8%) 464 (38.7%) 444 (36.9%) 
Total 2401 (100.0%) 807 (100.0%) 798 (100.0%) 796 (100.0%) 1199 (100.0%) 1202 (100.0%) 
  
Table 6-9 shows that more respondents chose the quality of life-improving 
treatment than the life-extending treatment in S4, though this preference was less 
pronounced amongst respondents in the visual aid arm. Overall, the proportion of 
respondents choosing to provide the life-extending treatment is statistically 
significantly different from (less than) 50% (binomial test; one-sided test: p<0.01; 
two-sided test: p<0.01). Hence, the hypothesis that people place no more weight 
on life-extending treatments than on quality of life-improving treatments for end of 
life patients (hypothesis 4) cannot be rejected.  
Table 6-9. S4: Quality of life improvement for end of life patient (A) vs. life extension for end 
of life patient (B)  
Overall Forced choice Indifference 
option 1 
Indifference 
option 2 
No visual aid Visual aid 
A 969 (40.4%) 350 (43.4%) 325 (40.7%) 294 (36.9%) 522 (43.5%) 447 (37.2%) 
I 817 (34.0%) 196 (24.3%) 288 (36.1%) 333 (41.8%) 413 (34.4%) 404 (33.6%) 
B 615 (25.6%) 261 (32.3%) 185 (23.2%) 169 (21.2%) 264 (22.0%) 351 (29.2%) 
Total 2401 (100.0%) 807 (100.0%) 798 (100.0%) 796 (100.0%) 1199 (100.0%) 1202 (100.0%) 
 
Comparing Table 6-9 with Table 6-10 shows that when the life-extending treatment 
was for a non-end of life patient (as in S5) rather than for an end of life patient (as 
in S4), respondents were more likely to choose the life-extending treatment and 
less likely to express indifference.  
Table 6-10. S5: Quality of life improvement for end of life patient (A) vs. life extension for 
non-end of life patient (B)  
Overall Forced choice Indifference 
option 1 
Indifference 
option 2 
No visual aid Visual aid 
A 924 (38.5%) 330 (40.9%) 300 (37.6%) 294 (36.9%) 464 (38.7%) 460 (38.3%) 
I 707 (29.4%) 191 (23.7%) 248 (31.1%) 268 (33.7%) 374 (31.2%) 333 (27.7%) 
B 770 (32.1%) 286 (35.4%) 250 (31.3%) 234 (29.4%) 361 (30.1%) 409 (34.0%) 
Total 2401 (100.0%) 807 (100.0%) 798 (100.0%) 796 (100.0%) 1199 (100.0%) 1202 (100.0%) 
 
Table 6-11 shows that that the preference for quality of life-improving treatments 
over life-extending treatments exists not only in the end of life context (as in S4) 
but also in a non-end of life context where the benefits from treatment would occur 
at the end of the patient’s normal life expectancy (as in S6). In the indifference 
arm, however, the most common choice was to express indifference. 
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Table 6-11. S6: Quality of life improvement at end of normal life expectancy (A) vs. life 
extension at end of normal life expectancy (B)  
Overall Forced choice Indifference 
option 1 
Indifference 
option 2 
No visual aid Visual aid 
A 1024 (42.6%) 401 (49.7%) 323 (40.5%) 300 (37.7%) 534 (44.5%) 490 (40.8%) 
I 891 (37.1%) 203 (25.2%) 348 (43.6%) 340 (42.7%) 466 (38.9%) 425 (35.4%) 
B 486 (20.2%) 203 (25.2%) 127 (15.9%) 156 (19.6%) 199 (16.6%) 287 (23.9%) 
Total 2401 (100.0%) 807 (100.0%) 798 (100.0%) 796 (100.0%) 1199 (100.0%) 1202 (100.0%) 
 
Table 6-12 shows that the vast majority of respondents did not choose the 
dominated (smaller life extension) option in S7, though many expressed 
indifference – particularly in the indifference arm. 
Table 6-12. S7: Smaller life extension for end of life patient (A) vs. larger life extension for 
end of life patient (B)  
Overall Forced choice Indifference 
option 1 
Indifference 
option 2 
No visual aid Visual aid 
A 190 (7.9%) 82 (10.2%) 62 (7.8%) 46 (5.8%) 104 (8.7%) 86 (7.2%) 
I 866 (36.1%) 165 (20.4%) 321 (40.2%) 380 (47.7%) 451 (37.6%) 415 (34.5%) 
B 1345 (56.0%) 560 (69.4%) 415 (52.0%) 370 (46.5%) 644 (53.7%) 701 (58.3%) 
Total 2401 (100.0%) 807 (100.0%) 798 (100.0%) 796 (100.0%) 1199 (100.0%) 1202 (100.0%) 
 
Comparing Table 6-6 and Table 6-13 shows that a larger proportion of respondents 
expressed preference for the provision of treatment for the non-end of life patient 
when answering from an individual perspective (as in S8) rather than from a social 
decision-maker perspective (as in S1). It should be noted that visual aids were not 
used in S8 (for any respondent), and an indifference option was always available 
(for all respondents). Differences in choices across arms were minimal in 
comparison to some of the other scenarios. 
Table 6-13. S8: Individual perspective adaptation of S1 – 1 year of life expectancy without 
treatment (A) vs. 5 years of life expectancy without treatment (B)  
Overall Forced choice Indifference 
option 1 
Indifference 
option 2 
No visual aid Visual aid 
A 440 (18.3%) 172 (21.3%) 134 (16.8%) 134 (16.8%) 212 (17.7%) 228 (19.0%) 
I 970 (40.4%) 326 (40.4%) 320 (40.1%) 324 (40.7%) 492 (41.0%) 478 (39.8%) 
B 991 (41.3%) 309 (38.3%) 344 (43.1%) 338 (42.5%) 495 (41.3%) 496 (41.3%) 
Total 2401 (100.0%) 807 (100.0%) 798 (100.0%) 796 (100.0%) 1199 (100.0%) 1202 (100.0%) 
 
6.3.2 Impact of experimental modifications 
6.3.2.1 Impact of including an indifference option 
Across scenarios S1 to S8, indifference was expressed 26.2% of the time by 
respondents in the forced choice arm; and 38.7% of the time by respondents in the 
indifference arm. Respondents in the indifference arm were statistically significantly 
more likely than respondents in the forced choice arm to express indifference (chi-
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squared test; p<0.01). This tendency is observed in all scenarios except S2 and S8, 
in which the proportions of respondents expressing indifference did not differ 
greatly by arm. 
Further, in S1 the modal choice was to treat the end of life patient amongst 
respondents in the forced choice arm, whereas for respondents in the indifference 
arm this was the least common choice. The association between the availability of 
an indifference option and the propensity to choose to treat the end of life patient is 
statistically significant (chi-squared test; p<0.01). Hence, the hypothesis that 
preferences regarding an end of life premium are unaffected by whether an 
indifference option is included (hypothesis 9) is rejected. 
The propensity to express indifference did not only differ between the indifference 
arm and the force choice arm, but also between the two indifference option arms. 
Across scenarios S1 to S7 (S8 is disregarded as the wording of the indifference 
option was the same for all respondents in that scenario), the indifference option 
was chosen 36.4% of the time by respondents in indifference option 1 arm; and 
40.4% of the time by respondents in the indifference option 2 arm. Respondents in 
the indifference option 2 arm were statistically significantly more likely than 
respondents in the indifference option 1 arm to express indifference (chi-squared 
test; p<0.01). This tendency is observed in all scenarios except S6, in which the 
proportions of respondents expressing indifference did not differ greatly (or 
statistically significantly) by arm. 
6.3.2.2 Impact of including a visual aid 
The impact of including a visual aid varied across scenarios. In each of the three 
scenarios in which one of the options involved a quality of life-improving treatment 
(S4, S5, S6), respondents in the visual aid arm were more likely than respondents 
in the no visual aid arm to choose the life-extending treatment over the quality of 
life-improving treatment. In two of those scenarios, the association between study 
arm and response pattern was statistically significant at the 5% level (chi-squared 
test; S4: p<0.01; S5: p=0.07; S6: p<0.01). 
In the other four scenarios, the patterns of responses did not differ greatly between 
arms. The association between study arm and response pattern was not statistically 
significant at the 5% level in these scenarios (chi-squared test; S1: p=0.07; S2: 
p=0.90; S3: p=0.47; S7: p=0.06). Whilst the hypothesis that preferences 
regarding an end of life premium are unaffected by whether visual aids are included 
(hypothesis 8) cannot be rejected on the basis of S1 alone, it is clear that the 
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results of stated priority-setting preference studies are to some extent influenced 
by whether the information is presented diagrammatically or not. 
6.3.3 Responses to follow-up questions 
In scenarios S1 to S6, the most common follow-up responses made by respondents 
who initially expressed a preference for a 12-month life extension were: 
 To choose a gain half the size of the initial gain – i.e. 6-month life extension 
 To choose a gain equal in size to the initial gain – i.e. 12-month life 
extension 
 To choose the smallest gain possible – i.e. life extension of 1 month or less 
See Appendix 20 for figures summarising responses to the follow-up questions. 
Note that respondents in the indifference arm answered the follow-up question only 
if they had initially chosen to treat either patient A or patient B (not if they had 
chosen the indifference option). Yet a sizeable minority of those respondents 
returned the same size of gain in the follow-up question, indicating either that they 
were indifferent between the two (but for whatever reason had not wanted to 
choose the initial indifference option) or that the follow-up response options were 
too crude (e.g. they might have selected 11.5 months). A caveat here is that it was 
not made explicit to respondents that one of the response options in the follow-up 
question was equivalent to choosing the indifference option in the initial question. 
Nevertheless, it is notable that the proportion of respondents returning the same 
size of gain was generally not much smaller, and in some cases greater, in the 
indifference arm compared to the forced choice arm.  
In scenarios S4 to S6, no ‘mid-point’ value (i.e. 25% gain) was available for 
respondents who initially chose the quality of life-improving treatment over the life-
extending treatment. In these scenarios, a more even spread of responses across 
the available options was observed.  
In scenario S7, the most common follow-up response, by some distance, was to 
choose a 6-month life-extension. With the exception of S7, the pattern of responses 
was very similar across scenarios (Table 6-14) and across arms.  
Table 6-14. Summary of responses to follow-up questions, by scenario  
Scenario Initial choice Follow-up choice - size of gain 
Choice Gain Mean Median Mode 
S1 A 12 months 5.9  6.0  6.0  
B 12 months 6.8  6.0  12.0  
S2 A 12 months 6.3  6.0  12.0  
B 12 months 6.4  6.0  12.0  
S3  A 12 months 6.2  6.0  6.0  
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Scenario Initial choice Follow-up choice - size of gain 
Choice Gain Mean Median Mode 
B 12 months 6.6  6.0  12.0  
S4 A 50% 27.4  30.0  50.0  
B 12 months 5.8  6.0  6.0  
S5 A 50% 26.7  30.0  50.0  
B 12 months 6.0  6.0  6.0  
S6 A 50% 26.9  30.0  50.0  
B 12 months 6.2  6.0  6.0  
S7 A 6 months 3.8  4.0  6.0  
B 12 months 6.3  6.0  6.0  
 
The way in which respondents responded to the follow-up questions in scenarios S1 
to S3 (which, regardless of the initial choice, always involved selecting a life 
extension of 12 months or shorter) is associated with the way in which they 
responded to the follow-up questions in scenarios S4 to S6. Figure 6-3 shows the 
distribution of responses to the follow-up questions in S4 to S6, for respondents 
who initially chose the quality of life improvement option in those scenarios. The 
follow-up questions for these respondents involved selecting a quality of life 
improvement of 50% or smaller, with no obvious mid-point available. The upper 
bar represents the data for all respondents who chose the quality of life 
improvement option at least once in S4, S5 and S6, regardless of their responses in 
the other scenarios (3,291 observations). No tendency towards one particular 
follow-up response option is observed. 
The lower three bars show the same data for subgroups of respondents who appear 
to have followed some heuristic in their responses to scenarios S1 to S3. The 
majority of respondents who selected the minimum possible life extension (‘less 
than one month’) in S1, S2 and S3 also selected the minimum possible quality of 
life improvement (‘less than 10%’) in S4, S5 and S6. The majority of respondents 
who selected the maximum possible life extension (12 months) in S1, S2 and S3 
also selected the maximum possible quality of life improvement (50%) in S4, S5 
and S6. The responses of respondents who selected the mid-point life extension (6 
months) in S1, S2 and S3 were more evenly spread, though the options closest to 
the mid-point of 25% (20% and 30%) were selected most frequently. 
145 
 
Figure 6-3. Responses to S4-S6 follow-up questions made by respondents who initially chose 
the quality of life improvement option in S4-S6 
 
6.3.4 Sets of choices 
There are 2,187 (=37) different combinations of choices that respondents could 
have made in scenarios S1 to S7, of which 784 were made by at least one 
respondent in the sample. The five most common sets of choices (covering 16.5% 
of respondents) are presented in Table 6-15, together with possible (face-value) 
explanations of those choices. 
Table 6-15. Five most common sets of choices in S1 to S7 
Set of choices a Count Possible explanations 
III-III-I 189  Rejection of prioritisation based on attributes presented 
Not enough difference between patients / options to justify 
prioritising one 
Lack of engagement / shortcutting the survey 
BBB-AAA-B 56  Rejection of end of life premium; priority to quality of life 
improvement over life extension (in end of life and non-end of life 
contexts); QALY-max when all other attributes levels are equal 
BBB-ABA-B 55  Rejection of end of life premium; priority to quality of life 
improvement over life extension (in end of life and non-end of life 
contexts) but preference for treating non-end of life patient 
outweighs preference for quality of life improvement; QALY-max 
when all other attributes levels are equal 
ABB-AAA-B 50  Support for end of life premium; priority to younger patients and 
patients with less time to prepare (both of which outweigh the 
preference for end of life); priority to quality of life improvement 
over life extension (in end of life and non-end of life contexts); 
QALY-max when all other attributes levels are equal 
ABA-AAA-B 46  Support for end of life premium; priority to younger patients 
(outweighing the preference for end of life); priority to quality of 
life improvement over life extension (in end of life and non-end of 
life contexts); QALY-max when all other attributes levels are equal 
a For ease of readability, each set of choices has been presented so that S1, S2 and S3 (in which 
treatment would generate life extensions for both patients) are grouped together; and S4, S5 and S6 (in 
which treating patient A would generate a quality of life improvement) are also grouped together. 
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Choices that would be most consistent with NICE’s end of life policy are as follows: 
 S1: A (priority to end of life patient) 
 S2: A (priority to end of life patient, regardless of age) 
 S3: A (priority to end of life patient, regardless of time of diagnosis) 
 S4: B (priority to life-extending treatment for end of life patient) 
 S5: N/A (neither option would meet the NICE criteria) 
 S6: N/A (neither option would meet the NICE criteria) 
 S7: B (QALY-maximisation) 
Thirty-one of the 2,401 respondents (1.3%) responded to scenarios S1, S2, S3, S4 
and S7 in such a way that would be entirely consistent with NICE’s end of life 
policy. 
An alternative (and less prescriptive) end of life policy, which involves always giving 
priority to the end of life patient but does not impose any restrictions about the size 
or type (i.e. quality of life improvement or life extension) of gain, would be 
consistent with the following choices: 
 S1: A (priority to end of life patient) 
 S2: A (priority to end of life patient, regardless of age) 
 S3: A (priority to end of life patient, regardless of time of diagnosis) 
 S4: N/A (both patients are equally at the end of life) 
 S5: A (priority to end of life patient, regardless of type of gain) 
 S6: N/A (both patients are non-end of life) 
 S7: N/A (both patients are equally at the end of life) 
Seventy-one of the 2,401 respondents (3.0%) responded to scenarios S1, S2, S3 
and S5 in such a way that would be entirely consistent with this alternative end of 
life policy. 
A pure QALY-maximiser (with zero time preference) who is not concerned about the 
recipient of the QALYs should make the following set of choices: III-III-B. Sixteen 
of the 2,401 respondents (0.7%) made this set of choices. Table 6-16 shows how 
respondents who expressed indifference in all seven scenarios (III-III-I) differed 
from those interpreted as pure QALY-maximisers (III-III-B) in terms of selected 
statistics.  
Table 6-16. Selected statistics for respondents expressing indifference in all scenarios (III-
III-I) and respondents who choices reflect QALY-maximisation (III-III-B)   
III-III-I III-III-B 
Number of respondents n 189  16  
Arm No visual aid 97 (51.3%)  8 (50.0%)  
Visual aid 92 (48.7%)  8 (50.0%)  
Time taken to complete survey  Median (min) 9.3  22.1  
<423 sec a 41 (21.7%) 1 (6.3%) 
>423 sec  148 (78.3%) 15 (93.8%) 
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III-III-I III-III-B 
Agreement with attitudinal statement: “The 
health service should give priority to treating 
patients who will get the largest amount of 
benefit from treatment” 
Strongly or 
moderately agree b 
73 (38.6%)  12 (75.0%)  
a 423 seconds is half of the median time taken by all respondents in the sample. See 6.3.7for an 
exploration of the use of this statistic as an indicator of data quality. 
b 72.4% of all respondents in the sample agreed (either strongly or moderately) with this statement – 
see 6.3.6 for analysis. 
The number of respondents in the III-III-B group is very small, which limits any 
conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis. Nevertheless, both groups are 
about equally split between the visual aid and no visual aid arms. Respondents in 
the III-III-I group spent much less time completing the survey than those in the 
III-III-B group (and also less than the average respondent). The majority of 
respondents in the III-III-B group expressed agreement with the attitudinal 
statement that most closely reflects the QALY-maximisation stance, whereas 
respondents in the III-III-I were much less likely than average to agree with this 
statement. 
6.3.5 Cross-tabulations of responses from selected pairs of 
scenarios 
Table 6-17 to Table 6-22 provide cross-tabulations of response data from selected 
combinations of scenarios that can be used to test some of the hypotheses set out 
in 6.1. In these tables, the shaded cells refer to respondents whose choice (A, I or 
B) was the same in both scenarios, and the sums of the shaded cells are reported 
as table footnotes.  
Table 6-17. Cross-tabulation – S1 vs. S2  
S2 
A I B Total 
S1 A 198 (8.2%) 75 (3.1%) 492 (20.5%) 765 (31.9%) 
I 56 (2.3%) 435 (18.1%) 342 (14.2%) 833 (34.7%) 
B 86 (3.6%) 113 (4.7%) 604 (25.2%) 803 (33.4%) 
Total 340 (14.2%) 623 (25.9%) 1438 (59.9%) 2401 (100.0%) 
Sum of shaded cells: 51.5% 
The association between patient age and the propensity to prioritise the treatment 
of the end of life patient is statistically significant (chi-squared test; p<0.01). 
Hence, the hypothesis that preferences regarding an end of life premium are 
unaffected by whether or not the end of life patient is older than the non-end of life 
patient (hypothesis 2) is rejected. 
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Table 6-18. Cross-tabulation – S1 vs. S3  
S3 
A I B Total 
S1 A 367 (15.3%) 150 (6.2%) 248 (10.3%) 765 (31.9%) 
I 92 (3.8%) 577 (24.0%) 164 (6.8%) 833 (34.7%) 
B 120 (5.0%) 187 (7.8%) 496 (20.7%) 803 (33.4%) 
Total 579 (24.1%) 914 (38.1%) 908 (37.8%) 2401 (100.0%) 
Sum of shaded cells: 60.0% 
Of the 2,401 respondents in the sample, 1,440 (60.0%) made the same choices – 
i.e. AA, II or BB – in both S1 and S3. The association between time with knowledge 
and the propensity to prioritise the treatment of the end of life patient is 
statistically significant (chi-squared test; p<0.01). Hence, the hypothesis that 
preferences regarding an end of life premium are unaffected by whether or not the 
end of life patient has known about their prognosis for longer than the non-end of 
life patient (hypothesis 3) is rejected. 
Table 6-19. Cross-tabulation – S1 vs. S5  
S5 
A I B Total 
S1 A 446 (18.6%) 113 (4.7%) 206 (8.6%) 765 (31.9%) 
I 209 (8.7%) 465 (19.4%) 159 (6.6%) 833 (34.7%) 
B 269 (11.2%) 129 (5.4%) 405 (16.9%) 803 (33.4%) 
Total 924 (38.5%) 707 (29.4%) 770 (32.1%) 2401 (100.0%) 
Sum of shaded cells: 54.9% 
The association between type of end of life treatment (quality of life improvement 
or life extension) and the propensity to prioritise the treatment of the end of life 
patient is statistically significant (chi-squared test; p<0.01). Hence, the hypothesis 
that preferences regarding an end of life premium are unaffected by whether the 
end of life treatment is quality of life-improving or life-extending (hypothesis 5) is 
rejected. 
Table 6-20. Cross-tabulation – S4 vs. S6  
S6 
A I B Total 
S4 A 601 (25.0%) 218 (9.1%) 150 (6.2%) 969 (40.4%) 
I 188 (7.8%) 540 (22.5%) 89 (3.7%) 817 (34.0%) 
B 235 (9.8%) 133 (5.5%) 247 (10.3%) 615 (25.6%) 
Total 1024 (42.6%) 891 (37.1%) 486 (20.2%) 2401 (100.0%) 
Sum of shaded cells: 57.8% 
The association between context (end of life or non-end of life) and the propensity 
to prioritise the quality of life-improving treatment is not statistically significant 
(chi-squared test; p=0.11). Hence, the hypothesis that preferences between quality 
of life improvements and life extensions are unaffected by whether the gain occurs 
in an end of life or non-end of life context (hypothesis 6) cannot be rejected. 
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Table 6-21. Cross-tabulation – S1 vs. S8  
S8 
A I B Total 
S1 A 280 (11.7%) 257 (10.7%) 228 (9.5%) 765 (31.9%) 
I 97 (4.0%) 460 (19.2%) 276 (11.5%) 833 (34.7%) 
B 63 (2.6%) 253 (10.5%) 487 (20.3%) 803 (33.4%) 
Total 440 (18.3%) 970 (40.4%) 991 (41.3%) 2401 (100.0%) 
Sum of shaded cells: 51.2% 
The association between study perspective (individual or social decision-maker) and 
the propensity to prioritise provision of the end of life treatment is statistically 
significant (chi-squared test; p<0.01). Hence, the hypothesis that preferences 
regarding an end of life premium are unaffected by whether the preferences are 
being elicited from an individual or a social decision perspective (hypothesis 7) is 
rejected. 
Note that scenario S8 differed from the other scenarios in that there was no visual 
aid (even for respondents in the visual aid arm), and indifference option 1 was used 
(even for respondents in the forced choice or indifference option 2 arms). To control 
for the effects of these design choices, the above analysis is repeated only for 
respondents who completed survey version 5 (no visual aid; indifference option 1), 
for whom the difference in framing between S8 and the other scenarios was least 
pronounced. 
Table 6-22. Cross-tabulation – S1 vs. S8 (survey version 5 only)  
S8 
A I B Total 
S1 A 42 (10.6%) 40 (10.1%) 47 (11.8%) 129 (32.5%) 
I 16 (4.0%) 101 (25.4%) 41 (10.3%) 158 (39.8%) 
B 9 (2.3%) 24 (6.0%) 77 (19.4%) 110 (27.7%) 
Total 67 (16.9%) 165 (41.6%) 165 (41.6%) 397 (100.0%) 
Sum of shaded cells: 55.4% 
As above, the association between study perspective and the propensity to 
prioritise provision of the end of life treatment is statistically significant (chi-
squared test; p<0.01).  
A further null hypothesis of relevance when comparing S1 and S8 is that the 
propensity to express indifference is unaffected by the perspective adopted. The 
alternative hypothesis is that when making choices from an individual perspective, 
respondents are more likely to express indifference, possibly in an attempt to 
minimise regret – i.e. disutility from learning that they would have been better off 
having not taken the action they did. 
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Although a larger proportion of survey version 5 respondents expressed indifference 
in S8 (165 respondents; 41.6%) than in S1 (158 respondents; 39.8%), the 
association between perspective and the propensity to express indifference is not 
statistically significant (chi-squared test; p=0.61). Hence, the hypothesis that the 
propensity to express indifference is unaffected by the perspective adopted cannot 
be rejected. 
6.3.6 Debrief statements 
Overall, the majority of respondents agreed with debrief statement 1 (65.8% 
agreed either strongly or moderately with this statement) and disagreed with 
debrief statement 2 (57.4% disagreed either strongly or moderately with this 
statement). 
The extent to which respondents agreed or disagreed with debrief statement 1 did 
not vary greatly by study arm (Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5). On the other hand, 
respondents in the forced choice arm were more likely to agree with debrief 
statement 2 than those who were given an indifference option (Figure 6-6). 
Figure 6-4. Responses to debrief statement 1 (by indifference arm) 
 
Statement 1: I found it difficult to decide on my answers to the questions 
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Figure 6-5. Responses to debrief statement 1 (by visual aid arm) 
 
Statement 1: I found it difficult to decide on my answers to the questions 
Figure 6-6. Responses to debrief statement 2 (by indifference arm) 
 
Statement 2: It was difficult to understand the questions I was asked 
Figure 6-7. Responses to debrief statement 2 (by visual aid arm) 
 
Statement 2: It was difficult to understand the questions I was asked 
The association between the use of indifference options and the propensity to agree 
with debrief statement 2 is statistically significant (chi-squared test; forced choice 
arm vs. indifference arm; p<0.01). Conversely, the association between the 
wording of the indifference option used and the propensity to agree with debrief 
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statement 2 is not statistically significant (chi-squared test; indifference option 1 
arm vs. indifference option 2 arm; p=0.39). 
6.3.7 Sensitivity analysis: exclusions linked to data quality  
Two potential flags of poor data quality or lack of respondent engagement were 
identified: 
1. Choosing the ‘dominated option’ in scenario S7 – i.e. choosing to treat the 
patient who would gain a life extension of six months from treatment rather 
than the (otherwise identical) patient who would gain a life extension of 12 
months from treatment – even after being given the opportunity to 
expression indifference 
2. Completing the survey in less than 423 seconds – i.e. less than half of the 
median time taken amongst respondents who had not already been 
excluded for speeding 
One-hundred and ninety respondents (7.9%) chose the dominated option in S7 and 
therefore hit flag 1. Two-hundred and twenty-one respondents (9.2%) completed 
the survey in less than 423 seconds and therefore hit flag 2. Twenty-two 
respondents (0.9%) hit both flags.  
Respondents hitting flags 1 or 2 chose to treat the end of life patient (A) more often 
than respondents who did not (Table 6-23). Excluding these respondents would 
therefore strengthen the finding that giving priority to the treatment of end of life 
patients is not supported (Table 6-24).  
Table 6-23. S1 choices made by all respondents and those who hit data quality flags  
All respondents Respondents hitting flag 1 Respondents hitting flag 2 
A 31.9% 54.7% 36.7% 
I 34.7% 20.5% 36.2% 
B 33.4% 24.7% 27.1% 
 
Table 6-24. S1 choices after exclusions based on flags 1 and 2  
No exclusions Exclude respondents 
hitting flag 1 
Exclude respondents 
hitting flag 2 
A 31.9% 29.9% 31.4% 
I 34.7% 35.9% 34.5% 
B 33.4% 34.2% 34.1% 
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6.3.8 Attitudinal questions 
Responses to the six attitudinal questions are shown in Table 6-25. Overall, 
respondents showed a tendency to agree with the statements presented, with the 
‘strongly disagree’ or ‘moderately disagree’ responses accounting for only 13.7% of 
all responses made across the six statements. Sizeable minorities of respondents 
agreed with multiple statements that appear, prima facie, to describe competing 
and non-concordant priority-setting objectives: 587 respondents (24.4%) agreed – 
either strongly or moderately – with attitudinal statements 1, 2 and 3; while 866 
respondents (36.1%) agreed – either strongly or moderately – with attitudinal 
statements 4, 5 and 6. 
Table 6-25. Responses to attitudinal questions 
The health service should: Agree 
strongly 
Agree 
moderately 
Neither 
agree not 
disagree 
Disagree 
moderately 
Disagree 
strongly 
Total 
1. give priority to extending 
the life of patients who are 
expected to die soon as a 
result of a medical condition 
308  
(12.8%)  
752  
(31.3%)  
801  
(33.4%)  
434  
(18.1%)  
106  
(4.4%)  
2,401 
(100.0%) 
2. give priority to treating 
patients who will get the 
largest amount of benefit 
from treatment 
757  
(31.5%)  
982  
(40.9%)  
484  
(20.2%)  
131  
(5.5%)  
47  
(2.0%)  
2,401 
(100.0%) 
3. give the same priority to 
treating all patients, 
regardless of how ill they 
are or when they will die 
792  
(33.0%)  
582  
(24.2%)  
622  
(25.9%)  
346  
(14.4%)  
59  
(2.5%)  
2,401 
(100.0%) 
4. give priority to improving 
the quality of life of patients 
who are expected to die 
soon as a result of a medical 
condition 
551  
(22.9%)  
903  
(37.6%) 
685  
(28.5%)  
216  
(9.0%)  
46  
(1.9%)  
2,401 
(100.0%) 
5. give priority to extending 
the life of patients who are 
expected to die soon as a 
result of a medical condition 
405  
(16.9%)  
824  
(34.3%) 
771  
(32.1%) 
332  
(13.8%) 
69  
(2.9%) 
2,401 
(100.0%) 
6. give equal priority to 
improving the quality of life 
and extending the life of 
patients who are expected 
to die soon as a result of a 
medical condition 
839  
(34.9%)  
789  
(32.9%)  
591  
(24.6%) 
161  
(6.7%)  
21  
(0.9%)  
2,401 
(100.0%) 
 
Statements 1 and 5 are identical: the former was presented alongside statements 2 
and 3, whereas the latter was presented alongside statements 4 and 6. Just over 
half of the respondents (55.4%) indicated exactly the same level of agreement with 
both statements. Conversely, 236 respondents (9.8%) strongly or moderately 
agreed with statement 1 whilst strongly or moderately disagreeing with statement 
5, or vice versa. 
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Choosing to treat patient A (the end of life patient) in S1 and agreeing with 
statement 1 (‘The health service should give priority to extending the life of 
patients who are expected to die soon as a result of a medical condition’) may both 
be interpreted as indicators of support for an end of life premium. Table 6-26 shows 
that a slight majority of respondents (50.5%) who chose to treat patient A in S1 did 
indeed express agreement with statement 1, though a sizeable minority (22.6%) 
disagreed. Amongst the respondents who chose to treat the non-end of life patient 
(despite being given an opportunity to express indifference), the most common 
response to attitudinal statement 1 was to neither agree nor disagree. Indeed, 
these respondents were more likely to agree than to disagree with statement 1. 
Table 6-26. Cross-tabulation: S1 vs. attitudinal statement 1  
Statement 1 (“priority to extending the life of patients who are expected to die soon …”) 
response  
S1 
response 
Agree 
strongly 
Agree 
moderately 
Neither 
agree not 
disagree 
Disagree 
moderately 
Disagree 
strongly 
Total 
A  
(end of 
life) 
104 (13.6%) 290 (37.9%) 198 (25.9%) 137 (17.9%) 36 (4.7%) 765 
(100.0%) 
I 107 (12.8%) 229 (27.5%) 356 (42.7%) 111 (13.3%) 30 (3.6%) 833 
(100.0%) 
B  
(non-end 
of life) 
97 (12.1%) 233 (29.0%) 247 (30.8%) 186 (23.2%) 40 (5.0%) 803 
(100.0%) 
 
In principle, choosing A (quality of life-improving treatment), B (life-extending 
treatment) or I (indifference option) in S4 would be consistent with agreeing with 
statements 4, 5 or 6, respectively. In fact, Table 6-27,  
Table 6-28 and Table 6-29 show that many respondents did not agree with the 
statement aligned to their choice in S4, in spite of the overall tendency to express 
agreement with all attitudinal statements.  
Table 6-27. Cross-tabulation: S4 vs. attitudinal statement 4  
Statement 4 (“priority to improving the quality of life …”) response  
S4 
response 
Agree 
strongly 
Agree 
moderately 
Neither 
agree not 
disagree 
Disagree 
moderately 
Disagree 
strongly 
Total 
A  
(quality of 
life gain) 
248 (25.6%) 391 (40.4%) 220 (22.7%) 91 (9.4%) 19 (2.0%) 969 
(100.0%) 
I 177 (21.7%) 256 (31.3%) 303 (37.1%) 67 (8.2%) 14 (1.7%) 817 
(100.0%) 
B  
(life 
extension) 
126 (20.5%) 256 (41.6%) 162 (26.3%) 58 (9.4%) 13 (2.1%) 615 
(100.0%) 
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Table 6-28. Cross-tabulation: S4 vs. attitudinal statement 5  
Statement 5 (“priority to extending the life …”) response  
S4 
response 
Agree strongly Agree 
moderately 
Neither agree 
not disagree 
Disagree 
moderately 
Disagree 
strongly 
Total 
A  
(quality of 
life gain) 
138 (14.2%) 337 (34.8%) 283 (29.2%) 179 (18.5%) 32 (3.3%) 969 
(100.0%) 
I 405 (17.1%) 251 (30.7%) 318 (38.9%) 84 (10.3%) 24 (2.9%) 817 
(100.0%) 
B  
(life 
extension) 
127 (20.7%) 236 (38.4%) 170 (27.6%) 69 (11.2%) 13 (2.1%) 615 
(100.0%) 
Table 6-29. Cross-tabulation: S4 vs. attitudinal statement 6  
Statement 6 (“equal priority to improving the quality of life and extending the life …”) response  
S4 
response 
Agree strongly Agree 
moderately 
Neither agree 
not disagree 
Disagree 
moderately 
Disagree 
strongly 
Total 
A  
(quality of 
life gain) 
329 (34.0%) 338 (34.9%) 213 (22.0%) 77 (7.9%) 12 (1.2%) 969 
(100.0%) 
I 272 (33.3%) 260 (31.8%) 234 (28.6%) 47 (5.8%) 4 (0.5%) 817 
(100.0%) 
B  
(life 
extension) 
238 (38.7%) 191 (31.1%) 144 (23.4%) 37 (6.0%) 5 (0.8%) 615 
(100.0%) 
 
Levels of internal incoherence – that is, providing responses to attitudinal questions 
that appear at odds with one’s earlier responses to the choice tasks – did not vary 
much between study arms. For example, the proportion of respondents who chose 
to treat the end of life patient in S1 whilst agreeing with attitudinal statement 1 
ranged from 50.3% in the forced choice arm to 52.3% in the indifference arm; and 
from 50.0% in the no visual aid arm to 53.0% in the visual aid arm.   
6.3.9 Impact of respondent background characteristics in S1 
The results of the multiple linear regression are shown in Table 6-30.  Three 
background characteristics were found to have coefficients that were statistically 
significant at the 5% level: age, children and experience of terminal illness. 
Respondents who are younger, have responsibility for children and have experience 
of terminal illness were more likely than average to choose to treat the end of life 
patient. However, when considering the subgroup of respondents meeting all three 
criteria (i.e. respondents who are younger than the median age of 47 years and 
have responsibility for children and have experience of terminal illness; n=326), the 
majority (60.1%) did not choose to treat the end of life patient. 
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Table 6-30. Impact of background characteristics – results of regression 
Variable Coefficient Standard error p-value 
Age -0.0076 0.0033 0.020 
Gender 0.0578 0.0955 0.545 
Social grade 0.0813 0.0958 0.396 
Children 0.2859 0.1025 0.005 
Degree -0.0230 0.0950 0.809 
Health limitations 0.1172 0.0711 0.099 
Experience of terminal illness 0.2777 0.0989 0.005 
Forced choice arm 0.5060 0.0935 0.000 
Visual aid arm 0.0135 0.0903 0.882 
Constant -1.0391 0.2607 0.000 
Observations (n): 2,316 
Log-likelihood: -1421.2 (LR test: chi-squared = 58.1; degrees of freedom = 9; p<0.01) 
Pseudo-R2: 0.020  
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6.3.10 Ordering effects 
The order in which scenarios S1 to S6 were presented was randomised for each respondent. Table 6-31 shows how the responses made 
differed depending on whether or not the scenario in question was the first to be presented. In each column, the modal choice is emboldened. 
In S1 and S3, the modal choice when those scenarios were presented first differs from the modal choice when they were presented later. In all 
six scenarios, indifference was expressed less often when the scenario was presented first. Pooling responses from the six scenarios, the 
association between scenario ordering (first or not first) and the propensity to express indifference is statistically significant (chi-squared test; 
p<0.01). 
Table 6-31. Aggregate S1 to S6 responses, split by whether scenario appeared first or not 
Scenario S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 
Ordering First Not first First Not first First Not first First Not first First Not first First Not first 
A 141 
(37.0%) 
624 
(30.9%) 
50 
(12.5%) 
290 
(14.5%) 
97 
(25.7%) 
482 
(23.8%) 
164 
(41.0%)  
805 
(40.2%) 
168 
(38.5%) 
756 
(38.5%) 
181 
(44.5%) 
843 
(42.3%) 
I 125 
(32.8%) 
708 
(35.1%) 
100 
(25.1%) 
523 
(26.1%) 
130 
(34.4%) 
784 
(38.8%) 
107 
(26.8%) 
710 
(35.5%) 
113 
(25.9%) 
594 
(30.2%) 
128 
(31.5%) 
763 
(38.3%) 
B 115 
(30.2%) 
688 
(34.1%) 
249 
(62.4%) 
1,189 
(59.4%) 
151 
(40.0%) 
757 
(37.4%) 
129 
(32.3%) 
486 
(24.3%) 
155 
(35.6%) 
615 
(31.3%) 
98 
(24.1%) 
388 
(19.5%) 
Total 381 
(100.0%) 
2,020 
(100.0%) 
399 
(100.0%) 
2,002 
(100.0%) 
378 
(100.0%) 
2,023 
(100.0%) 
400 
(100.0%) 
2,001 
(100.0%) 
436 
(100.0%) 
1,965 
(100.0%) 
407 
(100.0%) 
1,994 
(100.0%) 
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Respondents in the indifference arm were increasingly likely to express indifference 
in the initial question of each scenario (thereby avoiding the follow-up question) as 
they proceeded through the survey (Figure 6-8).  
Figure 6-8. Proportion choosing A or B versus proportion choosing I, by scenario order 
 
 
6.4 Discussion 
This study used an internet survey to elicit the preferences of a large sample of the 
general public, representative in terms of age, gender and social grade, regarding 
the prioritisation of treatments for patients with short life expectancy. Nine 
hypotheses were tested. Some of these hypotheses relate closely to NICE’s 
supplementary end of life policy, which in effect involves placing greater weight on 
a unit of health gain generated by life-extending end of life treatments than on that 
generated by other types of treatments (regardless of how old the patients in 
question are or for how long they have known about their prognosis). Other 
hypotheses were tested in order to examine methodological issues, such as 
whether people’s preferences regarding an end of life premium are affected by the 
inclusion of visual aids or an indifference option in the survey used to elicit those 
preferences. The results relating to each hypothesis are discussed below. 
The most straightforward test of public support for an end of life premium 
(hypothesis 1) was in scenario S1, in which respondents were asked to choose 
between giving a life extension to a patient with one year of life expectancy and an 
equal-sized life extension to another patient with five years of life expectancy. 
Responses were very evenly split across the three available options – the most 
common accounted for less than 35% of all responses. Overall, choosing to treat 
0.0%
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60.0%
80.0%
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the end of life patient was the least popular choice, though considerable variation in 
response patterns across arms can be observed – for respondents in the forced 
choice arm, for example, choosing to treat the end of life patient was the most 
popular choice. Nevertheless, in none of the study arms did a majority of 
respondents choose to treat the end of life patient. Hence, it can be concluded that 
the results observed are not consistent with an end of life premium. 
The results for scenario S2 were clearer and more robust than those for the other 
scenarios. The majority of respondents chose to treat a younger non-end of life 
patient rather than an older end of life patient. This result was observed in all study 
arms, and is consistent with findings elsewhere that people become less concerned 
about patients’ remaining life years when those patients are relatively old (Dolan 
and Shaw, 2004; Stahl et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 2012). NICE’s general 
principle is that health care resources cannot be allocated or restricted on the basis 
of age (NICE, 2008c; Shah et al., 2013a; Rowen et al., 2016b). Nevertheless, it is 
still informative that people’s preferences regarding end of life appear to be 
context-specific, and specifically that preferences regarding an end of life premium 
seem to be affected by the ages of the patients in question (hypothesis 2). The 
finding is particularly pertinent if the treatments meeting NICE’s end of life criteria 
tend to target older patients. 
Although the shifts in response patterns between scenarios S1 and S3 were modest 
in comparison to other pairs of scenarios, the results indicate that people’s 
preferences regarding an end of life premium appear to be affected by how long the 
patients in question have known about their prognosis (hypothesis 3). Respondents 
were more likely to choose to treat the patient with shorter life expectancy when 
advised that the patient had just been diagnosed, as opposed to having been 
diagnosed five years ago. A limitation of the design of S3 is that by the patients’ 
expected times of death without treatment, the difference in how long they would 
have known about their prognosis is small – patient A would have known about 
their prognosis for six years; patient B for five years. The effect of time with 
knowledge might have been stronger had there been a greater discrepancy 
between the situations facing the two patients, though there is a risk that the 
resulting scenario would have been considered implausible by respondents. 
Scenario S4 is of interest because NICE’s policy accommodates life-extending but 
not quality of life-improving end of life treatments. By contrast, the majority of 
respondents in this survey did not express preference for providing the life-
extending end of life treatment (hypothesis 4). Indeed, the proportion of 
respondents choosing the quality of life-improving treatment exceeded the 
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proportion choosing the life-extending treatment in all study arms. Hence, the 
responses to S1 and S4 suggest that public support for NICE’s end of life policy is 
limited. The preference for quality of life improvements is further demonstrated by 
the responses to scenario S5. In that scenario, where the end of life treatment was 
quality of life-improving, respondents were more likely to choose to treat the end of 
life patient than in S1, where the end of life treatment was life-extending 
(hypothesis 5).  
However, the responses to S4 should be considered alongside those of S6, which 
suggest that the preference of quality of life improvements over life extensions is 
not specific to the end of life context (hypothesis 6). As noted above, respondents 
were advised that patients consider living in 50% quality of life for two years to be 
equally desirable as living in 100% quality of life for one year. An implication of this 
assumption (albeit not explained explicitly to respondents in this way) is that a 
50% quality of life improvement lasting 12 months is equally desirable to patients 
as a 12-month life extension at 50% quality of life. This means that the 
(undiscounted) gains generated by treating patient A are equivalent to those 
generated by treating patient B in S4, S5 and S6. Provided that the respondents 
understood and accepted the information given, the fact that they were more likely 
to choose the quality of life-improving option in these scenarios appears to indicate 
that they consider a quality of life improvement worth half a QALY to be more 
socially valuable than a life extension worth half a QALY. Another possibility is that 
respondents ignored or rejected the information provided about the patients’ 
preferences, assuming instead that the patients would prefer the quality of life 
improvement for themselves.  
One way of disentangling individual and social values would be to design a study 
which asks respondents to provide their values for defined states of quality of life 
from an individual perspective (for example, using time trade-off) and then to 
evaluate those same states from a social decision-maker perspective, using those 
values. See Dolan and Green (1998) for an example of how a study comparing 
differences between individual and social values might be designed, though it 
should be noted that the methods used in that study would be challenging to apply 
in a self-completion internet survey.  
Instead, this study attempted to explore the effect of perspective on preferences 
for an end of life premium (hypothesis 7) by including scenario S8, an explicitly 
individual perspective operationalisation of S1. The results show that respondents 
were considerably less likely to prioritise the provision of the end of life treatment 
when answering from an individual perspective. This finding can be contrasted to 
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those of the individual perspective studies included in the literature review (see 
2.4.1). Those studies, all of which used the willingness-to-pay method, reported 
relatively high values for health gains in end of life scenarios (with the exception of 
Shiroiwa et al. (2013)). It may be that by presenting the end of life and non-end of 
life scenarios as two possible states of the world each with a 50% chance of 
occurring, and by removing explicit consideration of money from the tasks, this 
study managed to overcome some of the features of willingness-to-pay studies that 
render them potentially unsuitable for informing society-level decision-making. It is 
acknowledged that S8 may be considered the most abstract and contrived of the 
scenarios presented in the survey, though all of the pilot respondents claimed that 
it was easy to understand. 
The observation in the literature review that studies that include visual aids appear 
more likely than average to report evidence consistent with an end of life premium 
(see 2.4.3) was not repeated in this study. In four of the scenarios, including S1, 
the effect of the visual aid was modest. In the three scenarios in which the choice 
was between a quality of life improvement and a life extension (S4, S5, S6), the 
quality of life improvement was chosen less frequently when a visual aid was used. 
It seems therefore that visual presentation of information can have an impact on 
people’s choices about priority-setting, particularly when presenting information 
about quality of life – a concept that can be difficult for some people to 
comprehend. 
In all scenarios, respondents in the no visual aid arm expressed indifference more 
often than those in the visual aid arm, potentially implying that the visual aids 
helped respondents to distinguish between the alternatives and to be more decisive 
(though this conjecture is not supported by the responses to the debrief questions, 
which did not differ greatly between the visual aid and no visual aid arms). 
Respondents in the visual aid arm spent longer than average completing the 
survey, presumably because there was more information on the screen to make 
sense of.  
It should be noted that the visual aids used in this study were similar to those used 
in other studies of end of life-related preferences (for example, empirical studies 1, 
2 and 3 in this thesis; Pennington et al., 2015; Rowen et al., 2016a; Rowen et al., 
2016b), relying on conceptual diagrams with quality of life depicted on the vertical 
axis and length of life on the horizontal axis. This is not the only form that visual 
aids to support priority-setting scenarios can take. For example, in a group 
discussion study investigating public support for various ethical principles of health 
care rationing, Cookson and Dolan (1999) used photographs of actors to represent 
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hypothetical patients. The observed effect of conceptual diagrams in this study 
cannot be generalised to other, substantially different forms of visual aids.  
Compared to visual aids, the effect of including an explicit indifference option was 
less ambiguous. In S1, the modal choice amongst respondents in the forced choice 
arm – choosing to treat the end of life patient – was the least common choice for 
respondents in the indifference arm. Although this option was never chosen by a 
majority of respondents in any of the study arms, it is clear that the balance of 
responses to the choice tasks was influenced by what response options were 
available. In most of the scenarios, respondents were more likely to express 
indifference when an indifference option was offered in the initial question than 
when indifference could only be expressed indirectly via the follow-up question.  
The results provide evidence that it is not only whether an indifference option is 
available that matters, but also how exactly that indifference option is framed and 
mechanised. In this study, respondents were on the whole more likely to choose 
the option worded ‘Both patients should have an equal chance of being treated 
(tossing a coin would be a fair way to make the choice)’ than the option worded ‘I 
have no preference (I do not mind which patient is treated)’. This is in spite of the 
fact that both statements have identical implications for the allocation of health 
care resources. Alternative indifference options, such as ‘I am not able to make a 
decision and would prefer that the choice be made by others’ (Green, 2009), were 
considered but not included in the design in order to reduce complexity, and may 
well have generated different results.  
It is acknowledged that the follow-up questions used in this study were 
complicated, even after efforts to simplify the wording of the instructions following 
the pilot. Respondents in the forced choice arm were always made to answer the 
follow-up question, whereas respondents in the indifference arm only answered the 
follow-up question when they did not choose the indifference option in the initial 
question. This may be reflected in respondents’ responses to debrief statement 2 
(‘It was difficult to understand the questions I was asked’). Respondents in the 
indifference arm were more likely than those in the forced choice arm to disagree 
with this statement. This was particularly true of the 130 respondents who always 
expressed indifference in the initial question (and therefore never proceeded to the 
follow-up question) – disagreeing strongly with debrief statement 2 was the modal 
response (35%) amongst this group.  
Further, a plausible explanation of the finding that respondents in the indifference 
arm were increasingly likely to choose the indifference option as they proceeded 
through the survey is that they learned that this was how to avoid the follow-up 
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question, and therefore to reduce the time and effort needed to complete the 
survey. For surveys including multiple questions that are due to be compared with 
each other, randomisation of question order across respondents can help to 
minimise the impact of order bias, though the most appropriate specific 
randomisation mechanism is likely to vary from study to study. At the very least, 
studies should report whether or not the question order was randomised. 
The follow-up question in scenarios S1 to S7 involved asking respondents to specify 
a size of gain that would make them indifferent between treating patient A and 
patient B. This mechanism was similar to that used by Abel Olsen (2013), and 
chosen based on a judgement that it would generate more information than 
alternative approaches. The results indicate that when faced with a large number of 
response options, most respondents tend to be drawn to a small subset of those 
options (such as the mid-point value), implying the use of simplifying heuristics. An 
alternative approach, as used by Linley and Hughes (2013), would be to repeat the 
initial question but with a reduced size of gain for the patient that was preferred 
initially. This would generate information about the strength of respondents’ 
preferences, but would not in itself identify their points of indifference. An extension 
to this approach would be to apply a specified procedure of choice iterations to 
guide the respondent towards their point of indifference (i.e. by repeatedly 
increasing or reducing the size of gain for a given patient depending on the 
respondent’s previous choice). Such iterative procedures are commonly used in the 
application of the standard gamble, person trade-off, time trade-off and 
willingness-to-pay techniques, though they are themselves also a potential source 
of biases and heuristics (Ternent and Tsuchiya, 2013; Oppe et al., 2016). 
The attitudinal questions were included as an alternative means of capturing 
respondents’ views on priority-setting. Fewer than half (44.1%) of the respondents 
agreed with the statement that ‘The health service should give priority to extending 
the life of patients who are expected to die soon as a result of a medical condition’. 
This is somewhat greater than the 31.9% of respondents who chose to treat the 
end of life patient in S1, but still represents the lowest level of support observed 
across all six statements. The discrepancy may reflect respondents’ interpretation 
of the statement – they may have assumed a life extension greater than and/or a 
life expectancy without treatment shorter than the ones presented in S1. An overall 
tendency to express agreement with the statements can be observed, with many 
respondents agreeing with statements that appear, prima facie, to be inconsistent 
with their responses to the choice tasks and to other statements describing 
competing priority-setting objectives – for example, agreeing with statements 4, 5 
and 6. In contrast to the results of this study, Rowen et al. (2014) reported that a 
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lower level of support for an end of life premium could be discerned from 
respondents’ responses to attitudinal questions than from their responses to the 
preceding choice (DCE) tasks.  
It should be noted that although the attitudinal questions were designed so as to 
align with certain responses to the scenario questions, the type types of questions 
are not perfectly consistent with each other. For example, a respondent could have 
chosen to treat the end of life patient in scenario S1 whilst disagreeing with 
attitudinal statement 1 because they saw attitudinal statement 1 being presented 
alongside attitudinal statement 2 (‘The health service should give priority to 
treating patients who will get the largest amount of benefit from treatment’) and 
agreed more with attitudinal statement 2 than with attitudinal statement 1. In S1, 
both patients would get the same amount of benefit from treatment so respondents 
could not make a choice that involved one patient getting a larger benefit. 
However, it is trickier to think of a coherent reason why a respondent would choose 
to treat the non-end of life patient in S1 whilst agreeing with attitudinal statement 
1, which 41.1% of respondents did. Ultimately, the only way to have perfectly 
matched the attitudinal statements with the scenario questions would have been to 
add caveats and nuances to the statements. This may defeat the purpose of the 
exercise given that the intention of the attitudinal questions was to offer a more 
general and less convoluted alternative to the scenario-based choice tasks. 
The fact that 36.1% of respondents agreed with three statements that were 
intended to be mutually exclusive from each other (4, 5 and 6) suggests that the 
responses may have been distorted by acquiescence bias (Messick, 1967) – that is, 
the tendency to agree when in doubt – and casts doubt on the usefulness of this 
type of exercise. This issue is avoided in choice tasks such as the initial questions in 
the scenarios in this study, which specified that only one of the two patients could 
be treated and therefore required sacrifices to be made. A potential solution would 
be to ask respondents to indicate which of multiple competing attitudinal 
statements they agreed with most, thereby forcing them to prioritise amongst 
several policy statements that they are inclined to agree with.  
Some limitations of the study should be mentioned. Whilst the study design and 
analyses undertaken are deemed to be suitable for testing the hypotheses set out 
in 6.1, it is acknowledged that in many cases alternative approaches could have 
been followed. For example, hypothesis 5 was examined by testing for an 
association between choosing a life-extending end of life treatment over a life-
extending non-end of life treatment (in S1) and choosing a quality of life-improving 
end of life treatment over a life-extending non-end of life treatment (in S5). It is 
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unclear whether the same result would have been achieved if the treatment for the 
non-end of life patient in both scenarios had been quality of life-improving rather 
than life-extending. This would have been an alternative, and legitimate, means of 
testing hypothesis 5. 
Most of the analyses undertaken focused on the propensity to choose to treat 
patient A in each of the scenarios (in S1, S2 and S3, patient A was the end of life 
patient; in S4, S5 and S6, patient A stood to receive a quality of life-improving 
treatment). This meant that the analyses were largely binomial (i.e. A versus I/B) 
in nature. Given that the study was to a large extent motivated by questions about 
public support for NICE’s end of life policy, this focus seems reasonable. However, 
the conclusions made about the impact of scenario information, experimental 
modifications and other explanatory factors might have been different if the 
analyses had instead been multinomial (i.e. A versus I versus B). For the purpose 
of informing the design of stated preference studies, it may be just as useful to 
understand what drives people to express indifference in favour of choosing to treat 
patient B, and vice versa. However, this level of analysis was considered to be 
beyond the scope of the study. 
The study design involved adjusting a single factor or attribute (such as time with 
knowledge) from one scenario or arm to another, and using cross-tabulations to 
analyse the impact of that attribute on choices. This allowed the impact of a large 
number of attributes to be isolated to a greater degree than might have been 
possible using other methods such as DCE. However, only a small number (usually 
two) of levels for any given attribute were tested – for example, time with 
knowledge was set to either zero or five years, and the data are insufficient to 
make claims about the effect that other possible levels might have had. Further, 
the isolation of changes between scenarios may have resulted in a focusing effect 
whereby the importance of the varying attribute was exaggerated, though the 
randomisation of scenario ordering should have mitigated this effect to an extent. It 
has been suggested that seeking choices between packages of attributes that vary 
in multiple ways lessens such focusing effects and makes it more difficult for 
respondents to answer strategically (Sheldon, 1999). 
The level of drop-out from the survey (32.6%; comprising individuals who were 
screened in but either did not consent to take part or did not complete the survey) 
was higher than expected. It is unclear whether the high drop-out rate was due to 
respondent fatigue, technical problems, or some other cause. A drawback 
associated with internet surveys is that they offer limited opportunities to 
investigate reasons why respondents fail to complete the survey or give responses 
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that seem internally incoherent or contrary to researchers’ expectations (though no 
major issues with the present survey were identified in the face-to-face interviews 
conducted as part of the pilot). Further limitations of internet surveys are discussed 
in 5.2.2.  
Notwithstanding the caveats and limitations described above, this study has 
addressed some of the gaps in the empirical literature on public preferences 
regarding the social value of end of life treatments (see 2.4.5). Little support for 
NICE’s end of life policy is observed, with the majority of respondents rejecting the 
opportunity to prioritise the treatment of end of life patients over non-end of life 
patients, or to provide life-extending end of life treatments over quality of life-
improving treatments. Specifying that the end of life patient is relatively old or has 
known about their prognosis for some time, or asking the questions from an 
individual rather than a social decision-maker perspective, weakens further the 
evidence of support for an end of life premium. Study design considerations – 
specifically, the use of visual aids and the availability of explicit indifference options 
– were found to affect respondents’ choices, though in no version of the survey was 
a majority preference for treating the end of life patient observed.  
A finding of potential interest is that the responses to the choice tasks indicate that 
support for NICE’s end of life policy (or some variant of it) is stronger than support 
for a pure QALY-maximisation approach to health care priority-setting. But a more 
noteworthy finding is that very few respondents (less than 4%) made choices that 
imply unambiguous support for either QALY-maximisation or for (even a less 
prescriptive version of) NICE’s end of life policy. 
6.5 Conclusions  
This chapter has described a large-scale study that examined the extent of public 
support for an end of life premium, and the impact of study design considerations 
and framing effects on end of life-related preferences. The results are not 
consistent with an end of life premium – ceteris paribus, only a minority of 
respondents chose to give priority to the end of life patient over the non-end of life 
patient. This minority was reduced further when the end of life patient was 
described as older than and/or as having known about their prognosis for longer 
than the non-end of life patient. The use of an individual (rather than a social 
decision-maker) perspective also further weakened the case for an end of life 
premium. A preference for quality of life improvements over life extensions (holding 
the size of QALY gain constant) was observed, though this preference does not 
appear to be specific to the end of life context and was elicited under a social 
decision-maker perspective only. A caveat to these results is that a number of 
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discrepancies were found between respondents’ responses to the choice tasks and 
their subsequent responses to the attitudinal questions. The study adds not only to 
the evidence on end of life-related preferences but also to the evidence on framing 
effects in stated preference research. Respondents’ choices were found to be 
sensitive to the inclusion of indifference options and (to a lesser extent) visual aids.  
The ways in which the results of this study relate to those of the other empirical 
studies are discussed in Chapter 7.
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7 DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the findings of the overall thesis. It begins by summarising 
the main contributions of the research. It then highlights some of the ways in which 
the empirical studies complement and differ from both each other and other 
published research on the topic. The limitations and ambiguities of the research are 
then discussed. The chapter concludes by presenting recommendations for further 
research. 
The thesis was motivated by NICE’s introduction of supplementary guidance for the 
appraisal of life-extending end of life treatments (see 1.8.2), and by calls for 
research on the extent of societal support for such a policy (see 1.9). It set out to 
address the following research question: do members of the public wish to place 
greater weight on a unit of health gain for end of life patients than on that for other 
types of patients? A series of empirical studies were used to try to answer this 
question, focusing on the preferences of the UK general public and the definition of 
end of life adopted by NICE in its supplementary guidance.  
7.2 Key contributions 
The key contributions of the research are loosely organised into three (not 
necessarily mutually exclusive) categories: (1) contributions in terms of topics 
examined; (2) contributions in terms of methodological approaches; and (3) 
contributions in terms of important findings.  
7.2.1 Topics examined 
7.2.1.1 Specific focus on NICE’s end of life policy 
The empirical studies reported in this thesis were amongst the first to have directly 
addressed research questions arising from NICE’s policy on the appraisal of life-
extending end of life treatments. All four studies presented choices between 
treatments that would meet NICE’s criteria for special consideration (life expectancy 
without treatment of less than 24 months and life extension of greater than three 
months) and treatments that would not. Empirical study 3 went further by including 
in the regression analysis a dummy variable defined in terms of NICE’s cut-offs and 
by analysing the impacts of alternative cut-offs. 
All of the empirical studies also examined whether life-extending end of life 
treatments are preferred to quality of life-improving treatments. Given that the 
NICE’s end of life criteria accommodate life extensions but not quality of life 
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improvements per se,22 this seems like a relevant research question. Yet the 
literature review showed that evidence on this particular issue is scarce (see 
2.3.8.4).  
7.2.1.2 Examination of preparedness 
The literature review revealed that the issue of preparedness has not been 
examined in most of the studies published to date.23 The research in this thesis has 
therefore made a novel contribution to the understanding of end of life-related 
preferences in this respect. Further research to validate or extend the findings 
regarding preparedness in this thesis would be welcomed.  
7.2.1.3 Novelty of the literature review 
The literature review is novel in that no comparable reviews of public end of life-
related preferences are available. Existing general reviews of the empirical ethics 
literature that had sought to include end of life as an attribute of interest had 
reported finding no or limited relevant studies (Green, 2011; Keetharuth et al., 
2011). Three of the older studies identified in the end of life review (Dolan and 
Cookson, 2000; Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2005; Stolk et al., 2005) had also been 
included in the author’s earlier review of public preferences regarding severity of 
illness as a priority-setting criterion (Shah, 2009). However, most of the studies in 
the severity review described severity in terms of quality of life rather than life 
expectancy; and most of the studies in the end of life review were conducted and 
published after NICE issued its supplementary guidance in 2009. Given the 
increasing interest in the relative value of life extensions for patients with short life 
expectancy, the need for an up-to-date and specific review was clear. 
7.2.2 Methodological approaches 
7.2.2.1 Examination of preparedness 
A novel attempt was made in empirical studies 1 and 2 to design a scenario 
involving a choice between treating an end of life patient and treating a non-end of 
life patient whilst controlling for time-related preferences. This involved describing 
one patient as having been diagnosed with their illness nine years prior to the start 
                                           
22 It is worth noting that the NICE end of life policy asks appraisal committees to consider assuming that 
the life extensions generated by eligible treatments are experienced in full quality of life (Box 1). This 
aspect of the guidance was not examined in this thesis as it was judged that it simply described one 
possible mechanism for upward-adjusting QALY gains, and was not intended to reflect societal 
preferences. 
23 An exception is McHugh et al. (2015), in which a statement referring to the notion (‘It is important to 
give a dying person and their family time to prepare for their death, put their affairs in order, make 
peace and say goodbyes’) was included in the statement set. Respondents in that study identifying with 
the shared perspective emphasising patient choice and the right to life-extending treatment were likely 
to agree with this statement. 
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of the scenario and the other patient as having just been diagnosed. Life 
expectancy without treatment (from the start of the scenario) was the same for 
both patients. An observed preference for treating the latter patient could be 
explained by concern about how little time that patient will have had to prepare for 
death.  
Empirical studies 3 and 4 also investigated the issue of preparedness by presenting 
respondents with scenarios in which one of the patients had known about their 
illness for some time (two years and five years, respectively) and the other patient 
had only just learned of their illness. In many cases, the patient with longer life 
expectancy without treatment (from the start of the scenario) would have known 
about their prognosis for less time than the patient with shorter life expectancy. 
This meant the respondents in these studies were being asked to make trade-offs 
between prioritising based on concerns about end of life and prioritising based on 
concerns about preparedness. 
7.2.2.2 Examination of indifference   
An important methodological consideration in the design of stated preference 
studies is whether or not to permit respondents to express indifference between the 
available options. The literature review (Chapter 2) showed a fairly even split 
between the number of studies in which indifference could be expressed and 
number in which it could not. Yet the use or otherwise of indifference options was 
rarely discussed or justified in any of the articles.  
How indifference options are framed also matters. For example, framed one way, 
an indifference option may appeal to respondents who consider all of the 
alternatives on offer to be attractive (and equally so); framed another way, it may 
appeal to respondents who do not wish to engage in the choice task. Elsewhere in 
the empirical ethics literature, Ubel (1999) compared forced (pairwise) choice 
priority-setting questions with (otherwise identical) questions in which a third 
option of dividing resources equally was available. It was found that the majority of 
respondents expressed indifference when given the opportunity to do so. Building 
on Ubel’s study design, and drawing on another study by Oddsson (2003), Green 
(2009) tested the addition of a fourth option in which respondents could indicate 
that they were unable to make a decision and would prefer that the choice be made 
by others. Green reported that very few respondents chose this fourth option, and 
concluded that when respondents state a preference for equality it may be 
interpreted as a true preference rather than a means of avoiding making difficult 
decisions. 
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The research in this thesis adds to the contributions of Ubel and Green. The 
empirical studies analyse and discuss the impact of including or omitting an 
indifference option, and of alternative framings of indifference options.  
7.2.2.3 Examination of the impact of study perspective 
The majority of studies included in the literature review asked respondents to adopt 
a social decision-maker perspective. Four studies used an individual perspective in 
which respondents were explicitly asked to imagine that the hypothetical choices 
applied to their own lives. Two of those four studies (Shiroiwa et al., 2010; Pinto-
Prades et al., 2014) compared both types of perspective by asking respondents to 
complete individual perspective tasks and corresponding (but separate) social 
decision-maker perspective tasks. All of the studies that sought individual 
perspective preferences did so by applying the willingness-to-pay technique – a 
method that is rarely applied in social decision-maker perspective studies. Hence, it 
is difficult to assess whether any observed differences in results between the two 
types of task were driven by differences in study perspective per se or by 
differences in the ‘payment vehicle’ (i.e. what was being traded – money or some 
other benefit).    
The empirical studies reported in this thesis were largely undertaken from a social 
decision-maker perspective. In empirical study 4, however, an attempt was made 
to compare end of life-related preferences elicited using both types of perspective 
through the inclusion of scenario S8. The approach used was novel in that it used a 
method other than willingness-to-pay to examine individual perspective preferences 
regarding end of life treatments. It may be that by presenting two tasks that 
differed in terms of perspective but were otherwise intended to be identical, and by 
avoiding explicit consideration of money from the tasks, empirical study 4 managed 
both to overcome some of the limitations of willingness-to-pay studies in 
determining decisions about the allocation of public resources (see 2.4.1), and to 
isolate the effect of the change in perspective from the effect of the change in 
payment vehicle. 
The author is aware of two recent, unpublished studies that have also attempted to 
use methods other than willingness-to-pay to examine individual perspective 
preferences for an end of life premium. Gyrd-Hansen et al. (2017) asked 
respondents to choose which they would prefer out of four free extensions of a 
hypothetical private insurance policy. Nielsen et al. (2017) applied a risk-risk trade-
off approach which involved asking respondents to choose between a reduction in 
mortality risk and an improvement (both a life extension and a quality of life 
improvement) to their end of life situation.  
172 
 
7.2.2.4 Searching for search terms in the literature review 
The literature review applied a creative approach to searching for search terms and 
a comprehensive approach to extracting data that were of relevance to the research 
question. At the time of conduct, the number of studies that specifically set out to 
examine end of life-related preferences remained limited – only eight of the 
identified articles explicitly mentioned end of life, or some synonym for end of life, 
in the stated study objectives. A contribution of the review is that the author 
extended the scope in order to capture studies that set out to answer an altogether 
different research question but happened to analyse or report data that enabled the 
comparison of preferences regarding the treatment of (or of values of gains for) 
patients with different life expectancies (Stolk et al., 2005; Richardson et al., 2012; 
Rowen et al., 2016b). 
7.2.3 Important findings 
7.2.3.1 Choices running counter to an end of life premium 
The results varied from study to study, but overall the evidence presented in this 
thesis suggests that people do not place greater weight on a unit of health gain for 
end of life patients (as defined by NICE) than on that for other types of patients. An 
important finding in all four empirical studies was that non-trivial proportions of 
respondents favoured the treatment of the non-end of life patient over the end of 
life patient, in many cases even when an indifference option was available. In 
empirical study 1, three of the 21 respondents (14.3%) chose to treat the non-end 
of life patient in scenario S1. Comments made by these respondents when 
answering the probing questions suggest that they felt that the life extension 
should be given to someone who has a better opportunity to make the most out of 
the additional time offered by treatment. In empirical study 2, 13 of the 50 
respondents (26.0%) made the same choice, and their responses to the follow-up 
tick-box tasks suggest that this was driven by a belief that patients with longer life 
expectancy are better placed to make the most out of a short life extension. In 
empirical study 3, the patient with longer life expectancy was given priority over 
the patient with shorter life expectancy 55% of the time across all choice sets. 
Three-hundred and fifty-five of the 3,969 respondents (8.7%) never chose to give 
priority to the patient with shorter life expectancy. In empirical study 4, 803 of the 
2,401 respondents (33.4%) chose to treat the non-end of life patient in scenario 
S1. 
Such results had not been anticipated at the start of the PhD research programme. 
Placing greater weight to a unit of health gain for patients with longer life 
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expectancy than on that for patients with shorter life expectancy, ceteris paribus, is 
inconsistent not only with NICE’s end of life policy, but also with the QALY-
maximisation framework and many other candidate approaches for determining 
how health care resources should be allocated. The thesis includes some attempts 
to explain these preferences, drawing on respondents’ answers to follow-up 
questions (see 3.4.1 and 4.3.1) and on findings reported elsewhere that 
respondents may be acting strategically, overcompensating to counteract the 
choices they anticipate that others will make (Shah et al., 2015b). The potential for 
alternative research methods to better understand such ‘unexpected’ preferences is 
discussed in 7.5.1.1. 
7.2.3.2 Findings regarding the use of indifference options 
In empirical study 2, the indifference option (indicating that the respondent had no 
preference over which patient should be treated) was presented more explicitly and 
with greater visual prominence than in empirical study 1. Indifference was 
expressed more frequently overall, and by a larger proportion of respondents, in 
empirical study 2 than in empirical study 1. Empirical study 4 provides evidence 
that the findings of a survey of end of life-related preferences may depend on 
whether and how indifference can be expressed: in scenario S1, for example, the 
modal choice in the forced choice arm was to treat the end of life patient, whereas 
for respondents in the indifference arm this was the least common choice. If an end 
of life policy were to be made based on the findings of empirical study 4 (taken at 
face value) and on majoritarian grounds, then the decision about whether to 
include two or three response options could be a determining factor.     
On a related note, the responses to the follow-up questions in empirical study 4 
suggest that when faced with a large number of response options, respondents 
tend to restrict their choices to a small subset of those options, such as the middle 
option. This could explain why the indifference option in the study by Linley and 
Hughes (2013) was selected so frequently. In that study, 11 response options were 
available but the single option implying indifference – equal allocation to both 
patient groups – accounted for nearly half of all choices made (in some of the other 
scenarios addressing factors other than end of life, the proportion of respondents 
expressing indifference was even greater). In reporting their results, Linley and 
Hughes collapsed the 11 response options into three categories. Recommendations 
for further investigation of indifference expression in stated preference research are 
provided in 7.5.1.4. 
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7.2.3.3 Findings regarding preparedness 
Responses to the probing questions (in empirical study 1) and the tick-box tasks (in 
empirical study 2) suggest that the amount of time patients have to prepare for 
death was a consideration for a number of respondents. The results from both 
studies suggest that any observed preference for treating an end of life patient may 
be driven by concern about how long they have known their prognosis rather than 
by concern about how long they have left to live.  
When asked to choose between a patient who had known about their illness for 
some time and another patient who had only just learned of their illness, empirical 
studies 3 and 4 both reported an increase in the proportion of respondents choosing 
to treat the latter patient compared to when no ‘time with knowledge’ information 
was provided. 
7.2.3.4 Quality of life-improving versus life-extending end of life 
treatments 
Empirical studies 1, 2 and 4 report findings to suggest that quality of life-improving 
treatments are more highly valued than life-extending treatments for end of life 
patients. This is consistent with the findings of Pinto-Prades et al. (2014), the only 
study identified in the literature other than the author’s own studies to have 
reported findings relating directly to this issue. To the author’s knowledge, 
empirical study 3 is the only study to have reported evidence of public support for 
prioritising life-extending end of life treatments over quality of life-improving end of 
life treatments in a resource allocation context.  
7.2.3.5 State of the literature 
The key finding of the literature review (which included publications based on 
empirical studies 2 and 3 of this thesis) was that the evidence is mixed, with similar 
numbers of studies reporting evidence consistent with and not consistent with an 
end of life premium. There are a number of reasons why studies may differ in terms 
of their findings: for example, different samples (often reflecting different 
populations), different study objectives, and the use of different methodologies. 
Drawing on the results of the review, some hypotheses based on the notion that 
preferences regarding an end of life premium may depend on study design 
considerations, such as study perspective and the use of indifference options and 
visual aids, were tested in empirical study 4. However, it is also notable that 
several authors reported evidence of heterogeneous preferences within their own 
individual studies, controlling for sampling frame, study objective and methodology 
(for example, Pinto-Prades et al., 2014; McHugh et al., 2015; Shah et al., 2015). 
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This lends weight to a claim made in a recent NICE Citizens’ Council report that 
there are no straightforward answers to questions about societal values because of 
the diversity of the population and range of opinions within society (NICE, 2014b). 
A pertinent question, then (and not one that this thesis sought to answer), is how 
the findings of a given study should be reported in order to convey relevant 
information about the preferences of the sample. Is it sufficient simply to report a 
single representative preference (such as that of the median respondent), or is it 
important to account for the heterogeneity of views expressed? Devlin et al. (2017) 
suggest that there are no strong normative grounds for any single measure of 
overall preference in social choices. 
7.3 Differences between the studies in this thesis 
The four empirical studies reported in this thesis were all designed by the same 
author, with the same overarching research question in mind. It is therefore 
unsurprising that a number of features and characteristics are common across all 
four studies. However, each study had its own unique focus, and the design of the 
later studies was informed by the findings of and challenges encountered in the 
earlier studies. This section identifies and discusses a selection of key differences 
between the studies. Full details are available in Appendix 21, which summarises 
the four studies in terms of the same data extraction fields as used in the literature 
review (Table 2-1). 
7.3.1 Distinction between end of life and non-end of life 
patients 
Respondents in empirical studies 1 and 2 were more likely to choose to treat the 
end of life patient than were respondents in empirical studies 3 and 4. Empirical 
studies 1, 2 and 4 all included scenarios that sought to present a straightforward 
comparison between an end of life patient and a non-end of life patient. While the 
prognosis of the end of life patient was the same in all three studies, the prognosis 
of the non-end of life patient varied. In empirical studies 1 and 2, the non-end of 
life patient had a life expectancy of 10 years without treatment. By comparison, the 
non-end of life patient in empirical study 4 had a life expectancy of just five years. 
Similarly, the longest level used for the life expectancy without treatment attribute 
in empirical study 3 was also five years. Both choices of level are consistent with 
the designs of other studies in the literature (Shiroiwa et al., 2010; Abel Olsen, 
2013; Linley and Hughes, 2013; Skedgel et al., 2015). While five years of life 
expectancy is well beyond the two-year cut-off in the NICE criteria, it is 
nevertheless a poor prognosis and may well be considered by many respondents to 
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represent an end of life situation. Hence, the difference between the end of life 
patient and the non-end of life patient was starker in empirical studies 1 and 2. This 
could explain why the results of the earlier studies differed from those of the later 
studies.24  
While a life expectancy of 10 years is less likely to be considered an end of life 
situation than a life expectancy of five years, it has been argued that any 
presentation of a known life expectancy – no matter how long – may be interpreted 
as a ‘life sentence’ and may therefore induce end of life-type preferences (Gyrd-
Hansen et al., 2017). Studies using alternative comparators such as scenarios 
involving temporary quality of life losses (Shiroiwa et al., 2013; Pinto-Prades et al., 
2014; Pennington et al., 2015) are informative because the end of life scenario is 
compared to scenarios that do not involve a premature death. This reflects the 
broad range of alternative ways in which the resources required to provide end of 
life treatments could otherwise be used. Similarly, gains generated by end of life 
treatments could be compared to gains achieved through the prevention of illness, 
or through reductions in lifetime mortality risk. Such comparators have been tested 
in two recent, unpublished studies (Gyrd-Hansen et al., 2017; Nielsen et al., 2017).  
7.3.2 Influence of patient age 
A statistically significant association between patient age and the propensity to 
prioritise the treatment of the end of life patient was observed in empirical study 4. 
By comparison, empirical study 2 did not find that respondents’ choices were 
influenced by the ages of the patients. This is likely due to the fact that in empirical 
study 4, the difference in the ages of the two patients in the scenario of interest 
was much larger (20 years; the patients would die aged 70 years and 50 years 
without treatment, respectively) than the corresponding difference in empirical 
study 2 (nine years; absolute ages were not specified).  
The finding in empirical study 1 that respondents had made different assumptions 
about the ages of the patients informed subsequent decisions both to specify that 
the patients were both adults in empirical studies 2 and 3, and to specify the exact 
ages of the patients in empirical study 4. Researchers should consider providing 
information about patient ages when developing hypothetical priority-setting 
scenarios. This would reduce the likelihood of respondents making inappropriate or 
unintended assumptions, such as imagining that the patients are children when the 
researcher is interested in eliciting preferences regarding the treatment of adults. 
                                           
24 It should be noted, however, that Abel Olsen (2013) and Skedgel et al. (2015) also presented a 
maximum life expectancy without treatment of 10 years, and neither reported evidence consistent with 
an end of life premium 
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7.3.3 Support for QALY-maximisation 
In empirical studies 1, 2 and 4, very few respondents made sets of choices that 
corresponded perfectly to those of a strict QALY-maximiser. By comparison, the 
modelling results in empirical study 3 demonstrate that QALY gains were the 
primary driver of respondents’ choices in that study, and a sizeable proportion 
(albeit still a minority) of the respondents in that study consistently followed a 
strategy of choosing to treat the patient who stood to gain more QALYs from 
treatment.  
This difference in results may be linked to how the size of QALY gain was controlled 
for. In empirical studies 1, 2 and 4, the scenarios did not allow a trade-off to be 
made between giving priority to the end of life patient and pursuing a QALY-
maximisation approach, since in almost all cases the size of the (undiscounted) 
QALY gain was held equal for both patients. In principle, a respondent who was 
only interested in maximising QALYs should have expressed indifference in all 
choices in which both alternatives offered equal-sized QALY gains. In practice, 
however, respondents may be disinclined to choose an indifference or ‘no 
preference’ option, particularly if that option is not presented as prominently as the 
other options (as was the case in empirical study 1). Further, respondents may 
deem QALY-maximisation to be an important objective but would still be willing to 
consider other factors, such as the extent to which the patients are at the end of 
life, in cases where there is little or no difference in QALY gains between the 
alternatives. In empirical study 3, on the other hand, the QALY gains differed 
between patients in the vast majority of the choice sets presented. This allowed 
direct trade-offs between QALY-maximisation and end of life prioritisation (as well 
as other objectives and choice strategies) to be made.  
7.3.4 Propensity to express indifference 
In empirical study 1, indifference was expressed infrequently, accounting for only 
13% of all choices made. The findings of empirical study 1 informed the design of 
empirical study 2, in which the indifference option was presented more explicitly 
and with greater visual prominence. In that study, indifference was expressed more 
often, accounting for 20% of all choices. In empirical study 4, indifference was 
expressed 39% of the time by respondents in study arms in which an explicit 
indifference option was available, and 26% of the time by respondents in the forced 
choice arm in which respondents could only express indifference indirectly via their 
response to the follow-up question. The increased tendency to express indifference 
in empirical study 4 might reflect the fact that the difference between the 
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alternatives was (in some scenarios) less pronounced than was the case in the 
earlier studies (see 7.3.1).  
These findings indicate that the way in which indifference options are worded and 
presented matters. It may be the case that respondents are more inclined to 
express indifference in internet surveys (as used in empirical study 4) than in 
interviewer-led modes of administration (as used in empirical studies 1 and 2), 
possibly as a default choice that allows them to avoid taking time to make difficult 
decision. Indeed, this was one of the rationales for adopting a forced choice design 
in empirical study 3. 
7.3.5 Quality of life-improving versus life-extending 
treatments 
Empirical studies 1, 2 and 4 all reported evidence to suggest that quality of life-
improving treatments are preferred to life-extending treatments for end of life 
patients (with one year of life expectancy without treatment in 50% quality of life 
without treatment). In empirical study 2 it was shown that this result was 
unaffected by whether the end of life patients were younger adults or older adults. 
In empirical studies 2 and 4 it was shown that the preference for quality of life-
improving treatments over life-extending treatments persisted (albeit to differing 
degrees) even when the quality of life-improving treatment would be provided to a 
patient with longer life expectancy.  
The comparison of preferences for quality of life-improving and life-extending 
treatments was less straightforward in empirical study 3 due to differences in the 
study design and methodology. Nevertheless, in that study both the regression 
results and the predicted probability of choice analysis indicate the opposite result – 
that is, respondents’ choices were guided by life extensions to a greater degree 
than by quality of life improvements. The experimental design for empirical study 3 
did not include any choice sets that compared a quality of life-improving treatment 
with a life-extending treatment whilst controlling for all other aspects (including the 
size of QALY gain and the extent to which the two patients were at the end of life). 
The predicted probability analysis suggests that if a choice set had been included in 
empirical study 3 that corresponded directly to the relevant scenarios in empirical 
studies 1 (S4), 2 (S4/S5) and 4 (S4), then the patient who stood to gain a life 
extension would have been chosen more often. However, this is the result of 
econometric modelling and the various assumptions underpinning the methods of 
analysis. It is unclear whether a similar result would have arisen if respondents in 
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empirical study 3 had faced this choice set explicitly, thereby allowing the direct 
observation of their responses.  
7.3.6 Bias towards particular response options 
In empirical study 3, it was found that respondents were more likely overall to 
choose the alternative appearing at the bottom of the screen (labelled patient B). 
In this study, the labelling of the alternatives was randomised in order to control for 
such bias due to the positioning of options. Randomisation of labels was not applied 
in the other studies. Since the visual presentation of choice tasks was very similar 
in empirical studies 3 and 4 (see Figure 5-1 and Figure 6-1), it is plausible that a 
similar bias towards patient B would have been present in empirical study 4. This 
would have had the effect of, inter alia, indicating greater support for the non-end 
of life patient in scenario S1 and for the life-extending treatment in scenario S4 
than if the labelling of alternatives had been randomised.     
7.4 Comparing the research in this thesis with the 
research of others 
This section highlights some of the ways in which the research in this thesis 
compares to studies undertaken by other investigators, focusing on three studies of 
the preferences of the UK general public that were motivated by recent policy 
developments. 
7.4.1 Comparison with the Rowen et al. studies 
Two studies that shared similar designs and approaches, yet reached different 
conclusions about the level of support for an end of life premium, were Rowen et al. 
(2016a) and empirical study 3 in this thesis. Both studies used web-based DCEs to 
examine the views of large samples of the UK population (recruited from panels 
maintained by market research agencies). Both studies also used forced choice 
designs and similar visual presentations. Yet empirical study 3 reported regression 
results that indicated little support for an end of life premium and prioritising based 
on life expectancy without treatment, while Rowen et al. reported robust and 
consistent support for an end of life premium.  
Some differences between the two studies should be mentioned. Whereas empirical 
study 3 used only one survey version and made no reference to age (either directly 
or indirectly, other than the instruction that the patients were both adults of the 
same age), Rowen et al. used four different survey versions, each depicting a 
different ‘life expectancy without the condition’ (which may have been interpreted 
by respondents as a proxy for the patients’ life stage). The coefficients of the 
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explanatory variables differed across survey versions, though the authors’ main 
conclusions were based on the pooled data. Both studies used conditional logit 
regressions to model the choice data, though there were differences in the model 
specification, reflecting the differing objectives of the studies. For example, in 
models that included an end of life dummy variable, Rowen et al. did not include an 
explanatory variable representing life expectancy without treatment, based on 
concerns about conceptual overlap in these variables. However, the differences in 
conclusions between the two studies cannot be explained by these factors alone, 
since Rowen et al.’s end of life dummy variable was shown to be important in all 
survey versions, and the lack of importance of life expectancy without treatment in 
empirical study 3 was demonstrated not only in the regression analysis but also in 
the descriptive analysis of the raw choice data. Other features of the Rowen et al. 
study that differed from empirical study 3 included: the use of practice questions 
(intended to introduce respondents to the concept of higher and lower burden of 
illness); the presentation of choices between patient groups (rather than between 
individual patients); and the focus on marginal rates of substitution rather than on 
predicted probabilities in the analysis.   
Two other studies that shared similar characteristics were Rowen et al. (2016b) and 
empirical study 4. In each of the studies, a single survey was tested using multiple 
framings and formats. Rowen et al. (2016b) tested two modes of administration 
(face-to-face interview versus unsupervised internet survey), two sets of question 
wording (for example, labelling the alternatives in terms of conditions or patient 
groups), and the use of visual aids and instructional videos. The authors reported 
that the mode of administration influenced respondents’ choices, whereas the other 
factors did not. In empirical study 4, the impact of study perspective and the use of 
indifference options and visual aids was examined. All three factors were found to 
influence responses to some extent, though the primary conclusion (of limited 
support for an end of life premium) was common to all formats and framings.  
It is difficult to conclude from empirical study 4 which approach is most suitable for 
eliciting preferences regarding end of life prioritisation (and regarding equity and 
social values more generally). Rather, the findings suggest that it is important to 
use multiple approaches in order to ensure that the results of a given study are 
suitably robust and not an artefact of the methodology. This might be considered a 
rather unsatisfactory recommendation, as the use of multiple survey versions can 
make a study unwieldy and challenging to manage, and the findings more difficult 
to communicate. Further, it increases the likelihood that the study will produce 
results that are conflicting or inconclusive, which makes them less likely to be used 
to inform policy decisions directly. However, the author’s view is that the stated 
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preference researcher’s primary responsibility is not to generate ground-breaking 
and policy-influencing results, but to contribute to a shared understanding of how 
best to elicit, analyse and interpret preference data, and to be honest and explicit 
about the caveats and limitations of their work.  
It should be noted that the Rowen et al. (2016b) study acted, in effect, as a 
preliminary study that informed the design of the larger-scale Rowen et al. (2016a) 
study. This is a potentially useful approach: pilot several candidate versions of the 
survey in a preliminary study, and use the results to inform which version(s) to use 
in the main study. If two different methods or formats generate similar choice data, 
this gives the researcher freedom to select a preferred approach based on factors 
such as cost, parsimony or respondent feedback. A more general point is that there 
are many different, and legitimate, ways of testing a given hypothesis or research 
question. Given that the results of empirical study 4 differed depending on which 
specific framing was used, and differed from those of empirical study 2 (which was 
similar in many respects), it is unsurprising that different conclusions are reached 
by studies adopting vastly different methodologies and – in many cases – seeking 
to address very different research questions. 
A feature shared by empirical studies 3 and 4 and the two Rowen et al. studies was 
the inclusion of choices in which both of the patients had the same amount of life 
expectancy and quality of life without treatment, and one patient would gain more 
from treatment than the other. Under the assumption that health improvements 
result in positive (or at least non-negative) utility gains, these choice sets may be 
described as comprising a dominant and a dominated option. Although Lancsar and 
Louviere (2006) recommend that researchers refrain from excluding data that do 
not conform to their own preferences and expectations, it is common in health state 
valuation research to apply exclusion criteria based on so-called ‘logical 
inconsistencies’ (Engel et al., 2016). In empirical studies 3 and 4, a minority of 
respondents (8% and 8%, respectively) chose the dominated option. Sensitivity 
analyses showed that excluding these respondents did not affect the overall 
conclusions of either study. These results are very similar to those of the Rowen et 
al. studies, in which 7% (Rowen et al., 2016a) and 9% (Rowen et al., 2016b) of 
respondents chose the dominated option. 
One of the reasons for including tasks with dominated options in stated preference 
studies is to identify whether respondents are displaying appropriate levels of 
engagement and understanding – a particular concern for internet surveys and 
other non-interviewer-assisted modes of administration. Yet Rowen et al. (2016b) 
did not observe statistically significant differences in responses to the relevant 
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question across different modes of administration, suggesting that interviewer-
assisted studies may be as susceptible to this issue as self-complete internet 
surveys.  
7.4.2 Comparison with the Linley and Hughes study 
The results of empirical study 4 can also be compared to those of Linley and 
Hughes (2013), who similarly used an internet survey to seek the views of a large 
sample of the UK general public. The question relevant to end of life in the Linley 
and Hughes survey involved a choice between giving a six-month life extension to 
patients with 18 months of life expectancy without treatment and giving a six-
month life extension to patients with 60 months (five years) of life expectancy 
without treatment. The basic result was the same in both studies: the most 
common choice was to express indifference between the options.  
By comparison, Linley and Hughes reported that 47.6% of respondents expressed 
indifference, which is higher than the proportion expressing indifference in any of 
the empirical study 4 arms for the corresponding question (scenario S1). This may 
be explained by the framing of the choice task and indifference option. Whereas in 
empirical study 4 the choice was between two individual patients and the 
indifference option (where available) implied a lack of preference or willingness to 
prioritise randomly, Linley and Hughes used a budget allocation approach (where 
the choice was between two patient groups) in which 11 different splits were 
available, including one that involved an equal allocation to both groups. It has 
been shown elsewhere that options implying a 50:50 split of resources may be 
deemed more attractive to respondents than an ‘I have no preference’ option (Shah 
and Devlin, 2012) or an option implying an unwillingness to choose (Green, 2009). 
Recommendations for further exploration of indifference options are discussed in 
7.5.1.4.  
7.5 Limitations and recommendations for further 
research 
The research reported in this thesis is subject to a number of limitations. Many of 
these have been identified and discussed in the relevant chapters. This section 
reflects on some of the limitations of the overall programme of research. The 
purpose here is to understand how such limitations could be overcome in future 
research and to explore how the author would proceed (in light of what has been 
learned in this programme of work) if given the opportunity to answer the research 
question again (in some cases with greater monetary, intellectual and time 
resources). 
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It should be noted that all stated preference research methods, including 
preference elicitation techniques, modes of administration, design choices and 
analytical approaches, suffer from limitations and are open to critique to some 
extent. This PhD research was not intended to investigate all possible methods or 
to contain an extensive methodological review, though the use of different methods 
within and between studies has generated insights into the advantages and 
disadvantages of the various approaches. Drawing on these insights, this section 
includes conjectures and judgements about what might have been achieved using 
different research methods.  
7.5.1 Methodological approaches 
7.5.1.1 Understanding respondents’ choices 
All four empirical studies reported that a non-trivial proportion of respondents made 
choices that implied that they placed greater weight on a unit of health gain for 
non-end of life patients than on that for end of life patients, ceteris paribus. This 
finding was unexpected, though not entirely unique (see, for example, Skedgel et 
al., 2015). Some efforts were made to understand this type of preference, by way 
of probing debrief questions in empirical study 1, tick-box tasks to capture the 
reasons for respondents’ choices in empirical study 2, and attitudinal questions to 
test for internal coherence of responses in empirical study 4. The open-ended 
questions (as used in empirical study 1) were generally more insightful than the 
closed-ended questions (as used in empirical studies 2 and 4), but none of the 
efforts proved to be particularly enlightening. It was found that general public 
respondents are often unable to articulate the reasons for their choices, and that 
their responses are often inconsistent. Hence, a limitation of the research is that 
the reasons why people would support an end of life ‘penalty’ (as many appear to) 
remains unexplained.  
In the discussion of the literature review (see 2.4.2), it was contended – based on 
evidence reported by Shah et al. (2015b) – that respondents who choose to treat a 
non-end of life patient rather than an end of life patient (when the gains to both 
patients are the same) may be doing so based on an expectation that other 
respondents will choose to treat the end of life patient. Hence, choosing to treat the 
non-end of life patient is a means of increasing the likelihood that the overall 
outcome of the study will be neutral, which may well be the respondent’s true 
preference. A similar argument can be applied to the observation of respondents 
making choices that are supposedly dominated (see 7.4.1). Although it is probable 
that respondents making such choices (particularly when an indifference option is 
available) are doing so because they have failed to understand or pay sufficient 
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attention to the task, it is possible that they simply reject the provision of health 
care based on expected treatment gains, and they have judged that choosing the 
dominated option is a means of increasing the likelihood that the overall study 
result will be that of equal priority to both patients. Strategic bias and tactical 
responding have been discussed in the contingent valuation literature (Milon, 1989; 
Tilling et al., 2016) but rarely in relation to health care priority-setting and 
empirical ethics.      
A more investigative approach to understanding and interpreting respondents’ 
stated preferences and choice strategies, based on qualitative research methods, 
would have been beneficial. In a recent survey of authors of health care-related 
DCE studies, all of the researchers surveyed who had reported using qualitative 
methods stated that these methods had added value to their choice experiments 
(Vass et al., 2017). However, qualitative data can be difficult and resource-
intensive to analyse, particularly in large sample studies. One option could be to 
invite selected respondents (either a random selection or those who gave responses 
of particular interest) to attend an in-depth debrief interview or focus group 
discussion. It is acknowledged that there may be practical issues associated with 
this kind of approach. Panel providers may not typically permit face-to-face contact 
with their members, and even if they did, there is likely to be selection bias as 
those agreeing to take part in follow-up activities may not be representative of the 
panel membership. Further, test-retest reliability may be low at the individual level 
for priority-setting preference studies, which would make it difficult to develop 
meaningful debrief questions. Nevertheless, it would be worth exploring the 
feasibility of using qualitative methods to acquire additional information about 
preferences and considering whether the aforementioned challenges can be 
overcome. 
There is interest in the field of health state valuation in giving respondents 
completing stated preference surveys the opportunity to deliberate and reflect on 
their views, in order to ensure that the resulting choice data are a meaningful, 
carefully considered reflection of their preferences (Robinson and Bryan, 2013; 
Karimi et al., 2016; Shah, 2016b). This type of approach is informed by the view 
that people lack clearly formulated preferences for most evaluation tasks (Fischoff, 
1991) and are constructing their preferences on the spot in response to the 
particular tasks and question frames they are being presented with (as opposed to 
the view that people have pre-existing, consistent and stable values that 
researchers can ‘tap into’) (Dolan, 1999). Such approaches may be helpful in the 
context of eliciting end of life-related preferences, particularly to understand 
whether inconsistencies and ambiguities in respondents’ choices are caused by their 
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(mis)interpretation of the choice task or in fact reflect their considered preferences. 
It has been shown elsewhere that people’s views about priority-setting can change 
when they are given the opportunity to deliberate and discuss the issues (Dolan et 
al., 1999). It is conjectured that deliberative methods can also promote the 
articulation of ideas and allow a wider range of rationales to emerge.    
7.5.1.2 Range of life expectancies presented 
The focus on NICE’s policy resulted in a specific definition of end of life – that is, a 
life expectancy of less than two years. It is acknowledged that this cut-off is 
arbitrary and may not be relevant in other settings. All four of the empirical studies 
presented a relatively narrow range of life expectancy levels (albeit fairly consistent 
with the rest of the literature; see Appendix 3), often comparing a patient who 
would meet NICE’s criteria with another patient who would not, but whose life 
expectancy was still very short by most people’s standards. The methods are 
therefore relevant to understanding whether NICE’s life expectancy criterion is 
supported, but may be insufficient for determining the extent of support for a more 
general policy of prioritising on the basis of life expectancy. Further research should 
extend the range of life expectancies presented, in order to understand whether the 
preferences observed with regard to prioritising the patient with shorter life 
expectancy are generalisable. It is plausible, for example, that a respondent would 
be indifferent between treating a patient with one year left to live and treating 
another patient with three years left to live, but would prioritise a patient with 10 
years left to live over another patient with 30 years left to live. Any such research 
would need to account for potential confounding effects of age-related preferences. 
Another avenue of research could be use preliminary questions to identify what 
respondents consider to be ‘end of life’ and to use their responses to direct them to 
a selection of choice tasks that are pertinent to their views. 
7.5.1.3 Comparators  
A related issue is that when claims are made that research findings support or do 
not support an end of life premium, it is reasonable to ask what end of life is being 
compared to (Pinto-Prades et al., 2014). As noted in 7.3.1, the empirical studies in 
this thesis focused on comparing short life expectancies to longer life expectancies. 
This is in line with the majority of the literature – most of the studies included in 
the literature review were similarly limited in their choice of comparators (see 
2.3.7). Future studies should also elicit preferences for prioritising end of life 
treatments over other comparators, such as preventive interventions (Gyrd-
Hansen, 2017), treatments for chronic conditions, and treatments to alleviate 
temporary losses of quality of life. Such comparators are relevant because under 
186 
 
the assumption of a single, fixed health care budget, relaxing the funding 
requirements for end of life treatments means raising the requirements for all other 
types of treatments. 
7.5.1.4 Use of indifference options and visual aids 
Further research is recommended on the use of indifference options in stated 
preference studies. This thesis has provided evidence that respondents’ choices 
were influenced by the availability of an explicit indifference option, and by the 
wording of that option. However, the range of indifference options examined was 
limited, which restricts the generalisability of the findings. Further research could 
compare the indifference options used in empirical study 4 with alternatives such as 
‘don’t know’ options, equal splits of resources (as used by Green (2009) and Linley 
and Hughes (2013)), or options designed to reflect a desire to avoid making 
difficult decisions (for example, ‘I am not able to make a decision and would prefer 
that the choice be made by others’, also used by Green (2009)). Such research 
could investigate whether respondents consider these alternative options – which 
may well have similar or identical implications for the allocation of health care 
resources – to mean the same or different things. 
This thesis has also been provided evidence that the propensity to express 
indifference in a given choice task can depend on when in the survey that task 
appeared (see 6.3.10), though no attempt was made to examine whether this 
propensity is affected by the nature of the preceding tasks. This could be explored 
in further research. For example, if the survey were to begin with a choice involving 
a pair of dominant/dominated options, it is hypothesised – based on existing 
evidence of anchoring effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) – that respondents 
would be less likely to express indifference in subsequent tasks than if the survey 
were to begin with a more ‘difficult’ choice. In a similar vein, the impact of 
combining forced choice and non-forced choice designs could be investigated. This 
might involve starting each task as a forced choice, then making a third option of 
indifference available once respondents had made their initial choice. This could be 
compared to a test arm that includes an indifference option throughout, or one that 
starts with an indifference option before reverting to a forced choice for 
respondents who initially express indifference. It is hypothesised that respondents 
will be less willing to express indifference after having committed to choosing one 
of the forced choice options than if an indifference option had been available 
throughout.  
A study could also be undertaken to examine the impact of mode of administration 
on the propensity to express indifference – specifically, to test the hypothesis (as 
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suggested in 7.3.4) that respondents are more inclined to choose an indifference 
option in internet surveys that in in interviewer-led modes of administration. This 
research question cannot be answered with recourse to the existing literature on 
end of life-related preferences - neither of the studies that used multiple modes of 
administration (Richardson et al., 2012; Rowen et al., 2016b) included an 
indifference option.  
Just as the use of indifference options could be subjected to further investigation, 
there is also scope for extending the examination of the use of visual aids in health 
care priority-setting studies. The results of empirical study 4 suggested that the use 
of graphical presentations of information affected respondents’ choices in some 
scenarios but not in others. However, a limitation is that only one type of visual aid 
was used – a conceptual diagram that was near-identical to those used in empirical 
study 3 and the two Rowen et al. studies. Further research could compare different 
forms of visual aid, not only in terms of what choice data they generate but also in 
terms of the ways in which respondents perceive and interpret the information 
contained in the graphics. Van de Wetering et al. (2015) propose the use of think-
aloud procedures for this purpose. It has also been suggested that moving pictures 
(for example, animated graphs that show how health changes over time) and 
physical props (such as the wooden boards traditionally used in time trade-off 
interviews) can help improve respondent engagement and understanding (Lo, 
2017). 
It is acknowledged that these kinds of methodological experiments have the 
potential to complicate matters and make it more challenging for researchers to 
draw unequivocal conclusions from stated preference studies. However, given the 
known importance of framing effects, it is helpful to be able to understand whether 
the preferences elicited in a given study are stable or if they are likely to be an 
artefact of the study design (Ubel, 1999). The findings of such experiments can also 
provide guidance to researchers who are considering whether and how to include 
indifference options, visual aids and other features in their own studies, and what 
effect their chosen approach is likely to have on the resulting data relative to other 
candidate approaches.   
7.5.1.5 Preferences for quality of life-improving treatments  
The finding (common to empirical studies 1, 2 and 4) that quality of life 
improvements are favoured to equal-sized (in QALY terms) life extensions in an end 
of life context was obscured somewhat by the finding in empirical study 4 that 
similar preferences were also observed in a non-end of life context. This suggests 
that many respondents may have been expressing a social value judgement that 
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quality of life-improving QALYs should be prioritised over life-extending QALYs, 
even if both types of QALYs are equally valuable (in individual utility terms) to 
patients themselves.25 It could, however, call into question whether respondents 
assumed (as had been intended) that a quality of life improvement worth half a 
QALY would be considered equally desirable to the patients as a life extension 
worth half a QALY. It is plausible that respondents had ignored, rejected or failed to 
understand the implications of the instruction provided about how to interpret the 
concept of 50% health, instead assuming that the patients would in fact prefer the 
quality of life improvement for themselves.  
Disentangling individual and social values is not straightforward. One possible 
avenue of research would be to identify, for each individual respondent, a specific 
health state – defined using a preference-based measure such as EQ-5D – deemed 
by that respondent to have a value of 0.5 from the perspective of their own health. 
This would involve the respondent expressing indifference between living in that 
state for n years and living in full health for n/2 years. The time trade-off 
technique, which involves trading length of life for improved quality of life, would be 
well suited for this purpose, though some effort would be required to find a health 
state with a value sufficiently close to 0.5. This might involve first conducting a 
time trade-off valuation of a given EQ-5D health state. Then, depending on whether 
that health state was valued higher or lower than 0.5, the task would need to be 
repeated using a different health state slightly worse than or slightly better than 
the previous health state (by adjusting the level of one of the dimensions). Once a 
health state deemed to represent 0.5 has been identified, the same respondent 
could be presented with social decision-maker perspective tasks similar to those 
used in scenarios S4 and S6 in empirical study 4, but with 50% health defined 
specifically in terms of the EQ-5D health state that they themselves had valued at 
0.5. An alternative approach – which avoids the difficulty in aggregating data on 
preferences for different health states – would be to present the same health state 
to all respondents. The parameters of the subsequent social decision-maker 
perspective tasks would need to be adapted to account for the particular time 
trade-off value provided by each respondent.  
7.5.1.6 Preference heterogeneity and choice strategies 
The thesis reports a variety of analyses seeking to identify the characteristics of 
respondents who responded to choice tasks in certain ways. In empirical study 3, 
the background characteristics of respondents who consistently followed certain 
                                           
25 It should be noted that previous research has suggested that in non-end of life contexts, gains from 
life extensions are favoured over gains from quality of life enhancement, holding constant the size of the 
gains (Olsen and Donaldson, 1998; Pennington et al., 2013; Gu et al., 2015). 
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choice strategies of interest (such as always choosing to treat the patient with 
shorter life expectancy without treatment) were reported. Multinomial logit 
regressions were used to assess the extent to which these characteristics affected 
the likelihood of respondents belonging to a particular subgroup defined by their 
choice behaviour. In empirical study 4, a similar type of analysis was used to assess 
the impact of background characteristics on the likelihood of respondents choosing 
to give priority to the end of life patient in scenario S1. In both cases – and 
consistent with many of the studies identified in the literature review – the impact 
of the background characteristics was small, and respondents’ choices were not 
found to be well predicted by the observable characteristics on which information 
was collected in the relevant studies. It is acknowledged that the analytical 
approach adopted was fairly limited and that more rigorous forms of cluster 
analysis which allow for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences – such as latent 
class analysis – might be better suited to identifying relevant subgroups. 
7.5.1.7 Preference elicitation methods  
A general drawback of the studies reported in this thesis – and of many other 
studies in the literature – is that they require general public survey respondents to 
consider several pieces of numerical information simultaneously, and often to make 
unassisted calculations using numerical data. The subsequent results reported 
generally assume that respondents – who may or may not have high levels of 
numeracy – have interpreted the data and made the necessary calculations 
correctly. For example, in scenario S3 of empirical study 4, respondents were 
expected to have understood that by the time of the patients’ deaths in absence of 
treatment, patient A will have known about their prognosis for longer (and 
therefore will have had more time to prepare for death) than patient B. This is not 
self-evident and was not stated explicitly in the information presented. The piloting 
work did not indicate that this was problematic, but it is acknowledged that the 
pilot was not undertaken in similar conditions to the main study and no attempt 
was made to test the survey on a sample with below average levels of numeracy. 
Evidence of respondents in stated preference studies making responses that 
indicate misinterpretations of numerical information are reported both in this thesis 
(for example, see 4.3.1) and elsewhere (for example, see Veldwijk et al., 2016). 
This issue may be overcome by an increasing role for research methods that 
generate preference data but are less reliant on respondents’ numeracy, such as Q 
methodology. However, it should also be noted that such methods may be 
insufficient to generate QALY weights unless combined with other approaches. For 
example, having identified and described three perspectives on the value of end of 
life treatments using Q methodology in McHugh et al. (2015), the authors have 
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proceeded to investigate whether they can measure the distribution of those views 
across a large, representation sample using an alternative survey approach (Baker, 
2016). 
7.5.1.8 Reliability of the findings 
The empirical studies shared similar aims, methods and designs, but they differed 
sufficiently from each other so as to obscure direct comparisons between the 
results of (a given question in) one study with those of (a corresponding question 
in) another. A limitation of the research, therefore, is that little attempt was made 
to include an identical question in multiple studies in order to assess inter-study 
reliability, or to administer the same survey to the same respondents twice to 
assess test-retest reliability. To the author’s knowledge, such reliability tests are 
scarcely reported in the empirical ethics literature. 
7.5.2 Ideas for future research beyond the scope of the thesis 
7.5.2.1 Extending scope beyond the preferences of the UK general public 
Given the focus on NICE, the scope of the research was limited to the preferences 
of the UK general public.26 However, the question of whether end of life treatments 
should be subject to special weighting is not only of interest in the UK – the 
literature review showed that the issue has also been investigated in countries such 
as Norway (Abel Olsen, 2013) and Spain (Pinto-Prades et al., 2014). The author is 
aware of a just-published paper reporting similar research in the Netherlands 
(Wouters et al., 2017) and working papers reporting studies undertaken in 
Denmark (Gyrd-Hansen et al., 2017) and Sweden (Olofsson et al., 2016). It would 
be informative to apply the methods used in this thesis to elicit the preferences of 
non-UK populations, in order to examine whether the differences in findings 
observed between studies can be explained by differences in the setting (bearing in 
mind that Table 2-6 suggests that studies conducted in the UK report evidence 
consistent with an end of life premium less frequently than those conducted 
elsewhere).  
Likewise, it would be informative to elicit the preferences of other respondent 
groups, such as individuals involved in NICE’s technology appraisal processes and 
policy makers responsible for making prioritisation decisions on behalf of the public. 
                                           
26 It is worth noting that although the work reported in this thesis is independent research and the 
author maintained full control over all aspect of the work (including design, conduct and interpretation) 
at all times, financial support for all four empirical studies was provided by NICE via its Decision Support 
Unit. The author sought the feedback from selected NICE employees and advisors (see 
Acknowledgements), particularly during the early stages of the research programme, to ensure that the 
studies were designed so as to generate results that would be useful to NICE. Hence, although the focus 
on NICE can be described a limitation, to some extent it is by design.   
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This would provide insight into whether policy makers – who may be described as 
being part of an implicit principal-agent relationship (Coast, 2001) – make choices 
that reflect those of the public (Skedgel et al., 2015). Such research would 
complement previous studies that used stated preference (Tappenden et al., 2007) 
and revealed preference methods (Dakin et al., 2015) to examine the influence of 
factors other than cost-effectiveness on recommendations made by NICE’s 
appraisal committees. 
7.5.2.2 Condition-specific preferences 
All of the studies reported in this thesis used unlabelled designs in that the 
hypothetical patients were not described as having a particular named condition. 
This is in keeping with the rest of the empirical literature – 16 of the 20 studies 
included in the literature review did not specify the names of the conditions (Table 
2-5). The use of generic labels (patient A and patient B) was guided by concerns 
that the use of condition labels would induce emotional and biased responses. This 
approach is consistent with NICE’s end of life policy, which in principle does not 
distinguish between different illnesses or treatments. The generic presentation of 
health care priority-setting scenarios is supported by the findings of Roberts et al. 
(1999) who report that respondent engagement levels are not sensitive to the 
provision of supporting clinical information. 
However, NICE’s policy is sometimes interpreted as a ‘cancer premium’ since in 
practice only cancer drugs have met the criteria for special consideration (Collins 
and Latimer, 2013; McCabe et al., 2016b). The existence of the CDF also suggests 
that there is deemed to be something ‘special’ about cancer. Yet end of life and 
cancer are not synonymous – a policy of giving extra weight to cancer (and only 
cancer) treatments would exclude other terminal or end of life conditions, such as 
motor neurone disease and advanced heart disease (Shah, 2017). Moreover, many 
cancer treatments are indicated for patients with early stage disease who might 
expect to live for much longer than the 24-month cut-off specified in NICE’s end of 
life guidance (and may not die as a result of cancer). 
The research in this thesis could be extended by exploring the interaction between 
preferences regarding end of life and preferences regarding cancer. It could be that 
even in unlabelled studies, people connect end of life scenarios with cancer, and the 
preferences they express may therefore reflect ‘dread’ effects associated with that 
groups of diseases.27 The resulting policy question would then be whether it is 
                                           
27 Viscussi et al. (2014) describe cancer as a dread disease on the grounds that it generates fear that is 
disproportionate to the actual health impact and risks associated with the disease. 
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legitimate to base reimbursement decisions on the fears of the general public, 
which may be the product of biases and misconceptions (Shah, 2017).  
7.6 Policy implications and concluding remarks 
This thesis has sought to answer whether members of the public wish to place 
greater weight on a unit of health gain for end of life patients than on that for other 
types of patients – a research question that had been motivated by NICE’s policy 
for appraising end of life treatments. The programme of empirical research 
undertaken has provided little indication that this is the case. While empirical 
studies 1 and 2 reported tentative evidence of support for prioritising the treatment 
of end of life patients, empirical studies 3 and 4 – which used larger samples and 
more robust methods – reported results that are largely inconsistent with an end of 
life premium. The findings reported in the wider literature have been mixed, though 
it should be noted that the studies conducted in the UK have not, on the whole, 
reported evidence consistent with an end of life premium (Table 2-6). This has 
relevance for assessing the legitimacy of NICE’s end of life policy, which was 
assumed to have been motivated at least in part by the views held by the 
population that the NHS serves. The results of empirical studies 1, 2 and 4 also 
suggest that the focus on life-extending rather than on quality of life-improving 
treatments in NICE’s end of life policy does not appear to be supported by the 
public either. 
Based on these findings, it might be considered appropriate for NICE to abandon its 
end of life policy and any other mechanisms that relax the cost-effectiveness 
requirements for end of life treatments, on the grounds that the population health 
losses that arise due to the policy are not justified by the evidence on societal 
preferences. This would result in fewer approvals of end of life treatments, and 
therefore in reduced access to treatments for patients with terminal illness. Hence, 
some patients would lose out as a result, and the reigniting of issues that had 
instigated the initial introduction of NICE’s end of life policy would be inevitable. In 
principle, however, other, less identifiable groups of patients would benefit as the 
freed funding could be spent on health care that is more cost-effective and/or that 
the public values more. 
It may be that there are compelling arguments for retaining some form of end of 
life weighting irrespective of public preferences. For example, if the standard QALY 
approach used by NICE systematically underestimates the (health or non-health) 
benefits of end of life treatments (whether or not this is actually the case would 
itself need investigating), it may be appropriate to correct for this. An end of life 
premium may also help to encourage innovation, or to meet broader health system 
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and political objectives. Furthermore, once a prominent policy has been introduced, 
it may be inherently and procedurally difficult to withdraw that policy.  
At the time of writing, the policy situation is that there are no imminent plans to 
proceed with the introduction of burden of illness weights as had been planned as 
part of the value-based assessment proposals. However, the approach continues to 
be considered by NICE and may be revived in the future. It is clear that there is 
overlap between an end of life premium and the concept of weighting QALYs based 
on severity and burden of illness (whether operationalised in terms of absolute 
QALY shortfall, proportional QALY shortfall, or some other measure). Weighting 
QALYs in accordance with a continuous variable that captures quality of life as well 
as life expectancy may be more consistent with public preferences than the current 
practice of applying binary cut-offs based only on life expectancy information, and 
would address some of the criticisms of the arbitrariness of NICE’s end of life policy. 
The thesis has also provided evidence that where public preferences consistent with 
an end of life premium do exist, these preferences may depend to some degree on 
how long the end of life patients have known about their prognosis. A pertinent 
question to ask is whether this is a relevant policy consideration – is it feasible that 
NICE would ever incorporate this factor into a revised version of its end of life 
policy? It is acknowledged that it is unrealistic to expect NICE to make one 
recommendation for end of life patients who have just learned about their 
prognosis and another for end of life patients who have known about their 
prognosis for some time (though it may be feasible to make separate 
recommendations for different indications and disease stages). Nevertheless, it is 
informative to understand the rationale behind people’s preferences, both to help 
make sense of the results of stated preference studies and to determine whether a 
policy that purports to reflect public preferences would actually lead to outcomes 
that would enjoy widespread support.  
In the extreme, suppose a state of the world in which all end of life treatments 
being considered by NICE target patients who have known about their prognosis for 
some time (for example, patients at the late stage of a slow-progressing terminal 
illness that invariably presents and get diagnosed early). In an alternative state of 
the world, suppose that all end of life treatments target patients who have only 
recently learned of their prognosis (for example, patients with a condition that 
invariably presents and gets diagnosed late). In the former case, if there is robust 
evidence that any observed public support for an end of life premium is driven by 
concerns about preparedness and not by concerns about short life expectancy per 
se, then this would imply that the end of life premium currently applied by NICE is 
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not consistent with public preferences. In the latter case, the end of life premium 
would receive public support because the treatments that would stand to receive 
special weighting would benefit patients with limited amounts of time to prepare for 
death. 
Similar questions can be asked about the policy relevance of the finding in empirical 
study 4 that respondents’ preferences regarding an end of life premium appear to 
depend on the ages of the affected patients. This is consistent with findings 
elsewhere in the literature that people tend to become less concerned about 
patients’ remaining life years when those patients are relatively old (see 2.3.8.4). 
Although NICE cannot restrict access to health care on the basis of age unless age 
is a good indicator of clinical effectiveness, it is informative to know whether any 
observed support for an end of life premium is contingent on such characteristics. 
To give another hypothetical example: if many or all of the end of life treatments 
being considered by NICE happen to target older patients, and public support for an 
end of life premium exists but only for younger patients, it follows that the end of 
life premium currently applied by NICE would not be supported.  
It is acknowledged that in practice the selective application of an end of life 
premium in certain circumstances or for certain patient groups may have 
unintended and undesirable implications. It may be that older end of life patients 
tend to share some other characteristic that younger end of life patients tend not to 
possess, so a policy that gives lower priority to treating older end of life patients 
would inadvertently result in hurting disproportionately those with that particular 
characteristic. This may be inequitable in itself, even before taking into account any 
possible interaction between people’s end of life-related preferences and their 
preferences regarding that characteristic. For any future amendment of its end of 
life policy, NICE would need to consider carefully the identity of the potential 
winners and losers, and to assess the likely outcomes in relation to its principles on 
social value judgements about equity. 
The empirical literature on the relative weighting of QALYs, of which the literature 
on end of life-related preferences examined in thesis is part, is rapidly growing. It is 
clear that NICE and other UK decision-making agencies are interested in public 
preferences to some extent. This is demonstrated by the existence of the NICE 
Citizens’ Council; the claims made in official documents and unofficial papers 
authored by employees of and advisors to these agencies; and the fact that the 
agencies occasionally initiate and fund research on public preferences (including 
several of the studies discussed in this thesis). The extent to which this kind of 
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evidence actually influences decisions (and indeed, whether it ought to influence 
decisions) is less clear.  
The author’s view is that the empirical ethics process could be improved if stated 
preference researchers were to be given clearer signals from decision-makers about 
which topics they would like to see prioritised in applied research that seeks to 
inform policy. Decision-makers should also communicate clearly any concerns or 
doubts they have about existing research so that efforts can be made to address 
those concerns – for example, through improvements in methodology. Clearer 
communication of this sort would help make future empirical studies more useful 
and policy relevant. Subject to the decision-makers’ requests being compatible with 
research ethics and intellectual curiosity, most researchers would likely relish the 
opportunity to collaborate and engage in the co-production of knowledge that will 
ultimately be of benefit of society. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 List of acronyms and glossary 
List of acronyms 
CDF  Cancer Drugs Fund 
DCE  Discrete choice experiment 
EQ-5D  EuroQol five-dimension instrument  
ICER  Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio 
LE  Life expectancy 
NHS  National Health Service 
NICE   National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
PTO  Person trade-off 
QALY  Quality-adjusted life year 
QOL  Quality of life 
SSCI  Social Sciences Citation Index 
UK  United Kingdom 
WTP  Willingness-to-pay 
Glossary 
A selection of concepts used regularly in the thesis are explained below. It is 
acknowledged that some of these definitions are restrictive or simplistic, and that 
alternative definitions for these concepts exist. The intention is not to provide a 
comprehensive review of concepts but to briefly summarise the specific ways in 
which a selection of key concepts have been defined and interpreted in this thesis. 
Appraisal / health technology appraisal 
Within the context of NICE’s technology appraisal programme, this is the process of 
making recommendations about the use of new and existing technologies in the 
NHS. These recommendations are guided by evidence of the technologies’ 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness; and by scientific and social value judgements 
made by NICE’s advisory committees. 
Budget allocation 
A stated preference technique which asks survey respondents to indicate how a 
fixed budget should be allocated between two (or more) competing programmes.  
Choice-based method  
A method that requires a trade-off to be made (Whitty et al., 2014). Person trade-
off and willingness-to-pay are examples of choice-based methods. These can be 
compared to non-choice-based methods such as opinion polls and rating exercises. 
Discrete choice experiment 
A stated preference technique which asks survey respondents to make choices 
between two or more discrete alternatives where at least one attribute of the 
alternatives is systematically varied in such a way that information related to 
preference parameters of an indirect utility function can be inferred (Carson and 
Louviere, 2011). 
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Efficiency 
Either the maximisation of output or benefit for a given cost, or the minimisation of 
cost to achieve a given output or benefit. An example of an efficiency objective is to 
seek to maximise population health using available resources. 
Equity 
Related to ethical judgements about the fairness of distributions and the fair 
treatment of individuals. Horizontal equity refers to the equal treatment of equals – 
a distribution is said to be horizontally equitable when people are treated the same 
in some relevant respect. Vertical equity refers to the unequal treatment of 
unequals – a distribution is said to be vertically equitable when people who are 
different in some relevant way are treated appropriately differently (for example, 
according more of some relevant entity to those in greater need of it) (Culyer, 
2010). 
Framing effect 
An example of cognitive bias whereby people’s reaction to a given choice is 
influenced by the way is which that choice is presented (Plous, 1993). 
Full health 
A state involving no morbidity problems, thereby assigned a quality of life weight of 
one. This is consistent with the label of the upper anchor used in EQ-5D valuation 
studies (Shah et al., 2016). 
Health 
A combination of quality of life (morbidity) and length of life (longevity), as 
measured using quality-adjusted life years. Also used to describe quality of life 
(distinct from length of life) in the surveys used in the empirical studies in this 
thesis – see below. 
Health care 
Goods and services provided to promote health or to prevent, alleviate or eliminate 
ill health (Culyer, 2010). 
Health technology 
Any method for promoting health or preventing/postponing ill health (Culyer, 
2010), including but not limited to drugs. NICE (2017b) uses the term to mean a 
drug or other treatment that is being assessed. In this thesis, the NICE definition is 
adopted, and the terms ‘technology’, ‘intervention’ and ‘treatment’ are used 
interchangeably.   
Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio 
The ratio of the difference in costs between two alternatives to the difference in 
effectiveness between the same two alternatives (Brazier et al., 2017). 
Indifference 
The situation where the utility gained by an individual from either of two entities is 
the same (Culyer, 2010). 
Person trade-off 
198 
 
A stated preference technique which asks respondents how many outcomes of one 
kind   they consider to be equivalent in social value to X outcomes of another kind 
(Nord, 1995). 
Q method 
A research method that combines qualitative and quantitative techniques to study 
people’s ‘subjectivity’ (that is, their subjective opinions, values or beliefs). These 
methods enable the identification and description of shared views around a given 
topic (McHugh et al., 2015). 
Quality-adjusted life year 
A generic measure of health that combines quality of life and length of life in a 
single index (Weinstein et al., 2009). One quality-adjusted life year is equivalent to 
one year of life in full quality of life. 
Quality of life 
The morbidity aspect of health. Someone in full quality of life can be said to have 
no morbidity problems. This can be compared to broader uses of the term, referring 
to a construct reflecting subjective or objective judgement concerning all aspects of 
an individual’s existence, including not only health but also economic, political, 
cultural, environmental, aesthetic and spiritual aspects (Brazier et al., 2017). 
Numeric measurements of quality of life can be used to weight numeric 
measurements of length of life in the calculation of quality-adjusted life years. For 
this purpose, quality of life is measured on scale that is anchored at one 
(representing no morbidity problems) and zero (representing dead). The terms 
‘health-related quality of life’ and ‘health status’ are often used to describe the 
same concept (Karimi and Brazier, 2016) but these terms are not used in this 
thesis. In the surveys used in the empirical studies in this thesis, the terms ‘health’ 
and ‘general health’ were used to distinguish quality of life from length of life. This 
was because of concerns that the term ‘quality of life’ would have been interpreted 
by respondents in terms of the broader construct described above. 
Social grade  
A system of demographic classification based on the occupation of the head of the 
household, originally developed by the National Readership Survey.  
Social preference 
A preference concerning the allocation of resources for others in society. In this 
thesis, the terms ‘social preference’, ‘societal preference’, ‘social value’ and ‘societal 
value’ are used interchangeably. NICE’s Citizens’ Council favours the term ‘societal 
values’ (NICE, 2014b). 
Stated preference 
Willingness to engage in trade-offs to acquire a good, service or non-marketed 
entity as derived from questionnaires or experiments. The preference is stated 
verbally or numerically rather than revealed by actual behaviour in experiments or 
in real life (Culyer, 2010). 
Trade-off 
The notion of voluntarily sacrificing some of one good in exchange for a sufficient 
increase in the amount of some other good (Culyer, 2010). 
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Utility 
The preference for, or desirability of, a particular outcome (Brazier et al., 2017).  
Welfarism / extra-welfarism 
The main school of thought within modern welfare economics that holds that 
judgements of social welfare must be a function of individual utility, as judged by 
the individuals themselves (Brazier et al., 2017). By comparison, non-welfarism 
holds that judgements of social welfare can be based on information other than 
individual utility. One form of non-welfarism – extra-welfarism – commonly 
postulates health itself as the maximand of the health care sector, rather than the 
individual utility to which it may give rise (Culyer, 2010). 
Willingness-to-pay 
The maximum sum an individual or government is willing to pay to acquire some 
good or service, or to avoid a prospective loss. Willingness-to-pay can be elicited 
from stated or revealed preference experiments (Culyer, 2010). 
Without treatment 
Refers to the situation when the treatment on offer is not received and the benefits 
it generates are therefore not realised. Strictly speaking, the patient(s) failing to 
receive the treatment would receive best supportive care rather than no treatment 
at all. 
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Appendix 2 Results of preliminary SSCI searches 
All of the search strategies below were tested in May 2014. 
Table 0-1. Initial search terms 
Search Results 
TS=("end of life") 6,551 
TS=preferences 82,537 
TS=("end of life") AND TS=preferences 1,076 
 
Table 0-2. Addition of terms related to end of life 
Search Results 
TS=("end of life") AND TS=preferences 1,076 
TS=severity AND TS=preferences 837 
TS=terminal AND TS=preferences 655 
TS=("end of life" OR severity OR terminal) AND TS=preferences 2,387 
 
Table 0-3. Addition of terms identified in key paper abstracts 
Search Results 
TS=("end of life" OR severity OR terminal) AND TS=preferences 2,387 
TS=("end of life" OR severity OR terminal) AND TS=preferences AND 
TS=health 
1,022 
TS=("end of life" OR severity OR terminal) AND TS=(preferences) 
AND TS=health AND TS=(respondents OR subjects OR participants 
OR sampl*) 
539 
 
Table 0-4. Testing addition of further terms identified in key paper abstracts 
Search Results 
TS=("end of life" OR severity OR terminal) AND TS=(preferences) 
AND TS=health AND TS=(respondents OR subjects OR participants 
OR sampl*) 
539 
TS=("end of life" OR severity OR terminal) AND TS=(preferences) 
AND TS=health AND TS=(respondents OR subjects OR participants 
OR sampl*) AND TS=(patients OR treatments) 
439 
TS=("end of life" OR severity OR terminal) AND TS=(preferences) 
AND TS=health AND TS=(respondents OR subjects OR participants 
OR sampl*) AND TS=(public OR popul*) 
185 
TS=("end of life" OR severity OR terminal) AND TS=(preferences) 
AND TS=health AND TS=(respondents OR subjects OR participants 
OR sampl*) AND TS=(evidence) 
56 
 
Table 0-5. Addition of further term related to end of life 
Search Results 
TS=("end of life" OR severity OR terminal) AND TS=(preferences) 
AND TS=health AND TS=(respondents OR subjects OR participants 
OR sampl*) 
539 
TS=("end of life" OR severity OR terminal OR “life expectancy”) AND 
TS=(preferences) AND TS=health AND TS=(respondents OR subjects 
OR participants OR sampl*)  
598 
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Appendix 3 Tabular summary of included studies  
Note: The fields in this table are the same as those in Table 2-1. 
Record Abel Olsen (2013) 
Year of publication 2013 
Year of study conduct 2010 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
Norway 
Sample size 503 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Recruited by agency 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
No 
Mode of administration Internet survey 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To test for support for end of life prioritisation and the fair 
innings approach 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
Yes 
Pilot reported? No 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Other choice exercise 
Perspective Social decision-maker 
End of life definition Remaining lifetime without treatment 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
1yr, 3yrs, 10yrs 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
1mth, 3mths, 1yr, 3yrs 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
No 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Which of two patients to treat 
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Record Abel Olsen (2013) 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
Yes – following an initial forced choice without an 
indifference option, respondents were asked to specify how 
large a gain their less preferred patient would need in order 
for the two patients to have equal priority (hence, although 
respondents were never given an explicit indifference option 
to choose, they were able to express indifference by 
specifying a size of gain for their less preferred patient that 
was no different from that indicated in the initial forced 
choice question) 
Were visual aids used? No 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
Yes – using benefit trade-off type approach 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
4 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
No 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence not consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported 
Other results of potential 
interest 
Evidence of support for the fair innings approach 
Other factors examined Fair innings approach, health gain 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
No 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
Yes – respondents were asked which factor was most 
important to them when answering the questions 
Was any reference made to 
age-related preferences? 
Yes – evidence of a desire to reduce inequalities in age at 
death 
Was any reference made to 
time-related preferences? 
No 
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Record Baker et al. (2010a) 
Year of publication 2010 
Year of study conduct 2007 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
UK 
Sample size 587 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Recruited by agency 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
No 
Mode of administration Computer-assisted personal interview 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To test for support for multiple prioritisation criteria 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
No 
Pilot reported? Yes 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Discrete choice experiment 
Perspective Social decision-maker 
End of life definition Age at onset and age at death if untreated were included as 
variables; when age at onset = age at death if untreated, 
the profile describes an imminent death scenario where any 
treatment is life-saving/extending 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
0yrs, 9yrs, 10yrs, various levels > 10yrs (not presented 
explicitly, but can be calculated indirectly by subtracting age 
at onset from age at death if untreated) 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
0yrs, 1yr, 5yrs, 10yrs, 20yrs, 40yrs, 60yrs, 79yrs 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
No – when age at onset = age at death if untreated, all 
treatments are necessarily life-extending 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Which of two patient groups to treat 
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Record Baker et al. (2010a) 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
No 
Were visual aids used? Yes 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
No 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
8 (+6 tasks using a different method that did not examine 
end of life, as well as attitudinal questions) 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
Yes – 41 min (average) 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Mixed or inconclusive evidence 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported 
Other results of potential 
interest 
In ranking exercise (n=19) conducted in preliminary study, 
life expectancy without treatment was ranked third out of 10 
priority-setting attributes (below quality of life without 
treatment but above all patient characteristics, e.g. age, 
lifestyle); age and severity did not have a strong impact on 
choices over and above QALY gains 
Other factors examined Age at onset, age at death, life expectancy gain, quality of 
life without treatment, quality of life gain 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
No 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
Yes – in preliminary work (but end of life was not a specific 
topic of discussion) 
Was any reference made 
to age-related 
preferences? 
Yes – evidence of preference for life-saving treatments for 
10 year old patients but not for other patients of other ages 
Was any reference made 
to time-related 
preferences? 
No 
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Record Dolan and Cookson (2000) 
Year of publication 2000 
Year of study conduct Not reported 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
UK 
Sample size 60 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Random postal invitations 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
No exclusions 
Mode of administration Focus group 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
Qualitative examination of support for multiple prioritisation 
criteria 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
No 
Pilot reported? No 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Other choice exercise 
Perspective Social decision-maker (operationalised using a veil of 
ignorance condition for half of the respondents) 
End of life definition Life expectancy without treatment 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
0yrs, 5yrs, 10yrs, 30yrs (but the sole end of life vs. non-end 
of life question involved a choice between patients with life 
expectancies of 10yrs and 30yrs, respectively) 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
5yrs, 10yrs, 15yrs, 20yrs (but in the sole end of life vs. non-
end of life question, life expectancy gain was 10yrs for both 
candidate recipient groups) 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
No – quality of life was examined but in separate questions 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Which of two patient groups to treat (with the gain attribute 
then increased/reduced incrementally) 
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Record Dolan and Cookson (2000) 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
Yes – a ‘same priority’ option was available 
Were visual aids used? No 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
Yes – attribute levels were varied incrementally 
Number of tasks 
completed by each 
respondent 
6 (+initial discussion and questionnaire on health care 
priority-setting in general) 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
Yes – meeting lasted for two hours 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Mixed or inconclusive evidence 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported 
Other results of potential 
interest 
Veil of ignorance perspective (vs. social decision-maker) had 
no discernible impact; authors conclude from data that 
"equality of access should prevail over the maximisation of 
benefits" (p.19) 
Other factors examined Quality of life without treatment, quality of life with 
treatment; other factors were mentioned by respondents but 
these were either irrelevant or factors that they were not 
supposed to have considered (e.g. costs) 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
Yes – none found to influence propensity to favour treating 
end of life patients 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
Yes – study was predominantly a qualitative exercise 
Was any reference made 
to age-related 
preferences? 
Yes – but age was intended to be an irrelevant factor 
Was any reference made 
to time-related 
preferences? 
No 
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Record Dolan and Shaw (2004) 
Year of publication 2004 
Year of study conduct Not reported 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
UK 
Sample size 23 
Type of sample Public  
Sample recruitment 
process 
Recruited by agency 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
No 
Mode of administration Focus group 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To test for support for multiple prioritisation criteria 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
No 
Pilot reported? No 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Other choice exercise 
Perspective Social decision-maker 
End of life definition Life expectancy without transplant 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
1yr, 4yrs, 7yrs, 10yrs, 13yrs, 16yrs 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
5yrs, 10yrs, 15yrs, 20yrs, 25yrs, 30yrs 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
Yes – kidney failure 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
No 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Which of six patients should receive a kidney transplant 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
No 
Were visual aids used? No 
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Record Dolan and Shaw (2004) 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
No 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
3 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
Yes – two meetings, each of which lasted for two hours 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence not consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported 
Other results of potential 
interest 
Benefit from transplantation was the most important 
criterion overall; some participants chose to prioritise those 
with dependants 
Other factors examined Other factors mentioned by participants: age, family 
responsibilities, waiting time, cause, whether a re-
transplantation or not 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
No 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
Yes – study was predominantly a qualitative exercise 
Was any reference made 
to age-related 
preferences? 
Yes – the participants who had chosen to treat the patient 
with shortest life expectancy without transplant did not 
continue to do so when it was revealed that this patient was 
the oldest of the six candidate recipients 
Was any reference made 
to time-related 
preferences? 
No 
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Record Dolan and Tsuchiya (2005) 
Year of publication 2005 
Year of study conduct 2002 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
UK 
Sample size 100 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Postal invitation 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
Yes – excluded respondents who did not complete all of the 
tasks 
Mode of administration Self-completion paper survey (administered in group setting) 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To compare support for prioritisation according to age vs. 
prioritisation according to severity/life expectancy 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
Yes 
Pilot reported? No 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Ranking exercise and other choice exercise 
Perspective Social decision-maker  
End of life definition Future years without treatment 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
1yr, 6yrs 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
3yrs  
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
No – a question examining quality of life improvement was 
included, but the size of the life extension was fixed 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Which of six patient groups to treat; then to rank the six 
patient groups 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
No  
Were visual aids used? No 
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Record Dolan and Tsuchiya (2005) 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
No 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
4 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
No 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence not consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported 
Other results of potential 
interest 
Future health (quality of life without treatment) did not have 
a statistically significant effect on choices made, whereas 
past years (age) had a strong effect 
Other factors examined Past age, past health, quality of life without treatment  
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
Yes – age, education and employment status were all found 
to have statistically significant interactions with life 
expectancy without treatment  
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
No – discussions were not recorded as it was not intended to 
be a qualitative study 
Was any reference made to 
age-related preferences? 
Yes – younger patient groups were always chosen over older 
ones 
Was any reference made to 
time-related preferences? 
No 
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Record Lim et al. (2012) 
Year of publication 2012 
Year of study conduct 2010 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
Korea 
Sample size 800 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Recruited by agency 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
Yes – excluded multiple responses from the same IP address 
Mode of administration Internet survey 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To test for support for multiple prioritisation criteria 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
No 
Pilot reported? No (but focus groups were conducted, in part to inform the 
selection of attributes in the internet survey) 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Discrete choice experiment 
Perspective Social decision-maker 
End of life definition Life expectancy without treatment 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
1yr, 5yrs, 10yrs, 20yrs, 25yrs, 35yrs 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
0yrs, 1yr, 5yrs, 10yrs, 20yrs, 30yrs 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
No  
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Which of two patients to treat 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
Not reported 
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Record Lim et al. (2012) 
Were visual aids used? Yes 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
No 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
17 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
No 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported 
Other results of potential 
interest 
All attributes had statistically significant coefficients with 
signs that were consistent with the authors' expectations 
(QALY gain – positive; quality of life before treatment – 
negative; patient's household income – negative) 
Other factors examined QALY gain; quality of life before treatment; household 
income group 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
No 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
Yes – using focus groups (but end of life was not a specific 
topic for discussion) 
Was any reference made to 
age-related preferences? 
No 
Was any reference made to 
time-related preferences? 
No 
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Record Linley and Hughes (2013) 
Year of publication 2013 
Year of study conduct 2011 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
UK 
Sample size 4,118 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Recruited by agency 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
No 
Mode of administration Internet survey 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To test for support for multiple prioritisation criteria 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
No – end of life was one of many prioritisation criteria 
examined 
Pilot reported? Yes 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Budget allocation 
Perspective Social decision-maker 
End of life definition Fatal disease that leads to death in 18 months without 
treatment 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
18mths, 60mths 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
3mths, 6mths 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No (but preferences regarding ‘fatal cancer’ were examined 
in a separate question) 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
No 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
To allocate a fixed budget between two groups of patients 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
Yes – a 50:50 split option was available 
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Record Linley and Hughes (2013) 
Were visual aids used? No 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
Yes – respondents could choose from 11 different 
distributions of funding, and further ‘health gain trade-off’ 
and ‘cost trade-off’ approaches were also used 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
18 (of which two examined end of life explicitly) 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
No 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence not consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported 
Other results of potential 
interest 
Evidence of support for prioritising treatment of severe 
illness, but not for prioritising treatment of cancer 
specifically 
Other factors examined Health gain; many others examined separately from end of 
life 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
Yes – none found to influence propensity to favour treating 
end of life patients 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
No / not reported 
Was any reference made to 
age-related preferences? 
Yes – respondents did not support giving priority to the 
treatment of children overall (questions about children were 
separate from those about end of life) 
Was any reference made to 
time-related preferences? 
No 
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Record McHugh et al. (2015) 
Year of publication 2015 
Year of study conduct Not reported 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
UK 
Sample size 61  
Type of sample Individuals with different types of experiences or expertise in 
end of life in a professional or personal capacity (e.g. 
researchers, clinicians, people with experience of terminal 
illness) 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Purposive (to identify data-rich respondents) 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
No 
Mode of administration Non-computer-assisted personal interview 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
Qualitative examination of societal perspectives in relation to 
end of life prioritisation 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
Yes 
Pilot reported? Yes 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Q methodology (technique that combines card sort and 
ranking exercise) 
Perspective Social decision-maker (though a minority of statements were 
framed using an own health perspective) 
End of life definition Described in multiple ways (e.g. ‘terminally ill’, ‘die soon’) 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
N/A 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
N/A 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
Yes 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Rank statements according to how much they agreed or 
disagreed with them   
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Record McHugh et al. (2015) 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
Yes – in the grid ranging from -5 (most disagree) to +5 
(most agree), respondents were able to place statements in 
the position marked 0 
Were visual aids used? No 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
Yes – strength of preference indicated by position in which 
statements were placed on the grid 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
1 (comprising sorting and placing of 49 statements on grid) 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
No 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Mixed or inconclusive evidence 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Mixed or inconclusive evidence 
Other results of potential 
interest 
Three shared accounts identified: (1) A population 
perspective – value for money, no special cases; (2) Life is 
precious – valuing life-extensions and patient choice; (3) 
Valuing wider benefits and opportunity cost – the quality of 
life and death 
Other factors examined Alternative perspectives and approaches to resource 
allocation – e.g. health-maximisation, provision of 
treatments to patients with non-terminal conditions 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
Yes (though authors warn about making generalisations 
based on qualitative samples) – e.g. no academics helped to 
define the shared account most closely related to an end of 
life premium  
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
Yes – study was in part a qualitative exercise 
Was any reference made to 
age-related preferences? 
Yes – e.g. one statement was worded: “I think life-extending 
treatments for people who are terminally ill are of less value 
as people get older” 
Was any reference made to 
time-related preferences? 
No reference to time discounting per se, but several 
statements referred to the value of time – e.g. “It is 
important to give a dying person and their family time to 
prepare for their death, put their affairs in order, make 
peace and say goodbyes” 
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Record Pennington et al. (2015) 
Year of publication 2015 
Year of study conduct 2009-2010 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
Denmark, France, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Spain, Sweden, UK 
Sample size 17,657 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Internet panel 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
Yes – excluded protest responders; respondents who 
expected to live for less than 6yrs were directed to a 
different questionnaire (not reported); impact of other 
exclusions reported in sensitivity analysis 
Mode of administration Internet survey 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To compare willingness-to-pay for different types of QALY 
gain 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
No 
Pilot reported? Yes 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Willingness-to-pay 
Perspective Own health 
End of life definition "Imminent, premature death from a life threatening disease" 
(at least six years before respondent's self-reported 
expected end of life 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
Imminent (as above), respondent’s self-reported life 
expectancy 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
1 QALY worth of life extension (at a quality of life level 
consistent with respondent’s self-reported health) 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
No – quality of life was examined but in separate questions 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
What the maximum amount they would be willing to pay for 
a given specific gain 
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Record Pennington et al. (2015) 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
Yes – respondents could provide the same willingness-to-pay 
value for multiple gains 
Were visual aids used? Yes 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
Yes – strength of preference indicated by differing 
willingness-to-pay amounts 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
5 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
No 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported 
Other results of potential 
interest 
When comparing QALY gains obtained in the near future, life 
extensions were valued more highly then quality of life 
improvements; low median values for life extensions at 
respondents’ expected end of life strongly influenced by the 
large number of observations at zero 
Other factors examined Avoiding quality of life loss now (over 4yrs or 10yrs); 
avoiding time spent in coma (intended to elicit a gain in 
longevity occurring in the near future) 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
Yes – older age and poorer health associated with lower 
willingness-to-pay values for life extension in imminent 
death scenario 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
No / not reported 
Was any reference made to 
age-related preferences? 
Yes – hypothetical scenarios was based on respondents’ 
actual ages and self-reported life expectancies 
Was any reference made to 
time-related preferences? 
Yes – authors acknowledge that gains in the future would be 
discounted, and that for an individual facing immediate 
death the normal opportunity cost considerations may not 
apply 
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Record Pinto-Prades et al. (2014) 
Year of publication 2014 
Year of study conduct 2010 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
Spain 
Sample size 813 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Door-knock 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
Yes – excluded protest responders in the willingness-to-pay 
tasks 
Mode of administration Computer-assisted personal interview 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To test for support for end of life prioritisation 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
Yes 
Pilot reported? Yes 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Willingness-to-pay and person trade-off 
Perspective Both – own health (willingness-to-pay tasks); social 
decision-maker (person trade-off tasks) 
End of life definition Life expectancy without treatment 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
3mths, 6mths, 18mths 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
6mths, 18mths  
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
Yes 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
What the maximum amount they would be willing to pay for 
a 10% chance of improving their condition in a specified way 
(willingness-to-pay tasks); the number of patients treated of 
one type they consider equivalent to treating one patient of 
another type (person trade-off tasks) 
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Record Pinto-Prades et al. (2014) 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
Yes – respondents could provide the same willingness-to-pay 
value for multiple gains or choose an equal number of both 
types of patient in the person trade-off task 
Were visual aids used? Yes 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
Yes – strength of preference indicated by differing 
willingness-to-pay amounts and levels of trade-off 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
6 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
Yes – 21 minutes on average 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Quality of life improvement preferred 
Other results of potential 
interest 
Reasonably large proportion of respondents did not give too 
much value to a short life extension but those who did were 
willing to pay quite a lot (similar split of opinion observed in 
PTO responses) 
Other factors examined None 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
No 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
No / not reported 
Was any reference made to 
age-related preferences? 
No 
Was any reference made to 
time-related preferences? 
No 
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Record Richardson et al. (2012) 
Year of publication 2012 
Year of study conduct 2009-2010 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
Australia 
Sample size 544 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Internet panel; targeted postal invitations (based on 
socioeconomic characteristics of residential postcodes) 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
Yes – excluded respondents whose comments or answers 
indicated misunderstanding 
Mode of administration Multiple modes: internet survey; self-completion paper 
survey (postal) 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To test a technique for measuring support for health-
maximisation and health sharing 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
No 
Pilot reported? No 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Novel cross between a discrete choice and budget allocation 
exercise 
Perspective Social decision-maker 
End of life definition Immediate death without treatment 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
Multiples of 4yrs and 6yrs 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
4yrs, 6yrs, 8yrs, 12yrs 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
No 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Which of four patients to give a life extension to 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
No 
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Record Richardson et al. (2012) 
Were visual aids used? Yes 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
Not reported / unclear 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
1 (comprising 18 to 29 iterations) 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
No 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Mixed or inconclusive evidence 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported 
Other results of potential 
interest 
Results indicate that respondents were primarily concerned 
with outcome egalitarianism (as opposed to maximising 
health outcomes) 
Other factors examined Sharing / outcome egalitarianism 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
Yes – none found to influence propensity to favour treating 
end of life patients 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
No / not reported 
Was any reference made 
to age-related 
preferences? 
No – but all patients start at the same age (25yrs), so the 
results could be interpreted in terms of desire to equalise 
expected age at death 
Was any reference made 
to time-related 
preferences? 
Yes – authors acknowledge that there may be some 
variation from the orthodox economic prediction if time 
discounting is taken into account 
 
  
223 
 
Record Rowen et al. (2016a) 
Year of publication 2015 
Year of study conduct Not reported 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
UK 
Sample size 3,669 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Internet panel 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
No exclusions  
Mode of administration Internet survey 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To test for support for multiple prioritisation criteria 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
Yes 
Pilot reported? Yes 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Discrete choice experiment 
Perspective Social decision-maker 
End of life definition Life expectancy without treatment; dummy variable in the 
modelling representing the cut-offs associated with the NICE 
criteria 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
3mths, 6mths, 9mths, 1yr, 2yrs, 5yrs, 10yrs, 30yrs, 60yrs 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
0mths, 1mth, 3mths, 6mths, 9mths, 1yr, 3yrs, 10yrs, 60yrs 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
No 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Which of two patient groups to treat 
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Record Rowen et al. (2016a) 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
No 
Were visual aids used? Yes 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
No 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
10 (+further attitudinal questions) 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
Yes – 21 minutes on average 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported 
Other results of potential 
interest 
Preference for larger QALY gains, but at a diminishing rate; 
some support for prioritising those with higher burden of 
illness, though not robust 
Other factors examined QALY gain, burden of illness 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
No 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
Yes – in piloting and via attitudinal questions 
Was any reference made to 
age-related preferences? 
No – age attribute was purposely omitted 
Was any reference made to 
time-related preferences? 
No 
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Record Rowen et al. (2016b) 
Year of publication 2016 
Year of study conduct Not reported 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
UK 
Sample size 371 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Door-knock; internet panel 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
No exclusions 
Mode of administration Multiple modes: non-computer-assisted personal interview 
(except in some arms where the introductory video was 
shown on a computer); internet survey 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To test for framing and mode of administration effects in the 
elicitation of preferences regarding burden of illness a 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
No 
Pilot reported? No 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Other choice exercise 
Perspective Social decision-maker 
End of life definition Life expectancy without treatment / due to condition 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
5yrs, 10yrs, 15yrs (but the sole end of life vs. non-end of life 
question involved a choice between patients with life 
expectancies of 5yrs and 10yrs, respectively) 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
0yrs, 1yr, 2yrs (but in the sole end of life vs. non-end of life 
question, life expectancy gain was 1yr for both candidate 
recipient groups) 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
Yes 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Which of two patient groups to treat 
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Record Rowen et al. (2016b) 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
No 
Were visual aids used? Yes (in four of six arms; n=240); no (in two of six arms; 
n=131) 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
No 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
9 (2 of which were practice tasks, but were reported in full 
by authors) 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
No 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence not consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported (two questions involved choices 
between quality of life improvements and life extensions, but 
life expectancy without treatment was set to 10/15 years so 
is deemed not to describe an end of life context)  
Other results of potential 
interest 
Responses were affected by mode of administration but not 
by question wording or use of visual aids   
Other factors examined QALY gain (size and type); burden of illness 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
No – not for question of relevance to end of life (for other 
questions, few sociodemographic variables were significant) 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
No – follow-up questions were asked but these focused on 
framing issues and task understanding rather than on 
reasons for choices 
Was any reference made 
to age-related 
preferences? 
No 
Was any reference made 
to time-related 
preferences? 
No 
 
a The only task in this study relevant to the research question underpinning the literature review was 
labelled as a ‘practice question’. However, in the paper the authors do not treat the practice question as 
any less valid or reliable than the main (non-practice) questions, and present a full analysis of the 
responses to the practice questions. A notable feature of the practice questions in this study was that 
respondents were, in effect, asked to reconsider and confirm their responses. This suggests that the 
responses should not be interpreted as constituting lower quality data than the responses to the main 
questions. The decision to include this study in the review was informed by a discussion with one of the 
study authors (Tsuchiya, A., 2016, personal communication, 20 September).
227 
 
Record Shah et al. (2014) 
Year of publication 2014 
Year of study conduct 2011 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
UK 
Sample size 50 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Door-knock 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
No 
Mode of administration Non-computer-assisted personal interview 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To test for support for end of life prioritisation 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
Yes 
Pilot reported? Yes 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Other choice exercise 
Perspective Social decision-maker 
End of life definition Life expectancy without treatment 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
1yr, 10yrs 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
6mths, 1yr 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
Yes 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Which of two patients to treat 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
Yes – an ‘I have no preference’ option was available 
Were visual aids used? Yes 
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Record Shah et al. (2014) 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
No 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
6 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
No 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Quality of life improvement preferred 
Other results of potential 
interest 
No evidence that age- or time-related preferences are 
motivating factors for choosing to treat end of life patient; 
no evidence that concern about the life stage of end of life 
patients is a motivating factor for preferring either life-
extending or quality of life-improving treatments for those 
patients 
Other factors examined Age, time preference  
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
No 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
Yes – respondents indicated the reasons for their choices by 
choosing from a list 
Was any reference made to 
age-related preferences? 
Yes – no evidence that concern about age is a motivating 
factor for choosing to treat end of life patient 
Was any reference made to 
time-related preferences? 
Yes – one task involved choosing between a patient who had 
known their prognosis for some time and another who had 
only just learned their prognosis (life expectancy without 
treatment was the same for both) 
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Record Shah et al. (2015a) 
Year of publication 2015 
Year of study conduct 2012 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
UK 
Sample size 3,969 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Internet panel 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
Yes – excluded respondents who spent insufficient time 
completing the survey 
Mode of administration Internet survey 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To test for support for end of life prioritisation 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
Yes 
Pilot reported? Yes 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Discrete choice experiment 
Perspective Social decision-maker 
End of life definition Life expectancy without treatment; dummy variable in the 
modelling representing the cut-offs associated with the NICE 
criteria 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
3mths, 12mths, 24mths, 36mths, 60mths 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
0mths, 1mth, 2mths, 3mths, 6mths, 12mths 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
Yes 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Which of two patients to treat 
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Record Shah et al. (2015a) 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
No 
Were visual aids used? Yes 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
No 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
10 (+2 further tasks examining the issue of preparedness) 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
No 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence not consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Life extension preferred 
Other results of potential 
interest 
Majority of respondents supported a mixture of the QALY-
maximisation and priority-to-worst-off approaches to 
priority-setting 
Other factors examined Quality of life without treatment, preparedness 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
Yes – no characteristics found to be associated with 
preferences 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
No / not reported 
Was any reference made to 
age-related preferences? 
No – age attribute was purposely omitted 
Was any reference made to 
time-related preferences? 
‘Time with knowledge’ attribute was examined but the 
results were not reported; authors note that applying a 
positive discount rate would likely further strengthen their 
finding of a lack of support for an end of life premium 
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Record Shiroiwa et al. (2010) 
Year of publication 2010 
Year of study conduct 2007-2008 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
Australia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, UK, USA 
Sample size 5,620 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Internet panel 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
Yes – recruited respondents aged 20 to 59 years only 
(thereby excluding individuals aged 60 years and older) 
Mode of administration Internet survey 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To obtain the monetary value of a QALY (in six countries) 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
No 
Pilot reported? Yes 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Willingness-to-pay 
Perspective Both – own health (end of life and non-end of life scenarios); 
social decision-maker (end of life scenario only) 
End of life definition Serious illness that immediately threatens [your / their] life 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
0yrs, 5yrs 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
1yr 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No (but disease was described as a life-limiting illness such 
as metastatic cancer) 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
No 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Whether or not to pay set amounts for a given life extension  
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
Yes – respondents could provide the same willingness-to-pay 
value for multiple gains 
232 
 
Record Shiroiwa et al. (2010) 
Were visual aids used? No 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
Yes – strength of preference indicated by differing 
willingness-to-pay amounts 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
4 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
No 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported 
Other results of potential 
interest 
In Japan and Korea, the highest willingness-to-pay values 
observed were for a life extension for a family member; in 
Australia, UK and USA, the highest willingness-to-pay values 
observed were for a life extension for an unidentified 
member of society  
Other factors examined Willingness-to-pay for a life extension for a family member 
and for an unidentified member of society facing life-
threatening illness  
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
Yes – respondents with high household income and 
education levels gave higher willingness-to-pay values for 
life extensions at the end of life 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
No / not reported 
Was any reference made to 
age-related preferences? 
No 
Was any reference made to 
time-related preferences? 
Yes – authors interpret difference between willingness-to-
pay values in end of life and non-end of life scenarios in 
terms of time preference, and use the data to estimate 
discount rates for each country (ranging from 1.6% to 
6.8%) 
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Record Shiroiwa et al. (2013) 
Year of publication 2013 
Year of study conduct 2011 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
Japan 
Sample size 2,283 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Internet panel 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
Yes – recruited respondents aged 20 to 69 years only 
(thereby excluding individuals aged 70 years and older) 
Mode of administration Internet survey 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To obtain the monetary value of a QALY 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
No 
Pilot reported? No 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Willingness-to-pay 
Perspective Own health 
End of life definition Life expectancy without treatment (end of life scenario 1); 
life-threatening situation (end of life scenario 2) 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
1mth 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
2mths, 4mths, 7mths, 14mths 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
No 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
No – questions examining quality of life improvement were 
included, but these were related to non-end of life scenarios 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Whether or not to pay set amounts for a given specific gain 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
Yes – respondents could provide the same willingness-to-pay 
value for multiple gains 
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Record Shiroiwa et al. (2013) 
Were visual aids used? No 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
Yes – strength of preference indicated by differing 
willingness-to-pay amounts 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
1 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
No 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence not consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported 
Other results of potential 
interest 
Monetary value of a QALY is higher for severe health states 
than for mild health states 
Other factors examined Avoiding quality of life loss now (for periods lasting between 
4 and 20 months) 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
No – not specifically for questions of relevance to end of life 
(overall, willingness-to-pay values were significantly 
correlated with household income) 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
No / not reported 
Was any reference made to 
age-related preferences? 
No 
Was any reference made to 
time-related preferences? 
No 
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Record Skedgel et al. (2014) 
Year of publication 2015 
Year of study conduct 2011-2012 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
Canada 
Sample size 656 
Type of sample Public, decision-makers 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Internet panel (public); flyers and email invitations 
(decision-makers) 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
No exclusions 
Mode of administration Internet survey 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To test for support for multiple prioritisation criteria 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
No 
Pilot reported? Yes 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Discrete choice experiment 
Perspective Social decision-maker 
End of life definition Life expectancy without treatment 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
1mth, 5yrs, 10yrs 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
1yr, 5yrs, 10yrs 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
Yes – cancer  
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
No 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Which of two health programmes to allocate (all of) a fixed 
budget to 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
No 
Were visual aids used? Yes 
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Record Skedgel et al. (2014) 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
No 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
11 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
Yes – 9.5 minutes on average (public) 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence not consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported 
Other results of potential 
interest 
Evidence of support for treating younger and larger patient 
groups; and for deprioritising treatment for those who will 
be in poor health after treatment 
Other factors examined Age, quality of life without treatment, quality of life with 
treatment, number of patients treated 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
Yes – background characteristics were not statistically 
significantly associated with (latent) class membership 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
No / not reported 
Was any reference made to 
age-related preferences? 
Yes – evidence of support for treating younger patients, 
though the author did not interact the age and life 
expectancy without treatment variables 
Was any reference made to 
time-related preferences? 
No 
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Record Stahl et al. (2008) 
Year of publication 2008 
Year of study conduct Not reported 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
USA 
Sample size 623 
Type of sample Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Internet panel 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
No 
Mode of administration Internet survey 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To test for support for multiple prioritisation criteria 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
Yes  
Pilot reported? No 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Other choice exercise 
Perspective Social decision-maker 
End of life definition Urgency (life expectancy without treatment) 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
Levels not reported explicitly, but appear to cover: <1mth, 
3mths, 6mths, 9mths, 12mths, 15mths, 18mths, 21mths, 
24mths 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
1yr, 2yrs, 3yrs, 4yrs, 5yrs, 6yrs, 7yrs, 8yrs, 9yrs, 10yrs 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
Yes – organ transplantation 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
No 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Which of two patients to give an organ transplant to 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
Yes – a ‘can’t decide’ option was available 
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Record Stahl et al. (2008) 
Were visual aids used? No 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
Yes – attribute levels were varied incrementally 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
33 (unclear whether each respondent answered all or a 
subset of the 33) 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
No 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported 
Other results of potential 
interest 
When both patients have better (worse) than average 
quality of life, respondents preferred to treat the worse off 
(better off) patient 
Other factors examined Age, life expectancy with treatment, quality of life without 
treatment, quality of life with treatment; single-factor and 
cross-factor trade-offs examined 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
Yes – older (>40yrs) and female respondents had narrower 
windows of indifference – i.e. preferred to treat end of life 
patient until the difference between the life expectancies of 
the patients was extremely small; respondents with 
transplant recipient in family placed greater importance on 
quality of life without treatment then life expectancy without 
treatment unless the latter was extremely short (<1mth) 
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
No / not reported 
Was any reference made to 
age-related preferences? 
Yes – for an older patient to receive priority over a younger 
patient, the older patient must be at least 2.5mths closer to 
their end of life than the younger patient 
Was any reference made to 
time-related preferences? 
No 
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Record Stolk et al. (2005) 
Year of publication 2005 
Year of study conduct Not reported 
Country or countries of 
origin of data 
Netherlands 
Sample size 65 
Type of sample Students, researchers, health policy makers 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Not reported 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations reported? 
No 
Mode of administration Non-computer-assisted personal interview 
Summary of primary study 
objective(s) 
To test for support for multiple prioritisation criteria 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) mentioned 
explicitly in the study 
objectives? 
No 
Pilot reported? Yes 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Other choice exercise 
Perspective Social decision-maker 
End of life definition Information on life expectancy without treatment not 
provided explicitly but could be calculated given information 
on age, life expectancy (disease-free and with disease) and 
life years lost due to disease 
Life expectancy without 
treatment attribute levels 
0.5yrs, 2.25yrs, 3yrs, 11yrs, 14yrs, 14.5yrs, 16yrs, 20yrs, 
20.5yrs, 22.5yrs 
Life expectancy gain from 
treatment attribute levels 
N/A – treated patient would be given a ‘wonder pill’ which 
would relieve them of all described health problems and 
bring them back to normal health 
Was disease labelled or 
named? 
Yes – each patient had a different disease 
Did the study examine 
whether quality of life 
improving or life extending 
treatments are preferred 
for end of life patients? 
No 
What were respondents 
choosing between (or 
choosing to do)? 
Which of two patients to treat 
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Record Stolk et al. (2005) 
Was it possible to express 
indifference? 
No 
Were visual aids used? No 
Strength of preference 
examined at the individual 
respondent level? 
No 
Number of tasks completed 
by each respondent 
45 
Time taken to complete 
survey reported? 
Yes – 20 minutes on average 
Summary of finding: end 
of life vs. non-end of life 
Evidence not consistent with an end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life improvement 
vs. life extension 
Not examined / reported 
Other results of potential 
interest 
Fair innings and (to a lesser extent) proportional shortfall 
approaches to priority-setting were highly correlated with 
the observed rank order implied by respondents’ choices 
Other factors examined Fair innings, severity, proportional shortfall 
Impact of background 
characteristics reported? 
Yes – there were no major differences in the rank orderings 
of the three respondent subgroups  
Were qualitative data or 
explanatory factors 
sought? 
No / not reported 
Was any reference made to 
age-related preferences? 
Yes – treatments for elderly patients were not valued as 
higher prospective health theories that ignore the past (i.e. 
age) would have predicted 
Was any reference made to 
time-related preferences? 
No 
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Appendix 4 Empirical study 1 survey instrument 
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Scenario 1 
 
Time 
(years)   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11 
                                                  
                                                  
  A                                               
                                                  
                                                  
  B                                               
 
Consider two patients, patient A and patient B, who are the same age as each other. Suppose that 
both patient A and patient B have just been diagnosed with illnesses. The illnesses are asymptomatic 
– that is, they have no effect on the patient’s quality of life. 
Patient A will live for 10 years, from today, before dying. Patient B will live for 1 year, from today, 
before dying. 
There is a treatment, which, if taken today, would extend the life of either patient A or patient B by 6 
months. Treatment would not affect either patient’s quality of life. However, the health service has 
only enough funds to treat one of the two patients, and there are no alternative treatments availa-
ble (furthermore, the nature of the illnesses is such that further treatment will not be possible if ei-
ther patient is not treated today). 
Would you prefer to treat patient A or patient B? 
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Scenario 2  
 
Time 
(years)   -9   -8   -7   -6   -5   -4   -3   -2   -1   0   1   2 
                                                  
                                                  
  A                                               
                                                  
                                                  
  B                                               
 
Consider two patients, patient A and patient B, who are the same age as each other. Patient B has 
just been diagnosed with an illness; patient A has an illness which he/she was diagnosed with 9 years 
ago. Both illnesses are asymptomatic – that is, they have no effect on the patient’s quality of life. 
Patient A was told 9 years ago that he/she will live for 10 years before dying. This means that from 
today, he/she will live for 1 year before dying. 
Patient B has been told that he/she will live for 1 year, from today, before dying. 
There is a treatment, which, if taken today, would extend the life of either patient A or patient B by 6 
months. Treatment would not affect either patient’s quality of life. However, the health service has 
only enough funds to treat one of the two patients, and there are no alternative treatments availa-
ble (furthermore, the nature of the illnesses is such that further treatment will not be possible if ei-
ther patient is not treated today). 
Would you prefer to treat patient A or patient B? 
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Scenario 3  
 
Time 
(years)   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11 
                                                  
                                                  
  A                                               
                                                  
                                                  
  B                                               
 
Consider two patients, patient A and patient B. Suppose that both patient A and patient B have just 
been diagnosed with illnesses. The illnesses are asymptomatic – that is, they have no effect on the 
patient’s quality of life. 
Patient A will live for 10 years, from today, before dying. Patient B will live for 1 year, from today, 
before dying. Patient B is 9 years older than patient A, so both patients will die at the same age with-
out treatment. 
There is a treatment, which, if taken today, would extend the life of either patient A or patient B by 6 
months. Treatment would not affect either patient’s quality of life. However, the health service has 
only enough funds to treat one of the two patients, and there are no alternative treatments availa-
ble (furthermore, the nature of the illnesses is such that further treatment will not be possible if ei-
ther patient is not treated today). 
Would you prefer to treat patient A or patient B? 
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Scenario 4  
 
Time 
(years)   0   1   2       
                    
                    
  A                 
                    
                    
  B                 
                    
 
Consider two patients, patient A and patient B, who are the same age as each other. Suppose that 
both patient A and patient B have just been diagnosed with illnesses.  
Patient A will live for 1 year, from today, before dying. Patient B will also live for 1 year, from today, 
before dying. The illnesses have a negative impact on quality of life – both patients will experience 
their final year of life at 50% of full health. 
There is a treatment, which, if taken today, would restore patient A to full health. It would not affect 
patient A’s life expectancy. Another treatment would, if taken today, extend the life of patient B by 1 
year. It would not affect patient B’s quality of life, so patient B’s remaining life would be lived at 50% 
health. The health service has only enough funds to treat one of the two patients, and there are no 
alternative treatments available (furthermore, the nature of the illnesses is such that further treat-
ment will not be possible if either patient is not treated today). 
Would you prefer to treat patient A or patient B? 
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Scenario 5  
 
Time 
(years)       0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   
                                                
                                                
  A                                             
                                                    
                                                    
  B                                                 
                                                    
                                           
Consider two patients, patient A and patient B. Suppose that both patient A and patient B have just 
been diagnosed with illnesses.  
Patient A will live for 10 years, from today, before dying. Patient B will live for 1 year, from today, 
before dying. The illnesses have a negative impact on quality of life – both patients will experience 
their final year of life at 50% of full health. Patient B is 9 years older than patient A, so both patients 
will die at the same age without treatment. 
There is a treatment, which, if taken today, would restore patient A to full health in her final year of 
life. It would not affect patient A’s life expectancy. The same treatment would, if taken today, ex-
tend the life of patient B by 1 year. It would not affect patient B’s quality of life, so patient B’s re-
maining life would be lived at 50% health. 
The health service has only enough funds to treat one of the two patients, and there are no alterna-
tive treatments available (furthermore, the nature of the illnesses is such that further treatment will 
not be possible if either patient is not treated today). 
Would you prefer to treat patient A or patient B? 
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Appendix 5 Empirical study 1 information sheet 
1. Research Project Title: 
 
Health care priority setting preference project 
 
2. Invitation paragraph 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide whether you 
wish to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and 
what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss 
it with others if you wish. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank 
you for reading this. 
 
3. What is the project’s purpose? 
 
The purpose of the project is to find out what the general public thinks about a range of 
hypothetical scenarios where health care decision makers have to choose which types of 
treatment to allocate funding to. Better understanding of public preferences will help 
organisations such as the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) to 
make appropriate resource allocation decisions. 
 
4. Why have I been chosen? 
 
We are seeking to survey around 20 students and staff at the University of Sheffield as a 
pilot study. 
 
5. Do I have to take part? 
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be 
given this information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form) and you can still 
withdraw at any time without it affecting any benefits that you are entitled to in any way. If 
you decide to stop, then any information that you have provided will be destroyed. You do 
not have to give a reason for not taking part. 
 
6. What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you agree to take part, you will complete an interview survey that should last for no more 
than 30 minutes. You will be interviewed by a researcher, who will ask you a series of 
questions which require you to compare hypothetical scenarios in which a health care 
decision maker must allocate resources to one of two treatments for ill health. A paper 
questionnaire will be used to provide illustrations of the scenarios and to record your 
responses. You will also be asked some questions about your thoughts and opinions about 
the exercise, as well as some questions about your experience of ill health.  
 
You will only be asked to participate in one interview. 
 
7. What do I have to do? 
 
You will be asked to answer a series of questions involving hypothetical scenarios. There 
are no right or wrong answers – we are simply seeking your views. 
 
8. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
 
Some participants may feel uncomfortable when asked to think about scenarios involving 
illness and death. However, previous research in this area has shown that participants are 
generally interested and engaged when taking part in these types of exercises.  
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9. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
All participants will be given a small cash payment for agreeing to take part in the study. 
You will also be contributing to research that will help health care decision makers to better 
understand the preferences of members of the general public. 
 
10. What if something goes wrong? 
 
Should you wish to raise a complaint regarding your treatment by researchers or any other 
aspect of the study, you should contact Professor Aki Tsuchiya 
(a.tsuchiya@sheffield.ac.uk), who will follow up on your complaint immediately. However, 
should you feel that your complaint has not been handled to your satisfaction, you can 
contact the University’s Registrar and Secretary. 
 
11. Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential? 
 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept 
strictly confidential. All survey responses will be anonymised, so you will not be identified in 
any reports or publications.  
 
12. What will happen to the results of the research project? 
 
The results of the project will be written up in a report for the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence (NICE), and will be published in academic journals and presented 
at conferences. You will not be identified in any reports or publications. The anonymised 
data collected during the course of the project may be used for additional or subsequent 
research and analysis. 
 
13. Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
The project is being organised by Allan Wailoo, Aki Tsuchiya, and Koonal Shah, of the 
University of Sheffield’s’ School of Health and Related Research. It has been funded by the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. 
 
14. Who has ethically reviewed the project? 
 
The project has been reviewed by the School of Health and Related Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Sheffield. 
 
15. Contact for further information 
 
For information regarding participant recruitment and co-ordination of the interview 
programme, please contact Koonal Shah (k.k.shah@sheffield.ac.uk; 07920 496832). For 
any other issues, please contact Professor Aki Tsuchiya (a.tsuchiya@sheffield.ac.uk; 0114 
222 0710). 
 
16. Will I be recorded, and how will the recorded media be used? 
 
The interviews will be audio recorded. The recordings will be used only for analysis and will 
be kept in secure premises. No other use will be made of them without your written 
permission, and no individual outside the project will be allowed access to them.  Once the 
pilot study is written up, the recording will be destroyed. 
249 
 
Appendix 6 Empirical study 2 survey instrument 
 
 
Interviewer no: Interviewer name: 
 
 
Date: / Time interview started: : URN:  
 
 
Main Questionnaire 
 
HAND PARTICIPANT BOOKLET TO RESPONDENT 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research project.  
The interview consists of seven scenarios. I will read the description for each scenario 
to you, and will then ask you to answer some questions about that scenario. Please listen 
carefully to the descriptions. You may also refer to the summary tables and diagrams for 
each scenario, which can be found in the booklet I have given you. 
Please let me know if you have any questions at any stage of the interview. Remember, 
there are no right or wrong answers – we are simply seeking your view. 
 
Consider two patients, patient A and patient B. Both patients are adults, and are the 
same age as each other. Suppose that both patient A and patient B have just been 
diagnosed with illnesses. The illnesses are asymptomatic – that is, they have no effect 
on the patient’s health-related quality of life. 
Patient A will live for 10 years, from today, before dying. Patient B will live for 1 year, 
from today, before dying. These life expectancies are shown by the areas shaded pink in 
the diagrams. 
There is a treatment, which, if taken today, would extend the life of patient A by 2 
years. The same treatment would extend the life of patient B by 6 months. These gains 
are shown by the areas shaded green in the diagrams. Treatment would not affect either 
patient’s health-related quality of life. However, the health service has only enough 
funds to treat one of the two patients, and there are no alternative treatments available. 
Furthermore, the nature of the illnesses is such that further treatment will not be 
possible if either patient is not treated today – this is the only opportunity for treatment. 
Please complete the questions for Scenario 1, which can be found on page 3 of your 
booklet. 
 
Consider two patients, patient A and patient B. Both patients are adults, and are the 
same age as each other. Suppose that both patient A and patient B have just been 
diagnosed with illnesses. The illnesses are asymptomatic – that is, they have no effect 
on the patient’s health-related quality of life. 
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Patient A will live for 10 years, from today, before dying. Patient B will live for 1 year, 
from today, before dying. 
There is a treatment, which, if taken today, would extend the life of either patient A or 
patient B by 6 months. Treatment would not affect either patient’s health-related quality 
of life. However, the health service has only enough funds to treat one of the two 
patients, and there are no alternative treatments available. Furthermore, the nature of the 
illnesses is such that further treatment will not be possible if either patient is not treated 
today – this is the only opportunity for treatment. 
Please complete the questions for Scenario 2, which can be found on page 5 of your 
booklet. 
 
Consider two patients, patient A and patient B. Both patients are adults, but patient B is 
9 years older than patient A. Suppose that both patient A and patient B have just been 
diagnosed with illnesses. The illnesses are asymptomatic – that is, they have no effect 
on the patient’s health-related quality of life. 
Patient A will live for 10 years, from today, before dying. Patient B will live for 1 year, 
from today, before dying. Since patient B is 9 years older than patient A, both patients 
will die at the same age without treatment. 
There is a treatment, which, if taken today, would extend the life of either patient A or 
patient B by 6 months. Treatment would not affect either patient’s health-related quality 
of life. However, the health service has only enough funds to treat one of the two 
patients, and there are no alternative treatments available. Furthermore, the nature of the 
illnesses is such that further treatment will not be possible if either patient is not treated 
today – this is the only opportunity for treatment. 
Please complete the questions for Scenario 3, which can be found on page 7 of your 
booklet. 
 
Consider two patients, patient A and patient B, who are the same age as each other. 
Patient B has just been diagnosed with an illness; patient A has an illness which he or 
she was diagnosed with 9 years ago. Both illnesses are asymptomatic – that is, they 
have no effect on the patient’s health-related quality of life. 
Patient A was told 9 years ago that he or she would live for 10 years before dying. This 
means that from today, he or she will live for 1 year before dying. Patient B has been 
told that he or she will live for 1 year, from today, before dying. 
There is a treatment, which, if taken today, would extend the life of either patient A or 
patient B by 6 months. Treatment would not affect either patient’s health-related quality 
of life. However, the health service has only enough funds to treat one of the two 
patients, and there are no alternative treatments available. Furthermore, the nature of the 
illnesses is such that further treatment will not be possible if either patient is not treated 
today – this is the only opportunity for treatment. 
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Please complete the questions for Scenario 4, which can be found on page 9 of your 
booklet. 
 
Consider two patients, patient A and patient B, who are both 30 years old. Suppose that 
both patient A and patient B have just been diagnosed with illnesses.  
Patient A will live for 1 year, from today, before dying. Patient B will also live for 1 
year, from today, before dying. The illnesses have a negative impact on health-related 
quality of life – both patients will experience their final year of life in a state of ill 
health. Patients have told us that being in this health state for two years is equally 
desirable as being in full health for one year – we will therefore call this 50% health. 
There is a treatment, which, if taken today, would restore patient A to full health. It 
would not affect patient A’s life expectancy. Another treatment would, if taken today, 
extend the life of patient B by 1 year. It would not affect patient B’s health-related 
quality of life, so patient B’s remaining life would be lived at 50% health.  
The health service has only enough funds to treat one of the two patients, and there are 
no alternative treatments available. Furthermore, the nature of the illnesses is such that 
further treatment will not be possible if either patient is not treated today – this is the 
only opportunity for treatment. 
Please complete the questions for Scenario 5, which can be found on page 11 of your 
booklet. 
 
Consider two patients, patient A and patient B, who are both 70 years old. Suppose that 
both patient A and patient B have just been diagnosed with illnesses.  
Patient A will live for 1 year, from today, before dying. Patient B will also live for 1 
year, from today, before dying. The illnesses have a negative impact on health-related 
quality of life – both patients will experience their final year of life in a state of ill 
health. Patients have told us that being in this health state for two years is equally 
desirable as being in full health for one year – we will therefore call this 50% health. 
There is a treatment, which, if taken today, would restore patient A to full health. It 
would not affect patient A’s life expectancy. Another treatment would, if taken today, 
extend the life of patient B by 1 year. It would not affect patient B’s health-related 
quality of life, so patient B’s remaining life would be lived at 50% health.  
The health service has only enough funds to treat one of the two patients, and there are 
no alternative treatments available. Furthermore, the nature of the illnesses is such that 
further treatment will not be possible if either patient is not treated today – this is the 
only opportunity for treatment. 
 
Please complete the questions for Scenario 6, which can be found on page 13 of your 
booklet. 
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Consider two patients, patient A and patient B. Both patients are adults, but patient B is 
9 years older than patient A. Suppose that both patient A and patient B have just been 
diagnosed with illnesses.  
 
Patient A will live for 10 years, from today, before dying. Patient B will live for 1 year, 
from today, before dying. The illnesses have a negative impact on health-related quality 
of life – both patients will experience their final year of life in a state of ill health. 
Patients have told us that being in this health state for two years is equally desirable as 
being in full health for one year – we will therefore call this 50% health. Since patient B 
is 9 years older than patient A, both patients will die at the same age without treatment.  
There is a treatment, which, if taken today, would restore patient A to full health in his 
or her final year of life. It would not affect patient A’s life expectancy. The same 
treatment would, if taken today, extend the life of patient B by 1 year. It would not 
affect patient B’s health-related quality of life, so patient B’s remaining life would be 
lived at 50% health. 
The health service has only enough funds to treat one of the two patients, and there are 
no alternative treatments available. Furthermore, the nature of the illnesses is such that 
further treatment will not be possible if either patient is not treated today – this is the 
only opportunity for treatment. 
Please complete the questions for Scenario 7, which can be found on page 15 of your 
booklet. 
Thank you for your help in this research 
 
This research was conducted under the terms of the MRS code of conduct and is 
completely confidential. If you would like to confirm my credentials or those of Accent 
please call the MRS free on 0500 396999. HAND OVER THE THANK YOU SLIP AND 
CASH INCENTIVE. 
 
Please can I confirm your name and where we can contact you for quality control 
purposes? 
 
Respondent name:    
Telephone: home:    work:  
 
RECORD PARTICIPANT URN ON PARTICIPANT BOOKLET 
Thank you 
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INTERVIEWER: PLEASE FILL IN THE FOLLOWING (DO NOT ASK OF OR READ TO 
RESPONDENTS) 
 
How well do you think the respondent understood and carried out the tasks during the 
interview? 
 Understood and performed tasks easily 
 Some problems but seemed to understand the tasks in the end 
 Doubtful whether the respondent understood the tasks  
 
In terms of effort and concentration, which one of the following statements best 
describes the way the respondent undertook the tasks? 
 Concentrated very hard and put a great deal of effort into it 
 Concentrated fairly hard and put some effort into it 
 Didn’t concentrate very hard and put little effort into it 
 Concentrated at the beginning but lost interest/concentration before reaching the end 
 
Which of the following statements below best describes the environment in which the 
interview was conducted? 
 Quiet and no distraction 
 No interruption but some background distraction 
 Disruptions and interruptions 
 
I confirm that this interview was conducted under the terms of the MRS code of conduct 
and is completely confidential 
 
Interviewer’s signature:  
 
 
Time Interview completed: :  
  
254 
 
 
 
 
 
Health care priority setting preference project 
Participant booklet 
 
Box to be completed by the interviewer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant ID:    
 
Interviewer ID:    
 
Date:      
 
Time:   
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Questions [same for all scenarios] 
If the health service has only enough funds to treat one of the two patients, which of 
the following statements best describes your view? (tick one box only) 
 I would prefer the health service to treat Patient A 
 I have no preference 
 I would prefer the health service to treat Patient B 
 
Which of the following statements reflect the reason(s) for your answer to question 1?  
(tick all boxes that apply) 
 My choice delivers the largest benefit 
 My choice is the most fair 
 My choice delivers the benefit today rather than far away in the future 
 My choice benefits the patient who is closest to death 
 My choice benefits the patient who has longer left to live 
 My choice benefits the patient with less time to prepare for death 
 My choice benefits the patient who can make the most out of their remaining 
time 
 My choice benefits the patient who is worse off 
 My choice benefits the patient who is younger today 
 My choice benefits the patient who is older today 
 My choice benefits the patient who will die at a younger age 
 My choice benefits the patient who will die at an older age 
 I think that it is better to improve health than to extend life in this situation 
 I think that it is better to extend life than to improve health in this situation 
 I think that both patients are equally deserving of treatment 
 I think that it is unfair to choose between the patients 
 I am unwilling to choose between the patients  
 None of the above 
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Appendix 7 Empirical study 2 information sheet 
 
1. Research Project Title: 
Health care priority setting preference project 
2. Invitation paragraph 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide whether you 
wish to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and 
what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss 
it with others if you wish. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank 
you for reading this. 
3. What is the project’s purpose? 
The purpose of the project is to find out what the general public thinks about a range of 
hypothetical scenarios where health care decision makers have to choose which types of 
treatment to allocate funding to. Better understanding of public preferences will help 
organisations such as the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) to 
make appropriate resource allocation decisions. 
4. Why have I been chosen? 
We are seeking adult participants from the general population in England and Wales. We 
intend to recruit about 50 participants in total. 
5. Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be 
given this information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form) and you can still 
withdraw at any time without it affecting any benefits that you are entitled to in any way. If 
you decide to stop, then any information that you have provided will be destroyed. You do 
not have to give a reason for not taking part. 
6. What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you agree to take part, you will complete an interview survey that should last for no more 
than 30 minutes. You will be interviewed by a researcher, who will ask you a series of 
questions which require you to compare hypothetical scenarios in which a health care 
decision maker must allocate resources to one of two treatments for ill health. A paper 
questionnaire will be used to provide illustrations of the scenarios and to record your 
responses. You will also be asked some questions about your thoughts and opinions about 
the exercise, as well as some questions about your experience of ill health. You will only be 
asked to participate in one interview. 
7. What do I have to do? 
You will be asked to answer a series of questions involving hypothetical scenarios. There 
are no right or wrong answers – we are simply seeking your views. 
8. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
Some participants may feel uncomfortable when asked to think about scenarios involving 
illness and death. However, previous research in this area has shown that participants are 
generally interested and engaged when taking part in these types of exercises.  
 
9. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
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All participants will be given a small cash payment for agreeing to take part in the study. 
You will also be contributing to research that will help health care decision makers to better 
understand the preferences of members of the general public. 
10. What if something goes wrong? 
Should you wish to raise a complaint regarding your treatment by researchers or any other 
aspect of the study, you should contact Professor Aki Tsuchiya 
(a.tsuchiya@sheffield.ac.uk), who will follow up on your complaint immediately. However, 
should you feel that your complaint has not been handled to your satisfaction, you can 
contact the University’s Registrar and Secretary (telephone: 0114 222 1100; email: 
registrar@sheffield.ac.uk). 
11. Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept 
strictly confidential. All survey responses will be anonymised, so you will not be identified in 
any reports or publications.  
12. What will happen to the results of the research project? 
The results of the project will be written up in a report for the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence (NICE), and will be published in academic journals and presented 
at conferences. You will not be identified in any reports or publications. The anonymised 
data collected during the course of the project may be used for additional or subsequent 
research and analysis. 
13. Who is organising and funding the research? 
The project is being organised by Allan Wailoo, Aki Tsuchiya, and Koonal Shah, of the 
University of Sheffield’s’ School of Health and Related Research. It has been funded by the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. The University has a contract with 
Accent, an experienced market research agency, to carry out the interviews for this project. 
14. Who has ethically reviewed the project? 
The project has been reviewed by the School of Health and Related Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Sheffield. 
15. Contact for further information 
For information regarding participant recruitment and co-ordination of the interview 
programme, please contact Koonal Shah (k.k.shah@sheffield.ac.uk; 07920 496832). For 
any other issues relating to the research project, please contact Professor Aki Tsuchiya 
(a.tsuchiya@sheffield.ac.uk; 0114 222 0710).  
If you wish to seek further information about the topics covered in this project, you may find 
it helpful to get in touch with the Dying Matters Coalition, a group set up by the National 
Council for Palliative Care. You can find information, resources and details of organisations 
providing support and counselling on their website, http://www.dyingmatters.org.  
16. Will I be recorded, and how will the recorded media be used? 
No, we will not take any audio or video recording of the interviews. 
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Appendix 8 Empirical study 3 instructions for standard 
tasks 
-- 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research project. 
The main survey consists of 12 questions about hypothetical scenarios. Once you 
have completed these questions, you will be asked some further questions about 
yourself. 
-- 
We are going to show you some hypothetical scenarios involving patients who are 
affected by illness. We will use the survey to ask you which patients you think the 
health service should treat. 
-- 
Illnesses and medical treatments affect people's health and how long they live. 
Different illnesses affect people's health and how long they live in different ways; 
and different treatments offer different types of benefits. 
We are going to use pictures to show these differences in illnesses and treatments. 
On the following pages, we will explain how the pictures work. 
-- 
 
We can represent time with a line starting from 0 and going on to the right into the 
future. 
Let's suppose that someone will live for 6 years from today. This can be shown by 
the line going from 0 years to 6 years. 
-- 
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We can also show how good someone's health is using a health scale, where 'dead' 
is 0% and 'full health' is 100%. 
Of course, full health for a young person may be different from full health for an 
elderly person. But to keep things simple, we show full health for everyone as 
100%. 
Someone who has health problems would have a health level of less than 100%. 
Suppose there is a health state which involves some health problems. If patients 
tell us that being in this health state for 2 years is equally desirable as being in 
full health for 1 year, then we would describe someone in this health state as 
being in 50% health. 
-- 
 
The blue area shows someone with an illness that gives the patient 3 years to live 
from today, without treatment. This is shown by the end of the area at 3 years. 
Note that the level of health is 100%, which represents full health. This means that 
although the illness leads to death in 3 years, it does not affect the patient's 
general health during those 3 years. 
-- 
 
This blue area shows another illness. Without treatment, the patient shown here 
will live for 3 years in 50% health, and then they will die. 
-- 
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The green area shows a treatment for that illness. The treatment shown here gives 
the patient an extra 1 year of life at the same level of health (50%). 
-- 
 
This treatment restores some of the patient's health (to 75%) but does not extend 
their life. 
-- 
 
This treatment improves the patient's health to 75% AND gives them an extra 1 
year of life. 
-- 
In the following questions you will asked to consider the situations of 2 hypothetical 
patients - patient A and patient B. 
The patients will have different illnesses that affect their level of health and length 
of life in different ways. 
The treatments available will also affect their health and length of life in different 
ways. 
Scroll down to see an example of how the information about patient A and patient B 
will be shown in the questions. 
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-- 
No other information about the patients is available, except that they are both 
adults. You should therefore consider them to be equal in all other respects. 
We want you to assume that the health service has only enough funds to treat one 
of the two patients, and that there are no alternative treatments available. 
Furthermore, the nature of the illnesses is such that further treatment will not be 
possible if either patient is not treated today - this is the only opportunity for 
treatment. 
We want you to tell us which patient you think should be treated. 
There are no right or wrong answers - we are simply seeking your view. 
-- 
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Appendix 9 Empirical study 3 instructions for 
extension tasks 
-- 
The next 2 questions will require you to consider slightly different scenarios. 
Just as before, the patients will have different illnesses that affect their health and 
length of life in different ways. 
But in these scenarios, one of the patients has known about their illness for 
some time while the other patient has only just learned of their illness. 
-- 
 
This patient was told 2 years ago that they have 5 years to live. This means that 
from today, they have 3 years to live, unless they receive treatment. 
Note that the blue area to the left of 0 years is at 100% health. This means that up 
until today, the illness has not affected the patient's general health. 
-- 
 
This patient has just been told about their illness. From today, they will live for 
3 years before dying, unless they receive treatment. 
The light blue area to the left of 0 years shows that the patient had no knowledge 
of their illness up until today. 
-- 
Once again, we want you to tell us which patient you think should be treated. 
-- 
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Appendix 10 Empirical study 3 information sheet 
 
Health care priority setting preference project 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide whether 
you wish to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being done and what it will involve. Please read the following information carefully 
and discuss it with others if you wish. Take time to decide whether or not you wish 
to take part. Thank you for reading this. 
What is the project’s purpose? 
The purpose of the project is to find out what the general public thinks about a 
range of hypothetical scenarios where the health service has to choose which types 
of treatment to allocate funding to. Better understanding of public preferences will 
help organisations such as the NHS to make decisions about which treatments to 
provide. 
Why have I been chosen? 
We are seeking to survey around 4,000 members of the general public. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part 
you will be asked to complete an informed consent form and you can still withdraw 
at any time. If you decide to stop, then any information that you have provided will 
be destroyed. You do not have to give a reason for not taking part. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you agree to take part, you will complete an online survey. The survey will 
involve looking at hypothetical scenarios in which a health care decision maker 
must allocate resources to one of two treatments for ill health. You will also be 
asked some questions about yourself. 
What do I have to do? 
You will be asked to answer a series of questions involving hypothetical scenarios. 
There are no right or wrong answers – we are simply seeking your views. 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
Some participants may feel uncomfortable when asked to think about scenarios 
involving illness and death. However, previous research in this area has shown that 
participants are generally interested and engaged when taking part in these types 
of exercises. Remember – you are free to withdraw from participating at any time. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will be contributing to research that will help health care decision makers to 
better understand the preferences of members of the general public. 
What if something goes wrong? 
Should you wish to raise a complaint about any aspect of the study, please send 
this to isabel@valuedopinions.co.uk. 
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Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will 
be kept strictly confidential. All survey responses will be anonymised, so you will 
not be identified in any reports or publications. 
What will happen to the results of the research project? 
The results of the project will be written up in a report for the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), and will be published in academic journals 
and presented at conferences. You will not be identified in any reports or 
publications. The anonymised data collected during the course of the project may 
be used for additional or subsequent research and analysis. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The project is being organised by Allan Wailoo, Aki Tsuchiya and Koonal Shah, of 
the University of Sheffield’s School of Health and Related Research. It has been 
funded by NICE. 
Who has ethically reviewed the project? 
The project has been reviewed by the School of Health and Related Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Sheffield. 
Contact for further information 
For further information about this survey, please contact Professor Aki Tsuchiya 
(a.tsuchiya@sheffield.ac.uk; 0114 222 0710). 
If you wish to seek further information about the topics covered in this project, you 
may find it helpful to get in touch with the Dying Matters Coalition, a group set up 
by the National Council for Palliative Care. You can find information, resources and 
details of organisations providing support and counselling on their website, 
http://www.dyingmatters.org. To speak to someone for cancer support over the 
telephone, you may call the Macmillan Support Line: 0808 808 0000 (free). 
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Appendix 11 Empirical studies 1, 2, 3 ethics approval 
Note: The letter below refers to the approval of empirical studies 1 and 2. Empirical 
study 3 was approved via email by the Chair of the ScHARR Ethics Committee (Dr 
Jennifer Burr) on the basis that it was the next phase of the project that had 
already been approved by the ScHARR Ethics Committee (Burr, J., 2011, personal 
communication, 12 December). 
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Appendix 12 Empirical study 3 estimated utility score 
and predicted probability of choice for all 
profiles 
Table 0-6. Estimated utility score and predicted probability of choice for all 110 profiles 
(complete version of Table 5-6)  
Rank 
LE 
without 
treatment 
(mths) 
QOL 
without 
treatment 
(%) 
LE 
gain 
(mths) 
QOL 
gain 
(%) 
QALYs 
without 
treatment 
QALYs 
gained  Utility Prob. 
 
Cumul. 
Prob. 
1 60 50 12 50 2.500 3.500 4.3445 0.1351 0.1351 
2 36 50 12 50 1.500 2.500 3.6380 0.0667 0.2018 
3 12 50 12 50 0.500 1.500 3.3041 0.0477 0.2495 
4 24 50 12 50 1.000 2.000 3.2848 0.0468 0.2964 
5 60 50 6 50 2.500 3.000 3.0554 0.0372 0.3336 
6 3 50 12 50 0.125 1.125 3.0392 0.0366 0.3702 
7 3 100 12 0 0.250 1.000 2.7498 0.0274 0.3976 
8 12 100 12 0 1.000 1.000 2.6977 0.0260 0.4237 
9 60 50 12 25 2.500 2.000 2.5973 0.0235 0.4472 
10 60 50 3 50 2.500 2.750 2.4109 0.0195 0.4668 
11 12 50 12 25 0.500 1.000 2.4022 0.0194 0.4861 
12 36 50 6 50 1.500 2.000 2.3490 0.0184 0.5045 
13 36 50 12 25 1.500 1.500 2.3135 0.0177 0.5222 
14 3 50 12 25 0.125 0.813 2.2958 0.0174 0.5396 
15 24 100 12 0 2.000 1.000 2.2557 0.0167 0.5564 
16 60 50 2 50 2.500 2.667 2.1961 0.0158 0.5721 
17 36 100 12 0 3.000 1.000 2.1862 0.0156 0.5878 
18 24 50 12 25 1.000 1.250 2.1716 0.0154 0.6031 
19 60 100 12 0 5.000 1.000 2.0474 0.0136 0.6167 
20 12 50 6 50 0.500 1.000 2.0150 0.0132 0.6299 
21 24 50 6 50 1.000 1.500 1.9957 0.0129 0.6428 
22 60 50 1 50 2.500 2.583 1.9812 0.0127 0.6555 
23 60 50 0 50 2.500 2.500 1.7664 0.0103 0.6658 
24 3 50 6 50 0.125 0.625 1.7501 0.0101 0.6759 
25 36 50 3 50 1.500 1.750 1.7045 0.0096 0.6855 
26 60 50 6 25 2.500 1.625 1.6535 0.0092 0.6947 
27 3 100 6 0 0.250 0.500 1.5527 0.0083 0.7029 
28 3 50 12 0 0.125 0.500 1.5525 0.0083 0.7112 
29 12 100 6 0 1.000 0.500 1.5006 0.0079 0.7191 
30 12 50 12 0 0.500 0.500 1.5004 0.0079 0.7270 
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Rank 
LE 
without 
treatment 
(mths) 
QOL 
without 
treatment 
(%) 
LE 
gain 
(mths) 
QOL 
gain 
(%) 
QALYs 
without 
treatment 
QALYs 
gained  Utility Prob. 
 
Cumul. 
Prob. 
31 36 50 2 50 1.500 1.667 1.4896 0.0078 0.7347 
32 12 50 6 25 0.500 0.625 1.4585 0.0075 0.7423 
33 12 50 3 50 0.500 0.750 1.3705 0.0069 0.7492 
34 36 50 6 25 1.500 1.125 1.3697 0.0069 0.7561 
35 3 50 6 25 0.125 0.438 1.3520 0.0068 0.7629 
36 24 50 3 50 1.000 1.250 1.3512 0.0068 0.7696 
37 36 50 1 50 1.500 1.583 1.2748 0.0063 0.7759 
38 24 50 6 25 1.000 0.875 1.2278 0.0060 0.7819 
39 60 50 3 25 2.500 1.438 1.1816 0.0057 0.7876 
40 24 50 2 50 1.000 1.167 1.1364 0.0055 0.7931 
41 3 50 3 50 0.125 0.375 1.1056 0.0053 0.7984 
42 36 50 0 50 1.500 1.500 1.0599 0.0051 0.8034 
43 24 100 6 0 2.000 0.500 1.0587 0.0051 0.8085 
44 24 50 12 0 1.000 0.500 1.0584 0.0051 0.8135 
45 60 50 2 25 2.500 1.375 1.0243 0.0049 0.8184 
46 36 100 6 0 3.000 0.500 0.9892 0.0047 0.8231 
47 36 50 12 0 1.500 0.500 0.9890 0.0047 0.8278 
48 12 50 3 25 0.500 0.438 0.9866 0.0047 0.8325 
49 3 100 3 0 0.250 0.250 0.9542 0.0046 0.8371 
50 3 50 6 0 0.125 0.250 0.9539 0.0046 0.8417 
51 24 50 1 50 1.000 1.083 0.9215 0.0044 0.8461 
52 12 100 3 0 1.000 0.250 0.9021 0.0043 0.8504 
53 12 50 6 0 0.500 0.250 0.9019 0.0043 0.8547 
54 36 50 3 25 1.500 0.938 0.8978 0.0043 0.8590 
55 3 50 3 25 0.125 0.250 0.8801 0.0042 0.8632 
56 60 50 1 25 2.500 1.313 0.8670 0.0042 0.8674 
57 60 100 6 0 5.000 0.500 0.8503 0.0041 0.8715 
58 60 50 12 0 2.500 0.500 0.8501 0.0041 0.8756 
59 12 50 2 50 0.500 0.667 0.7832 0.0038 0.8795 
60 24 50 3 25 1.000 0.688 0.7559 0.0037 0.8832 
61 36 50 2 25 1.500 0.875 0.7405 0.0037 0.8869 
62 60 50 0 25 2.500 1.250 0.7097 0.0036 0.8904 
63 24 50 0 50 1.000 1.000 0.7067 0.0036 0.8940 
64 3 50 3 0 0.125 0.125 0.6547 0.0034 0.8974 
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Rank 
LE 
without 
treatment 
(mths) 
QOL 
without 
treatment 
(%) 
LE 
gain 
(mths) 
QOL 
gain 
(%) 
QALYs 
without 
treatment 
QALYs 
gained  Utility Prob. 
 
Cumul. 
Prob. 
65 12 50 3 0 0.500 0.125 0.6026 0.0032 0.9006 
66 24 50 2 25 1.000 0.625 0.5986 0.0032 0.9038 
67 36 50 1 25 1.500 0.813 0.5832 0.0031 0.9069 
68 12 50 1 50 0.500 0.583 0.5683 0.0031 0.9100 
69 3 50 2 50 0.125 0.292 0.5182 0.0029 0.9129 
70 24 100 3 0 2.000 0.250 0.4601 0.0028 0.9157 
71 24 50 6 0 1.000 0.250 0.4599 0.0028 0.9185 
72 12 50 2 25 0.500 0.375 0.4567 0.0028 0.9213 
73 24 50 1 25 1.000 0.563 0.4413 0.0027 0.9240 
74 36 50 0 25 1.500 0.750 0.4259 0.0027 0.9267 
75 36 100 3 0 3.000 0.250 0.3907 0.0026 0.9293 
76 36 50 6 0 1.500 0.250 0.3904 0.0026 0.9319 
77 3 100 2 0 0.250 0.167 0.3822 0.0026 0.9344 
78 12 50 0 50 0.500 0.500 0.3535 0.0025 0.9369 
79 3 50 2 25 0.125 0.188 0.3503 0.0025 0.9394 
80 12 100 2 0 1.000 0.167 0.3301 0.0024 0.9419 
81 3 50 1 50 0.125 0.208 0.3034 0.0024 0.9442 
82 12 50 1 25 0.500 0.313 0.2994 0.0024 0.9466 
83 24 50 0 25 1.000 0.500 0.2840 0.0023 0.9489 
84 24 100 2 0 2.000 0.167 0.2606 0.0023 0.9512 
85 60 100 3 0 5.000 0.250 0.2518 0.0023 0.9535 
86 60 50 6 0 2.500 0.250 0.2515 0.0023 0.9557 
87 3 50 1 25 0.125 0.125 0.1930 0.0021 0.9578 
88 36 100 2 0 3.000 0.167 0.1912 0.0021 0.9600 
89 3 100 1 0 0.250 0.083 0.1827 0.0021 0.9621 
90 3 50 2 0 0.125 0.083 0.1824 0.0021 0.9642 
91 24 50 3 0 1.000 0.125 0.1606 0.0021 0.9662 
92 12 50 0 25 0.500 0.250 0.1421 0.0020 0.9683 
93 12 100 1 0 1.000 0.083 0.1306 0.0020 0.9703 
94 12 50 2 0 0.500 0.083 0.1303 0.0020 0.9723 
95 36 50 3 0 1.500 0.125 0.0912 0.0019 0.9742 
96 3 50 0 50 0.125 0.125 0.0886 0.0019 0.9761 
97 3 50 1 0 0.125 0.042 0.0826 0.0019 0.9780 
98 24 100 1 0 2.000 0.083 0.0611 0.0019 0.9799 
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Rank 
LE 
without 
treatment 
(mths) 
QOL 
without 
treatment 
(%) 
LE 
gain 
(mths) 
QOL 
gain 
(%) 
QALYs 
without 
treatment 
QALYs 
gained  Utility Prob. 
 
Cumul. 
Prob. 
99 24 50 2 0 1.000 0.083 0.0609 0.0019 0.9817 
100 60 100 2 0 5.000 0.167 0.0523 0.0018 0.9836 
101 3 50 0 25 0.125 0.063 0.0357 0.0018 0.9854 
102 12 50 1 0 0.500 0.042 0.0306 0.0018 0.9872 
103 36 100 1 0 3.000 0.083 -0.0083 0.0017 0.9889 
104 36 50 2 0 1.500 0.083 -0.0086 0.0017 0.9907 
105 24 50 1 0 1.000 0.042 -0.0389 0.0017 0.9924 
106 60 50 3 0 2.500 0.125 -0.0477 0.0017 0.9940 
107 36 50 1 0 1.500 0.042 -0.1083 0.0016 0.9956 
108 60 100 1 0 5.000 0.083 -0.1472 0.0015 0.9971 
109 60 50 2 0 2.500 0.083 -0.1475 0.0015 0.9986 
110 60 50 1 0 2.500 0.042 -0.2472 0.0014 1.0000 
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Appendix 13 Empirical study 3 analysis of respondent 
choice strategies and background 
characteristics 
The overall results of empirical study 3 indicate that choices about which patient to 
treat are influenced more by the sizes of the health gains achievable from 
treatment than by patients’ life expectancy or quality of life in absence of 
treatment. However, whilst this conclusion may reflect the ‘average’ view of the 
sample, it is likely that a variety of different strategies were used by different 
groups of respondents when completing the choice tasks. It may be that whilst 
many respondents support a QALY-maximisation type objective, there are other 
groups of respondents who consistently prefer to treat those who are worse off 
without treatment, or who advocate a mixture of the two approaches. It has also 
been observed that respondents in stated preference studies often fail to make 
trade-offs between attributes, instead basing their choices on simple rules or 
heuristics (Araña et al., 2008). The additional analysis described in this appendix 
seeks to define subgroups of respondents according to the nature of their choices, 
and to shed light on some of the potential determinants of belonging to one or 
other of these subgroups. 
Twelve different choice strategies that respondents might follow when faced with 
these sorts of choice sets were identified a priori (Table 0-7). The first six are 
concerned with choosing the profile associated with larger health gains from 
treatment; and the final six are concerned with choosing the profile associated with 
poorer health without treatment; all of these are examples of very simple decision 
rules that respondents might adopt. One would expect an advocate of NICE’s policy 
of giving higher priority to life-extending end of life treatments to consistently 
follow strategy 8 (choose patient with less life expectancy without treatment) and 
strategy 2 (choose patient with larger life expectancy gain).  
Choice strategies 4, 5 and 6 refer to choice sets in which both patients have a 
‘similar’ number of QALYs without treatment. Likewise, choice strategies 10, 11 and 
12 refer to choice sets in which both patients gain a ‘similar’ number of QALYs from 
treatment. The former are defined as instances where the difference between the 
better off patient and the worse off patient (in terms of their health without 
treatment) is less than or equal to 0.750 QALYs. The latter are defined as instances 
where the difference between the larger gain and the smaller gain is less than or 
equal to 0.917 QALYs. The reason why these particular cut-offs were used was a 
practical one – it meant that the same number of choice sets were captured by 
either rule (in 86 of the 160 choice sets, the patients had similar QALYs without 
treatment; likewise, in 86 of the 160 choice sets, the treatments offered similar 
QALY gains). The general results below are not sensitive to the choice of cut-offs 
used. 
For each of the 160 choice sets, it was determined which choice (if any) would be 
consistent with each of the 12 strategies. The 10 choice sets faced by each 
individual respondent was then examined in order to determine whether or not 
their actual choices were consistent with each of the strategies. All 3,969 
respondents faced the possibility of following or not following each of the 12 
strategies on at each one occasion. The experimental design ensured that the 
patients always differed in terms of at least two of the four attributes. Hence, it was 
possible to follow or not follow several of the 12 strategies in any given choice set.  
The third column in Table 0-7 shows the overall proportion of choices made by 
respondents that were consistent with each strategy when that strategy was 
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possible. A value of 1 in this column would indicate that on every occasion that 
respondents faced a choice set in which it was possible to follow the relevant 
strategy, they did indeed follow that strategy. The fourth, fifth and sixth columns 
show the number and proportion of respondents who never, sometimes and always 
followed each strategy, respectively. The proportions were calculated by using as 
the denominator the total number of respondents who faced at least one choice set 
in which it was possible to follow the relevant strategy. To ‘never follow’ a given 
strategy means to always follow the opposite strategy – for example, a respondent 
who always chose to treat the patient with greater QALYs without treatment can be 
said to have never followed strategy 7. Clearly, these statistics become less 
meaningful when the number of choice sets in which it was possible to follow a 
given strategy is very small (for example, 12.6% and 25.1% of respondents faced 
only one choice set in which it was possible to follow strategies 11 and 12, 
respectively).   
Table 0-7: Summary of different choice strategies and how consistently they were followed by 
respondents 
Choice strategy Min / mean / 
max number 
of choice sets 
faced by 
respondents 
in which 
strategy was 
available 
Prop. 
choices 
made 
according 
to this 
strategy 
(when 
available) 
n (prop.) 
respondents 
who never 
followed this 
strategy 
n (prop.) 
respondents 
who 
sometimes 
followed this 
strategy 
n (prop.) 
respondents 
who always 
followed this 
strategy 
1 Choose patient 
with larger QALY 
gain 
8 / 9.6 / 10  0.75 1 (0.000) 3,530 (0.889) 438 (0.110) 
2 Choose patient 
with larger LE 
gain 
4 / 5.2 / 7 0.69 20 (0.005) 3,405 (0.858) 544 (0.137) 
3 Choose patient 
with larger QOL 
gain 
8 / 8.3 / 9 0.70 2 (0.001) 3,640 (0.917) 327 (0.082) 
 
4 
Choose patient 
with larger QALY 
gain when both 
have similar 
QALYs without 
treatment 
3 / 5.0 / 7 0.78 29 (0.007) 2,449 (0.617) 1491 (0.376) 
 
5 
Choose patient 
with larger LE 
gain when both 
have similar 
QALYs without 
treatment 
3 / 4.0 / 5 0.71 32 (0.008) 3,106 (0.783) 
 
831 (0.209) 
 
 
6 
Choose patient 
with larger QOL 
gain when both 
have similar 
QALYs without 
treatment 
4 / 4.6 / 6 0.70 21 (0.005) 3,107 (0.783) 841 (0.212) 
7 Choose patient 
with fewer QALYs 
without treatment 
6 / 7.2 / 8 0.47 182 (0.046) 3,701 (0.932) 86 (0.022) 
8 Choose patient 
with less LE 
without treatment 
5 / 5.6 / 6 0.45 355 (0.089) 3,434 (0.865) 180 (0.045) 
9 Choose patient 
with less QOL 
without treatment 
3 / 3.6 / 4 0.54 276 (0.070) 3,074 (0.775) 619 (0.156) 
 
10 
Choose patient 
with fewer QALYs 
2 / 4.1 / 6 0.51 457 (0.115) 3,051 (0.769) 461 (0.116) 
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Choice strategy Min / mean / 
max number 
of choice sets 
faced by 
respondents 
in which 
strategy was 
available 
Prop. 
choices 
made 
according 
to this 
strategy 
(when 
available) 
n (prop.) 
respondents 
who never 
followed this 
strategy 
n (prop.) 
respondents 
who 
sometimes 
followed this 
strategy 
n (prop.) 
respondents 
who always 
followed this 
strategy 
without treatment 
when both  
gain similar QALYs 
from treatment 
 
11 
Choose patient 
with less LE 
without treatment 
when both gain 
similar QALYs 
from treatment 
1 / 2.9 / 4 0.52 891 (0.224) 2,101 (0.529) 977 (0.246) 
 
12 
Choose patient 
with less QOL 
without treatment 
when both gain 
similar QALYs 
from treatment 
1 / 2.7 / 4 0.50 732 (0.184) 2,366 (0.596) 871 (0.219) 
This analysis reinforces the finding that concern for achieving larger health gains 
generally trumps concerns about treating the patient who is most severely ill or 
closest to their end of life. Respondents chose to treat the worse off patient (or the 
patient with shorter life expectancy) in less than 50% of all instances (strategies 7 
and 8). The propensity to choose to treat the worse off patient increases only very 
slightly when analysis is restricted to choice sets in which both patients gain similar 
QALYs from treatment (strategies 10 and 11).   
Moreover, 891 respondents (22.4%) never chose strategy 11 (that is, they never 
chose to treat the patient with shorter life expectancy) even when the gains from 
treating that patient were similar to those from treating the patient with longer life 
expectancy. Hence, there is a sizeable number of respondents who appear to 
actively reject the concept of giving priority to those at the end of life. This is 
consistent with the findings of empirical study 2. 
Although the majority of respondents support a variety of different objectives when 
making choices about which patient to treat, there appear to be subgroups of 
respondents who hold opposing views from each other. It may be possible to 
predict whether or not a given respondent holds a particular view about priority-
setting using information about their sociodemographic or health background.  
Table 0-8 summarises the background characteristics of subgroups of respondents 
who consistently followed certain choice strategies that are of particular interest for 
this study. The summary statistics suggest that these subgroups are similar to each 
other and to the full sample with respect to most of the characteristics. A notable 
exception is that of age – the respondents who always support giving priority to the 
severely ill and/or to those at the end of life are somewhat younger than the 
respondents who reject such strategies. Respondents who support giving priority to 
the patient with fewer QALYs without treatment have lower levels of life satisfaction 
than do respondents who reject such strategies (two-sample t-test; p<0.05). 
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Table 0-8: Characteristics of respondents who always/never followed selected choice 
strategies 
Characteristic 
Always 
follow 
strategy 7 
(always 
choose 
patient 
with least 
QALYs 
without 
treatment) 
(n=86) 
Never 
follow 
strategy 7 
(never 
choose 
patient 
with least 
QALYs 
without 
treatment) 
(n=182) 
Always 
follow 
strategy 8 
(always 
choose 
patient 
with least 
LE without 
treatment) 
(n=180) 
Never 
follow 
strategy 8 
(never 
choose 
patient 
with least 
LE without 
treatment) 
(n=355) 
Overall 
sample 
(n=3,969) 
Age  Mean years 40.7 53.8 41.7 55.5 48.9 
Gender  % female 57% 47% 60% 42% 51% 
Social grade  Mean;  
1=A, 6=DE 
3.35 3.49 3.49 3.48 3.31 
Children % Yes 47% 34% 39% 33% 38% 
Education 
past school 
leaving age  
% Yes 85% 67% 82% 68% 78% 
Education to 
degree level  
% Yes 45% 38% 43% 38% 46% 
General 
health  
Mean;  
1=Very good; 
5=Very poor 
2.00 2.00 2.06 2.17 2.06 
Health 
limitations  
Mean; 
 1=Limited a lot; 
3=Not limited 
2.72 2.65 2.63 2.50 2.61 
Mobility  Mean;  
1=No problems; 
5=Extreme 
problems 
1.15 1.38 1.29 1.55 1.41 
Self-care  Mean;  
1=No problems; 
5=Extreme 
problems 
1.07 1.08 1.07 1.18 1.13 
Usual 
activities  
Mean;  
1=No problems; 
5=Extreme 
problems 
1.28 1.36 1.35 1.54 1.42 
Pain/ 
discomfort  
Mean;  
1=No problems; 
5=Extreme 
problems 
1.45 1.67 1.57 1.89 1.72 
Anxiety/ 
depression  
Mean;  
1=No problems; 
5=Extreme 
problems 
1.70 1.49 1.76 1.61 1.59 
Health 
satisfaction  
Mean;  
0=Completely 
dissatisfied;  
10=Completely 
satisfied 
6.85 6.95 6.82 6.59 6.93 
Life 
satisfaction  
Mean;  
0=Completely 
dissatisfied;  
10=Completely 
satisfied 
6.91 7.38 6.79 7.08 7.09 
Experience 
of terminal 
illness  
% Yes 60% 66% 60% 70% 66% 
In order to identify the driving factor(s) behind respondents’ membership of the 
‘always follow choice strategy 7’ and ‘never follow choice strategy 7’ subgroups, the 
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data were modelled using multinomial logit regressions. The model included 
‘category’ as the dependent variable (1 = respondent sometimes follows choice 
strategy 7; 2 = respondent always follows choice strategy 7; 3 = respondent never 
follows choice strategy 7) and all of the background characteristics as the 
individual-specific explanatory variables. Marginal effects were then computed to 
show the change in the probability of belonging to either category 2 (as opposed to 
categories 1 and 3) or category 3 (as opposed to categories 1 and 2) following a 
marginal change in one of the explanatory variables. The results are shown in Table 
0-9 and Table 0-10. 
Table 0-9: Marginal effects for category 2 (change in probability of belonging to the ‘always 
follow choice strategy 7’ subgroup (n=3,969) 
Variable Marginal effect p-value 
Age  -0.0002821 0.033 
Gender  0.0016252 0.685 
Social grade  0.0003300 0.826 
Children 0.0010360 0.683 
Education past school leaving age  -0.0068714 0.229 
Education to degree level  0.0027102 0.518 
General health  0.0005779 0.869 
Health limitations  -0.0015464 0.769 
Mobility  -0.0119115 0.027 
Self-care  0.0051298 0.501 
Usual activities  0.0003138 0.949 
Pain / discomfort  -0.0061657 0.085 
Anxiety / depression  0.0011895 0.639 
Health satisfaction  -0.0024644 0.065 
Life satisfaction  0.0005622 0.642 
Experience of terminal illness  0.0004673 0.898 
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Table 0-10: Marginal effects for category 3 (change in probability of belonging to the ‘never 
follow choice strategy 7’ subgroup (n=3,969) 
Variable Marginal effect p-value 
Age  0.0009494 0.000 
Gender  -0.0026001 0.674 
Social grade  0.0031572 0.152 
Children 0.0015610 0.734 
Education past school leaving age  0.0128890 0.080 
Education to degree level  0.0055896 0.431 
General health  -0.0107651 0.055 
Health limitations  0.0046483 0.581 
Mobility  0.0015486 0.823 
Self-care  -0.0093990 0.378 
Usual activities  -0.0019084 0.806 
Pain / discomfort  -0.0050063 0.357 
Anxiety / depression  0.0003044 0.947 
Health satisfaction  -0.0051820 0.013 
Life satisfaction  0.0024120 0.237 
Experience of terminal illness  0.0027552 0.648 
For example, with respect to category 2, the marginal effect of age is -0.00028, 
and is statistically significant at the 5% level. This can be interpreted as follows: as 
age increases by one unit (year), the probability of always choosing the patient 
with fewest QALYs decreases by 0.00028. Similarly, with respect to category 3, the 
marginal effect of age is 0.00095, and is also statistically significant. This means 
that as age increases by one year, the probability of never choosing the patient 
with fewest QALYs increases by 0.00095. It is worth noting that although the 
marginal effect of age is statistically significant, it is small in practical terms. All 
else equal, even a 30-year increase in age would not be sufficient for a 1% change 
in the probability of always choosing the patient with fewest QALYs. Including an 
age squared explanatory variable in the model reduces the statistical significance of 
the marginal effects of age but does not affect their signs. 
Other than age, it is worth noting that the marginal effect of the health satisfaction 
variable is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level with respect to 
both category 2 and category 3. The means that as health satisfaction increases by 
one unit, the probability of always choosing the patient with fewest QALYs 
decreases, as does the probability of never choosing the patient with fewest QALYs. 
Again, however, the actual changes in probability are very small. 
The marginal effects of most of the other variables are not statistically significant. 
This suggests that the other background characteristics do not appear particularly 
likely to determine whether the respondent always or never follows the strategy of 
choosing the patient with fewest QALYs.   
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Table 0-11 and Table 0-12 use the same method to identify the driving factor(s) 
behind respondents’ membership of the ‘always follow choice strategy 8’ and ‘never 
follow choice strategy 8’ subgroups.  
Table 0-11: Marginal effects for category 2 (change in probability of belonging to the ‘always 
follow choice strategy 8’ subgroup (n=3,969) 
Variable Marginal effect p-value 
Age  -0.0006512 0.001 
Gender  0.0107338 0.091 
Social grade  0.0028863 0.213 
Children -0.0022585 0.598 
Education past school leaving age  -0.0105657 0.220 
Education to degree level  0.0054587 0.417 
General health  0.0030304 0.591 
Health limitations  -0.0107831 0.171 
Mobility  -0.0021591 0.765 
Self-care  -0.0165401 0.164 
Usual activities  -0.0031122 0.676 
Pain / discomfort  -0.0096205 0.081 
Anxiety / depression  0.0053571 0.174 
Health satisfaction  -0.0016267 0.471 
Life satisfaction  -0.0001371 0.943 
Experience of terminal illness  0.0030492 0.599 
Table 0-12: Marginal effects for category 3 (change in probability of belonging to the ‘never 
follow choice strategy 8’ subgroup (n=3,969) 
Variable Marginal effect p-value 
Age  0.0022183 0.000 
Gender  -0.0199488 0.018 
Social grade  0.0039996 0.181 
Children 0.0076284 0.220 
Education past school leaving age  0.0152432 0.129 
Education to degree level  0.0157259 0.100 
General health  -0.0143061 0.061 
Health limitations  -0.0011434 0.916 
Mobility  -0.0046376 0.592 
Self-care  0.0040344 0.714 
Usual activities  -0.0004983 0.958 
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Variable Marginal effect p-value 
Pain / discomfort  0.0057664 0.402 
Anxiety / depression  0.0047326 0.412 
Health satisfaction  -0.0056320 0.058 
Life satisfaction  0.0012172 0.652 
Experience of terminal illness  -0.0012765 0.880 
 
Again, with respect to category 2, the marginal effect of age is negative and 
statistically significant; and with respect to category 3, the marginal effect of age is 
positive and statistically significant. This means that as age increases by one year, 
the probability of always choosing the patient with less life expectancy decreases 
while the probability of never choosing the patient with less life expectancy 
increases. Again, including an age squared explanatory variable in the model 
reduces the statistical significance of the marginal effects of age but does not affect 
their signs. 
The marginal effects of most of the other variables are not statistically significant. 
An exception to this is the marginal effect of gender, which is positive with respect 
to category 2 and negative with respect to category 3. This means that as gender 
changes from male to female, the probability of always choosing the patient with 
less life expectancy increases whilst the probability of never choosing the patient 
with less life expectancy decreases.  
The analysis in this appendix shows that the sample comprises multiple subgroups 
with clearly opposing views about priority-setting – for example, 8.9% of 
respondents always chose to treat the patient with longer life expectancy while 
4.5% respondents always chose to treat the patient with shorter life expectancy. 
However, membership of these subgroups is not particularly well predicted by the 
observable characteristics on which information was collected in this study. This is 
consistent with the findings of the subgroup analysis that showed that excluding 
from the sample respondents with experience of close friends or family members 
with terminal illness, or respondents with responsibility with children, did not have 
a major impact on the regression results. There may be characteristics that are 
more difficult to observe (such as personal and cultural values) which are driving 
respondents’ preferences and choice strategies.
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Appendix 14 Empirical study 4 instructions for visual aid 
arm 
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Appendix 15  Empirical study 4 instructions for no visual 
aid arm 
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Appendix 16  Empirical study 4 survey instrument  
Note: These screenshots are taken from the forced choice, visual aid arm. 
Scenario S1 
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Scenario S2 
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Scenario S3 
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Scenario S4 
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Scenario S5 
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Scenario S6 
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Scenario S7 
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Follow-up question after having chosen a life-extending gain in a given scenario 
 
Follow-up question after having chosen a QOL-improving gain in a given scenario 
 
Follow-up question after having chosen smaller gain in scenario 7 
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Feedback / self-reported difficulty questions 
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Scenario 8 (individual perspective) 
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Attitudinal questions
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Background questions 
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End screen 
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Appendix 17 Empirical study 4 information sheet 
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Appendix 18 Empirical study 4 pilot interview guide 
 
Health Priorities Survey – Questions for participants 
ID:  
 
General feedback on survey 
(“I will begin with some general questions about the survey.”) 
1. How did you find the survey? 
 
2. Do you feel you understood the questions you were asked? 
 
3. Did the instructions adequately prepare you for the questions? 
 
Feedback on scenarios / choice tasks 
(“I will now ask you about the hypothetical scenarios, in which you were asked to 
choose which patient the health service should treat.”) 
4. <Show wording of indifference option> What did you think about the option that 
did not involve choosing to treat either patient A or patient B? 
 
5. <Show example diagram> What did you think about the diagrams used to 
illustrate the scenarios? 
 
6. <Show example second question> In each scenario, after choosing which 
patient you thought should be treated, you were asked what size that patient’s 
gain from treatment would need to be for both patients to have equal priority. 
Was this clear? 
 
7. <Show example second question> You were then asked to select your response 
from a list. Did the response you had in mind appear in this list? 
 
8. <Show S3> This scenario asked you to consider one patient who has just been 
diagnosed with an illness and another who has known about their illness for five 
years. How did you find this scenario, compared to the other scenarios? 
 
9. <Show S6> This scenario asked you to consider two patients whose illnesses do 
not affect how long they will live for, and any benefits from treatment would not 
take place for another 30 years. How did you find this scenario, compared to 
the other scenarios?  
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10. <Show S8> This scenario asked you to imagine that you could be one of the 
patients in need of treatment, and therefore focused on your own life rather 
than on the lives of others. How did you find this scenario, compared to the 
other scenarios? 
 
Feedback on attitudinal questions 
(“I will now ask about the questions that followed the hypothetical scenarios.”) 
11. <Show attitudinal questions> These questions asked you to indicate the extent 
to which you agreed or disagreed with a particular statement. What did you 
think of these questions? 
 
General feedback on survey 
12. Do you have any other suggestions for improving the survey? 
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Appendix 19 Empirical study 4 ethics approval 
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Appendix 20 Empirical study 4 follow-up question 
responses 
In the following charts (Figure 0-1 to Figure 0-10), each bar refers to the 
proportion of all respondents in the relevant arm (excluding those who expressed 
indifference in their initial choice, and therefore did not proceed to the follow-up 
question) who selected the specified value as their point of indifference. The graphs 
for S4, S5 and S6 are split between respondents who initially chose the life 
extension option and respondents who initially chose the quality of life 
improvement option.  
Figure 0-1. S1 follow-up question responses (initial choice: 12-mth life extension) – n=1,770 
 
Figure 0-2. S2 follow-up question responses (initial choice: 12-mth life extension) – n=1,984 
 
Figure 0-3. S3 follow-up question responses (initial choice: 12-mth life extension) – n=1,676 
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Figure 0-4. S4 follow-up question responses (initial choice: 12-mth life extension) – n=685 
 
Figure 0-5. S4 follow-up question responses (initial choice: 50% QOL improvement) – 
n=1,094 
 
Figure 0-6. S5 follow-up question responses (initial choice: 12-mth life extension) – n=852 
 
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
<1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Size of gain (months) at respondent's point of indifference
Forced Ind1 Ind2
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
<10 10 20 30 40 50
Size of gain (%QOL) at respondent's point of indifference
Forced Ind1 Ind2
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
<1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Size of gain (months) at respondent's point of indifference
Forced Ind1 Ind2
311 
 
Figure 0-7. S5 follow-up question responses (initial choice: 50% QOL improvement) – 
n=1,030 
 
Figure 0-8. S6 follow-up question responses (initial choice: 12-mth life extension) – n=545 
 
Figure 0-9. S6 follow-up question responses (initial choice: 50% QOL improvement) – 
n=1,167 
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Figure 0-10. S7 follow-up question responses (initial choice: 6- or 12- mth life extension) – 
n=1,700 
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Appendix 21 Tabular comparison of empirical studies 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Note: The fields in this table are the same as those in Table 2-1. 
Study  Empirical study 1 Empirical study 2 Empirical study 3 Empirical study 4 
Year of publication Not fully published 2014 2015 Not fully published 
Year of study 
conduct 
2011 2011 2012 2016 
Country or countries 
of origin of data 
UK (England) UK (England) UK (England and Wales) UK 
Sample size 21 50 3,969 2,401 
Type of sample University staff and students Public Public Public 
Sample recruitment 
process 
Flyers and email invitations Door-knock Internet panel Internet panel 
Criteria for excluding 
respondents and/or 
observations 
reported? 
No No Yes – excluded respondents who 
spent insufficient time completing 
the survey 
Yes – excluded respondents who 
spent insufficient time completing 
the survey 
Mode of 
administration 
Non-computer-assisted personal 
interview 
Non-computer-assisted personal 
interview 
Internet survey Internet survey 
Summary of primary 
study objective(s) 
To pilot an approach for testing 
for support for end of life 
prioritisation 
To test for support for end of life 
prioritisation 
To test for support for end of life 
prioritisation 
To test for framing effects in the 
elicitation of preferences 
regarding end of life 
Was end of life (or a 
related term) 
mentioned explicitly 
in the study 
objectives? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Study  Empirical study 1 Empirical study 2 Empirical study 3 Empirical study 4 
Pilot reported? No (the study itself was a pilot) Yes Yes Yes 
Preference elicitation 
technique 
Other choice exercise Other choice exercise Discrete choice experiment Other choice exercise 
Perspective Social decision-maker Social decision-maker Social decision-maker Both – study included one task 
that was an own health 
perspective operationalisation of 
an earlier social decision-maker 
perspective task 
End of life definition Life expectancy without treatment Life expectancy without treatment Life expectancy without 
treatment; dummy variable in the 
modelling representing the cut-
offs associated with NICE criteria 
Life expectancy without treatment 
Life expectancy 
without treatment 
attribute levels 
1yr, 10yrs 1yr, 10yrs 3mths, 12mths, 24mths, 36mths, 
60mths 
1yr, 5yrs, 30yrs 
Life expectancy gain 
from treatment 
attribute levels 
6mths, 1yr 6mths, 1yr 0mths, 1mth, 2mths, 3mths, 
6mths, 12mths 
6mths, 1yr 
Was disease labelled 
or named? 
No No No No 
Did the study 
examine whether 
quality of life-
improving or life-
extending 
treatments are 
preferred for end of 
life patients? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
What were 
respondents 
Which of two patients to treat Which of two patients to treat Which of two patients to treat Which of two patients to treat 
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Study  Empirical study 1 Empirical study 2 Empirical study 3 Empirical study 4 
choosing between 
(or choosing to do)? 
Was it possible to 
express indifference? 
Yes – an ‘I have no preference’ 
option was available (but not 
listed with same prominence as 
other response options) 
Yes – an ‘I have no preference’ 
option was available 
No Yes (in four of six arms; 
n=1,594); no (in two of six arms; 
n=807; for these respondents 
indifference could be expressed 
indirectly in a follow-up question) 
Were visual aids 
used? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes (in three of six arms; 
n=1,202); no (in three of six 
arms; n=1,199) 
Strength of 
preference examined 
at the individual 
respondent level? 
No No No Yes – using benefit trade-off type 
approach 
Number of tasks 
completed by each 
respondent 
5 6 10 (+2 further tasks examining 
the issue of preparedness) 
8 (+attitudinal questions) 
Time taken to 
complete survey 
reported? 
Yes – between 20 and 35 minutes No No Yes – 17 minutes on average 
Summary of finding: 
end of life vs. non-
end of life 
Evidence consistent with an end 
of life premium 
Evidence consistent with an end 
of life premium 
Evidence not consistent with an 
end of life premium 
Evidence not consistent with an 
end of life premium 
Summary of finding: 
quality of life 
improvement vs. life 
extension 
Quality of life improvement 
preferred 
Quality of life improvement 
preferred 
Life extension preferred Quality of life improvement 
preferred 
Other results of 
potential interest 
Various insights into how design 
of an end of life preference study 
can be improved – e.g. explicit 
No evidence that age- or time-
related preferences are 
motivating factors for choosing to 
Majority of respondents supported 
a mixture of the QALY-
maximisation and priority-to-
Respondents’ choices found to be 
sensitive to the inclusion of 
indifference options and the use 
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Study  Empirical study 1 Empirical study 2 Empirical study 3 Empirical study 4 
inclusion of an indifference 
option; some respondents 
reported that their views may be 
influenced by the life stages of 
the patients 
treat end of life patient; no 
evidence that concern about the 
life stage of end of life patients is 
a motivating factor for preferring 
either life-extending or quality of 
life-improving treatments for 
those patients 
worst-off approaches to priority-
setting 
of alternative study perspectives; 
preference for treating the end of 
life patient weakened when that 
patient is older than and/or has 
known about their prognosis for 
longer than the non-end of life 
patient 
Other factors 
examined 
Age, time preference Age, time preference  Quality of life without treatment, 
preparedness 
Age, preparedness, perspective, 
framing effects 
Impact of 
background 
characteristics 
reported? 
No No Yes – no characteristics found to 
be associated with preferences 
Yes – respondents who are 
younger, have children and have 
experience of terminal illness 
were more likely to favour 
treating the end of life patient 
Were qualitative 
data or explanatory 
factors sought? 
Yes – respondents answered 
probing debrief questions as part 
of interview 
Yes – respondents indicated the 
reasons for their choices by 
choosing from a list 
No / not reported Yes – via attitudinal questions 
Was any reference 
made to age-related 
preferences? 
Yes – no evidence that age is a 
motivating factor for choosing to 
treat end of life patient 
Yes – no evidence that age is a 
motivating factor for choosing to 
treat end of life patient 
No – age attribute was purposely 
omitted 
Yes – evidence that age is a 
motivating factor for choosing to 
treat end of life patient 
Was any reference 
made to time-related 
preferences? 
Yes – one task involved choosing 
between a patient who had 
known their prognosis for some 
time and another who had only 
just learned their prognosis (life 
expectancy without treatment 
was the same for both) 
Yes – one task involved choosing 
between a patient who had known 
their prognosis for some time and 
another who had only just learned 
their prognosis (life expectancy 
without treatment was the same 
for both) 
Yes – two tasks involved choosing 
between a patient who had 
known their prognosis for some 
time and another who had only 
just learned their prognosis  
Yes – one task involved choosing 
between a patient who had known 
their prognosis for some time and 
another who had only just learned 
their prognosis  
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